The Road to Berlin (113 page)

Although the General Staff specified an offensive involving three fronts, the commander of the third front—2nd Belorussian—did not take part in this conference. The
Stavka
merely sent Rokossovskii at 2nd Belorussian Front a warning order to begin an urgent regrouping of his forces, the four rifle armies, three tank and one mechanized corps as well as the reinforcements deployed in the Stettin area, in order to facilitate a change of sectors with Zhukov’s right flank; this would have to be carried through no later than 15–18 April. Following Stalin’s original directive that the 1st Belorussian Front should play a decisive part in the capture of Berlin, the
Stavka
intended to reduce Zhukov’s frontage by at least 100 miles. This would enable him to concentrate his main assault force as Rokossovskii took over the sector running from Kolberg to Schwedt; the boundary line between the fronts (1st and 2nd Belorussian) now ran through Schneidemühl–Arnswalde–Pyritz–Schwedt–Angermunde–Wittenberg.

This relatively brief instruction from the
Stavka
, when translated into action, thrust Rokossovskii into intense and complicated activity. His Front, so recently advancing to the east, now had to swing westwards and traverse almost 200 miles of devastated countryside, villages still aflame, towns blocked and river crossings impassable. Trains could only proceed at a snail’s pace, even if the rolling stock could be assembled. The tanks would have to go by rail, but other formations took to the roads using lorries and horses; 49th and 70th Armies received the first orders to redeploy, followed by Batov’s 65th and Fedyuninskii’s 2nd Shock Armies, with 5th Tank Army taking up Fedyuninskii’s positions. Lorries carrying troops, ammunition and food, and towing regimental artillery, moved by day and night; rifle units also followed on foot, walking arsenals with riflemen festooned with machine-pistols, ammunition, grenades, fighting knives, a pouch with dry rations—all at a pace of twenty or so miles a day. The loot also went on the lorries.

Stalin signed Zhukov’s operational directive on 1 April. Koniev received his signed orders the next day, stipulating that the main task of 1st Ukrainian Front was to destroy enemy forces in the Cottbus area and to the south of Berlin, with the principal assault aimed along the Spremberg–Belzig axis; Koniev’s two tank armies might be swung on Berlin, but only after they had passed Lübben. Though drafted, the directive to Rokossovskii was not issued until 6 April; Rokossovskii would not participate directly in the capture of Berlin, but 2nd Belorussian Front would attack in a westerly direction towards Berlin, destroying German forces at Stettin and securing the whole Berlin operation on this northerly sector. The attack plan specified that 2nd Belorussian—once regrouped—would force the Oder north of Schwedt, destroy the Third
Panzer
Army and seal its escape route in the direction of Berlin. Having thus secured Zhukov’s assault from the north, Rokossovskii would drive west and north-west to reach the Anklam–Pritzwalk–Wittenberg line not later than the 12th-15th day of operations. The main attack would be mounted with three rifle armies, three tank corps and a mechanized corps from the area north of Schwedt, aimed at Neustrelitz.

Complete now in every detail, including regrouping and reinforcement, the main Soviet plan committed three Fronts to action on ‘the Berlin axis’, mounting six powerful attacks designed to break through the German defences on a wide front in order to split the defending forces and destroy them piecemeal. The encirclement of the German forces committed directly to the defence of Berlin—Ninth Army and Fourth
Panzer
—would be accomplished by the right-flank operations of 1st Belorussian Front, outflanking Berlin from the north and north-west, while right-flank formations of 1st Ukrainian Front outflanked the city from the south and south-west. The splitting of the encircled defenders into two isolated groups would be carried out by Zhukov’s left-flank armies attacking towards the southern suburbs of Berlin and Brandenburg; if successful, this manoeuvre would greatly facilitate the task of capturing Berlin itself, for the bulk of the defending force—Ninth Army—would be isolated from the fighting for the city. The 2nd Belorussian Front, operating to the north of Berlin and advancing on western and north-western axes with its left-flank formations, would engage Third
Panzer
Army and push the German defence north of the city back to the sea. Third
Panzer
would be cut off from Berlin and its escape route to the Elbe would also be severed.

