The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (103 page)

41.
Joint Chiefs of Staff message to CINCRED, “Planning Guidance for Countering a Soviet Invasion of Iran” (262336Z), September 1980; Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Planning Guidance for Countering a Soviet Invasion of Iran” (DTG 262336Z), September 1980, pp. 2–3; Department of the Army memorandum, “U.S. Strategy to Counter a Major Soviet Attack into Iran,” April 25, 1981, pp. 3–4. In the various documents produced by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies, the number of Soviet divisions invading Iran varied considerably, ranging from seventeen to thirty.

42.
For the Reagan administration, nuclear or strategic planning against the Soviets was an early priority. Iran remained an adjunct of the larger concepts. The new Weinberger Pentagon quickly set out three options for nuclear weapons against the Soviets. The first was designed to deter further Soviet attacks and limited the use of such attacks against Soviet military forces in Iran and Afghanistan only. Should that deterrent fail, the United States would escalate to a “geographical escalation” that entailed vaporizing Soviet military bases in neighboring countries, chiefly Ethiopia and South Yemen. The last escalation would attack Soviet military installations and combat units in the Soviet Transcaucasus districts.

43.
The Brookings Institution, “The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project,”
www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nucweapons/madm.aspx
, accessed April 4, 2007.

44.
Joint Chiefs of Staff message to Chief of Naval Operations, “CINCPAC Rules of Engagement for Patrol of the Arabian Gulf” (030133Z), March 1981.

45.
Presidential Directive/NSC-63, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” January 15, 1981.

C
HAPTER 3
B
ARBED
-W
IRE
B
OB

1.
Allan Millett and Jack Shulimson, eds.,
Commandants of the Marine Corps
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), p. 453.

2.
John Poindexter, interview with author, March 8, 2008.

3.
Joint Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Facility Requirements in Support of Southwest Asia Strategy,” February 3, 1982.

4.
Richard Allen memorandum for Caspar Weinberger, “Iran Hostages and Related Issues,” 1981.

5.
Richard Allen memorandum on draft National Security Decision Directive toward Iran, “National Security Council Meeting,” September 29, 1981, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:638, Folder Iran 2.

6.
Caspar Weinberger,
In the Arena: A Memoir of the 20th Century
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2001), pp. 287–88.

7.
Caspar Weinberger, interviews with author, December 15, 1994, May 1, 1996, and September 2000.

8.
General Volney Warner letter to Caspar Weinberger, January 20, 1980, Appendix B, Warner Oral History, Volney Warner Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. Warner also advocated that Readiness Command be given responsibility for deploying forces to operations worldwide, using its subordinate, the rapid deployment force, as its headquarters for the Middle East.

9.
Caspar Weinberger interview.

10.
Lieutenant General Robert Kingston letter to Caspar Weinberger, November 2, 1982; Lieutenant Colonel Charles Seifert, USAF, memorandum to Weinberger, November 5, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder 1982 U.S. Commander Rapid Deployment Force.

11.
Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, April 29, 1981; Richard Allen memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “Middle East Command Arrangements,” August 13, 1981; Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, May 17, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder U.S. Commander RDJTF 2.

12.
Senator Stevens objected to the elimination of the global mission for the rapid deployment force and did not like a command solely dedicated to the Middle East. His objections opened the door for the navy to propose that the rapid deployment force should be, rather than a unified command, a “global strike force,” which would not substantially alter its current mission.

13.
In a sop to the navy, with the exception of the small flotilla operating in the Persian Gulf, the chiefs allowed the navy to be excluded from the new Middle East command. The Indian Ocean and the ships of the carrier battle groups operating there to support CENTCOM were excluded and remained under the control of the Pacific Fleet in Honolulu. They would be “in support” of CENTCOM, a nebulous concept that allowed the navy to remain independent of the new command’s control but still nominally obligated to support its operations. This would cause no end of problems over the coming years. The navy formed a new combined task force, CTF-70, to support CENTCOM, but it operated under the operational control of the commander of the Pacific Fleet.

14.
General Volney Warner letter to President Ronald Reagan, July 8, 1981, Appendix F, Warner Oral History.

15.
General Volney Warner, USA (Ret.), interview with author, April 7, 2008.

16.
The two men even discussed the possibility of a secret alliance between archenemies Israel and Syria to carve up Lebanon.

17.
Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, April 29, 1981; Richard Allen memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “Middle East Command Arrangements,” August 13, 1981, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder U.S. Commander RDJTF 2.

18.
Relations between the two countries were also already strained over the Israeli government’s refusal to halt Jewish settlements on the Palestinian West Bank, which President Carter believed Prime Minister Menachem Begin had agreed to with the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not see much utility in using Israel to defend the Persian Gulf, they did advocate using Israel to help maintain control over the western Mediterranean against Soviet submarines.

19.
Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, May 17, 1982; Caspar Weinberger memorandum to Ronald Reagan, “Unified Command for Southwest Asia,” June 23, 1982; Francis West, Jr., memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “New Command for Southwest Asia,” May 20, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder U.S. Commander RDJTF 2.

