The Road to Berlin (84 page)

General Farago, the Hungarian negotiator in Moscow, signed the text of an armistice, which Molotov abruptly put in front of him, on 11 October; Admiral Horthy agreed to accept the terms, though he asked the Soviet government to halt their military operations on ‘the Budapest axis’ in order to give the Hungarians time to carry out the terms. Antonov at the Soviet General Staff sent Malinovskii a signal on these lines on 12 October, but this time the Germans acted first, their plans having been laid well in advance. The creation of the Lakatos government at the end of August showed the Germans which way the wind was blowing, clearly indicating Hungarian withdrawal from the war. Almost simultaneously Ferenc Szalasi, the fanatically pro-Nazi Hungarian, stood by to seize power, supported by the men and the machinery of the
SS
. In Budapest
SS-Obergruppenführer
Winkelmann, chief of the
SS
in Hungary and head of the special police squads, resolved to ‘clarify the situation’ which had built up since the Lakatos government came to power. That ‘clarification’ was simplicity itself—to arrest the Horthy group with all possible speed and to nip further ‘treachery’ in the bud. Winkelmann, Geschke (
Sicherheitspolizei
commander in Hungary) and Skorzeny, the man who had rescued one dictator, Mussolini, on the Führer’s orders and was now assigned to eliminate another, drew up a joint plan to deal with Horthy and his supporters. ‘Action Horthy’, or ‘Operation
Panzerfaust’
as Skorzeny christened it (as a joking reminder that he had failed to tell his para-commandos to bring their bazookas), sprang to life on 10 October, when first Field-Marshal Bakay was kidnapped; Aggteleki, Bakay’s replacement, was then speedily removed.

The
Sicherheitsdienst (SD)
now proceeded with an elaborate decoy operation to trap Horthy’s son, suspected of dealings with Tito in an attempt to arrange an armistice; the
SD
proposed to impersonate two officers of Tito’s entourage
and catch the young Horthy ‘red-handed’, kidnap him and use the hostage to exert pressure on the elder Horthy to remain on Germany’s side. The first attempt to carry through this cloak-and-dagger job fizzled out when the young Horthy became suspicious; on 15 October he agreed to a meeting but took a company of Hungarian troops and a group of Hungarian officers with him. In what suddenly developed into a running gun-fight between the
SD
men and the Hungarians, Skorzeny’s body-snatchers managed to seize Horthy and rush him into a car and off to a waiting aircraft, which transported him to the concentration camp that was his destination.

The
coup
, for all its complicated details carried out with a dash becoming its Al Capone style, proved to be something of a damp squib. The German Minister in Hungary, Dr Veesenmayer, also an officer of the
SS
, suddenly quailed at the prospect of bargaining with Admiral Horthy for the life of his son; that interview took place at noon when young Horthy had been in German hands for two hours, but Veesenmayer did not ‘fire the biggest gun’ at the Admiral—the news of the successful kidnapping—and early in the afternoon Radio Budapest broadcast its own news about the conclusion of an armistice with the Soviet Union. News of his son’s disappearance did not unnerve Admiral Horthy in the fashion that Hitler and Ribbentrop expected. With more than forty Tiger tanks making a menacing show in the city, Winkelmann and Skorzeny set about taking over Budapest completely, and in another feat of derring-do Skorzeny’s commandos assaulted the Burgberg, Horthy’s redoubt, an action completed by 6.30 am on 16 October. Yet half an hour before Skorzeny’s men went into action, Horthy had indicated his willingness to abdicate and to hand over power to Szalasi. This brought a hoodlum government to rule over Hungary, stiffened with German troops and given over to a final rampage against the Jews when the Eichmann commando won a free hand to conduct its mass round-ups and exterminations.

The road to Budapest was now barred to the Russians, as the Germans intended that it should be. On 7 September Veesenmayer and the German military attaché von Greiffenberg had informed the Hungarian Prime Minister quite bluntly that ‘the Germans are intent on holding the Eastern Front will all their forces, and if they lost the war, they would not let the collapse take place on the Eastern Front’ but would rather surrender the Western Front. Budapest was becoming the key point of a ferocious defence of southern Europe, and the Hungarians were dragged by the heels into the holocaust of one of the most savage battles of the war, a siege operation of great cruelty and raging ferocity on both sides. The Political Administration of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reported after the
coup
that some Hungarian officers and a large part of the rank and file of the Hungarian Army took the view that further resistance was really futile. Within three days of the Germans taking over, two Hungarian generals, Varos Dalnoki and Miklos Bela, went over to the Russians—Miklos, commander of the 1st Hungarian Army, offered to bring his army over to the Russians but the Germans quickly stepped in to stop the rot. On 24 October the
Stavka
issued a formal order to
the commanders of the 2nd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts instructing them to treat German and Hungarian troops alike, since Hungarian troops were continuing to fight.

