The Road to Berlin (110 page)

The
Stavka
meanwhile stared long and hard at the hundred-mile gap opening up between Zhukov’s right flank and Rokossovskii’s 2nd Belorussian Front, concentrating its gaze on East Pomerania which hung menacingly over 1st Belorussian Front. To the rear lay two considerable bodies of German troops
surrounded in East Prussia and Courland, their land links with the
Reich
cut. Seen from Moscow, Zhukov’s open flank was no simple ‘visual’ phenomenon derived from General Staff maps but a dangerous gap filling at an alarming rate with German divisions, thirty-three of which were piling up in Pomerania and only thirteen diverted to the ‘Berlin axis’ itself. The buffeting which Soviet divisions suffered early in February was real enough—the air attacks came from the fighters Hitler ordered eastwards (and at Hitler’s insistence German fighters had in most cases been designed to carry a bombload).
AA
guns were rushed to the Oder to provide some anti-tank defence, though this meant stripping German cities of protection as Anglo–American bombing raids increased in intensity, striking harder at Germany’s rail communications. Fierce though that onslaught was, Hitler derived some phantasmagorial comfort from such a shift in targets when
Luftwaffe
intelligence presented him with the intercept of an American directive issued late in January, prescribing these air attacks apparently to assist the Soviet advance but in reality aimed at slowing it down. Himmler, whose jellied military nerve gave way so often, also began to speak of a miracle, as the impetus of the Soviet attack on the Oder began to die away. The highway of ice, too, would soon be gone.

Guderian pressed repeatedly for a major and timely German counter-stroke from the Glogau–Kottbus area and from Pomerania across the Oder to strike at the weakened Soviet lead armies. Hitler showed himself remarkably reluctant to consider this plan and persisted with the transfer of Sixth
SS Panzer
Army to Hungary, thus not only removing it from a decisive axis but also rendering it useless until its extensive movement was done. Guderian pleaded for the evacuation of German troops from Courland, locked up to no purpose, together with the transfer of German forces from Italy, Norway and the Balkans, all to build up effective counter-attack forces. Hitler rejected these proposals out of hand and in a wild meeting full of tempestuous tantrum—with Himmler’s dismal military competence dredged up in front of him—the
Führer
clung to his refusal to move one man or a single gun from Courland and reduced Guderian’s plans to a limited attack from the Stargard area to strike at the Soviet forces north of the Warthe and thus hold Pomerania in German hands. To the accompaniment of more frantic screaming Hitler gave his permission for this counter-stroke to be launched in a few days and for General Wenck, Guderian’s own deputy, to be attached to Himmler’s
HQ
as a guarantee of sensible military leadership.

Guderian was right to press for an immediate German counter-attack. Time had almost run out. On 10 February, the day on which Hitler held his hysterical meeting with Guderian and Himmler, two Soviet fronts—2nd and 3rd Belorussian—launched fresh attacks conforming to the revised operational orders issued by the
Stavka
on 8 February. Rokossovskii’s 2nd Belorussian Front received orders to destroy German forces in East Pomerania, launching an offensive with left-flank and centre formations to reach a line running from the mouth of the Vistula to Dirchau–Rummelsburg–Neustettin by 20 February, thereafter
using 19th Army to drive straight on Stettin, and with right-flank formations to capture Danzig and Gdynia, as well as clearing the Baltic coast from Frisches Haff in the east to the Pomeranian bight in the west. On 9 February the
Stavka
instructed 3rd Belorussian Front to speed up and accomplish the destruction of the Fourth German Army in East Prussia not later than 20–25 February, thus eliminating the ‘Heilsberg group’ south of Königsberg.

