The Road to Berlin (80 page)

The partisans’ forces in Bulgaria remained small, never rising above 15–18,000 men (organized finally into eleven brigades and thirty-eight detachments)—though by adducing the strength of their ‘helpers’, this figure is boosted to over 200,000; that army, however, was a wraith and a propaganda fiction. Nevertheless, the raids and incursions of the partisans stung the government to mounting frenzy. In the autumn of 1943, after the death of the king and by authority of the new Regency Council, fresh and powerful forces were thrown against the partisans in campaigns conducted with ferocity and efficiency and involving the Bulgarian army. Fifteen thousand men of the
gendarmerie
equipped with heavy weapons, 30,000 men of the police, 8,000 forest wardens and four army divisions hunted the partisans down, a measure which only served to increase the unpopularity of the pro-German government. The growing turbulence also attracted outside aid, from the British and the Yugoslav partisans, who helped the Bulgarians operating in the frontier area, and at a very late stage from the Russians, who dropped arms and ammunition at the request of the ‘Main Staff of the National Liberation Army’.

Late in the spring of 1944 the Bulgarians started out of their political dream-world: the Russians were closing in. A new government under Bagrianov, one much less professedly pro-German, took over from the Bozhilov cabinet and adopted a more lenient policy towards the partisans (or at least the hostages taken for them), as well as modifying the prevailing anti-Jewish measures. This occurred just as a Soviet diplomatic offensive aimed at Bulgaria began to take effect, and it remained for Bagrianov to solve this acutely difficult problem. On 17 April a Soviet official note to the Bulgarians had drawn ‘attention’ to Bulgaria’s aid to Germany and to the German use of the ports of Varna, Burgas and Ruschuk. This had been followed by another note on 26 April demanding the opening of Soviet consulates in these towns, and by yet a third note—peremptory in tone—delivered on 18 May, pointing out that without satisfaction of the Soviet demands ‘it will be impossible to maintain relations with Bulgaria, since this is a state which helps and deliberately helps Hitlerite Germany in the war against the Soviet Union’. The next day Bozhilov’s government retired from the scene and Bagrianov took office, a shuffle which the Russians seem to have considered nothing more than a manoeuvre. It took Bagrianov more than two months to frame a reply to the Soviet demands and then the outcome, presented to the Russians on 29 July, promised merely a ‘considered’ approach to the Soviet request. In turn, the Soviet reply of 12 August brushed aside the question of consulates and counselled the Bulgarians to think of their position—the only way out of ‘the blind alley’ was to break with Germany: ‘the Soviet Government is asking the Bulgarian government whether it is ready to make the break with Germany.’

If Bagrianov thought that a soft answer might turn away Russian wrath, he was mistaken. His speech of 17 August, promising a programme of reform and stressing the Bulgarian desire for peace, struck the Russians as sheer demagoguery. Nor did his assurance to the Soviet plenipotentiary in Sofia that Bulgaria would break with Germany at the first favourable opportunity—though not at the price of precipitating an armed clash—cut much ice with the Russians. The Red Army stood poised for the Jassy–Kishinev operation and, given any success, Soviet troops should soon be on the Danube. What then followed in Bulgaria was of necessity overshadowed by the course of military operations in Rumania, with the Bulgarians forced to do something to head off what looked like impending disaster. Whatever complacency existed about Russian indulgence born of long historical association or Slav kinship was shattered, not least on the day when King Michael took Rumania out of the war.

It was the turn of the Fatherland Front to act. On 24 August the Front demanded that the government hand over power, a demand that Bagrianov’s government refused outright, though it promised the Front a few seats in the cabinet, an offer that was duly spurned. The pro-Western and the pro-Soviet politicians now tried each in their own way to advance their separate causes. Bagrianov decided to send emissaries to Cairo to sue for peace with the Western powers (with whom Bulgaria was officially at war); Stoicho Moshanov and Colonel Zhelezkov were dispatched on this mission, though they did not reach Cairo until the end of the month (30 August). It was necessary to hold off both the Russians and the Fatherland Front, though the Bulgarian government had left everything much too late. On 26 August the Bulgarian government officially informed the Soviet plenipotentiary in Sofia that Bulgaria would now conform to ‘full neutrality’, that German troops crossing from Rumania would be disarmed according to the Hague Convention and that the German government had been asked to remove its troops, failing which they would be disarmed. That same evening Sofia radio informed the populace that Bulgaria had entered into contact with those states with whom Bulgaria was presently at war (Britain and the United States), while maintaining ‘a state of neutrality’ towards the Soviet–German conflict.