In the latter half of October, with Hungary dragged back into the German camp, fierce straggling engagements took place on the plain to the north of Debrecen. The German command struggled to secure the safe withdrawal of their own Eighth Army and the two Hungarian armies (the 1st and 2nd), jabbing the Russians in the Orad and Debrecen areas with repeated attacks mounted in battalion or regimental strength supported by anything from 10 to 50 tanks and
SP
guns; in the area of Szolnok, two German divisions (24th
Panzer
and an
SS
division), with a battalion of heavy tanks rushed in from the interior, attacked on 19 October to free the German lines of communication and managed to push the Soviet troops back a distance of some twenty miles, retaking Mezö Tür and Turkev in the process. Meanwhile Pliev’s mobile group was outflanking Debreczen, held by a force of three divisions made up of Hungarian and German troops; Soviet pressure drove the defenders westwards to the Tisza and northwards to Nyiregyhaza, only to be pursued by Pliev whose units took Nyiregyhaza on 22 October and pushed on for another fifteen miles, reaching the Tisza at Dombrad and Rakamaz in the northerly bend of the river. The enemy escape route was now well and truly cut, sealing off divisions to the east of Debrecen and on the southern bank of the Tisza. To support what was left of the Debrecen garrison, now rammed back to the Tisza, German tank units crossed the Tisza at Tokaj and struck out for Nyiregyhaza, striking the Soviet troops in the flank, recapturing the town on 25 October and reopening the westerly escape route. In this see-saw struggle, Pliev’s men recaptured Nyiregyhaza five days later, but by this time a far larger battle had opened as Malinovskii launched his armour in a fast-moving drive between the Tisza and the Danube, fighting the battle of the Great Alföld and striking in the direction of Budapest.

The conclusion of the Debrecen operation brought Soviet forces into eastern Hungary (almost one-third of the country) and marked the clearing of northern Transylvania, once Satu Mare and Carei Mare had been taken on 25 October. With the capture of Mukachevo on 27 October and Uzhorod the following day, Petrov’s 4th Ukrainian Front brought its ‘Carpathian-Uzhorod’ operations to a close, moving up to a line running through Starina to Sobrante and Cop, and ‘sharing’ a boundary line with Malinovskii’s 2nd Ukrainian Front on the river Tisza. On Malinovskii’s left, Tolbukhin’s 3rd Ukrainian Front fought its way into Belgrade alongside Tito’s troops, but instead of striking westwards and helping to free considerable areas of Croatia and Bosnia in Axis hands, these Soviet units moved only a little to west of Belgrade and halted on
Stavka
orders: after three days (on 18 October) the
Stavka
instructed Tolbukhin to move one rifle corps to the northern bank of the Danube and into the Sambor–Novi Sad sector, in order to cover Malinovskii’s flank (where Tolbukhin’s 75th Corps finally locked flanks with the 46th Army of Malinovskii’s 2nd Ukrainian Front). There
was never any intention of swinging Tolbukhin’s Front forces to the west; at the beginning of November Tolbukhin began to regroup along the middle reaches of the Danube in order to strike into Hungary from the south-east, operating with Malinovskii’s 2nd Ukrainian Front along the ‘Budapest–Vienna axis’—keeping Soviet troops well clear of the ‘demarcation line’ marked out between Churchill and Stalin at their Moscow conference in mid-October.

