The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (129 page)

2563.
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02).

2564.
The August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum addressed 10 interrogation techniques. The May 10, 2005, OLC memorandum addressed 13 techniques.

2565.
“Our advice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these facts were to change, this advice would not necessarily apply.” (
See
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1).) CIA records indicate that it was not until July 29, 2003, that the Attorney General stated that the legal principles of the August 1, 2002, memorandum could be applied to other CIA detainees. (
See
June 18, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith III to Director Tenet (DTS #2004-2710).) In a subsequent interview with the OIG, however, ███ CTC Legal, ███████, stated that “every detainee interrogated is different in that they are outside the opinion because the opinion was written for Zubaydah.” The context for █████’s statement was the legality of the waterboarding of KSM. See Interview of ██████, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.

2566.
Other CIA attendees at the hearing included John Rizzo, █████ and ██████. █████, former ████ CTC Legal, attended for the ODNl.

2567.
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1).

2568.
████████ 10496 (162014Z FEB 03). On July 25, 2002, a CIA Headquarters cable stated that Abu Zubaydah was the “author of a seminal al-Qa’ida manual on resistance to interrogation techniques.” (
See
DIRECTOR ██████ (251609Z JUL 02)). As a result of an ACLU lawsuit, in April 2010, the CIA released a document stating that Abu Zubaydah was the “author of a seminal al-Qa’ida manual on resistance to interrogation techniques.” (
See
ACLU release entitled, “CIA Interrogation of AZ Released 04-15-10.”) No CIA records could be identified to support this CIA assessment.

2569.
████████ 10496 (162014Z FEB 03).

2570.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[w]e concede that prior to promulgation of DCI guidance on interrogation in January 2003 and the establishment of interrogator training courses in November of the same year, not every CIA employee who debriefed detainees had been thoroughly screened or had received formal training. After that time, however - the period with which DCIA Hayden, who came to the Agency in 2005, was most familiar - the statement is accurate.” CIA records indicate that the first interrogator training course was established in November 2002. General Hayden became the CIA Director on May 30, 2006. After this time two CIA detainees entered CIA custody, one of whom was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

2571.
Email from: ███████████████████, ██/CTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ████████████████████; subject: EYES ONLY; date: November ██, 2002, at 03:13:01 PM. As described above, Gul Rahman likely froze to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of November ██, 2002. ████████████████’s email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had found Gul Rahman’s body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211 ████████████████, describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November ██, 2002. Gul Rahman’s death appeared in cable traffic at least ████████ after ██████████’s email. No records could be identified to provide the impetus for ██████████’s email.

2572.
In addition, ███████████████, Former Chief, █████████████████████████, CTC, testified: “First off, we have thirteen interrogators and, of that thirteen, eleven are contract employees of ours, and they’ve all been through the screening process, they’ve all been through our vetting process, and they are certainly more than qualified. They are probably some of the most mature and professional people you will have in this business.”

2573.
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: █████████████, ██CTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████████; subject: EYES ONLY; date: November ██, 2002, at 04:27 PM.

2574.
For additional detailed information,
See
Volume III.

2575.
December 4, 2002 Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02, (pilot running).

2576.
DIRECTOR ██████ ████████ APR 03).

2577.
Interrogator Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Process; approximately January 29-February 4, 2003.

2578.
See
██████████ 10604 (091624Z AUG 02) and ██████████ 10607 (100335Z AUG 02). In an email, the former SERE psychologists on contract with the CIA, who largely devised the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques, wrote that Abu Zubaydah stated he was “ready to talk” the first day after they used the CIA’s techniques. Speaking specifically of the waterboard technique, they wrote, “As for our buddy; he capitulated the first time. We chose to expose him over and over until we had a high degree of confidence he wouldn’t hold back. He said he was ready to talk during the first exposure.”
See
email from: [REDACTED]; subject: “Re: [SWIGERT and DUNBAR]”; date: August 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM.

2579.
██████████ 10607 (100335Z AUG 02).

2580.
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: “[DETENTION SITE GREEN],” with attachment of an earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; date: August 12, 2002.
See also
the section on Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation in this summary and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

2581.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████████████; cc: ██████████████████; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM.

2582.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ███████████████; cc: ████████████████, █████████████, Jose Rodriguez; subject: re: Eyes Only – Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM.

2583.
Email from: ███████████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, ███████████████, ███████████████, ███████████████, ███████████████; subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13, 2003, at 08:28 AM.

