The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (128 page)

2528.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the interrogation tapes, Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational cables promised by Director Hayden.
See
April 21, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-1798). See
also
May 8, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-2030).

2529.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, February 5, 2008 (DTS #2008-1140).

2530.
U.S. Senate vote to adopt the conference report on February 13, 2008, 4:31 PM. H.R. 2082 (Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008).

2531.
The President’s veto message to the House of Representatives stated that “[t]he CIA’s ability to conduct a separate and specialized interrogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London” (Message to the House of Representatives, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). The president also explained his veto in his weekly radio address, in which he referenced the “Library Tower,” also known as the “Second Wave” plot, and the Heathrow Airport plot, while representing that the CIA program “helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi . . . .” (
See
President’s Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed, CIA representations regarding the role of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow Airport, Djibouti, and Karachi plots were inaccurate.

2532.
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 117 of the 110th Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01 PM.

2533.
CIA Responses to Questions for the Record from the 6 March 2008 SSCI Covert Action Hearing, May 22, 2008 (DTS #2008-2234).

2534.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

2535.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).

2536.
The CIA response stated that during sleep deprivation, the detainee is “typically . . . handcuffed in front of his body,” and “will not be permitted to hang from [the handcuffs],” despite the practice of detainees being subjected to the technique with their hands above their heads, and reports of detainees hanging from their wrists at DETENTION SITE COBALT. The response stated that “adult diapers and shorts [are] for sanitary purposes,” and that “caloric intake will always be at least 1,000 kcal/day,” although CIA records indicate that the purpose of the diapers in several cases was humiliation and there were no caloric requirements until May 2004. The response stated that “[n]o sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted,” despite an insinuation that a family member of a detainee would be sexually abused. The response stated that “[t]he detainee may not be intentionally exposed to detention facility staff,” even though detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT were walked around nude by guards. The response stated that during water dousing, water “cannot enter the detainee’s nose, mouth, or eyes,” but did not acknowledge detainees being immersed in water. Finally, the CIA response described limitations on the use of the waterboard that were exceeded in the case of KSM. (See Response to Congressionally Directed Actions cited in the Compartmented Annex to Report 110-75, June 16, 2008 (DTS #2008-2663).) This response was provided notwithstanding the presidential veto of this legislation on March 8, 2008.

2537.
The Committee had been provided four copies of the memoranda for a limited time.
See
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, June 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-2698).

2538.
███████ CTC Legal repeated the representation that during sleep deprivation, detainees’ hands were shackled “about chin to chest level,” and stated that “[i]f there is any indication, such as the legs begin to swell, or things of that nature, that may terminate the sleep deprivation.” █████ CTC Legal also stated, inaccurately, that “we cannot begin to implement any of the measures, absent first attempting to get information from the individual in an up front and non-coercive way.” He added, also inaccurately, that “if the individual cooperates and begins to talk to you, you never go into the interrogation program.”

2539.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, June 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-2698).

2540.
Questions for the Record submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden, September 8, 2008, with a request for a response by October 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-3522).

2541.
See
CIA document prepared in response to “Questions for the Record” submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 8, 2008. The Committee had inquired why information provided by Abu Zubaydah about Jose Padilla was included in the CIA’s “Effectiveness Memo” for the Department of Justice, given that Abu Zubaydah provided the information to FBI Special Agents prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA response, prepared but never sent to the Committee, stated that the CTC attorney who prepared the CIA “Effectiveness Memo,” ███████, “simply inadvertently reported this wrong.” The unsent CIA response added that “Abu Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI,” and cited a specific CIA cable, █████ 10991. In contrast to the CIA’s unsent response to Committee questions in 2008, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “[t]he Study also claims Abu Zubaydah had already provided [Jose Padilla’s] ‘Dirty Bomb’ plot information to FBI interrogators prior to undergoing CIA interrogation, but this is based on an undocumented FBI internal communication and an FBI officer’s recollection to the Senate Judiciary Committee seven years later.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response also represents that “[w]hile we have considerable information from FBI debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, we have no record that FBI debriefers acquired information about such an al-Qa’ida threat.” As detailed in this summary, this is inaccurate. The CIA’s June 2013 Response further states that “CIA correctly represented Abu Zubaydah’s description of Jose Padilla as an example of information provided after an individual had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.” The CIA’s unsent response to Committee questions in 2008 acknowledged that “[d]uring the initial timeframe Abu Zubaydah (AZ) was waterboarded the interrogation team believed that AZ was compliant and was not withholding actionable threat information,” but ALEC Station “had additional information they felt linked AZ with more planned attacks,” and that “[a]s a result, the interrogation team was instructed to continue with the waterboarding based on ALEC Station’s belief.” Finally, the unsent responses acknowledged that notwithstanding CIA representations to the Department of Justice regarding amenities available to CIA detainees, “[t]he amenities of today evolved over the first year and a half of the program,” and that Abu Zubaydah was not initially provided those amenities.