In spite of their brave bold words to Stalin and the
Stavka
, both Zhukov and Koniev could only reel privately at the enormity of their tasks—not the actual operations but the logistical effort. Stalin had already prodded Koniev about his present deployment: two armies—the 28th and 31st from 3rd Belorussian Front—were earmarked as reinforcement for Koniev, but they had a long way to travel and could not possibly arrive in time for the opening of the attack. Koniev could only propose that he would launch his offensive without this reinforcement, a suggestion which Stalin approved, assigning 16 April as ‘D-Day, H-hour’ for Koniev. Zhukov received Gorbatov’s 3rd Army as immediate
reinforcement, assigned to the 1st Belorussian Front’s second echelon with the forces operating along the main line of attack. A few days later Rokossovskii flew into Moscow to receive his briefing and his operational orders. Only after protracted argument did he succeed in having the date of his offensive operations fixed at 20 April, a plea supported by data showing that 2nd Belorussian Front had not yet completed the East Pomeranian operation, that it must now swing from east to west, redeploy across a couple of hundred miles and then prepare to force the lower reaches of the Oder. Four days at the very most was all that Rokossovskii could win by way of time; his urgent request for more lorries to speed his movement simply went unanswered.

Zhukov and Koniev left Moscow in aircraft which left within minutes of each other, both marshals bent on exploiting the limited time available to them. To save precious time Marshal Zhukov had already telephoned his Chief of Staff, Col.-Gen. M.S. Malinin, on the evening of 1 April, telling him that the main operational plan had been accepted more or less without change but ‘we haven’t much time’, hence Malinin must start things moving at once. Laid out on maps and seen from the air—Soviet aircraft flew six special reconnaissance missions to photograph the city and its defences—Berlin presented a formidable obstacle, 320 square miles of urban sprawl, a giant ‘hedgehog’ with a huge number of strong points provided by the substantial buildings as well as the underground facilities and installations which could be put to good use by the defenders. Improvised anti-tank barriers sprouted from the jumble of bomb-blasted concrete, rubble and abandoned vehicles, linking up the lakes and rivers which formed natural tank traps. Immediately ahead of Zhukov lay the Seelow Heights, two hundred feet high in places, with carefully prepared fortifications and German guns sited atop the plateau to cover all approaches, particularly the valley intersected with numerous streams and filled with soft ground.

Developing his original plan, Plan A, Zhukov worked on the details of the assault to be launched from the Küstrin bridgehead with six armies (four rifle armies and two tank armies), all with the aim of smashing in the German defence to the east of the capital and then embarking on the storming of the city itself. The three armies at the centre of the front in the Küstrin bridgehead—3rd and 5th Shock Army, with 8th Guards Army—received orders to break the German defences, open up a passage for the armour and by the sixth day of operations reach the eastern edge of the Havel lake in the Henningsdorf–Gatow sector; 47th Army was to outflank the city from the north-west, attacking towards Nauen–Rathenow and on the eleventh day of operations reach the area of Schönhausen on the river Elbe. The two tank armies were deployed with the main strike force, but Zhukov now planned to use them to outflank Berlin from the north and from the south—a change in the role of 1st Guards Tank Army which Stalin personally sanctioned; Katukov’s 1st Guards would now make a southerly swing rather than operating to the north with 2nd Guards Tank Army. Katukov’s tank army, together with Yushchuk’s 11th Tank Corps, received orders
to move into the breach opened by Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army, advance in the direction of Seelow-Karlshorst and on the second day after moving off seize the Köpenick–Friedrichshafen–Neuenhagen area; having outflanked the city from the south, 1st Guards Tank Army would then co-operate with 2nd Guards Tank Army in seizing the Charlottenburg area (in western Berlin) and Zehlendorf. Bogdanov with 2nd Guards Tank Army would exploit 5th Shock Army’s breakthrough, driving finally to the river Havel in the Oranienburg–Henningsdorf sector and then turning to the south to operate with 1st Guards Tank Army in reducing the north-western suburbs of the city.

Zhukov also planned two supporting attacks designed to cover his main striking force from the north and the south. Two armies, 61st and 1st Polish Army, would mount the northerly attack to sweep to the north-west across Liebenwalde and thence to the Elbe on the eleventh day of operations. The second attack, launched by 69th and 33rd Armies, would sweep in from the south driving in the general direction of Fürstenwalde–Potsdam–Brandenburg; these two armies received orders to break the German defence in the Frankfurt area and drive to the southern and south-western suburbs of Berlin, thus completely isolating the German Ninth Army. Gorbatov’s 3rd Army, furnished as reinforcement, would be committed along the line of the main attack, operating as the Front second echelon.

