The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (68 page)

222.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

223.
ALEC ███ (181439Z OCT 02).

224.
ALEC ███ (181439Z OCT 02).

225.
Among other documents, see ████ 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); ████ 10672 (240229Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED] (███ chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN); to: CIA Headquarters; subject: “Assessment to Date” of Abu Zubaydah; date: October 6, 2002, at 05:36:46 AM.

226.
See “Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KSM,” dated February 2008, updated for briefings on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to Director Leon Panetta, as well as the “Effectiveness Memo” provided to the Department of Justice, testimony provided by CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other documents discussed in detail in Volume II. For example, see ODNI September 2006 press release stating: “During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker ‘Mukhtar.’ This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa’ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal.”

227.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

228.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). This OLC memorandum cites CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from █████ ███, ██ Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject “Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.”

229.
While there are no records of Abu Zubaydah making these statements, the deputy chief of ALEC Station, █████, told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the “best information [the CIA] received on how to handle the [CIA] detainees came from a walk-in [a source ████████████ to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were underestimating Al-Qa’ida. The detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial. When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so they talked. Allah apparently allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of.” See █████, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with deputy chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.

230.
███ 10496 (1620I4Z FEB 03). For more information, see a March 7, 2005, cable describing Abu Zubaydah’s explanations more fully (██ 2166 (070647Z MAR 05)).

231.
███ 10496 (162014Z FEB 03). For additional details on this matter, see Volume II, specifically the section on information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice.

232.
The information provided by the CIA to the Committee on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program is summarized later in this document, and described in greater detail in Volume II.

233.
See Volume II, specifically the section on CIA representations to Congress.

234.
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; cc: Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached document] Re: Graham request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM.

235.
By June 2002 the CIA had taken custody of five detainees who were captured outside of Country █ and placed these CIA detainees in Country ███ detention facilities. The detainees were held at the Country █ facilities at the request of the CIA and the CIA had unlimited access to them. See ███████ 21147 ███████.

236.
DIRECTOR ███ (062212Z JUN 02).

237.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ██████, September 9, 2003.

238.
For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume III. The specific date has been generalized at the request of the CIA.

239.
███████ 28246 ████.

240.
For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume III, and among other documents: ██████ 31118 █████; DIRECTOR ███ ██████; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002; Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from █████, January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN; and CIA Inspector General, Report of lnvestigation, Death of a ██████ (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. One senior interrogator, █████, told the CIA OIG that “literally, a detainee could go for days or weeks without anyone looking at him,” and that his team found one detainee who, “ ‘as far as we could determine,’ had been chained to the wall in a standing position for 17 days.” According to the CIA interrogator, some of the CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT “‘literally looked like a dog that had been kenneled.’ When the doors to their cells were opened, ‘they cowered.’” [See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, █████, April 30, 2003.) The chief of interrogations, █████, told the CIA OIG that “[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is good for interrogations because it is the closest thing he has seen to a dungeon, facilitating the displacement of detainee expectations.” (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, █████, April 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT told the CIA OIG that “[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is an EIT.” (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, █████, May 8, 2003.).

241.
See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee April 7, 2005, Memorandum for John Helgerson, Inspector General, from Robert Grenier, Subject: Comments on Draft Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee █████(2003-7402-IG).

242.
████████████████████████████████████████████████████████, Subject: █████ [CIA OFFICER 1]. ████████████████████████████████████████.

243.
██████████████████ [CIA OFFICER 1] █████.

244.
██████████████████ [CIA OFFICER 1] █████.

245.
The full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. While there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at COBALT, the waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between the Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard’s presence at COBALT.

246.
█████ 11357 ██████; ████ 11443 ████.

247.
███ 178155 ██████.

248.
████ 11542 ████.

249.
███████████ 27054 ██████.

250.
ALEC ███ (162135Z JUL 02). Although the plans at the time were for DETENTION SITE COBALT to be owned and operated by the Country ██ government, the detention site was controlled and overseen by the CIA and its officers from the day it became operational in September 2002.

251.
ALEC ███ (162135Z JUL 02). The deputy chief of ALEC Station, █████, and ████ CTC Legal, would later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.

