The Road to Berlin (66 page)

By the end of October ‘Free Slovakia’ was almost obliterated. Himmler quickened the pace of the sadistic ‘pacification’ he was visiting upon the Slovaks. General Viest and General Golian, who attempted to make their escape by plane, saw their machine burned before their eyes by embittered Slovak soldiers, and both officers fell into German hands. Partisans and the survivors of Colonel Prikryl’s 2nd Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade trudged into the mountains and prepared to fight through all the fierce winter conditions.

The use of partisans in the Slovak rising provided the Soviet Union’s most successful ‘transplant’ of the partisan movement across the Soviet frontiers, the
only sustained example of Soviet-led partisans being used to precipitate a ‘revolutionary struggle’ on which even leading Slovak Communists turned their backs. In the field the Red Army did not succeed in breaking through to the rebel Slovak Army, but this force had been effectively eliminated by the Germans or disorganized by the antics of the Slovak officers long before the first Soviet soldier moved off for Slovakia. Soviet plans to break through to Presov proved to be unrealistic, though Soviet military pressure in the Carpathians did undoubtedly draw off over 12,000 German troops fighting the Slovak insurgents in the interior. The Soviet command, to the degree that it was actually culpable, made Slovakia the victim of its inflexibility; but equally the London-based government, even while trying to get control of all Czechoslovak fighting forces, failed to call out any more than a handful of its men from Bohemia and Moravia, from which only about a thousand appeared in Slovakia.

The Red Army continued its gruelling battle in the Carpathians until late November, though any hope of rescue for Slovakia had gone. Moskalenko’s 38th Army set out its reasons for prolonging its operations in a staff submission at the end of October: to fight on could bring the encirclement of German units on the left flank, an eventual drive into eastern Slovakia to link up with forces on the 2nd Ukrainian Front striking north from the direction of Hungary, and also some relief for the Slovak guerrillas by drawing off German troops. Troops of the 38th continued to fight, therefore, through these dark days with winter already whipping in the wind until they reached the river Ondova. Whatever the deviousness of the politics of the Slovak rising, it had cost the Red Army dear. Behind Moskalenko’s men presently on the Ondova lay the battles for the mountain passes and 80,000 casualties, with almost 20,000 men killed in action. General Ludwik Svoboda’s 1st Czechoslovak Corps, fighting alongside the Soviet 38th Army, suffered even more fearfully in wresting a foothold on its native soil, of which many men of 1st Corps saw only a few metres. General Vedral, commander of 1st Czechoslovak Brigade, was only yards over the frontier line when he was blown to pieces by a German mine; he joined the lists of the Czechoslovak dead in this operation—6,500 men in all, almost half the original strength of the 1st Czechoslovak Corps.

Shortly before dawn on 17 August 1944 a section of Soviet riflemen led by Viktor Mikhailovich Zakabluk used the last of the morning dark to slip off the road into a clover field and crawl the final two hundred metres to the river Sheshupe, a line on which German and Soviet tanks had clashed in the past few days in small but fierce actions. To the left and right of Zakabluk’s section, Captain Gubkin’s 2nd Rifle Battalion from 184th Rifle Division (attached to 5th Army, operating with Chernyakhovskii’s 3rd Belorussian Front) fought with tank and heavy mortar support to clear the German trenches running along the river bank. At five o’clock in the morning, with only a few metres more to go
before reaching the frontier with East Prussia, Zakabluk gave the order to charge; his section scrambled to their feet and moved off at the double, raising as much of a cheer as they could. Half an hour later Alexander Afanasevich Tretyak—the first Soviet soldier to stand on the Soviet–German frontier—planted his red battle-flag on the site of Frontier Marker No. 56. Chernyakhovskii’s Front armies had carried out
Stavka
orders to the letter.

With Vilno surrounded by Soviet armies as early as 9 July, Chernyakhovskii loosed his mobile columns in pursuit of the Germans and drove towards the river Niemen. Lt.-Gen. N.I. Krylov, 5th Army commander, demanded the surrender of the German garrison in Vilno now that ‘you [the Germans] are trapped in our deep rear and it is useless to think of a break-out’. Chernyakhovskii’s columns raced on to the Niemen, reaching the river on a broad front between the area west of Vilno and the approaches to Grodno. (Third
Panzer
held the Niemen sector from Kaunas to Alitus and Fourth Army was dug in along the southern reaches of the river as far as Grodno itself.)