20.
Henry Cunningham, “Delta Pioneer Dies,”
Fayetteville Observer
, March 22, 2007.

21.
Richard Shultz, Jr.,
The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 89.

22.
Kingston had actually hoped to be appointed as the next deputy director of the CIA, which went instead to a civilian, John McMahon.

23.
Major Caesar J. Civitella, USA (Ret.), interview with author, March 5, 2010.

24.
William Williams and William Handy, interview with author at the reunion for the thirtieth anniversary of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, March 4, 2010, Tampa, Florida.

25.
CINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Plans to Counter a Soviet Invasion of Iran” (021530), August 1983.

26.
While keeping the original plans for a passive introduction of U.S. forces, CENTCOM built two slightly different new plans based upon the degree of basing and the forces prestaged for the invasion, available in nearby countries, designed to defeat Iranian forces first as well as the Red Army. For the first time, the planning reflected the challenges of countering the Soviets in a country fundamentally hostile to the United States. Should U.S. diplomacy fail to secure the Iranians’ support, U.S. forces needed to be positioned in advance, “postured to enter Iran to counter a Soviet invasion, [as] interdicting the Soviet advance will be much more difficult.” The new plans were labeled 1008 and 1009.

27.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Study to Improve U.S. Special Operations Capability,” March 18, 1981, pp. 1–20.

28.
Kingston also wanted permission to use his special forces to strike deep into the Soviet Caucasus, even to try working with Muslim opponents of Moscow to foment a guerrilla movement within the Soviet Union. But that was a step too far for the White House, and the permission for other than rudimentary planning never came from the defense secretary.

29.
Jeffrey Richelson,
The U.S. Intelligence Community
(New York: Ballinger, 1989), pp. 61–62; Steven Emerson,
Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era
(New York: Putnam, 1988); Lieutenant General Philip Gast, USAF, J-3, memorandum for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Capability,” December 10, 1980, p. 1; “United States Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1987 Historical Report,” U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity, October 23, 1987, pp. 7–9; Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci memorandum to Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, May 26, 1982; “Charter of U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity,” 1983; “Brief History of the Unit,” 1986; National Security Archive,
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46
, accessed July 4, 2007;
www.specwarnet.net/americas/isa.htm
.

30.
Odom interview.

31.
ISA was augmented by the Air Force Special Activities Center at Fort Belvoir and coordinated activities with the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence, which conducted its own separate recruitment effort largely directed at Iranian naval officers.

32.
Howard Hart, interview with author, June 26, 2007.

33.
Odom interview.

34.
Timothy Naftali,
Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism
(New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 124.

C
HAPTER 4
A D
EN OF
S
PIES

1.
Joseph Persico,
Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey, from the OSS to the CIA
(New York: Viking, 1990), p. 71.

2.
Ibid., p. 66.

3.
Ibid., p. 83.

4.
Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence
, volume 1, U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, September 16–20, 1991, p. 475.

5.
John Prados,
Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 500; Persico,
Casey
, p. 301.

6.
It stated that events in Iran were no longer as chaotic as viewed in 1985, and as Fuller noted in congressional testimony, “Some of our concerns had not been borne out.”
Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence
, Executive Report 102-19, U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, October 19, 1991, pp. 46–48.

7.
Jack Devine, interview with author, March 25, 2008.

8.
Richard Allen memorandum, “National Security Council Meeting, Draft NSDD on Iran,” September 29, 1981.

9.
Robert McFarlane, interview with author, March 23, 2008.

10.
“Statement of the Honorable William Casey,” November 21, 1986, in
Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence
, volume 1, pp. 106–7.

11.
Philip Giraldi, interview with author, June 15, 2010.

12.
Tim Weiner,
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
(New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp. 425–26; Tim Weiner, telephone interview with author, May 29, 2007; “U.S. Spies’ Statements on CIA Activities,” Tehran Television Service in Persian, November 3, 1989, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), November 7, 1989.

13.
Giraldi interview.

14.
Nazhatoon Riahi, interview with author, November 20, 2008.

15.
Said Zanganeh, interview with author, November 18, 2007.

16.
“U.S. Blunder Over Spies,” Iranian News Agency, April 22, 1989, FBIS, April 24, 1989, p. 24; “Information Minister Names CIA Spies,” Iranian News Agency, April 26, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989, pp. 43–50; “Text of News Conference,” Tehran Television Service in Persian, April 26, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989; Zanganeh interview.

17.
This included the captain of the Iranian flagship, the destroyer
Babr
.

18.
Zanganeh interview.

19.
Text of news conference by Minister of Intelligence and Security Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, April 26, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989, pp. 44–50.

20.
Reza Kahlili, interview with author, July 10, 2010; Muhammad Sahimi, “Iran’s Crumbling Judiciary,” August 15, 2009,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/irans-crumbling-judiciary.html
, accessed January 29, 2011.