The Road to Berlin (38 page)

On 17 January came the crisis as Fedyuninskii and Maslennikov chopped and hacked their way through the German defences, the infantry locked in hundreds of separate engagements, the tanks churning about in deep snow or labouring on narrow roads. German units pulled back out of the trap, blowing up the bridges on the Duderhof and the dam, flooding the area near Krasnoe Selo. Both Fedyuninskii and Maslennikov committed their second-echelon troops, and on the evening of 19 January forward armoured units of 2nd Shock and 42nd Armies linked up south-east of Ropsha. With the fall of Strelna, Russian troops captured the heavy gun batteries which only hours before had been shelling Leningrad—almost a hundred siege guns, pieces up to 400mm calibre, were taken. The cost, however, was great; regiments in 42nd Army dropped to two-battalion strength, battalions to two companies. The sapper battalions of the ‘assault-engineer sapper brigades’, fighting their close-range David and Goliath contests with the concrete forts, suffered dreadful losses. The entire situation, however, was transformed almost by the hour as 2nd Shock and 42nd Armies clubbed in the left flank of Eighteenth Army; 67th Army made ready to strike out on the Mga sector and Meretskov’s Volkhov Front armies lunged forward. Govorov now aligned 2nd Shock Army on Kingisepp, 42nd on Krasnogvardeisk and 67th on Ulyanov–Tosno. Lt.-Gen. Sviridov, 67th Army commander, was not to allow German units to pull back unmolested, but when on the night of 20–21 January the German withdrawal from Mga began, he let his chance slip. Govorov upbraided him fiercely, demanding that 67th catch up and pin the enemy.

Meretskov’s Volkhov Front had also gone over to the attack on 14 January, when Lt.-Gen. I.T. Korovnikov’s 59th Army tried to break through the German defences to the north of Novgorod. That first day the northerly attack made only 1,000 yards, but to the south of Novgorod the ‘southern group’ under Maj.-Gen. Sviklin crossed lake Ilmen screened by the dark and a driving snow-storm, seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Volkhov and by the evening was deep into the German defences. North and south of Novgorod Korovnikov committed more rifle divisions, strengthening the southern outflanking drive. While this heavy fighting continued amidst ice and deep snow, Meretskov ordered 54th Army on his right flank to attack towards Lyuban to prevent
German reinforcements being drawn off to Novgorod. Fresh German units had moved up from Mga, but by 18 January the threat of Soviet encirclement was very real. German troops were now pulling back from Novgorod to Batetskaya junction and Lyubolyada, though 59th Army had the one road to the west already within artillery range. Sviklin’s ‘southern group’ meanwhile cut the Novgorod–Shimsk road and the railway line. North of Novgorod 14th Rifle Corps stopped dead on 19 January, making preparations that evening to storm the city at first light, but bad reconnaissance and faulty intelligence failed to disclose that the enemy facing 14th Corps had melted away; when rifle units of 14th and 7th Corps entered Novgorod at 0930 on 20 January, except for a demolition squad left to blow the bridge over the Volkhov the city was bare of German troops.

Circling and harassing the retreating Germans were numerous partisan groups, whose activity had intensified as far back as November 1943, when their chief function was reconnaissance in the German rear. Partisan units blew up railway lines, attacked railway stations, fought their own local actions with German garrisons and liberated small townships or villages, holding them until the Red Army arrived on the scene. The 11th Partisan Brigade operated against German lines of communication in the Kingisepp sector, the 9th at Gdov—thirteen partisan brigades with a combined strength of 35,000 men were in action in January 1944. In view of the heavy losses the partisan movement and the underground at large had suffered in 1943 this was no small achievement. While a brigade normally mustered some hundreds of partisans, one or two—like Karitskii’s 5th Brigade—had a strength of 6,000. The main strength of the partisan movement was gathered in the Pskov area—at Gdov, at Luga and in the Novgorod region—where not long before German punitive detachments burned villages and shot local inhabitants in an effort to stamp out partisan activity. No less important in partisan operations was the rescue of civilians rounded up for deportation, lodged in some improvized concentration camp or even loaded on to trains.

By 20 January the double breakthrough was an accomplished fact. As 67th, 8th and 54th Armies were finally committed, the Soviet offensive was unfolding across a front running from the Gulf of Finland to lake Ilmen. As the first phase of the offensive drew to a close, Front commanders faced two problems: the first, to clear their operational plans for the next phase with the
Stavka;
the second, to eradicate the tactical deficiencies which slowed up progress and to shake up army and corps commanders who persisted with frontal attacks and used infantry for almost everything, leaving their armour or supporting artillery to idle on some road or track and too often failing to make adequate reconnaissance. On 22 January the
Stavka
approved Govorov’s fresh directives, to set 2nd Shock on the march to Volosovo–Kingisepp and to take the river Luga line (from the mouth to Kingisepp) by the end of the month, to swing 42nd south-west on to the Luga after the capure of Gatchina, to move 67th Army south and west
on Pushkino–Slutsk and Ulyanov–Tosno. Luga was the great prize, the vital junction in the rear of Eighteenth Army: to seize it would put the Red Army astride the escape route to the south-west. Meretskov had already submitted his proposals to the
Stavka
for committing 59th Army in a drive for Luga: 8th Army would clear the railway line between Tosno and Ushako, while 54th was to capture Lyuban. The
Stavka
authorized this plan and set 29–30 January as the date for the capture of Luga, 23–24 January for the clearing of Lyuban.