2584.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████████; cc: ██████████████; subject: Re: State cable; date: March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written that “I am going the extra mile to try to handle this in a non confrontational manner.”
See
email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████████████; cc: ████████████; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM.

2585.
See
, for example,
the report of investigation of the Inspector General: “By mid-2002, Headquarters and [DETENTION SITE BLUE] were at odds regarding [DETENTION SITE BLUE]’s assessment on Al-Nashiri and how to proceed with his interrogation or debriefing. On several occasions throughout December 2002, [DETENTION SITE BLUE] reported via cables and secure telephone calls that Al-Nashiri was not actively resisting and was responding to questions directly. Headquarters disagreed with [DETENTION SITE BLUE]’s assessment because Headquarters analysts thought Al-Nashiri was withholding imminent threat information.”
See
Report of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 18 (DTS #2003-4897).

2586.
Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 35 (DTS #2004-2710).

2587.
Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 40 (DTS #2004-2710).

2588.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 2002, at 05:35 AM.

2589.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

2590.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

2591.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: August 9, 2002, at 10:44 PM.

2592.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at 09:45 AM.

2593.
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002.

2594.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, Scott W. Muller, September 5, 2003.

2595.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ██████████, April 7, 2003.

2596.
Report of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 24 (DTS #2003-4897).

2597.
See
Volume III for details.

2598.
See
Volume III for details. As discussed in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, on January 5, 2009, a CIA officer informed Director Hayden that additional CIA detainees beyond the 98 CIA detainees previously briefed to Congress had been identified. A CIA chart indicated there were “13 New Finds,” additional individuals who had been detained by the CIA, and that the new true number of CIA detainees was now at least 112. After the briefing with Director Hayden, the CIA officer sent a record of this interaction via email only to himself, which stated: “I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 -- pick whatever date i needed to make that happen but the number is 98.” (See email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5, 2009, at 10:50 PM.) Shortly thereafter, the final draft of prepared remarks by Director Hayden to President-elect Obama’s national security team state: “There have been 98 detainees in the history of the CIA program.”

2599.
Interrogators had asked CIA Headquarters for the assessments supporting the decision to subject Asadullah to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, noting that “it would be of enormous help to the interrogator to know what concrete fact and what is good analysis.” (See ██████████████████ 33963 ██████████████████████████████ 34098 ████████████████; ██████████████████ 34812 ████████████████.) In response, ALEC Station acknowledged that “[t]o be sure, our case that Asadullah should have a good sense of bin Ladin’s location is circumstantial.” (
See
ALEC ███ ██████████.) The following day, interrogators commented that “it may be that he simply does not know the [locational information on AQ leaders].”
See
█████████████████████████ 34310 ████████████████.

2600.
Following al-Hawsawi’s first interrogation session. Chief of Interrogations ██████████ asked CIA Headquarters for information on what al-Hawsawi actually “knows,” saying “he does not appear to the [sic] be a person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi]. What we need at this point is substantive information vice supposition.”
See
██████████████████ 34757 (101742Z MAR 03).

2601.
Although CIA records include no requests or approval cables for the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation. He was released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be.
See
WASHINGTON DC ███████ ████████████████; ██████████ 51303 ███████.

2602.
CIA Headquarters initially resisted approving Arsala Khan’s capture because of a lack of information confirming that he was a “continuing threat.” (See ████████████████ 169986 ██████████; email from: ██████████████; to: █████████████, █████████████, and [REDACTED]; subject: Denial of Approval to Capture Arsala Khan; date: ██████████ .) Despite doubts that Arsala Khan was the individual sought by the CIA, interrogators subjected him to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques “to make a better assessment regarding [his] willingness to start talking, or assess if our subject is, in fact the man we are looking for.” (
See
███████████████ 1373 ████████████.

2603.
Authorization to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI was sought in order to “identify inconsistencies in [ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI’s] story.”
See
███████████████ 2186 ████████████.

2604.
The true names of these detainees have been replaced with the capitalized pseudonyms AL-MAGREBI and AL-TURKI. At the time the two detainees were rendered to CIA custody, the CIA was aware that they were then working for a foreign partner government. They were subjected to sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation until the CIA confirmed that the detainees had been trying to contact the CIA for weeks to inform the CIA of what they believed were pending al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks. After the CIA had determined that AL-MAGREBI and AL-TURKI should not be in CIA custody, the two detainees were held for ████████████ additional months before they were released.