The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (64 page)

30.
Email from: ████████ to: ████████ [Himself]; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5, 2009. According to the CIA’s June 2013 Response, “Hayden did not view the discrepancy, if it existed, as particularly significant given that, if true, it would increase the total number by just over 10 percent.”

31.
They include Sayed Habib, who was detained due to fabrications made by KSM while KSM was being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques (
█████
1281 (130801Z JUN 04);
██████████████
3031
████████
████;
██████████
3015 ████████; 2817 ████████); Ali Saeed Awadh, the subject of mistaken identity (ALEC ████ ████████; ████████████ 1871 ████████; ██████████ 2024 ████████;██████████ 2022 ████████; █████14322 ████████); Modin Nik Muhammed, whom the CIA determined had been purposefully misindentified by a source due to a blood feud (████████████ 43701 ████████; DIRECTOR ███ ████████; ████████████ 52893 (████████); Khalid al-Masri, whose “prolonged detention” was determined by the CIA Inspector General to be “unjustified” (CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007, at 83); and Zarmein, who was one of “a number of detainees about whom” the CIA knew “very little” (████████████ 1528 ███████.

32.
They include Abu Hudhaifa, who was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation before being released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be (WASHINGTON ███ ████████; ████ 51303 ████████); Muhammad Khan, who, like Zarmein, was among detainees about whom the CIA acknowledged knowing “very little” (██████ ████ 1528 ████████); Gul Rahman, another case of mistaken identity (HEADQUARTERS ███████████); Shaistah Habibullah Khan, who, like his brother, Sayed Habib, was the subject of fabrications by KSM (HEADQUARTERS ███ ████████); Haji Ghalgi, who was detained as “useful leverage” against a family member (██████████ 33678 ████████); Nazir Ali, an “intellectually challenged” individual whose taped crying was used as leverage against his family member (████████ 13065 ████████; ███████████████, ██████████; ███████ 13147 ████████; ██████████ 29864 (████████); Juma Gul, who was released with a payment of $██ and ██ [other currency] (█████ 150822Z ████████; ██████ █████ 33693 ████████; ██████████ 33265 ██████; ███████████████ 33693 ███████); Hayatullah Haqqani, whom the CIA determined “may have been in the wrong place at the wrong time” (██████████ 33322 ████████); Ali Jan, who was detained for using a satellite phone, traces on which “revealed no derogatory information” (███ 1542 ██████████); two individuals ████████████—Mohammad al-Shomaila and Salah Nasir Salim Ali—on whom derogatory information was “speculative” (email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Backgrounders; date: April 19, 2006; ██████ 17411 ████████; ALEC ███ ███████; undated document titled, “Talking Points for HPSCI about Former CIA Detainees”); two individuals who were discovered to be foreign government sources prior to being rendered to CIA custody, and later determined to be former CIA sources (██████████ 2185 ([REDACTED]); ALEC ███ ([REDACTED]); HEADQUARTERS ███ ([REDACTED])); seven individuals ███████████████ thought to be travelling to Iraq to join al-Qa’ida who were detained based on claims that were “thin but cannot be ignored” (email from [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED|; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████████████, [REDACTED], ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Request Chief/CTC Approval to Apprehend and Detain Individuals Departing Imminently for Iraq to Fight Against US Forces; date: September 16, 2003); and Bismullah, who was mistakenly arrested ██████████ and later released with $█ and told not to speak about his experience (██████████ 46620 ████████).

33.
For example, the Committee did not include among the 26 individuals wrongfully detained: Dr. Hikmat Nafi Shaukat, even though it was determined that he was not involved in CBRN efforts and his involvement with al-Qa’ida members was limited to personal relationships with former neighbors (████████████ 30414 ████████; DIRECTOR ██ ████████); Karim, aka Asat Sar Jan, about whom questions were raised within the CIA about whether he may have been slandered by a rival tribal faction (███████████ 27931 ████████; [REDACTED] Memo, ████████ SUBJECT: getting a handle on detainees); Arsala Khan, who suffered disturbing hallucinations after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, after which the CIA determined that he does not appear to be the subject involved in . . . current plans or activities against U.S. personnel or facilities” (█████████████ 1393 (201006Z OCT 03); HEADQUARTERS ███ (████████); and Janat Gul, who also suffered “frightful” hallucinations following sleep deprivation and about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, “[t]here simply is no ‘smoking gun’ that we can refer to that would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DETENTION SITE BLACK]” (████ 1530 ███████ 04); █████ 1537 █████ 04); █████ 1542 █████ 04); email from: [REDACTED] (COB [DETENTIONSITEBLACK]); to: ████████ cc: █████████, ██████, █████████; subject: re: █████████ date: April 30, 2005).

