The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (79 page)

BOOK: The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program
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869.
The CIA took custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Munthir al-Magrebi, Ibrahim Jan, and Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi in 2005, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in 2006.

870.
The first detainees arrived in Country ██ in ██████ 2003. CIA detainees were held within an existing Country ██ facility in Country ██ from ███ to ██████ 2003, and then again beginning in ████ 2004. For additional information, see Volume I.

871.
Email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: █████████, ██████, ██████; subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.

872.
Email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: █████████, ██████, ██████; subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.

873.
Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14, 2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. As further described in the Committee Study, the Inspector General audit described how the CIA’s detention facilities were not equipped to provide detainees with medical care. The audit described unhygienic food preparation, including at a facility with a “rodent infestation,” and noted that a physician assistant attributed symptoms of acute gastrointestinal illness and giardiasis experienced by six staff and a detainee to food and water contamination. The audit further identified insufficient guidelines covering possible detainee escape or the death of a detainee.

874.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

875.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

876.
May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of Justice Concerning Legal Guidance on Interrogation Techniques.

877.
May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of Justice Concerning Legal Guidance on Interrogation Techniques.

878.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

879.
For more information on Abu Faraj al-Libi’s detention and interrogation, see Volume III.

880.
HEADQUARTERS ████ (251840Z MAY05).

881.
See, for example, █████████ 1085 (describing meetings on May 6 and 7, 2005).

882.
May, ██, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, via Acting Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations from Robert Grenier, Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

883.
Email from: ████████; to: Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTEDl, [REDACTED], ███████, ███████, [REDACTED], ███████, █████████; cc: ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24, 2005.

884.
Email from: ████████; to: Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTEDl, [REDACTED], ███████, ███████, [REDACTED], ███████, █████████; cc: ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24, 2005.

885.
█████████████ 4526 █████████.

886.
█████████ 6131 ███████; █████ 2319 █████████.

887.
Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May █, 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

888.
Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May ██, 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

889.
Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May ██, 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

890.
HEADQUARTERS █████ ███████.

891.
████████ 2336 (282003Z MAY 05).

892.
████████ 2499 (262123Z JUN 05).

893.
██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.

894.
Email from: ██████████; to: ██████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████, ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED] ████████, [REDACTED], ████████; subject: ██ Response to DDO Tasking of 7 July on Abu Faraj Interrogation; date: July 8, 2005, at 06:16 PM.

895.
DIRECTOR █████ (121847Z JUL 05); HEADQUARTERS ████ █████████ JAN 04); ████ 20361 (291232Z JAN 04); DIRECTOR ████ (040522Z MAY 04).

896.
██████ 29454 (131701Z JUL 05).

897.
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning DOD Support to CIA with Sensitive Capture and Detention Operations in the War on Terrorism.

898.
See email from: [REDACTED], ███████; to: ██████████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: █████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD Request for a list of HVTs not to be issued ISN numbers. The email stated: “In conjunction with discussions between CIA and DoD over the weekend regarding our request to have the military render Ibraliim Jan to our custody and NOT issuing him an ISN number, DoD has requested CIA provide a list of HVTs to whom, if captured, the military should NOT issue ISN numbers” (emphasis in original). See ████████ 1505 ██████ OCT 05).

899.
July ██, 2005 Memorandum for Joint Staff (██████) from ████████████, re: Interim Guidance Regarding (██████████████████).

900.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
█████
█████████████
, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: ██████████ [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; Subject: McCain Amendment on Detainee Treatment; date: October 6, 2005, at 12:37 PM.

901.
According to CIA records, Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to a sitting position, and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, after which CIA Headquarters informed interrogators that eight hours was the minimum rest period between sleep deprivation sessions exceeding 48 hours. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi also experienced an edema on his head due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles. See █████ 1810 █████ DEC 05); █████ 1813 █████ DEC 05); █████ 1819 █████ DEC 05); █████ 1847 █████ DEC 05); █████ 1848 █████ DEC 05); HEADQUARTERS ███ █████ DEC 05). See additional information on Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi in Volume III.

