The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (67 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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a dunderhead for an ambassador, but lack of competence represents opportunities foregone to advance U.S. interests around the world.
Bush's nonambassadorial appointments were somewhat more kindly received. One Republican PAS, somewhat estranged from the administration, judged his colleagues as "not too bad," noting that he had nothing to compare them with, but, in any case, "It's not their competency I question, but their perspective." Others expressed appreciation for the skills of those PASs who had gotten their jobs because of their competence, not as political payoff.
Many PASs remarked on the very high level of cooperative relations among their colleagues, but noted also the competitiveness for resources, time, and turf that is everywhere apparent in politics. "I'm not possessive, but I protect my mandate," as one said. An outsider to Washington prior to his appointment, he was "bothered that government feeds on itself, with battles between and even within agencies." The lack of cooperation between agencies was particularly troubling for him because his agency was required by law to consult with other agencies but they had no limit on their response time. "Sometimes, it seems they don't understand we all work for the same government," he sighed.
One Democrat discussed the great lack of collegiality within her IRC. There were no policy discussions, no give-and-take, no mutual respect for the members, no teamwork. In her estimation, "Republicans don't value government, so they don't work hard to put the right people in the right jobs, so you end up with mediocre people in government."
Elliot L. Richardson, perhaps the quintessential in-and-outer, has served in numerous political positions since Eisenhower's administration. He observed that
the ethos of the Bush administration tended to be competitive. It bore earmarks of his experiences as captain of the Yale baseball team [viz., Bush Team 100]. It was a team orientation with an element of loyalty to the team captain. PASs reinforced the notion that they were Bush loyalists. How long they had been with Bush, if not determinative, was more relevant than in any previous administration.
One Republican discussed turf issues at his agency. He thought the other assistant secretaries (ASs) felt threatened by him, that he was trying to enlarge his area at their expense. "They operate out of the six-glass theory," he said. "All six ASs are represented by six glasses with the exact
 
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same water level-when any glass's level gets too high it has to be lowered until it's the same as the others."
Others confirmed what has been reported in the public administration literature, that the worst PASs were those coming directly from the business sector and, to a lesser extent, those from academia. "The business types don't understand how government works. They think government works like business and they can sit in their offices and issue orders and expect them to be obeyed."
Many PASs and careerists stated that the best PASs are those who have had previous government, particularly staff, experience. "Dick Cheney, for example, came originally as a horse holder and learned how the town functions," said one former appointee.
Charles Grizzle, former EPA assistant administrator for administration and resources management, saw commonalities among successful PASs: they are open-minded, willing to learn and trust, and they possess a sixth sense of when to delegate and when to make a decision oneself, noting the fine line between responsibility and authority. The unsuccessful PASs share commonalities as well. They
come in with an agenda; they want to accomplish one or two things. This is a fatal flaw. You have to deal with everything that's on your plate. You can't let everything else go in the name of agenda. PASs' principal task is to manage the organization they inherit. Stewards/managers will have a more lasting impact than cause-oriented PASs. Generalists/political animals (those who understand the political process) will have more success than the apolitical/technical people who don't have a feel for the political process or how the town or the country works.
Success can be measured by the degree of change in an agency, the number of programs scuttled, if there are no scathing IG or GAO reports, and if the PAS hasn't done anything to embarrass the administration. In other words, avoid real or trumped-up scandal, or even the appearance of scandal.
Connie Newman noted that the competence and self-confidence of the appointees influenced their willingness to ask questions and seek the counsel of careerists. Overall, Bush appointee competence was good, she felt, noting that there were few scandals in his administration and that those making the news (e.g., the savings and loans and HUD scandals) were "old scandals, hangovers from Ronald Reagan." This level of competence was related to the fact that "Bush and his people have been
 
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around before (as opposed to Carter and his neophytes in Washington), and they have the combination of skills that indicates they can operate in Washington." But there are three areas where appointees are most likely to get in troubleCongress, the media, and interest groups, she said.
Steven D. Potts, as director of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), personally signed off on all PASs before they went to the Senate. He was very impressed with the agency heads in his contacts with them regarding government standards. He felt that the emphasis the Bush administration placed on ethics in government at the beginning of the administration had borne fruit: "There has been no scandal of real significance, compared to other administrations."
7
One PAS, a former SES, spoke highly of the benefit to the country of requiring a Senate confirmation of appointees, feeling that it insured better quality. Along with many others, she observed that those PASs who came from government service tended generally to have the most success. However, she noted that they also tended to have the tougher confirmation trials because they had a reputation to defend. "If they have done
anything,
they have made enemies, particularly if they tried to change things. In confirmation your career is on the lineit's very public and partisan and
very
stressful."
She felt that political chiefs of staff and special assistants (NSESs and Schedule Cs) were more troublesome than PASs because, while they had not had the public exposure of a confirmation, they did have the power of a high-level position. "They are the right-hand person, the closest aide to the secretary who tries to push around and dominate the PAS structure and operate ruthlessly with the careerists. They aren't in charge of any line operations, serve their principal only and have personal loyalty only and no institutional loyalty."
Some had horror stories to tell about appointees in the Reagan administrations. Deborah Gore Dean, for example, a Georgetown socialite and bartender trying to grow her own business, became Samuel Pierce's assistant in HUD. Their scandals still reverberate in the halls of HUD and in the newspapers. Although Pierce escaped indictment, if not suspicion, Dean was convicted in late October 1993 on charges of using her job to funnel federal money to Republican insiders, friends, and Nixon's former attorney general, John N. Mitchell, her mother's companion.
The Civil Rights Commission was taken over by politicals during the Reagan era, completely changing its character. Its general counsel, a twenty-seven-year-old lawyer with a tax law background and no experience in supervision or civil rights law, headed an office of thirty-five lawyers, "a set-up not all that rare during the Reagan years," said one careerist.

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