The Road to Berlin (37 page)

As Soviet and German troops began fighting what became the appalling battle for the Korsun salient, amidst the mud and sleet of a winter already on the wane in the southern theatre, Soviet operations at the other end of the front, in the north, were already reaching their first critical phase.

The Leningrad battlefront, with its entrenchments, wire, fortification, fixed defences, emplacements and all the gear of positional warfare, looked like something from the First World War. German long-range and medium guns, seventy batteries north of Krasnoe Selo and another seventy in the ‘Mga group’, kept the city under steady bombardment, hurting Leningrad day by day. The trams scuttled out of the firing zone as best they could, and shells smashed into buildings or cascaded into the Neva as German and Soviet gunners waged the longest artillery duel in history. In 1943 the 3rd Leningrad Counter–Battery Artillery Corps, 195 guns including the 356mm naval guns, brought all five Soviet artillery concentrations under its control. Sound-detectors, aerial reconnaissance, ground-spotters, balloons, mobile railway guns, deeply emplaced heavy guns—all made their contribution of pinpointing and hitting German batteries. Life had become less nightmarish since the piercing of the tight blockade in January 1943, but it remained dangerous, cramped and hard—900 days of sudden or lingering death, unbroken privation and unending work. An oil pipeline had been laid into the city; the railway line opened in 1943 and running along its narrow corridor raked by German guns brought in fuel and essential supplies along the southern shore of lake Ladoga;
more factories started up production and fewer people dropped dead from hunger.

Field-Marshal Küchler’s Army Group North clamped the blockade on Leningrad, the Eighteenth Army holding the ring round the city and a line running south to lake Ilmen, while southwards the Sixteenth Army held a line running along the river Lovat. The German northern group also kept the lid on the Baltic states, helped to hold Finland in the German orbit and trusted to its extensive fixed defences. The German command had steadily thinned the army group, drawing off men and equipment for other fronts and replacing first-line divisions with units of lower calibre and
Luftwaffe
field divisions. Two other defence lines covered a third defensive zone, which in turn protected a rear defence line; the ‘Panther line’ ran from Pskov to Ostrov. On the centre and left of the Soviet Volkhov Front, German troops set up defence lines on the western bank of the river Volkhov (where Soviet troops had a small bridgehead); lake Ilmen covered Novgorod on the right flank. The grip of winter was much fiercer here, but once again in 1943–4 the climate played tricks—the autumn dragged on, December was rainy. Milder temperatures brought sudden thaws, the ice on rivers and lakes could take the weight of lorries and light guns but not tanks. The marshes of the Volkhov failed to freeze solid.

After a burst of fierce fighting in September 1943 to take the Sinyavino heights, the Leningrad command set about preparing plans to lift the blockade completely, submitting a general outline of its assessment to the
Stavka:

In connection with the general situation, the Military Soviet of the Leningrad Front considers it timely to raise the question of the destruction of 18 Army, the basic force on the northern wing of the Eastern Front, and not only to free Leningrad completely but also to capture the Luga bridgehead with an advance to the line of the river Luga from the mouth of the river to the town of Luga, a prerequisite for further operations in the Baltic area. [S.P. Platonov,
Bitva za Leningrad
, 1964, p. 300.]

The Leningrad command considered the Eighteenth Army to be on the brink of disaster, deprived as it was of operational reserves. At the end of September, at a session of the full Leningrad command, Lt.-Gen. D.N. Gusev (chief of staff, Leningrad Front) laid out the new attack plan: a concentric attack was to be made from the Oranienbaum bridgehead and from the Pulkovo heights to trap the German forces in the Peterhof–Strelna area, the two Soviet forces linking up at Ropsha, after which the Soviet offensive would develop towards Kingisepp and Krasnogvardeisk. The larger offensive design envisaged a northern attack on the Leningrad–Krasnogvardeisk–Kingisepp axis and an attack from the south-east towards Chudovo–Novgorod–Luga to cut the communications of Army Group North. The change in plans, compared with previous break-out attempts, was a radical one; previously all attacks had been made in an easterly direction from the left flank of the Leningrad Front against the Schlusselburg–Sinyavino group of Eighteenth Army. The weight of the new attack would come on the
right flank from Oranienbaum–Pulkovo, with the thrust going south to link up with the Volkhov and 2nd Baltic Fronts.