The very heavy fighting in East Prussia and the battles to reduce German strongholds wrought a certain havoc with Soviet timetables. At the beginning of February the
Stavka
decided to turn the Soviet Baltic Fronts to the defensive; with Stalin and Antonov on their way to the Yalta conference, Marshal Vasilevskii resumed his duties as Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Defence Commissar, handing over the co-ordination of the Baltic Front operations to L.A. Govorov, commander of the Leningrad Front. The
Stavka
also set in motion an intensive military shunting operation, regrouping 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts together with the Baltic Fronts. On 6 February on
Stavka
instructions, 2nd Baltic Front took over the forces operating with 1st Baltic, whose command received three armies (43rd, 39th and 11th Guards) from 3rd Belorussian Front. To compensate, Chernyakhovskii at 3rd Belorussian Front acquired three armies (including 5th Guards Tank Army) and one tank corps (the 8th) from Rokossovskii. The intention behind this extensive reshuffle of armies and commands was to free Rokossovskii entirely for operations in East Pomerania, while Chernyakhovskii’s 3rd Belorussian Front and Bagramyan’s 1st Baltic Front went about clearing East Prussia, Chernyakhovskii destroying the German Fourth Army south of Frisches Haff and Bagramyan reducing Königsberg itself and German troops in Samland. Simultaneously, 3rd Air Army received orders to move up to Insterburg. Marshal Vasilevskii himself, having received Stalin’s authorization by telephone from Yalta, informed Rokossovskii on 8 February about his new operational assignment. In this complicated fashion the
Stavka
set about wrenching these several Soviet fronts back to their main axes of advance and thus eliminating growing deviations from the original master plan.

Vasilevskii’s instructions placed Rokossovskii in an unenviable position: his operational responsibilities were reduced, with Chernyakhovskii taking over operations in East Prussia, but half of his fighting strength went to Chernyakhovskii. Now, without halt or pause, he faced a new offensive operation, with forty-five rifle divisions of 2nd Belorussian Front facing thirteen German infantry divisions, two
Panzer
divisions and the several battle groups of the German Second Army. Rokossovskii at once requested reinforcement, receiving the promise of 19th Army (presently deployed near Torun) and one tank corps. Meanwhile Zhukov at 1st Belorussian Front proposed to continue with his preparations for the main attack on Berlin, leaving only light forces facing East Pomerania; by 12–13 February the beleaguered German garrisons at Schneidemühl, Deutsche Krone and Arnswalde should have been eliminated, right-flank formations on 1st Belorussian Front
would move to the Stargard–Falkenburg line and then leave defensive forces in position while Front regrouping continued.

Attacking simultaneously on 10 February, neither Rokossovskii nor Chernyakhovskii achieved any substantial result. Rokossovskii’s left-flank 70th Army made some progress, but on his right encircled German garrisons still snagged Soviet armies, or else, like 2nd Shock Army, they were on the move to new positions, struggling at the same time with the ice-laden Vistula. In five days Batov’s 65th Army and the 49th Army covered only ten miles at the centre of 2nd Belorussian Front, grappling with fierce German resistance and struggling with the mud and flooded ground. Further to the east Chernyakhovskii with sixty-three divisions (four rifle armies reinforced by three transferred from Rokossovskii and one tank army, 5th Guards) planned concentric attacks to reduce the ‘Heilsberg group’, ordering Volskii’s tank army to isolate German forces from Frisches Haff and prevent any attempted evacuation in the direction of Frische–Nehring. Two air armies—1st and 3rd—supported by naval aircraft from the Baltic Fleet pounded away at the German defences, but stubborn resistance from well-prepared defences slowed the Soviet advance to a painful and bloody crawl covering less than a mile a day. Bagramyan also hammered in vain and at much cost at the approaches to Königsberg.

The situation was beginning to deteriorate sharply. On his right flank Zhukov now faced stronger German attacks merging into a powerful counterstroke launched by Third
Panzer
Army on 15 February, an attack supervised by Guderian’s own man, Wenck. German troops succeeded in piercing the Soviet blockade of Arnswalde, releasing the German garrison and then slicing into Bogdanov’s 2nd Tank Army to the south, recapturing Pyritz. However, Zhukov considered that his right-flank armies were strong enough to hold off this German thrust and also to help Rokossovskii’s attack. Fate came unexpectedly to Zhukov’s aid when Wenck, driving back from the
Führer’s
evening briefing on 17 February took the wheel of his staff car from a tired driver and then crashed into a bridge parapet; with Wenck incapacitated, the German attack sputtered out. Rokossovskii, for his part, had already talked to Vasilevskii on 15 February about modifying his attack plans, proposing that the scale of the offensive be reduced and replacing frontal attack with a manoeuvre to squeeze the German Second Army to the sea. Two days later Zhukov added his own views, suggesting that his right-flank armies mount their own attack on 19 February in the direction of Stettin, with 2nd Guards Tank Army, 61st Army and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps carrying through this stroke, supported by 3rd Shock Army and the 1st Polish Army.

