The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (46 page)

“KSM identified a mechanism for al-Qa’ida to smuggle explosives into the US via a Pakistani businessman and textile merchant who shipped his material to the US. The businessman had agreed to use this method to help al-Qa’ida smuggle in explosives for follow-on attacks to 9/11.”
1983

Similarly, on July 29, 2003, the CIA made a presentation to a select group of National Security Council principals, including Vice President Cheney, seeking policy reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA briefing materials state that “the use of the [CIA interrogation] techniques has produced significant results,” and warned that “[t]ermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive.” The CIA conveyed that “[m]ajor threats were countered and attacks averted,” and under a briefing slide entitled “RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO,” represented that information obtained from KSM after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques led to the “identification” of Saifullah Paracha.
1984

A widely disseminated CIA Intelligence Assessment, entitled “Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa’ida,” that was described in internal CIA emails as being “put together using past assessments” and initially intended for the White House only, with “marching orders” to “throw everything in it,”
1985
states:

“Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding . . . operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots . . .
KSM’s revelation in March 2003
that he was plotting with Sayfal-Rahman Pamcha—who also used the name Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha—to smuggle explosives into the United States for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha’s business ties in the United States
.”
1986

CIA representations related to the “identification” of the Parachas and/or the arrest of Uzair Paracha—as well as the identification of an explosives smuggling plot—omit significant information acquired by the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. Specifically, prior to KSM’s reporting, the Intelligence Community had already collected and acted upon significant information related to the Paracha family’s connections to al-Qa’ida and international terrorism:

• Information on Saifullah Paracha was found in documents seized during a March 28, 2002, raid against al-Qa’ida targets associated with Hassan Ghul, which resulted in the capture of Abu Zubaydah. The documents identified “Saifullah Piracha” (the spelling found in the document seized during the raid) and phone numbers, which would be associated with his Karachi-based business. International Merchandise Pvt Ltd, as early as April 2002. An address associated with the business was also identified.
  1987
  
• The name “Saifullah Piracha” was provided to Pakistani officials by the CIA in December 2002. The CIA wrote: “Information below leads us to believe that the following individual and phone numbers may have a connection to al-Qa’ida and international terrorism. . . . We request your assistance in investigating this individual to determine if he is involved in terrorist activity.” The request included three phone numbers found in the documents seized on March 28, 2002, one of which was associated with Saifullah Paracha’s Karachi-based company, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd.
  1988
  
• In April 2002, the FBI opened an investigation on another ████████████, at a New York-based business associated with Saifullah Paracha. During the course of the investigation, the FBI interviewed an employer at a New York address and acquired additional information on the business and the Parachas. ████████ business card, identifying him as an employee of International Merchandise Limited, was found among documents seized during the April 2002 Karachi raid.
  1989
  
• Months later, financial documents seized during the September 11, 2002, raids that resulted in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh identified an email address attributed to International Merchandise Pvt Ltd., with the same contact—Saifullah A. Paracha—as well as the same address and phone number as the business identified after the March 2002 raid.
  1990
  
• Based on the information obtained during the September 2002 raids, the CIA informed the FBI, the NSA, and the Department of Treasury that they suspected “Saifullah Paracha” was engaged in terrorist financing activities, specifically for al-Qa’ida. The cable included detailed information on Saifullah Paracha and International Merchandise Pvt Ltd in Karachi, and noted the CIA’s ongoing interest in, and analysis of, the information.
  1991
  
• FBI investigative activity of terrorism subject Iyman Faris found that Faris was linked to Paracha Imports via his Ohio-based housemates.
  1992
  
• Majid Khan, who was in foreign government custody, provided reporting that “Uzhair” ran the New York branch of his father’s Karachi-based import-export business. According to the reporting, Uzhair was assisting Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi in their efforts to resettle Majid Khan in the United States for terrorism-related purposes. Khan provided a detailed physical description of both Uzhair and his father.
  1993
  

KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March █, 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
1994
A CIA interrogation report from March 24, 2003, states that during the afternoon, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, for failing to provide information on operations in the United States and for having “lied about poison and biological warfare programs.”
1995
That evening, KSM’s interrogators received reports on information being provided by Majid Khan,
1996
who was in foreign government custody and being interviewed by FBI special agents and foreign government officers. The information included details on a U.S.-based individual associated with al-Qa’ida named Uzhair. According to Khan, this Uzhair ran the New York branch of his father’s Karachi-based import-export business.
1997
CIA cables describe KSM as being “boxed in” by reporting from Majid Khan
1998
before providing the following information on the Parachas and a smuggling plot:

