The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (44 page)

On March 15, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
████████
sent an email to CIA Headquarters noting that she had read the reporting from Majid Khan’s foreign government interrogations and was requesting photographs of Majid Khan and his associates to use in the KSM interrogations.
1897
CIA Headquarters provided the photographs the same day.
1898
On March 17, 2003, KSM was shown the photograph of Majid Khan and discussed the person he stated he knew as “Yusif,” for the first time.
1899

6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting

The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the U.S. military base. Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations were inaccurate.

In the September 6, 2006, speech, acknowledging the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, President George W. Bush stated:

“This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information.”

The speech continued:

“These are some of the plots that have been stopped because of information from this vital program. Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.”
1900

An Office of the Director of National Intelligence public release accompanying the September 6, 2006, speech, states that “the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal.” The document asserts: “In early 2004,
shortly
after his capture
, al-Qa’ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad
revealed
that in mid-2003 al-Qa’ida East Africa cell leader Abu Talha al-Sudani sent him from Mogadishu to Djibouti to case the US Marine base Camp Lemonier, as part of a plot to send suicide bombers with a truck bomb.”
1901

Similarly, in a prepared briefing for the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, on October 30, 2007, the CIA represented that the CIA could not conduct its detention operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because “interrogations conducted on US military installations must comply with the Army Field Manual.” The CIA presentation stated that the CIA program was “critical to [the CIA’s] ability to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from terrorist attack,” that “[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this [CIA] program would Likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way,” that the CIA program “is in no way comparable to the detainee programs run by our military,” and that the CIA used information derived from the program “to disrupt terrorist plots—
including against our military
.”
1902
The CIA presentation then stated:

“[A CIA detainee] informed us
1903
of an operation underway to attack the U.S. military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We believe our understanding of this plot helped us to prevent the attack.”
1904

A review of CIA records found that: (1) the detainee to whom the CIA’s representations refer—Guleed (variant, Gouled) Hassan Dourad—was not subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) the CIA was aware of and reported on the terrorist threat to Camp Lemonier prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees;
1905
(3) Guleed provided corroborative reporting on the threat prior to being transferred to CIA custody; and (4) contrary to CIA representations, the plotting did not “stop” because of information acquired from CIA detainee Guleed in 2004, but rather, continued well into 2007.
1906

On March 4, 2004, Guleed was captured in Djibouti based on information obtained from a foreign government and a CIA source.
1907
Prior to entering CIA custody, Guleed was confronted with information acquired from signals intelligence, and he confirmed that he cased Camp Lemonier for a potential terrorist attack.
1908
CIA sought to render Guleed to CIA custody in order to question Guleed about senior al-Qa’ida East Africa members Abu Talha al-Sudani and Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan. A CIA cable states:

“Guleed represents the closest we have come to an individual with first hand, face-to-face knowledge of Abu Talha [al-Sudani] and Nabhan, and our hope is that Guleed will provide key intelligence necessary for the capture of these senior al-Qa’ida members.”
1909

Prior to Guleed’s rendition to CIA custody, he provided detailed information on his casing of Camp Lemonier to CIA officers.
1910
On March █, 2004, Guleed was rendered to CIA custody.
1911
There are no records to indicate that Guleed was subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, nor are there any CIA records to indicate that Guleed provided the information that was the basis for his rendition to CIA custody—information leading to the capture of Abu Talha al-Sudani or Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan.

While in CIA custody, Guleed continued to provide information on his targeting of Camp Lemonier. Guleed stated that Abu Talha al-Sudani had not yet picked the operatives for the attack against Camp Lemonier,
1912
that the attack was “on hold while they raised the necessary funds via the bank robbery operation,”
1913
and that “he [Guleed] was not informed of the operational plan.”
1914

Neither the detention of Guleed, nor the information he provided, thwarted terrorist plotting against Camp Lemonier; and CIA records indicate that attack planning against Camp Lemonier continued well after Guleed’s capture in March 2004, to include a time period beyond the president’s September 6, 2006, speech. In March 2005, the CIA sought approval to render an associate of Guleed whom the CIA stated was “planning terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in East Africa, particularly against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.”
1915
In October 2005, a cable stated, “a body of reporting indicates that East Africa al-Qa’ida network operatives are currently planning attacks on U.S. interests in the region, particularly . . . the U.S. military base Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.”
1916
In April 2007, the continued terrorist threat reporting against Camp Lemonier resulted in a request for the Camp to further “alter their security practices.”
1917

In October 2007, in light of the ongoing threat reporting related to Camp Lemonier, CIA officer ██████ attempted to explain the CIA-validated statement in the president’s September 6, 2006, speech that “[t]errorists held in CIA custody “helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.”
1918
████, who was involved in vetting of the speech, wrote to a CIA colleague tracking the ongoing threats to Camp Lemonier that:

“The reasoning behind [the CIA] validation of the language in the speech—and remember, we can argue about whether or not ‘planning’ consistitutes [
sic
] a ‘plot’ and about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to heightened security.”
1919