The following day, 18 February, Stalin consulted Vasilevskii about the situation in East Prussia, suggesting that Vasilevskii proceed to the front to lend his assistance to 1st Belorussian and 1st Baltic Front commanders. Stalin explained that these forces would be needed to reinforce the main strike force for the attack on Berlin, but, equally important, he wanted to know what forces could be released for transfer to the Far East. Vasilevskii learned that Stalin wanted two
or three of the best armies pinpointed for the move to the Far East—where, Stalin continued, Vasilevskii himself would most likely be going to direct operations, roughly two or three months after the German surrender. Vasilevskii then asked to be relieved of his post as Chief of the General Staff, which Antonov presently discharged in all but formal rank. Stalin approved, leaving Vasilevskii his official post as Deputy Defence Commissar and signed the
Stavka
directive covering the ‘co-ordination’ of 1st Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts. Within hours Vasilevskii received an urgent summons to report to Stalin once again. The youngest Front commander in the Red Army, General Chernyakhovskii, had just died of wounds at Mehlsack in East Prussia. Stalin signed the
Stavka
order appointing Vasilevskii Front commander to replace this brilliant young general; on the evening of 19 February Stalin gave Vasilevskii his orders, some advice and his best wishes. Poskrebyshev gave Vasilevskii another document, containing a revised version of the GKO decree of 10 July 1941 appointing members of the
Stavka
. Vasilevskii had never been an official member of the
Stavka
but this revision of the decree duly nominated him; Zhukov alone of Front commanders served on the
Stavka
and Vasilevskii asked Poskrebyshev just what this new move meant. All he got by way of reply was a smile and the remark that Vasilevskii knew as much as anyone else.

As Vasilevskii took over his operational command, Zhukov tried to launch his right-flank attack. Two Soviet corps began to encircle Arnswalde once again and the 311th Rifle Division fought hand-to-hand actions in the town itself, but if German troops here were falling back to the north-east and the north-west, Bogdanov’s 2nd Guards Tank Army could not turn to the attack since this formation was still fighting off German assaults. Zhukov pulled all these units over to the defensive. The
Stavka
, however, had other ideas. Between 17 and 22 February fresh orders went out to both Rokossovskii and Zhukov, prescribing a joint attack on East Pomerania with the flanks of 1st and 2nd Belorussian Front locked. The new offensive was aimed in the general direction of Kolberg, striking from the south towards the north and bringing both fronts to the Baltic coast, first slicing the German forces in two and isolating them from the main body of German troops. Once on the Baltic, Rokossovskii would turn east and seize both Danzig and Gdynia; Zhukov’s right-flank armies were charged with developing a high-speed offensive in the direction of Kolberg, breaking out to the Baltic and clearing the western region of Pomerania, as well as investing the western bank of the Oder.
Stavka
orders fixed 24 February as the date for Rokossovskii’s offensive and 1 March as the latest date for Zhukov to open his attack, though he should move off when 19th Army on 2nd Belorussian Front reached the Baldenburg–Neustettin line. Vasilevskii with 3rd Belorussian Front was instructed to move his left flank towards the gulf of Danzig to the east of the Vistula and block an enemy escape from Frische Nehring; this gave Rokossovskii the chance to use Fedyuninskii’s 2nd Shock Army in his main assault force, rather than holding it back.

On the morning of 24 February, after a thirty-minute artillery barrage, Rokossovskii launched his new offensive, designed to exploit manoeuvre—his true
métier
. In two days 2nd Belorussian Front ripped a 35-mile gap in the German defences and penetrated to a depth of thirty miles. The infantry needed tank support and Rokossovskii decided to commit 3rd Tank Corps ahead of schedule. Unfortunately 19th Army lagged behind, failing to take advantage of the situation created by the advancing armour. With Stalin’s permission, Rokossovskii removed the commander, G.A. Kozlov, and replaced him with V.Z. Romanovskii. This, however, was the least of Rokossovskii’s worries: his left-flank formations were advancing slowly, moving across marshy ground towards the coast, but the Front lacked any reserves to supplement this thrust. This nervousness at the lack of any Front reserve increased as Rokossovskii watched his left flank being uncovered since Zhukov had not budged. On being told of this situation Stalin asked Rokossovskii if Zhukov was ‘up to something’? Rokossovskii denied this but stressed the danger to his left flank, whereupon Stalin promised to jog Zhukov’s elbow. Meanwhile Rokossovskii would have to take Neustettin on his own.