The Regency Council, desperately anxious to light upon some formula that would maximize Bulgaria’s supposed advantages, proposed joint consultations with all the opposition parties, pro-Western (such as Gichev and Muraviev of the Right Agrarians) or pro-Soviet from the ranks of the Fatherland Front. Whatever the seriousness of the intention to form a joint government, however, it all came to nothing, precisely because the Fatherland Front refused to participate, an outcome that gravely disturbed the pro-Western moderates who would have felt safer with some communist representation, the better perhaps to fend off the Russians. The Front, however, had already decided on insurrection, the Central Committee circular No. 4 of the Bulgarian Party announcing on 26 August that ‘for Bulgaria the twelfth hour has come!’ In his letter of 27 August to the Bulgarian Central Committee, the Fatherland Front and the Staff of the National
Liberation Army—a text transmitted by radio—Dimitrov urged concentration of all ‘democratic and progressive forces’ around the Fatherland Front, the disarming of German units, the summoning of the people to the struggle against ‘the Hitlerites and their agents’, the establishment of the greatest freedom of action for the ‘National Committees’ of the Fatherland Front, and finally the creation of a state of readiness to pass over to the side of the Red Army, the army of liberation from ‘the German yoke’. While Moshanov argued in Cairo, the Fatherland Front issued its own sixteen-point manifesto, demanding a break with Germany and friendship with the Soviet Union, the cessation of all military operations and the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Greece and Yugoslavia, and the restoration of all civil rights within the country.

On 30 August a
TASS
announcement vigorously denied ‘rumours’ that the Soviet Union recognized Bulgarian ‘neutrality’ in the form or on the terms stipulated by the Bulgarian government. Side by side with this semi-official and somewhat ominous announcement, a Soviet note delivered the same day to the Bulgarian government referred to ‘confirmed reports’ of German troops using Bulgaria as a means of access to Rumania where ‘Soviet troops are located’, an attitude on the part of the Bulgarians that could only be regarded as ‘direct aid to the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union’. In the most peremptory terms the Soviet government demanded termination of this transit. Within twenty-four hours the Bagrianov government toppled, to be replaced by one formed by Muraviev representing the ‘democratic opposition’—parties (like the Right-Wing Agrarians) that were by no means enamoured of Bulgaria’s pro-German course but which also out of persistent mistrust refused to join the Fatherland Front. The advent of the Muraviev government thus brought ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-Soviet’ elements face to face. For both, time was running out, but the advantage turned increasingly in favour of the latter, for the Red Army was now almost concentrated on the Bulgarian border.

Muraviev’s last attempt on 4 September to manage the kind of extrication he favoured failed within hours; the government statement made that day included a denunciation of the Tripartite Pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact, a declaration that Bulgarian troops would be pulled out of Axis-occupied territories and a commitment to speed up talks with the British and Americans in order to bring about an armistice. Bulgarian policy was one of firm and unconditional neutrality in the Soviet–German war. As for a final rupture with Germany, this would undoubtedly come if German troops on Bulgarian territory refused to be disarmed. Muraviev thus withdrew Bulgaria from the war against the Anglo-Americans and promised neutrality to the Soviet Union. But this did not suffice—indeed, it was the reverse of Moscow’s preference, since it excluded the Soviet Union from a direct act of peace-making. The next day, without consulting its allies, the Soviet Union promptly declared war on Bulgaria, citing as justification Muraviev’s declaration of neutrality which was nothing less than
‘de facto
waging of war in the camp of Germany against the Soviet Union’. With frantic speed
Muraviev informed the Soviet Legation in Sofia during the night of 6 September that the Bulgarian government had severed relations with Germany—for that seemed the nub of the matter—and promptly asked Moscow for an armistice. But again Muraviev was baulked: Moscow pointed to the Bulgarian public statement about seeking an armistice of the Russians, yet ‘nothing was said about a break with Germany’. Convinced of Bulgarian ‘perfidy’, Moscow stood by its declaration of war. The Fatherland Front meanwhile prepared its final plans for a
coup d’état
.

During the first few days of September Tolbukhin’s armies closed on the Rumanian–Bulgarian frontier: 46th Army moved along the Giurgiu–Silistra sector, 57th and 37th Armies with two mechanized corps (4th Guards and 7th) occupied the sector between the Danube and the Black Sea. Tolbukhin, now a Marshal of the Soviet Union (like Malinovskii, who was also promoted for his part in the Jassy–Kishinev operation), disposed of twenty-eight divisions with 169,000 infantrymen. The Bulgarian army, deploying five armies and two corps of ‘occupation forces’, could field 450,000 men; eleven divisions were on ‘occupation duties’ in Yugoslavia and Greece, with one corps administration in Yugoslavia (together with the headquarters of 5th Army) and the other in Greece. Late in August Stalin sent Marshal Zhukov down to 3rd Ukrainian Front to supervise the operations aimed against Bulgaria. Zhukov’s first stop was at Fetesti to discuss general Front co-ordination with Marshal Timoshenko. Zhukov had already talked with Dimitrov about developments in the Bulgarian situation and at the end of July, when the Jassy–Kishinev operation was undergoing its final scrutiny, Tolbukhin and Zheltov—on Stalin’s recommendation—also talked with Dimitrov about the problem of Bulgaria. The plan worked out by Tolbukhin’s command for the invasion of Bulgaria called for 46th Army to advance in the direction of Esechoi–Kubrat, 57th Army towards Kocmar–Shumen and 37th towards Dobrich–Provadiya, while the mechanized corps struck towards Karnobat–Burgas.