902.
PDB Draft titled: ███████████████████████████████████, Date: December 13, 2005, ALT ID#: -2132586. Director Goss notified the national security advisor that he had authorized the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi because “CIA believes that Abu Ja’far possesses considerable operational information about Abu Mu’sab al-Zarqawi.” See December 1, 2005, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Central Intelligence Agency, subject, “Counterterrorist lnterrogation Techniques.”

903.
PDB Draft titled: █████████████████████, Date: December 16 2005, ALT ID: 20051217 PDB on Abu Jafar al-Iraqi. Urging the change to the draft PDB, one of the interrogators involved in Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi’s interrogation wrote, “If we allow the Director to give this PDB, as it is written, to the President, I would imagine the President would say, ‘You asked me to risk my presidency on your interrogations, and now you give me this that implies the interrogations are not working. Why do we bother?’ We think the tone of the PDB should be tweaked. Some of the conclusions, based on our experts’ observations, should be amended. The glass is half full, not half empty, and is getting more full every day.” See email from: [REDACTED] ██████████████████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: PDB on [Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi]; date: December 15, 2005, at 12:25 AM.

904.
███████ 2031 █████████. In June 2007, inaccurate information about the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja’far al-Iraqi was provided to the Committee. See CIA Response to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record, June 18, 2007 (DTS #2007-2564); █████████ 32732 ████████ OCT 05); ███████ 32707 ███████ OCT 05); ██████ 32726 ██████ OCT 05); ██████ 32810 ██████ OCT 05); ███████ 32944 ███████ OCT 05).

905.
The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that an “important factor” contributing to the slower pace of CIA detention operations was al-Qa’ida’s relocation to the FATA, which “made it significantly more challenging [for the Pakistani government] to mount capture operations resulting in renditions and detentions by the RDI program.” A review of CIA records by the Committee found that legal, policy, and other operational concerns dominated internal deliberations about the program. In 2005, CIA officers asked ██████ officials to render two detainees to CIA one █████ and one █████. ████████████████████ neither detainee was transferred to CIA custody. CIA officers noted that obtaining custody of detainees held by a foreign government during this period was becoming increasingly difficult, highlighting that ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████.” In March 2006, Director Goss testified to the Committee that lack of space was the limiting factor in taking custody of additional detainees. See HEADQUARTERS ████ █████████; HEADQUARTERS █████ █████████; email from: [REDACTED], ████; to: ██████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: for coord, pls: D/CIA talking points ████████████ re: rendition of ███████████████████████████ 6702 ███████; HEADQUARTERS ████ █████████; and transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

906.
Text redacted by the CIA prior to provision to Committee members at the U.S. Senate.

907.
See CIA document dated, January 12, 2005, entitled, “DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor.”

908.
See CIA Talking Points for Principals Committee Meeting on Long-Term Disposition of High-Value Detainees, 8 March 2005.

909.
See email from: ████████ to: John Rizzo; subject: Meeting this am with WH counsel on endgame planning; date: January 14, 2005.

910.
Email from: █████████; to: █████████; cc: [REDACTED], ██████████, [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, █████████, █████████, █████████; subject: Re: Brokaw interview; Take one; date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. In 2006, Vice President Cheney expressed reservations about any public release of information regarding the CIA program. See CIA Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED], C/CTC████, subject, “9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees.”

911.
Negotiations with Countries ██ and ██ to host CIA detention facilities are described in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume I.

912.
HEADQUARTERS ████ (232040Z DEC 05).

913.
DDCIA Talking Points for 10 February 2006 Un-DC re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program - Interrogation Techniques.

914.
HEADQUAR ████ █████████; HEADQUAR ████ █████████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ████████.

915.
The other options put forward by the CIA were transfer of CIA detainees ████████, which the CIA anticipated would release the detainees after a short period. The CIA also proposed its own outright release of the detainees. See CIA document entitled D/CIA Talking Points for use at ███████ Principals Meeting (2005).

916.
HEADQUARTERS ████ ████████.

917.
Talking Points for Dr. J.D. Crouch for telephone calls to Ambassadors in [REDACTED] regarding possibility of forthcoming Dana Priest press article; email from: ██████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re: Ambassadors who want to speak to the SecState; date: ███████, at 06:45 PM.

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