Divisions of the German Eighteenth Army no longer held a firm front; defensive actions centred on junctions, small towns, heights and the roads. Strong, skilful German rearguards deflected the Soviet advance wherever possible, a fighting retreat simplified by Soviet tactics. Fedyuninskii raged at his corps commanders in an order of 23 January for ‘marking time’—
toptatsya na meste
—in front of ‘insignificant enemy forces’ which covered the German withdrawal south and south-west. Maslennikov issued similar orders, complaining that corps commanders used neither their fire-power nor their reserves, that artillery and mortars were not even deployed, much less used. Govorov in his orders demanded the end of ‘linear tactics’, more manoeuvre and more fire-power. On Meretskov’s front, German rearguards, regiments covered by battalions, battalions by companies, fought in isolation or with the
Kampfgruppen
to hold up the Soviet drive to Luga and to keep escape routes open. From west to Novgorod 59th Army fought its way forward to Luga while Maj.-Gen. Roginskii’s 54th Army stormed Lyuban and blockaded the remaining German units in Chudovo, thereby relieving the pressure on 59th Army’s flank and clearing a whole stretch of the main Leningrad-Moscow railway. Like Govorov, Meretskov issued categorical instructions for energetic action—to outflank, to get into the German rear, if necessary to fight on inverted fronts, to keep corps and divisional
HQ
s well forward. On the right flank of 59th Army, 112th Corps struggled along the Novgorod–Batetskaya railway line, a battleground of bog where Soviet riflemen fought up to their knees in icy slush, manhandling guns when the artillery units failed to find a track or road. Korovnikov’s front widened continually; keeping four corps under control proved too difficult, whereupon Meretskov moved 8th Army
HQ
on to the right flank and gave it two corps from 59th, 7th and 14th. Both armies, 8th and 59th, were to co-operate in outflanking and capturing Luga.

Though the great encirclement failed to materialize, Leningrad was free on 26 January when the Moscow–Leningrad railway was cleared. The next day, with Stalin’s permission, the Leningrad Front Military Soviet issued an order of the day formally announcing the end of the blockade and that same evening Leningrad’s artillery—on ship and shore—fired off twenty-four salvoes in a victory salute. There was nothing grandiose in Leningrad saluting itself: it bought the right with its dead families, shattered buildings and emaciated survivors. Yet in the midst of jubilation, Eighteenth Army was fighting its way steadily out of the Soviet trap. On 29 January Stalin sent Meretskov an urgent signal, promising a reinforcement of 12,000–15,000 men and 130 tanks but demanding the capture
of Luga: ‘Don’t get tied down in fighting for Shimsk and Soltsy; this is not the main thing, merely screen yourself on this axis. The main thing is to take the town of Luga at all possible speed. After capturing Luga, deploy in two columns and go for Pskov’ (S.P. Platonov,
op. cit
., p. 379). Luga, however, did not fall on time. With troops pulled back from the Mga salient, from Novgorod, from Lyuban and with 12th
Panzer
Division moved up from Army Group Centre, Army Group North hung on to cover the Luga–Pskov road and railway line; the battle for Luga dragged on, ending only when Govorov swung 42nd and 67th Armies down from the north to threaten the German rear. On 12 February, 67th Army finally took Luga, and German units fell back to the south-west, towards Pskov, clinging grimly to the Luga–Pskov railway line. Fedyuninskii’s 2nd Shock Army had reached the river Narva north and south of Narva itself at the beginning of February: in the middle of the month the
Stavka
informed Govorov that ‘military and political requirements’ made the capture of Narva by 17 February mandatory, but the 2nd Shock Army now felt the impact of its losses, the effect of poor command at divisional and company level—a fact Fedyuninskii stressed in his report to the Front Military Soviet—and the limitations imposed by shortage of ammunition, especially for the heavier guns.

With the capture of Luga, the
Stavka
disbanded the Volkhov Front with its directive of 13 February; 59th, 8th and 54th Armies with the Front reserve (two divisions) came under Govorov’s command and 1st Shock Army, ‘loaned’ to Meretskov for operations against Staraya Russa, reverted to Popov’s 2nd Baltic Front. Throughout January, in God-forsaken country, 10th Guards and 22nd Army on Popov’s front struggled to capture the rail junction at Novosokolniki, but the pressure here on Sixteenth Army was never great enough to prevent Army Group North moving units northwards to block Meretskov. Towards the middle of February, as Govorov struck out for Narva and Pskov, the
Stavka
proposed to use 2nd Baltic Front in operations aimed at Ostrov, with Popov’s left flank—two armies, ‘a minimum of twenty divisions’—committed in the direction of Rezekne (Rezhitsa)-Karsave, orders for which were issued on 17 February. The danger to Sixteenth Army was growing, from Govorov in the north and from Popov in the south-east, two outflanking moves which the German command could no longer ignore. To escape Govorov’s flanking move in the north, German units at Staraya Russa began to pull back, a withdrawal that 1st Shock Army failed to discover for a couple of days. This blunder called down the wrath of the all-powerful State Defence Committee (the
GKO)
on Popov: so unsatisfactory was the performance of 2nd Baltic command deemed that the
GKO
issued its own special reprimand, more significant since Bulganin was the current third ‘political’ member of Popov’s Military Soviet and Mekhlis had been his immediate predecessor. Somewhat tardily 1st Shock Army set out in pursuit, advancing towards Dno and Dedovichi.