34.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response “acknowledge[s] that there were cases in which errors were made,” but points only to the case of Khalid al-Masri, whose wrongful detention was the subject of an Inspector General review. The CIA’s June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that it was “far fewer” than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA’s June 2013 Response acknowledges that “the Agency frequently moved too slowly to release detainees,” and that “[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we adjudicated only three cases in less than 31 days. Most took three to six months. CIA should have acted sooner.” As detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of individuals determined by the CIA to have been wrongfully detained.

35.
ALEC ████ (████████; DIRECTOR ███ ███████; DIRECTOR ███ ████████; ALEC ████ ████████. Despite the CIA’s conclusion that these individuals did not meet the standard for detention, these individuals were included in the list of 26 wrongfully detained if they were released, but not if they were transferred to the custody of another country. The list thus does not include Hamid Aich, although CIA Headquarters recognized that Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sought to place him in Country ████████ custody where the CIA could still debrief him. (See DIRECTOR ████████████)). Hamid Aich was transferred to Country ████████ custody on April █, 2003, and transferred to █████ [another country’s] custody more than a month later. (See ████████████ 36682 ██████████; ████████████████ 38836 █████████). The list also does not include Mohammad Dinshah, despite a determination prior to his capture that the CIA “does not view Dinshah as meeting the ‘continuing serious threat’ threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority,” and a determination, after his capture, that “he does not meet the strict standards required to go to [DETENTION SITE COBALT].” (See DlRECTOR ████ ███████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ███████). Dinshah was transferred to ██████ custody. See HEADQUARTERS ███ ███████; ████████████ 41204 ████████; ██████ 60937 ██████.

36.
January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on █████, at 7-8 (DTS #1989-0131).

37.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302).

38.
Attachment to Memorandum entitled, “Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Tenorists,” CTC: 1026(138)/01 from J. Cofer Black, Director of DCI Counterterrorist Center, to Director of Central Intelligence via multiple parties, October 25, 2001; Draft of Legal Appendix, “Handling Interrogations.”

39.
Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(1)(a), updated October 9, 2001.

40.
KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85.

41.
According to public records, in the mid-1960s, the CIA imprisoned and interrogated Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964, for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers at the time did not believe Nosenko was an actual defector and ordered his imprisonment and interrogation. Nosenko was confined in a specially constructed “jail,” with nothing but a cot, and was subjected to a series of sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.

42.
Among other documents, see CIA “Family Jewels” Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. 5, 23–24, available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf.

43.
“Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy,” Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations of U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, September 11–15, 1978. Testimony of John Hart, pp. 487–536 (September 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761).

44.
Transcript of Committee Hearing on ████ Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988, pp. 3–4 (DTS #1988-2302).

45.
April 13, 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspector General William F. Donnelly to Jim Currie and John Nelson, SSCI Staff, re: Answers to SSCI Questions on, ██████, attachment M to Memorandum to Chairman and Vice Chairman, re: Inquiry into █████ Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 (DTS # 1989-0675).
See also
████1984, Memorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re: ███████, IG-██84.

46.
As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the “Renditions and Interrogations Group,” as well as the “Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group,” and by the initials, “RDI” and “RDG.”

47.
December 4, 2002, Training Report, Revised Version, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (“[████████] was recently assigned to the CTC/RG to manage the HVT Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) mission, assuming the role as HVT interrogator/Team Chief.”).

48.
January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on █████, at 7-8 (DTS #1989-0131).

49.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302).

50.
November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, “Handling Interrogation.”
See also
Volume I.

51.
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, “Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers.” The draft memo cited the “Israeli example” as a possible basis for arguing that “torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm.”

52.
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Like the November 26, 2001, draft memo, the OLC memorandum addressed the Israeli example.

53.
Email from ██████████; to: [REDACTED] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodiguez, ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: For OOB Wednesday - Draft Letter to the President; date: January 29, 2002. No records have been identified to indicate that this letter was or was not sent.

54.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ██████████ and [REDACTED]; subject: POW’s and Questioning; date: February 1, 2002, at 01:02:12 PM.

55.
February 7, 2002, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, chief of staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.

56.
After the CIA was unsuccessful in acquiring information from its last detainee, Muhammad Rahim, using the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, an after-action review in April 2008 suggested that the CIA conduct a survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to develop effective interrogation techniques. See undated CIA Memorandum, titled █████ After-Action Review, author [REDACTED], and undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT. For additional information, see Volume I.

57.
Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR, Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al Qaeda Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (undated).
See also
Memorandum for the Record, November 15, 2007, SSCI Staff Briefing with Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR (DTS #2009-0572).

58.
See, for example, ████████, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, ████████, subject, “Qualifications to provide special mission interrogation consultation”; Undated, untitled memo stating: “The following information was obtained by a telephone conversation with [REDACTED], █████████████████████████; ████, Interrogator Training, Lesson Plan, Title: A Scientific Approach to Successful Interrogation; DIR ███ (031227Z APR 02).

59.
See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, ██████, subject: “Qualifications to provide special mission interrogation consultation.”