252.
The term “mind virus” first appeared in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. See ████ 10086 (201900Z APR 02).

253.
Referenced July 16, 2002, cable is ALEC ███ (162135Z JUL 02).

254.
ALEC ███ (162135Z JUL 02).

255.
ALEC ███ (162135Z JUL 02).

256.
At this time, July 26, 2002,Abu Zubaydah was in isolation at DETENTION SITE GREEN. Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation on June 18, 2002, and remained in isolation for 47 days, until the CIA began subjecting him to its enhanced interrogation techniques on August 4, 2002.

257.
███████ 25107 (260903Z JUL 02).

258.
███████ 25107 (260903Z JUL 02).

259.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: Buzzy Krongard, John O. Brennan, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John H. Moseman, [REDACTED] █████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████, ██████, Jose Rodriguez, ██████, John P. Mudd, █████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM TO DCI DAILY 1630 OPS UPDATE - 26 JULY; date: July 26, 2002.

260.
DIRECTOR ███ (052309Z AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and approved the use of CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydah. The Office of Legal Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004.

261.
[REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02).

262.
[REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02).

263.
November █ 2002, Memorandum for ████████████. Subject: Legal Analysis of ███ Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka “[DETENTION SITE COBALT]”).

264.
November █ 2002, Memorandum for ████████████. Subject: Legal Analysis of ███ Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka “[DETENTION SITE COBALT]”).

265.
November █ 2002, Memorandum for ████████████. Subject: Legal Analysis of ███ Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka “[DETENTION SITE COBALT]”).

266.
November █ 2002, Memorandum for ████████████. Subject: Legal Analysis of ███ Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [REDACTED] (aka “[DETENTION SITE COBALT]”).

267.
According to the IG report, “in late July or early August 2002, a senior operations officer on TDY to ███████ interrogated a particularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at ██████ detention facility that was used before [COBALT] was opened. The officer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, became the model for [COBALT].” See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death of a Detainee ███████ (2003-7402-IG).
See also
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ██████, April 30, 2003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Puposes, █████, April 2, 2003.

268.
See Volume II and Volume III for additional information.

269.
ALEC ███ ██████.

270.
ALEC ███ ███████.

271.
█████████ 29963 █████.

272.
Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from █████ January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN. Other contributing factors were identified as dehydration, lack of food, and immobility due to “short chaining.”

273.
███████ 30211 █████. See Volume I and III for additional details.

274.
As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the “Renditions and Interrogations Group,” as well as the “Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group,” and by the initials, “RDI” and “RDG.”

275.
DIRECTOR ███ (032336Z DEC 02).

276.
██████████ 34909 ██████.

277.
DIRECTOR ███ ██████. In late 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman’s death. The board recommended that the executive director “impose a 10 day suspension without pay” on ███ [CIA OFFICER 1], and noted that this action would “strike the appropriate balance between: I) the fact that [████ [CIA OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman’s death, and 2) the significant weight the Board attached to the mitigating factors at play in this incident.” (See Memorandum for Executive Director from ██████, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re: Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability Board Regarding the Death of Afghan Detainee Gul Rahman.) On February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive Director K.B. Foggo notified ████ [CIA OFFICER 1] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against him. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: “While not condoning your actions, it is imperative, in my view, that they . . . be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Rahman’s detention. Cable traffic reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was aware of, and posed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques being imposed on Rahman as late as ██ November. On that date, Headquarters notified [the CIA Station in COUNTRY ██] . . . that it was ‘motivated to extract any and all operational information’ from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman’s cooperation to be of ‘great importance’ and that it acknowledged that Rahman ‘may need to be subjected to enhanced interrogation measures to induce him to comply.” (See February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [██████ CIA OFFICER 1]], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re: “Accountability Decision.”) With regard to the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “Most egregiously, we believe that CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to the death of Gul Rahman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management’s decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least experienced officer involved. The most junior in the chain of command should not have to bear the full weight of accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are thrust into difficult battlefield situations by their supervisors and given a risky and difficult task and little preparation or guidance. Still, it is hard to accept that a CIA officer does not bear at least some responsibility for his or her actions, even under trying circumstances.”