One by one the German bastions toppled, the scene of fierce fighting in the past—Staraya Russa, Kholm, Shimsk. But the fall of Narva, Pskov and Ostrov
proved for the moment, in spite of
Stavka
orders, beyond the Soviet troops. The Soviet offensive had nevertheless achieved its first objective, the elimination of Eighteenth Army south of lake Ladoga and on the eastern sector of the gulf of Finland. Leningrad was free, most of the Leningrad and Kalinin
oblasts
had been completely cleared, and Soviet troops were across the Estonian frontier. Behind them lay a trail of smashed towns, burned and blackened villages, and broken bridges; in front of them, the ‘Panther line’ upon which they were now closing. Ambitious plans for a rapid thrust into Estonia proved at this juncture too optimistic, a not-infrequent feature of
Stavka
directives, yet the Soviet victory was already bringing its political fall-out. With the left flank of Army Group North torn to shreds and the German hold on the northern theatre substantially, if not fatally, weakened, the warning lights began to flash for Finland. Pressure on Finland was no doubt part of the ‘political requirement’ brought to Govorov’s attention by the
Stavka
directive on the need to take Narva quickly. Nothing was lost upon the Finns, who had already begun to probe the Soviet attitude in contacts carefully picked out in Stockholm.

On the southerly face of the Korsun–Shevchenkovskii salient, with its blunt nose pressed up to the Dnieper, the flash and roar of a massive artillery barrage fired off at dawn on 24 January signalled the opening of the Soviet attack. General Koniev’s 2nd Ukrainian Front took the lead. By the evening of the first day, forward battalions of 4th Guards and 53rd Armies made, in places, up to three miles into the German positions: at dawn the next day the main body of the two infantry armies followed and at noon Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army, a crack armoured formation, moved into the attack, surging forward towards Shpola–Lebedin on the ‘base’ of the salient. Fighting towards the tanks and infantry of 2nd Ukrainian Front came the extreme left-flank armies of Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian, 27th, 40th and 6th Tank, developing their attack in the direction of Zvenigorodka.

Vatutin’s offensive began on 26 January with forty minutes of artillery fire, but it developed only slowly. The tank army in the lead was brand-new, Lt.-Gen. Kravchenko’s 6th, literally only a few days old; it was rushed at top speed into the battle for the Korsun salient, 160 tanks and 50
SP
guns, 2 corps (5th Guards Tank and 5th Mechanized), up to strength in men but well below the mark in trained crews. Marshal Zhukov and General Vatutin demanded speed above all things from Kravchenko, and when 27th Army broke through a little to the north, Vatutin ordered 6th Tank to move a mobile group into 27th Army area, outflank Vinograd and drive on Zvenigorodka. Maj.-Gen. Savelev, deputy commander of 5th Mechanized Corps, took command of this ‘mobile group’, 233rd Tank brigade, with some 50 tanks and 200 tommy-gunners. Savelev’s combat group cleared Lysanka late at night on 27 January and by the morning, in a burst of heavy fighting, worked its way into the north-western outskirts of
Zvenigorodka. German artillery fire in these actions killed Lt.-Gen. Shtevnev, 1st Ukrainian Front Armoured Forces commander, who with a group of officers from his ‘operational group’ followed in Savelev’s wake. Pushing on Zvenigorodka, Savelev’s tanks linked up with 20th Tank Corps from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. A thin outer encircling screen had been laid down and the internal encirclement solidified, shutting up the German divisions in Korsun; the outer encirclement was entrusted to 5th Guards and 6th Tank Army with their front facing south. From the inner front, Soviet units fought their way into the ‘pocket’, cutting and slicing it away. On the outer front the tank armies—reinforced with rifle divisions—had to hold off the clumps of
Panzer
divisions of General Hube’s relief force trying to batter their way in to free the trapped divisions. The snow blizzards came, mixed with rain and sleet. Short of lorries, Soviet infantry marched in the tracks of the tank columns. In the Korsun area, with seven infantry divisions, an
SS Panzer
division, a Belgian
SS
formation and a varied collection of auxiliary units compressed into a space at no point wider than twenty miles, the German defence was hurriedly and painfully improvized. Against the beleaguered Germans, General Koniev unleashed a savage, remorseless attack, bombing, shelling, hacking the defences to pieces. The ‘Free German Committee’ moved captured German generals down to fire off a propaganda barrage of its own, inciting desertion and appealing for surrender. The effort was quite futile.