While Tolbukhin’s front made its last preparations, the partisans inside Bulgaria were rushing to form the 1st Division of the ‘National Liberation Army’, a task made almost impossible by the shortage of weapons. Early in September the Bulgarian Party Central Committee and the ‘Main Staff’ of the Revolutionary Army sought the help of 3rd Ukrainian Front: on 4 September seventy-five Soviet transport planes dropped rifles, machine-guns and ammunition to the Bulgarian partisans in the area of Kalna, thereby providing the 1st Division with weapons. Three days later this division began its march on Sofia. During the morning of 8 September Tolbukhin’s armies began their operations against Bulgaria and the first Soviet units crossed the frontier. It was as Dimitrov had forecast—no fighting and no war. Though perhaps the ‘bread and salt’ was a romantic exaggeration, Bulgarian soldiers and civilians turned out to greet the Red Army with banners and placards—in Silistra the townspeople came on to the streets in their best clothes and the fire-brigade hosed the streets clean for the Red Army’s procession. Not a shot was exchanged between Soviet and
Bulgarian units, whereupon Zhukov telephoned Stalin, who advised against disarming the Bulgarian troops—‘let them be while they are waiting for orders from their government’.

The first Soviet units crossed the Bulgarian frontier at 11 am on the morning of 8 September; twelve hours later, after driving through unusual heat for the time of the year, advance detachments were well south of the Tutrakan–Sakalli–Emirkei line, over forty miles into Bulgaria and still driving south-west. In the absence of any resistance, Tolbukhin ordered 4th Guards Mechanized Corps and a motorized rifle brigade to move off at once, though their orders called for them to advance as from 9 September; at 3 pm the motorized infantry reached the port of Varna, followed by Soviet marines brought in first by aircraft and then landed from three motor-torpedo boats. At dawn the next day (9 September) a thousand men from 83rd Marine Brigade descended on Varna, where Bulgarian warships offered no resistance and German naval units in the port scuttled themselves on the orders of the German commander. Further south Soviet marines landed at Burgas, with more men brought in by aircraft. By the evening Tolbukhin’s right and centre were already astride the line—running from Rushcuk on the Danube to Palatitsa, Karnobat and Burgas—specified as the first objective in the Front plan (which laid down 12 September as the deadline for the advance, after which Soviet movement would halt until a decision had been made about further operations, depending on the course of the insurrection planned inside Bulgaria). The orders about not crossing this line without ‘special authorization’ nevertheless still held; when a mobile unit of 31st Rifle Corps (46th Army) did push on, the army commander received an immediate reprimand from Front
HQ
and a categorical order to bring the unit back ‘to the line specified’.

At 2100 hours on 9 September Soviet troops in Bulgaria received orders to suspend all military operations: the Fatherland Front had seized power inside Bulgaria and the war was at an end. During the early hours of 9 September the Front carried out a smooth and silent
coup
in Sofia; partisan units together with ‘patriotic’ elements of the Bulgarian army seized post offices, the radio station and government buildings, including the War Ministry. The police, who did not venture out of their barracks, were disarmed. Further afield in the country almost 700 ‘National Committees’ of the Fatherland Front began to take power into their own hands; the partisans moved down from the mountains, were handed arms and formed in many places a ‘people’s militia’. In the larger towns and cities strikes had already begun some time before the
coup
and by 8 September the Fatherland Front had set up its own administration in a few towns. The Muraviev government fell and was replaced by one headed by Colonel Kimon Georgiev (former premier of the Military League government set up in 1934), with two Communists (Tarpeshev and Yugov), Petkov (Agrarian), two Social Democrats and two ‘independents’ in the new government. Already at 6.25 am on 9 September the government announced its programme, one based largely on that of the Fatherland Front—a break with Germany, friendship for the Soviet
Union, the restoration of civil liberties. Later in the day Georgiev’s government decreed the arrest of the Regency Council and all ‘pro-German members’ of the previous government. That evening Dimitrov, still in Moscow, asked Tolbukhin’s
HQ
to receive a ‘plenipotentiary delegate’ of the Fatherland Front government, Ganev of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Ganev duly arrived and ‘reported’ to the Soviet command on the course of the insurrection, at the same time voicing his fears about German Army Group F attacking Sofia, pointing to the German concentration at Vidin north-west of Sofia and also in Yugoslavia at Nis and Bela-Palanka. For Tolbukhin, who was about to lose 46th Army and 7th Mechanized Corps to Malinovskii fighting in Transylvania, this was not perhaps the best of news, though it provided a ready justification for moving on Sofia. Bulgarian partisans were sent to cover the western frontier, and the new government ‘requested’ the Soviet government to authorize 3rd Ukrainian Front to organize Red Army and Bulgarian Army ‘co-operation’. On 13 September the
Stavka
issued a formal directive to this effect, assigning Col.-Gen. Biryuzov (Front chief of staff) directly to Sofia to handle this Soviet–Bulgarian military effort.