• KSM corroborated reporting from Majid Khan that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan approached Uzhair Paracha for assistance in resettling Majid Khan in the United States.
  1999
  
• KSM stated that he was close to Uzhair’s father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, who provided assistance through his business and by helping to find safe houses in Karachi.
  2000
  
• KSM claimed that Ammar al-Baliichi and Majid Khan approached Sayf al-Rahman Paracha with a plan to use Sayf al-Rahman Paracha’s textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. KSM stated that Paracha agreed to this plan and was arranging the details with Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan at the time of his (KSM’s) capture.
  2001
  A later CIA cable provided additional background, stating: “KSM did not volunteer [the explosives plot] information on Paracha. He provided this reporting only when confronted with details on his role and other information on the plot, which had been provided by detainee Majid Khan,” who was in foreign government custody.
  2002
  

According to CIA records, on March 28, 2003, at a FBI field office, Uzhair Paracha provided significant information to interviewing FBI special agents on his father’s links to al-Qa’ida and his own efforts to assist Majid Khan’s reentry to the United States. Uzhair denied knowing anything about an explosives smuggling plot.
2003

On April 29, 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was detained by Pakistani authorities as a result of reporting unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. Records indicate Ammar al-Baluchi provided significant information prior to being transferred to CIA custody.
2004
On May ██, 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
2005
The CIA stopped using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ammar al-Baluchi on May 20, 2003.
2006
A June 18, 2003, cable states that Ammar al-Baluchi denied that he and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States. Ammar al-Baluchi stated he only asked Sayf al-Rahman Paracha questions and made inquiries about how explosives shipping could be done. Ammar al-Baluchi maintained that he did not take any action based on the discussion.
2007

On July 5, 2003, Saifullah Paracha was detained in ██████, in an operation orchestrated by the FBI.
2008
Shortly thereafter, Saifullah Paracha was rendered to U.S. military custody at Bagram Air Force Base.
2009
At Bagram, Saifullah Paracha was questioned by an FBI special agent.
2010
A CIA cable from July 17, 2003, relays that Saifullah Paracha stated that Ammar al-Baluchi had asked if he knew a forwarding agent who could ship garments and “materials” to Europe, which Saifullah Paracha inferred were either explosives or chemicals. Paracha stated he had no information to provide to Ammar al-Baluchi on this topic and that no further action was taken on the matter.
2011

With regards to the explosives smuggling reporting, a senior CIA counterterrorism official commented:

“again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads . . . why ‘smuggle’ in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks and got everything he needed right here, this may be true, but it just seems damn odd to me.”
2012

9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jajfar al-Tayyar

The CIA made repeated claims that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in “key intelligence” from Abu Zubaydah and KSM on an operative named Jaffar al-Tayyar,
2013
later identified as Adnan el-Shukrijumah.
2014
These CIA representations frequently asserted that information obtained from KSM after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in an FBI investigation that prompted al-Tayyar to flee the United States. These representations were inaccurate. KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. Jaffar al-Tayyar departed the United States in May 2001.
2015

CIA representations also omitted key contextual facts, including that: (1) the Intelligence Community was interested in the Florida-based Adnan el-Shukiijumah prior to the detention of the CIA’s first detainee;
2016
(2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI special agents in May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques;
2017
(3) CIA personnel distrusted KSM’s reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar—stating that KSM fabricated information and had inserted al-Tayyar “into practically every story, each time with a different role”;
2018
(4) other CIA detainee reporting differed from KSM’s reporting in significant ways;
2019
and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not identify al-Tayyar’s true name and that it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being questioned by the FBI—who provided al-Tayyar’s true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah.
2020
Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM the characterization of al-Tayyar as the “next Mohammed Atta,” despite clarifications from KSM to the contrary.
2021

For example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum with the subject line, “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” the CIA responded to a request from the Office of Legal Counsel “for the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value].” Under a section entitled, “Results,” the CIA stated:

“CIA’s use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa’ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:”
2022

The CIA then listed “Jafaar al-Tayyar” as one of 11 examples, stating:

“Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa’ida operative who was conducting casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad Atta. Tayyar’s family is in Florida and we have identified many of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly publicized Tayyar’s true name and aggressively followed up with his family and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States. ██████████ and we are actively pursuing his capture.
███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.
2023

In January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book—CIA Director Hayden produced his own prepared remarks—for a three-hour briefing on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama’s national security staff.
2024
Included in the materials was a document entitled, “Key Impacts,” which states: