 | | some Independents to lean in a Republican direction (or through some combination of these), the administrative presidency was to achieve among Independent bureaucrats a level of support for the Republican party much greater than before. (Ibid., 407-08)
|
Reagan was to be even more aggressive in promoting Republican partisans, as discussed below.
|
This study carries key implications for partisans of the strong presidency: bureaucrats identifying themselves as Independent tend to favor presidential programs. This is a particularly important finding, as studies have found 36 percent to 44 percent of the senior careerists identifying themselves as Independent. Therefore, "Independents and party identifiers combined assure either a Republican or a Democratic president substantial support at the senior career levels of the federal bureaucracy" (ibid., 412).
|
Additionally, "the 'pull' of the presidency [is] strong" regardless of party identification. By 1976, substantial proportions of Democrats also identified with Nixon's programs. Thus, "bureaucratic accommodation" will lend presidents considerable success, even among bureaucrats of the opposing party, despite the relatively few vacancies at their disposal in any given administration (ibid., 412). This "cycle of accommodation" is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
|
Quoting Aberbach and Rockman, Cole and Caputo conclude:
|
| | "The framers of the Constitution, having given us little guidance (in the area of bureaucratic control and responsibility), have left these problems as part of their enduring legacy." Yet, lacking constitutional directives we find that political realities provide considerable relief. The influence of the president is so strong as to sway even protected career service personnel. While maintaining its formal independence (and perhaps even basic philosophic differences), the bureaucracy still responds to specific presidential initiatives. To this extent a certain degree of presidential control is accomplished even in the absence of a clear constitutional directive. (ibid., 412-13)
|
Political Costs of Nixon's Administrative Strategy
|
The successes of Nixon's administrative strategy were not unalloyed, of course. During his first term it became obvious that Ehrlichman's counterbureaucracy strategy was a failure. According to Nathan,
|
| | as the White House became more and more involved in routine adminis-
|
|