While Krylov’s riflemen assisted by units of the Polish underground finally cleared Vilno on 13 July after one last savage battle in the centre of the city, the
Stavka
set about regrouping to strengthen 3rd Belorussian Front for the coming assault on the Niemen line: 39th Army operating north of Vilno reverted to Chernyakhovskii’s command, Bagramyan at 1st Baltic Front was relieved of the ‘Kaunas axis’, while 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps passed to Bagramyan from Chernyakhovskii and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, which was already engaged in fighting at Grodno came under Zakharov’s direct command in 2nd Belorussian Front. Lyudnikov’s 39th Army now extended Chernyakhovskii’s right-flank operations up to Ukmerg; Krylov’s 5th, after investing Vilno, was fighting off German units that had broken through north-west of the city, while 3rd Guards Tank Corps struck north-west, cutting the Vilno–Kaunas railway line and breaking into Kaisyadoris. Col.-Gen. Galitskii’s 11th Guards Army pushed on for sixty miles between 9 and 13 July, his right-flank corps (Maj.-Gen. Gurev’s 16th Guards) reaching the Niemen on 13 July and making immediate preparations to cross. First over in the Alitus area was Colonel Leshchenko’s 95th Guards Regiment (31st Guards Division); by dawn on 14 July 11th Guards Army had two corps on the western bank north and south of Alitus. North of 11th Guards, 45th Corps of 5th Army also drew up to the Niemen within a few hours, followed by 31st Army whose forward elements forced the Niemen north of Grodno. The next day (15 July), under threat of encirclement, German troops pulled out of Alitus.

North-west of Vilno German armour and infantry attacked in an effort to hold the developing Soviet drive on Kaunas. On the western bank of the Niemen repeated attacks were launched on the Soviet bridgeheads.
Stavka
orders issued to Chernyakhovskii in the major directive of 28 July specified an attack from the north and south to take Kaunas not later than 1–2 August, to be followed by a drive towards the East Prussian frontier. Krylov’s 5th Army accordingly
received orders from Chernyakhovskii to outflank Kaunas from the north and south, destroy the German garrison and then drive on to the frontier. Within hours Krylov began his assault on Kaunas, using two assault formations, 72nd Guards Corps to break through to the north-west and 45th Corps fighting in the south-east. On 30 July, as Krylov’s corps hacked their way into Kaunas German resistance along the whole Niemen line began to crumble. Chernyakhovskii’s centre and left-wing armies moved forward in the direction of Vilkovyshki, with one tank corps—2nd Guards—racing for the railway station at Mariampol, thus threatening German communications leading out of Kaunas. During the night of 31 July two Soviet corps, 45th and 65th, put in a decisive attack against Kaunas from the south; one Soviet division, the 144th, fought its way through the old forts in the south into Kaunas itself. By the evening much of the city had been cleared, though the German command pulled 9th Army Corps out to the north-west, followed by the Soviet 72nd Corps in hot pursuit.

To cut off the German troops trying to withdraw along the railway line and motor-road from Kaunas to Mariampol, a fighting withdrawal covered by heavy tanks, assault guns and motorized infantry, the commander of 45th Rifle Corps Lt.-Gen. S.G. Poplawski—by birth a Pole, currently a career officer with the Red Army and subsequently transferred towards the end of 1944 to the command of 1st Polish Army—ordered a rifle regiment with tank support to move south-west and block both road and rail routes. Behind this blocking force came Burdeinyi’s 2nd Guard Tank Corps operating with the infantry of 5th Army also south-west of Kaunas. With the tanks in the lead, the infantry of yet another army (the 33rd) moved in to occupy the railway station at Mariampol and then pushed on in the direction of Vilkovyshki.

For some time Chernyakhovskii maintained this momentum, some of his units crossing the Niemen bend (lying east of Kaunas), others striking out from the smaller bridgeheads at Druskeniki and Gozha (north of Grodno) into the great forest of Augustovo, the tanks racing along the main road to Suvalki and past Mariampol. Early in August units of 3rd Belorussian Front were over the Sheshupe, having captured Vilkovyshki and Kalvaria, with the fastest progress being made north-west of Mariampol. In the course of little more than three weeks, nine German divisions had been broken or flung aside, the 15,000-man garrison of Vilno wiped out or captured (Soviet troops counted 7,000 German dead), and almost 44,000 prisoners taken in the subsequent pursuit. Soviet armies, however, did not escape lightly. Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank Army could deploy only one brigade of twenty-eight tanks, all that was left of its tank force, with only the motorized infantry left to fight in the tank corps when the tank brigades were pulled back to Ionavi to refit. In 11th Guards Army the two-company battalions were reduced in many regiments to a single company per battalion. German troops still held considerable stretches of the region lying between the Niemen and the Sheshupe, German forces were gathering behind the Niemen north-west of Kaunas at Shaki, and at Vilkovyshki a German counter-attack at
the end of the first week in August drove Soviet troops back. Though Chernyakhovskii was skirting the frontier with East Prussia—and formally implanted some units there on 17 August—behind the frontier line lay fixed German defences which could not be overcome with a rush. The
Stavka
directive of 28 July specified preparations for an attack in the direction of Gumbinnen–Insterburg–Preis–Eilau, a drive in the direction of the Kaunas–Eydtkuhnen railway line, but Chernyakhovskii had yet to clear the Niemen–Sheshupe area and then recoup sufficient strength to launch his front against the formidable defences of East Prussia. With Soviet troops on the frontier, just biting into East Prussia, the front settled into shape: German troops held Vladislavov (south-east of Schirwindt) on the Sheshupe, Soviet units Mariampol and thence southwards through Kalvaria and on to Seyny.