The
Stavka
indicated its general approval for these plans but advised Govorov in Leningrad and Meretskov on the Volkhov to hold themselves ready for a possible German withdrawal. Govorov at his September staff conference had made the same point, that Army Group North might pull back from Leningrad and Novgorod; Front intelligence had learned of extensive German construction work on all the river lines—Mshaga, Plius, Narva, Velikaya—mainly field fortifications and minefields, with all approach bridges destroyed. For this contingency—a German withdrawal—Govorov drew up the operational plan
Neva 1
, and for a break-out operation,
Neva 2
. The
Stavka
meanwhile issued orders that no front must attempt a break-out without permission. And one very significant change it did institute in Govorov’s attack plan, ordering 2nd Shock Army to move into the Oranienbaum bridgehead. This bridgehead was a narrow strip of coast, some twenty miles long and twelve deep, which was a remnant of the disastrous days of 1941 and the grim days of Eighth Army: the bridgehead was cut off from Leningrad but lay within range and under the protection of Soviet long-range guns at Kronstadt. Three divisions and three brigades of the Coastal Operational Group
(POG: Primorskaya Operativnaya Gruppa)
held Oranienbaum, in which the Germans had been largely disinterested. Now Govorov planned to bring one hook out of the bridgehead, the other from the southern outskirts of Leningrad, where Col.-Gen. Maslennikov’s 42nd Army would attack. Planning proceeded on the basis of
Neva 2
, a break-out; as a result of the
Stavka’s
instruction, a fantastic amount of work had to be put in hand to shift 2nd Shock Army from Sinyavino in the east right round to the western Oranienbaum bridgehead.

The overall Soviet offensive involved three fronts, Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic, now under the command of General M.M. Popov. After crushing in the flanks of Eighteenth Army, Soviet thrusts on Luga would trap the main German force and bring the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts to a junction at Luga and on to the line of the river Luga. Having knocked out the Eighteenth, the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic Fronts would eliminate the German Sixteenth Army by striking for Narva, Pskov and Idritsa, thus freeing the whole of the Leningrad
oblast
as well as positioning themselves for a general offensive against the Baltic states. On the Leningrad Front Govorov planned a main and a subsidiary attack; the 2nd Shock Army, moving out of the Oranienbaum bridgehead, and 42nd Army, striking from inside the Leningrad perimeter at Pulkovo, would link up at Ropsha, eliminate the German forces in the Peterhof area and then advance on Kingisepp and Krasnogvardeisk; to the east, 67th Army would mount a supporting attack in the direction of Mga. Meretskov on the Volkhov Front, the scene of so much frustration, agony and heartbreak in the past, proposed to use the Soviet bridgehead on the western bank of the Volkhov and 59th Army for the main attack north and south of Novgorod: on the left flank two armies (8th
and 54th) would attack in the direction of Tosno–Lyuban–Chudovo to pin down German troops that might otherwise move up to Novgorod. Once the Novgorod group had been encircled, Volkhov Front units would make for Luga, advance to the Luga–Utorgosh line and cut the German escape route to Pskov. General Popov on the 2nd Baltic Front intended to attack on his left to seize the Pustoshka–Idritsa area followed by a drive on Opochka–Sebezh.

Throughout November Soviet commanders began to mass their artillery, the instrument they would need most of all against the German defences. Dumps filled with ammunition, fuel, lubricants and food. On the Pulkovo Heights Govorov ordered a major concentration of artillery in 42nd Army area. In the autumn of 1941, when the German attack had been beaten off here, there had been eight guns per kilometre and never enough ammunition; now the attack plan called for 140 guns per kilometre. Elsewhere the terrain demanded as much engineering equipment as possible. Shifting 2nd Shock Army into the bridgehead at Oranienbaum, however, presented problems of great magnitude and complexity. It fell to the Baltic Fleet to get the men and equipment out of Leningrad by ship and ashore to the west, including two rifle corps, a tank brigade, artillery and all the assorted supplies. On 7 November a forward
HQ
party from 2nd Shock Army was landed on the bridgehead and took over from the Coastal Operational Group. For the rest of the month, motorized barges, small steamers and tugs towing barges and minesweepers with a covey of small craft steamed to the bridgehead under cover of darkness, speeding as best they could to remove every trace of barges, men and equipment from enemy sight by dawn. When the ice came to the gulf of Finland, the little ships gave way to fleet minesweepers and ice-breakers.

