The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (48 page)

In the context of the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented to policymakers over several years that “key intelligence” was obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques that revealed Shkai, Pakistan, to be “a major al-Qa’ida hub in the tribal areas,” and resulted in “tactical intelligence ██████████████████ in Shkai, Pakistan.”
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These CIA representations were based on the CIA’s experience with one CIA detainee, Hassan Ghul. While CIA records indicate that Hassan Ghul did provide information on Shkai, Pakistan, a review of CIA records found that: (1) the vast majority of this information, including the identities, activities, and locations of senior al-Qa’ida operatives in Shkai, was provided prior to Hassan Ghul being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) CIA’s ███████████ assessed that Ghul’s reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques contained sufficient detail to press the Pakistani ███████████████; and (3) the CIA assessed that the information provided by Ghul corroborated earlier reporting that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa’ida’s command and control center after the group’s 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.
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As an example of one of the CIA’s representations on Shkai, Pakistan, and the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, on March 2, 2005, the CIA responded to a request from the OLC “for the intelligence the Agency obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of intelligence [value].” The resulting CIA memorandum, with the subject line “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,” included the following under the heading, “Results”:

“CIA’s use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disnipt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa’ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa’ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:”
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The CIA then listed “Shkai, Pakistan” as an example, stating:

“Shkai, Pakistan: The interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan was a major Al-Qa’ida hub in the tribal areas. Through use of
██████████████████
during the Ghul interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders in Shkai. This intelligence was provided
████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████
.”
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The CIA representation that the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable tactical intelligence related to Shkai, Pakistan, was provided to senior policy-makers and the Department of Justice between 2004 and 2009.
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Hassan Ghul was captured on January
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, 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
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Ghul was reportedly first interrogated by
███████
,
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then transferred to U.S. military custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody on January ██, 2004.
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Hassan Ghul spent two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT before being transferred to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLACK on January ██, 2004. Prior to his capture, the CIA assessed that Ghul possessed substantial knowledge of al-Qa’ida facilities and procedures in Wana and Shkai, Pakistan.
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During Hassan Ghul’s two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA interrogators did not use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul. Instead, CIA cables state that upon his arrival at the CIA detention site, Hassan Ghul was “examined, and placed in a cell, given adequate clothing, bedding, water and a waste bucket.”
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During this two-day period (January 2004, and January 2004),
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Ghul provided information for at least 21 intelligence reports.
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As detailed below, Ghul’s reporting on Shkai, Pakistan, and al-Qa’ida operatives who resided in or visited Shkai, was included in at least 16 of these intelligence reports.
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The reports included information on the locations, movements, and operational security and training of senior al-Qa’ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as the visits of leaders and operatives to the area. The information provided by Ghul included details on various groups operating in Shkai, Pakistan, and conflicts among the groups. Hassan Ghul also identified and decoded phone numbers and email addresses contained in a notebook seized with him, some of which were associated with Shkai-based operatives.
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Hassan Ghul described the origins of al-Qa’ida’s presence in Shkai, including how Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi became the original group’s military commander and its al-Qa’ida representative.
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He discussed tensions between al-Hadi and others in Shkai, the mediating role of Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the role of Khalid Habib.
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Hassan Ghul explained how he moved to Shkai due to concerns about Abu Musa’b al-Baluchi’s contacts with
████████
, how he traveled to Shkai to make contact with Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and how Abu Faraj mediated between Ghul and Hamza Rabi’a.
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Ghul stated that he last saw Abu Faraj in the summer of 2003, when Ghul was seeking Abu Faraj’s assistance in moving money from Saudi Arabia to deliver to al-Hadi for support of their community in Shkai.
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According to Hassan Ghul, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi moved periodically among various houses within the village, including that of Abu Hussein and
███████
, whom he described as “senior media people for al-Qa’ida.”
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Elaborating on al-Hadi’s location, Hassan Ghul described the importance of both a
madrassa
and a guesthouse in Shkai known as the “bachelor house,” where unaccompanied men stayed. Ghul stated that he last saw al-Hadi in December 2003 when al-Hadi came to the “bachelor house” to visit with other Arabs.
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Ghul also identified other permanent and transient residents of the “bachelor house.”
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He stated that al-Hadi, who he believed was seeking another safehouse in Shkai at which to hold meetings, had approximately 40 to 50 men under his command. Hassan Ghul also identified a phone number used to contact al-Hadi.
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According to Hassan Ghul, as of December 2003, approximately 60 Arab males and between 150 and 200 Turkic/Uzbek males were living in Shkai, along with a “significant population” of Baluchis who assisted the Arabs and Uzbeks.
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Ghul described al-Qa’ida training, including an electronics course taught in the fall of 2003 by Abu Bakr al-Suri at the house of Hamza Rabi’a where, he believed, individuals were being trained for an ongoing operation.
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Ghul discerned from the training and Rabi’a’s statements that al-Qa’ida operatives in Shkai were involved in an assassination attempt against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
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Ghul stated Hamza Rabi’a was also likely planning operations into Afghanistan, but had no specifics.
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Hassan Ghul elaborated on numerous other al-Qa’ida operatives he said resided in or visited Shkai, Pakistan, including Shaikh Sa’id al-Masri,
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Sharif al-Masri,
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Abu Maryam,
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Janat Gul,
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Khalil Deek,
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Abu Talha al-Pakistani,
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Firas,
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and others.
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Finally, Hassan Ghul described his interactions with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, which also related to al-Qa’ida figures in Shkai, in particular Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi.
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Ghul described al-Zarqawi’s request to al-Hadi for money, explosive experts, and electronic experts, and provided details of his own trip to Iraq on behalf of al-Hadi.
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Hassan Ghul identified four email addresses for contacting al-Zarqawi directly,
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and described a phone code he would use to communicate with al-Zarqawi.
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Ghul also described his conversations with al-Zarqawi, interpreted the notes he had taken of the last of his conversations with al-Zarqawi, identified operatives whom al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi agreed to send to Iraq,
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and discussed strategic differences between al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi related to Iraq.
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On January ██, 2004, after two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT, during which Hassan Ghul provided the aforementioned information about al-Qa’ida activities in Shkai and other matters, Ghul was transferred to the CIA’s DETENTION SITE BLACK.
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Ghul was immediately, and for the first time, subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. He was “shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing position.”
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According to a CIA cable, Hassan Ghul provided no new information during this period and was immediately placed in standing sleep deprivation with his hands above his head, with plans to lower his hands after two hours.
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In their request to use the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, CIA detention site personnel wrote:

“The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul’s] reaction to the initial contact, that his al-Qa’ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift [Hassan Ghul’s] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these increasd [
sic
] measures may limit the team’s capability to collect critical and reliable information in a timely manner.”
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CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Hassan Ghul in order to “sufficiently shift [Ghul’s] paradigm of what he can expect from the interrogation process, and to increase base’s capability to collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner.”
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CIA records do not indicate that information provided by Ghul during this period, or after, resulted in the identification or capture of any al-Qa’ida leaders. After his arrival at DETENTION SITE BLACK, Ghul was asked to identify locations on
███████████
and line drawings of Shkai provided to him, for the first time, by interrogators.
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Hassan Ghul’s reporting on Shkai prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques was compiled by the CIA for passage to the Pakistani government. On January 28, 2004, ████████ issued a cable stating that the information on Shkai provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with reporting unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, “moved Shkai to the forefront ███████,” and that “[a]s a result, Station is currently revising its Shkai ██████████████████████.”
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On January 29, 2004, ALEC Station proposed that ████████ initiate a discussion with the Pakistanis on “possible Arabs in Shkai,” and concurred with a tear-line that requests that Pakistan “undertake to verify” the presence of “a large number of Arabs” in Shkai “as soon as possible.”
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On January 31, 2004, CIA’s ███████████ drafted with an extensive “tear-line” for Pakistan, much of it related to Shkai. The cable from
████████
referenced nine cables describing Hassan Ghul’s reporting prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques,
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and no cables describing Ghul’s reporting after the use of the techniques.
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The cable from
██████████
then stated that “Station sees the type of information coming from [Hassan Ghul’s] interrogations as perfect fodder for pressing [Pakistan] into action against
█████
associates of Hassan Ghul in Pakistan,
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, and other terrorist ██████ in Pakistan
██████████████████████████████████████████████████
.” The tear-line for Pakistan included extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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On February 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters requested that the tear-line be passed to the Pakistanis, but deferred to █████████ on the portions dealing with Shkai.
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As CIA’s █████████████ informed CIA Headquarters on February 9, 2004, it intended to hold the information on Shkai until the DCI’s visit to Pakistan the following day. As Station noted, “this tearline will prove critical █████████████.”
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In the meantime and afterwards, additional tear-lines were prepared for the Pakistanis that were based primarily on reporting from Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with Ghul’s subsequent reporting, and information from sources unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.
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In July 2004, the CIA assessed
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that “al-Qa’ida operatives ███████████████ are continuing with their activities and waiting for the situation to normalize in the tribal areas.” In particular, “[a]l-Qa’ida’s senior operatives who were in Shkai before the military’s offensive remained in South Waziristan as of mid-June [2004].”
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Later, in December 2005, a CIA detainee profile of Hassan Ghul assessed that the information provided by Ghul confirmed earlier reporting in CIA’s possession that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa’ida’s command and control center after the group’s 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.
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Hassan Ghul was
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, and later released.
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███████████████████████████████████████
.
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