2542.
CIA Letter to Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, October 17, 2008 (DTS #2008-4131).

2543.
Letter from Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV to CIA Director Michael Hayden, October 29, 2008 (DTS #2008-4217).

2544.
Letter from Senator Feinstein to CIA Director Michael Hayden, October 30, 2008 (DTS #2008-4235).

2545.
See
Committee business meeting records and transcript from February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420).

2546.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the interrogation tapes, Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational cables promised by Director Hayden.
See
letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden, April 21, 2008 (DTS #2008-1798); letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden, May 8, 2008 (DTS #2008-2030).

2547.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420).

2548.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420).

2549.
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR). Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420).

2550.
Transcript, business meeting, February 24, 2009 (DTS #2009-1913).

2551.
Transcript, business meeting, March 5, 2009 (DTS #2009-1916).

2552.
After the receipt of the CIA’s June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, and subsequent meetings between the CIA and the Committee in the summer of 2013, the full Committee Study was updated. The final Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program exceeds 6,700 pages and includes approximately 38,000 footnotes.

2553.
Transcript at DTS #2007-3158. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “We disagree with the
Study’s
conclusion that the Agency actively impeded Congressional oversight of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program . . . As discussed in our response to Conclusion 9, we also disagree with the assessment that the information CIA provided on the effectiveness of the program was largely inaccurate. Finally, we have reviewed DCIA Hayden’s testimony before SSCI on 12 April, 2007 and do not find, as the
Study
claims, that he misrepresented virtually all aspects of the program, although a few aspects were in error . . . .The testimony contained some inaccuracies, and the Agency should have done better in preparing the Director, particularly concerning events that occurred prior to his tenure. However, there is no evidence that there was any intent on the part of the Agency or Director Hayden to misrepresent material facts.” The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that the CIA has “identified a number of broad lessons learned” and includes eight recommendations. The CIA’s only recommendation related to Congress was: “Recommendation 8: Improve recordkeeping for interactions with Congress. Direct the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the Chief Information Officer to develop a concrete plan to improve recordkeeping on CIA’s interactions with Congress. OCA’s records going forward should reflect each interaction with Congress and the content of that interaction. OCA should work with the oversight committees to develop better access to transcripts of CIA testimony and briefings. This plan should be completed within 90 days of the arrival of a new Director of OCA.”

2554.
See
intelligence reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as a CIA paper entitled, “Abu Zubaydah,” dated March 2005. Similar information was included in, “Abu Zubaydah Bio,” a CIA document “Prepared on 9 August 2006.”

2555.
See
Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

2556.
See
Volume I, including █████ 178955 (012236Z APR 02); April 1, 2002 email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], re: Please coord on cable attached; and email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: ████████, April 1, 2002, re: POC for [SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted Al-Qa’ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL would contact SWIGERT).

2557.
See
Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

2558.
See
Volume I for additional details.

2559.
Email from: [REDACTED] (outgoing Chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN): to: [REDACTED] subject: “Assessment to Date” of AZ; date: 10/06/2002, at 05:36:46 AM.

2560.
CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, “Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001.”

2561.
See
Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, including monthly intelligence reporting charts.

2562.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, May 27, 2004. For more information on the SERE program,
See
the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December 2008. See
also
statement of Senator Carl Levin relating to the inquiry, December 11, 2008: “In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody.”