The miniature fleet sailed from the Neva bight, the Leningrad Naval Base command under Rear-Admiral I.D. Kuleshov and from Lisii Nos, a headland round the coast which came under the Kronstadt Naval Defence Zone (Rear-Admiral G.I. Levchenko). The tanks, self-propelled guns and heavy equipment loaded off the 300-yard piers built at Lisii Nos, though ice began to interfere with the later stages of this operation. Towards the end of December when the ice thickened, the second stage of the bridgehead build-up continued, with transport aircraft flying in corps staff and some artillery. The Russians did all they could to foster the idea that they were evacuating the bridgehead, but by January five rifle divisions (11th, 43rd, 90th, 131st and 196th)—44,000 men—with 600 guns of thirteen artillery regiments, a tank brigade with T-34 tanks, one tank regiment, two self-propelled gun regiments, 700 wagon-loads of ammunition and an assortment of supplies had been put down in thousands of nightly journeys. Towards the end of December, Fedyuninskii, hitherto in Rokossovskii’s command though an old ‘northern’ commander, arrived by minelayer on the bridgehead,
‘Malaya zemlya’
, the ‘little land’, where he took over 2nd Shock Army from a bitterly disappointed Romanovskii.

Between them the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts mustered some 375,000 men, upwards of 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns, 718 aircraft for tactical support as well as 192 aircraft from the Baltic Fleet and 330 bombers of Long Range Aviation. Govorov had 33 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades and Rybalchenko’s 13th Air Army; Meretskov, 22 rifle divisions, 6 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades and Zhuravlev’s 14th Air Army. Popov’s 2nd Baltic Front facing the Sixteenth Army numbered no less than 45 rifle divisions, 3 rifle and 4 tank brigades with 355 aircraft of Naumenko’s 15th Air Army for tactical support. On 11 January 1944 Govorov and Zhdanov held a final review of plans and preparations at a full session of the Front Military Soviet, attended by formation and arms commanders: Fedyuninskii’s attack from Oranienbaum was timed for 14 January, Maslennikov’s from Pulkovo for the following day.

During the night of 13–14 January heavy bombers of Long Range Aviation attacked the German artillery concentrations at Bezzabotny: only 109 bombers flew their sorties, bad weather grounding most of the eight bomber corps and one bomber division assigned to these attacks. With the dawn, the mist rolled more densely round Leningrad. On the Oranienbaum bridgehead nothing broke the stillness along the forward line. Fedyuninskii in his forward command post, 300 yards behind the assault units, was nevertheless astounded to hear a cock crow in a spot miles from any farm or village. The bird belonged to Colonel Yashchenko, 90th Rifle Division commander: if the cock crowed loudly, the riflemen said, it signalled a good day ahead. At 0935 hours a salvo of rockets opened the artillery preparation for the attack, 2nd Shock Army guns being joined by the long-range guns from the Kronstadt forts and the warships of the Baltic Fleet, 100,000 rounds loosed off in a 65-minute bombardment. As the bombardment ended, the first echelon of 2nd Shock Army moved forward in attack order; the regimental band of 286th Regiment, 90th Rifle Division, played its men into action. That first day, under a cloudy sky, in weather at first unseasonally warm and with slush underfoot, 2nd Shock Army ground its way forward for 3,000 yards on a five-mile front; 90th Division reached the second German defence line.

Only the sappers clearing mines in front of 42nd Army were happy with the mist that closed on Leningrad. To confuse the German command about the direction of the Soviet attack, the guns of 42nd and 67th Armies had joined the first bombardment. Govorov, who had flown into the bridgehead earlier, now insisted on flying back to Leningrad even though the weather had closed down; after much hazardous circling over an airfield, he finally landed. On Fedyuninskii’s front snow had begun to fall, while under cover of darkness Maslennikov’s assault divisions took up their final positions. When daylight came, fog hung everywhere, shrouding the army engineers up front but hampering the gunners. Nevertheless, promptly at 0920 hours on 15 January 3,000 guns and heavy mortars opened a massive bombardment of the German positions, firing off over 200,000 rounds in one hundred minutes. A good half of the heavier-calibre
guns fired at the German defences in the breakthrough sector were assigned to Maj.-Gen. Simonyak’s 30th Guards Corps (42nd Army). It was Simonyak’s Corps that made the best progress that first day, driving over 4,000 yards into the German trenches and pill-boxes. Fedyuninskii had resumed his attack at 11 am, but progress was so slow that Lt.-Gen. Gusev, Govorov’s chief of staff, flew out to the bridgehead to investigate; the infantry were having to fight it out at German strong-points without support from heavy weapons, the tanks having strayed into unreconnoitred minefields or become stuck in the snow. Maslennikov’s flank corps had meanwhile been badly knocked about and had made little progress.