With his Front not as favourably inclined to the ‘Berlin axis’, Marshal Koniev faced some complex planning problems, to which was added the complication of incorporating Stalin’s suggested ‘variant’—moving the tank armies into the battle for Berlin. On closer inspection of the situation, Koniev began to realize that his position was far from unpromising: if he planned
from the outset
to include the ‘manoeuvre’ which would bring him to Berlin into his operational plan and aimed for a rapid breakthrough, his right-flank forces could be committed to the Berlin operation. After all, this was in full conformity with the
Stavka’s
own appreciation of the possible turn of events. Accordingly, Koniev pinpointed the force to accomplish this—a reinforced tank corps from 3rd Guards Tank Army and a rifle division from 3rd Guards Army. With that fixed in his mind’s eye, Koniev could proceed to plan the whole operation. He intended to launch his main attack with five armies (three rifle, two tank: 3rd Guards, 13th and 5th Guards Army, 3rd and 4th Tank Army) from Triebel in the direction of Spremberg–Belzig in order to destroy German forces in the Cottbus area and to the south of Berlin; Koniev planned to break through to the Beelitz–Wittenberg line by the 10th-12th day of operations and then push on to the river Elbe as far as Dresden. The main striking force received specific orders to break through the entire German tactical defence in the Forst–Muskau sector by the second day and drive for the river Spree.

Once on the Spree, both tank armies would go into action, Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army under orders to move through the breach opened by 3rd Guards Army, south of Cottbus, and drive on Luckenwalde, seizing the Trebbin–Treuenbritzen–Luckenwalde
area by the fifth day and using reinforced lead elements to take Brandenburg on the sixth day. Rybalko should also ‘bear in mind’ the possibility of attacking Berlin itself with a tank corps and a rifle corps. Also jumping off from the Spree, Lelyushenko’s 4th Guards Tank Army would drive with all speed towards Schlieben, invest the whole Finsterwalde area by the third day, seize the Niemegk–Wittenberg–Arsndorf line by the fifth day, and on the sixth day capture Rathenow and Dessau with reinforced lead elements. Operating at the centre of the Front, it seemed that Lelyushenko must cover a lot of ground, but having passed through 5th Guards Army he would then be swinging north-west, as indeed would the entire Front once the breakthrough was accomplished. Finally, to screen his main assault force, Koniev planned a supporting attack with 2nd Polish Army and right-flank divisions of 52nd Army, an attack aimed in the general direction of Dresden.

Losing no time, Zhukov set about preparing his army commanders for the attack. The Front command held two days of special briefings and exercises between 5–7 April, using for this purpose a huge scale model of Berlin and its suburbs. According to Soviet intelligence, straddling the route from Küstrin to Berlin the German command had constructed five defence lines, which beyond Miincheberg linked up with the three defence belts covering Berlin; German reserves were on the move, concentrating principally against 1st Belorussian Front and its Oder bridgeheads. Zhukov also knew that he would have to launch his attack without Rokossovskii providing cover from the north in the opening stages of the offensive—but no one could wait. He was also still in the process of recovering his two tank armies from East Pomerania, adding to the supply and movement difficulties which beset his Front.

The main problem, however, centred on the organization of the attack. To attain maximum shock power, Zhukov decided this time on a night attack, to jump off two hours before dawn and to light the German positions with no less than 143 searchlights providing artificial moonlight to illuminate the battlefield and confuse the defenders. (To test this idea, searchlights were used against Soviet troops and seemed to blind or daze them effectively.) But ahead of Zhukov, rising out of the sandy ground some five miles or so behind the forward German positions, lay the Seelow Heights, heavily invested by the German defenders. How should the two tank armies be best employed in view of this barrier? Tactical exercises showed clearly that the tanks should go in only when the heights had been captured—but in the event that the initial attack did not pierce the enemy positions quickly enough, the tanks must move at once and ‘rip the defences wide open’. Zhukov accordingly decided upon an adjustment to the
Stavka
plan, which specified using both tank armies in a northerly outflanking drive: he now planned to deploy Katukov’s 1st Guards Tank Army directly behind Chuikov’s 8th Guards riflemen, so that both armies could go into action together should the need arise. Stalin agreed upon this change without argument, though it proved to be not the happiest of solutions.