A review of CIA records, however, found no indication that CIA detainee reporting from Guleed, or any other CIA detainee, alerted the CIA or the U.S. military to increased terrorist targeting of Camp Lemonier. To the contrary, CIA records indicate that the CIA was in possession of substantial threat reporting demonstrating that Camp Lemonier in Djibouti was being targeted by al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida affiliated extremists prior to the detention of Guleed on March 4, 2004.
1920
For example, on January 28, 2003, a foreign government report disseminated by the CIA stated that al-Qa’ida operatives were planning “to ram an explosives-laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier.”
1921
On March 10, 2003, a “Terrorist Advisory” was issued, which stated that “U.S. forces stationed at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti . . . could be targeted.”
1922
Similar reporting continued thimgh 2003, and by the end of the year, the CIA had ██ coverage
1923
indicating that Guleed and other identified operatives were being directed by Abu Talha al-Sudani to target Camp Lemonier.
1924
By the end of December 2003, Djiboutian authorities confirmed that Guleed had cased Camp Lemonier and that Guleed appeared to have “formulate[d] a complete targeting package, which included an escape route.”
1925
It was this reporting that led ███ to capture Guleed on March 4, 2004.
1926

7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources

In addition to CIA claims that information produced during or after the use of CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques led to the disruption of terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists, the CIA also represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim was based on one CIA detainee—Janat Gul—contradicting the reporting of one CIA asset.

The CIA repeatedly represented to policymakers that information acquired after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques helped to “validate” CIA sources. For example, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided testimony to the Committee on April 12, 2007, that:

“Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources. In fact, in one case, the detainee’s information proved to be the accurate story, and the clandestine source was confronted and subsequently admitted to embellishing or fabricating some or all [of] the details in his report.”
1927

Similarly, in January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book for a planned three-hour briefing of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama’s national security staff. Included in the materials was a document that stated, “[k]ey intelligence [was] collected from HVD interrogations
after
applying [the CIA’s enhanced] interrogation techniques.” After this statement, the CIA provided examples, including that the “most significant reporting” acquired from CIA detainee Janat Gul after applying the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was information that helped the CIA “validate a CIA asset.”
1928
The document states:

“Pakistan-based facilitator
Janat Gul’s most significant reporting
helped us validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself and al-Qa’ida’s chief of finance, Shaykh Sa’id, a claim that Gul vehemently denied. Gul’s reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting about the meeting.”
1929

The CIA representation that the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced information that allowed the CIA to identify the reporting of a CIA asset as fabricated lacked critical contextual information. The CIA representations did not describe how the CIA asset’s reporting was already doubted by CIA officers prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul. Nor did the CIA representations acknowledge that the asset’s fabricated reporting was the reason that Janat Gul was subjected to the techniques in the first place. The CIA concluded that Janat Gul was not a high-level al-Qa’ida figure and did not possess threat information, but this conclusion was not included in CIA representations.

In March 2004, the CIA received reporting from a CIA asset, “ASSET Y”
1930
that Janat Gul was planning with senior al-Qa’ida leaders to conduct attacks inside the United States. The attacks were reportedly planned to occur prior to the U.S. elections in November 2004.
1931
ASSET Y, who cited Janat Gul as the source of the information, stated that Gul was going to facilitate a meeting between Abu Faraj al-Libi and ASSET Y in support of the operation.
1932
As noted, CIA officers expressed doubts about ASSET Y’s reporting at the time it was received.
1933
A senior CIA officer, ███████, who formerly served as chief of the Bin Ladin Unit, raised questions about the reliability of the asset’s reporting on March ██, 2004, stating that the reporting was “vague” and “worthless in terms of actionable intelligence,” and that al-Qa’ida “loses nothing” by disclosing the information. He further stated that, given an al-Qa’ida statement emphasizing a lack of desire to strike before the U.S. election, and al-Qa’ida’s knowledge that “threat reporting causes panic in Washington” and “leaks soon after it is received,” the report “would be an easy way [for al-Qa’ida] to test” ASSET Y.
1934
ALEC Station officer █████████ expressed similar doubts about the source’s reporting in response to the email.
1935

Less than three months later, Janat Gul was captured in █████ on June ██, 2004.
1936
On June ██, 2004, CIA’s ███████ proposed that Gul be rendered to CIA custody, citing ASSET Y’s reporting.
1937
During this period, however, the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques had been suspended by the CIA director.
1938
On June 29, 2004, a draft memorandum from DCI Tenet to National Security Adviser Rice sought special approval from the National Security Council Principals Committee to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul to learn more about the threat reporting from ASSET Y.
1939
The memorandum referenced ASSET Y’s reporting and stated that if the CIA could use the techniques, “the Agency would be in an optimum position to obtain from Gul critical intelligence necessary to save American lives by disrupting the pre-election plot, locating senior al-Qa’ida leaders still at large, and learning how Usama Bin Laden communicates with his operatives.” The memorandum further stated that “[g]iven the magnitude of the danger posed by the pre-election plot, and [Janat] Gul’s almost certain knowledge of any intelligence about that plot, I request the fastest possible resolution of the above issues.”
1940