Chernyakhovskii’s neighbour to the north, Bagramyan, in command of 1st Baltic Front, had orders to cut the communications between Army Group North and East Prussia, all part of a grand strategic design emanating from the
Stavka
. But the way in which the
Stavka
proposed to deal with Army Group North failed to impress Bagramyan, who on earlier occasions had voiced his scepticism over the high hopes so glibly entertained at the centre. This new offensive proved to be no exception. Bagramyan’s own plans envisaged an attack in the direction of Riga with the main forces of his front, with a supporting attack on Shavli, a powerful offensive aimed at the entire southern flank of Army Group North with the object of rolling it up to the north-west and pushing the remaining German strength behind the western Dvina, where it would be pounded to pieces by 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts operating to the north of the river. In addition to endangering the German flank and rear, threatening land communications with East Prussia and thereby lowering the defensive capacity of the German divisions which would then be under attack by two other Soviet fronts (2nd and 3rd Baltic), Bagramyan reached for his greatest prize, finishing off Third
Panzer
Army once and for all in co-operation with the right-flank formations of 3rd Belorussian Front, leaving all Lithuania and Courland wide open to Soviet troops. The
Stavka
directive No. 220130 of 4 July, which prescribed Bagramyan’s objectives, came as a rude shock to the Front commander, who was nurturing his own plans: the main line of the advance set by the
Stavka
ran along the Sventsyani–Kaunas axis, where five Soviet armies—6th Guards, 43rd, 39th, 2nd Guards and 51st—were to be committed, with part of the Front forces detached to attack in the direction of Panevezus–Shavli to secure the main offensive from the north. The 4th Shock Army, presently on Bagramyan’s right flank, was transferred to Yeremenko’s 2nd Baltic Front; in exchange Bagramyan acquired 39th Army which was almost free of the encirclement battle at Vitebsk.

The
Stavka
plans for eliminating Army Group North were based on a series of staggered blows involving the three Baltic fronts (1st, 2nd and 3rd), with Govorov’s Leningrad Front driving into the Narva isthmus from the east. Bagramyan’s 1st Baltic would move off first on 5 July in a westerly direction,
attacking between the Niemen and the Dvina: next to go would be Yeremenko’s 2nd Baltic Front, with orders to advance along the Polotsk–Dvina railway line and then develop a full-scale offensive to wipe out German units in the Idrits–Sebezh–Drissa area, with the Front forces advanced to the Rezenke line (north-east of Dvinsk) and ready to strike towards Riga. Col.-Gen. Maslennikov’s 3rd Baltic Front would be the last of the Baltic fronts to attack, with its first objective the destruction of the German forces in the Pskov–Ostrov area, followed by an advance towards Tartu and Piarnu, thereby ‘bottling up’ German units defending the Narva area. Maslennikov and Govorov (Leningrad Front) would be jointly responsible for clearing Estonia of German troops.

The flaw in all this was plain enough to Bagramyan. Where German strength was greatest, on the northern wing, Soviet attacks would be ‘relatively weaker’ with fronts going over to the offensive ‘considerably later’. Bagramyan evidently tried to persuade the
Stavka
to throw the main Soviet weight against the German southern wing, but all to no avail. The
Stavka
demanded an offensive in the direction of Kaunas as a means of ‘isolating’ Army Group North and as a protection for the Soviet offensive aimed at Warsaw, while the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts would force a general withdrawal of Army Group North towards East Prussia. This was the grand design, but in Bagramyan’s opinion the
Stavka
was deluding itself; how, he asked with characteristic bluntness, did the capture of Kaunas ‘isolate’ Army Group North? The whole ‘Kaunas plan’ posed a threat to the operations of 1st Baltic Front, whose flank and rear would be exposed to a danger ‘hanging like the sword of Damocles’ from Army Group North itself—the further west 1st Baltic advanced, the greater the danger of a German counter-blow. Worse still, Bagramyan had lost one army (4th Shock) without receiving a replacement, though 39th Army was promised him. The new army would not be in position, however, for at least another five days, and even with the exchange completed it scarcely favoured Bagramyan, who lost 4th Shock with ten divisions and got the 39th with only seven—and it would be mid-July before 2nd Guards and 51st Army arrived in full strength. His Front reserve consisted of a single tank corps (the 1st), equipped largely with battered tanks just out of the repair shops.