Malinovskii found himself well placed at the conclusion of the Debrecen operation to jump rapidly into the second phase, the attack between the Tisza and the Danube. The bulk of his forces were already concentrated on his right flank and on the centre, facing Army Group South with its thirty-five divisions (nine motorized or armoured), the bulk of them deployed along the Nyiregyhaza–Miskolcz axis where Malinovskii had already concentrated his main strength: the bulk of the remaining enemy forces were largely Hungarian and facing Malinovskii’s left. As yet no great concentration of German force had appeared to defend Budapest, though this was quickly remedied when the German command began pulling units back from the northern sector on the western bank of the Tisza towards the Hungarian capital, improvising a hasty defence between Budapest and Jaszbereny. The
Stavka
orders transmitted to Malinovskii on 28 October envisaged a frontal attack towards Budapest and its capture ‘with relatively small forces’: on 29 October 46th Army and 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps would start their attack into the Great Alfold with the object of turning the German defences on the Tisza line and bringing 7th Guards Army up to the river, with 46th Army reinforced by two mechanized corps (2nd and 4th Guards) assaulting enemy forces defending Budapest itself. Petrov’s 4th Ukrainian Front received orders to prepare a drive deep into Czechoslovakia to tie down First
Panzer
, which must not be permitted to divert forces to Budapest. Tolbukhin would simultaneously proceed to regroup, concentrating the bulk of his forces in the Banat and consolidating the bridgehead on the Danube, and then drive into Hungarian territory. Malinovskii proposed, therefore, to use Shlemin’s 46th Army and Sviridov’s 2nd Mechanized Corps in an attack aimed first at Kecskemet, followed by Shumilov’s 7th Guards Army attacking south-east of Szolnok, forcing the Tisza and making way for 6th Guards Tank Army—the Front reserve—aimed directly at Budapest; the right-flank formations (40th, 27th and 53rd Armies) with Rumanian divisions and Pliev’s mobile group would continue to drive along the ‘Nyiregyhaza–Miskolcz axis’.

Up at Shlemin’s
HQ
, Malinovskii received a rude jolting from Stalin in the wake of the
Stavka
directive. Stalin wanted Budapest and he wanted it within hours, not least to make sense of his moves to bring a ‘democratic government’ to life: a triumphant sweep into Budapest would be a
coup de main
which would silence the ‘bourgeois’ waverers. This he now proceeded to impress upon Malinovskii in no uncertain terms, opening his telephone conversation with a question which was more a categorical statement:

It is absolutely essential that in the shortest possible time, in days even, you capture the capital of Hungary—Budapest. This has to be done no matter what it costs you. Can you do this?

MALINOVSKII
: This assignment could be carried out within five days, once 4th Guards Mechanized Corps moves up to 46th Army. This movement is expected to be complete by November 1. Then 46th Army, reinforced by two Guards mechanized corps—2nd and 4th—would be able to mount a powerful attack, which would come as a complete surprise to the enemy and in two to three days take Budapest.

STALIN
: The
Stavka
cannot
give
you five days. You understand that it is because of political considerations that we have got to take Budapest as quickly as possible.

MALINOVSKII
: I very definitely understand that we have to take Budapest in view of these political considerations. However we should wait for the arrival of 4th Guards Mechanized Corps. Only under these considerations will it be possible to count on success.

STALIN
: We cannot consider postponing the offensive for five days. It is necessary to go over to the offensive for Budapest at once.

MALINOVSKII
: If you give me, as of now, five days, five days as an absolute maximum, Budapest will be taken. If we go over to the offensive without delay, then 46th Army, for sheer lack of forces, will not be able to develop its blow quickly, it will inevitably get bogged down in heavy fighting at the very approaches to the Hungarian capital. Putting it briefly, it cannot seize Budapest off the march.

STALIN
: You are arguing all to no purpose. You do not understand the political necessity of mounting an immediate attack on Budapest.

MALINOVSKII
: I understand all the political importance of taking Budapest and for that very reason I am asking five days.…

STALIN
: I categorically order you to go over to the offensive for Budapest tomorrow. [Malinovskii,
Budapesht Vena Praga
, pp. 81–2.]

The conversation ended abruptly. A few minutes later the telephone rang once more, and this time it was General Antonov of the General Staff on the line, seeking from Malinovskii confirmation of 46th Army’s attack timetable. There on the spot, in 46th Army
HQ
, Malinovskii issued orders for an immediate attack on the morning of 29 October.

Shlemin with 46th Army opened his attack on time and within twenty-four hours had driven up to twenty miles into the German positions: 7th Guards attacked and seized a substantial bridgehead on the western bank of the Tisza. German attempts to hold Kecskemet with elements of XXIV
Panzer
were crushed and on 1 November the town was in Soviet hands. The Budapest attack, mounted with two mechanized and four rifle corps, seemed to bring rapid success within the first hours, but it also brought immediate complications connected with Malinovskii’s sudden offensive lunge which left the regrouping incomplete. More than a dozen formations, including four German
Panzer
divisions and a motorized division, were moving to positions lying across 46th Army’s line of advance, though 4th Mechanized Corps had finally joined Shlemin’s rifle army and, with
the two mechanized corps in the lead—2nd and 4th—and the infantrymen of 23rd Independent Guards Rifle Corps moving forward in lorries, the Soviet command was pressing its advance units on to the south-easterly approaches of Budapest.