The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (105 page)

34.
Bing West memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Sale of Helicopters to Iraq,” January 1983; David Schneider and Jonathan Howe memorandum for Secretary George Shultz, “Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq,” January 30, 1984.

35.
Kenneth Timmerman, “Fanning the Flames: Guns, Greed and Geopolitics in the Gulf War,”
Iran Brief
, 1988, pp. 1–10,
www.iran.org/tib/krt/fanning_ch7.htm
, accessed November 16, 2007.

36.
Secretary of State message to American Embassy Amman, “Kittani Call on Under Secretary Eagleburger” (180139Z), March 1984.

37.
Secretary of State message to American Embassy Tel Aviv, “Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran” (140318Z), January 1984, p. 2; Richard Murphy, interview with author, December 21, 1994; Richard Fairbanks, interviewed by Charles Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, April 19, 1989; John Stempel, interviewed by Kristin Hamblin Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 1993.

38.
“Iraqi Officer Cited on Cooperation with CIA in War with Iran,”
Tehran Times
, March 11, 2002.

39.
Ibid.

40.
W. Patrick Lang, “The Land Between the Rivers,” unpublished, April 2006, p. 21. Written as a supplement to his autobiographical file at the Virginia Military Institute archives.

41.
Michael Dobbs, “U.S. Had Key Roll in Iraq Buildup,”
Washington Post
, December 30, 2002, p. A1.

42.
Comments by George Cave, William Eagleton, Nicholas Veliotes, and Steven Ward, “Toward an International History of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988: A Critical Oral History Workshop,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, pp. 263–65. At the height of the fighting, on March 23 the CIA issued a speculative report presenting the “worst-case scenario” on the prospects of an Iranian victory: “Iran is determined to replace Saddam’s secular Baathist government with a radical fundamentalist Shia regime controlled by Tehran.” With three-quarters of the Iraqi army being Shia, there was a distinct possibility of the army disintegrating—a prophetic prediction when one looks at the Iraqi army during the U.S. invasion of 2003. “An Iranian victory could lead fairly rapidly to Iranian hegemony over the entire Gulf—Kuwait and Bahrain would be especially vulnerable,” the CIA report concluded. It went on for eight pages describing dire possibilities if the Iranians triumphed: massive disruptions in world oil supplies; spillover fighting in northern Kuwait; Saddam Hussein’s retaliating by lifting all restraints, including hitting major Iranian cities with chemical weapons; massive airlift of new equipment from the Soviets to shore up their client, which would lead to a closer bond between Baghdad and Moscow. CIA, “Iran-Iraq: Consequences of an Iranian Breakthrough at Al Basra,” March 23, 1984.

43.
Thomas Twetten, interviews with author, June 20 and 28, 2007.

C
HAPTER 6
S
HARON’S
G
RAND
D
ESIGN

1.
John Boykin,
Cursed Is the Peacemaker: The American Diplomat versus the Israeli General, Beirut 1982
(Belmont, CA: Applegate Press, 2002), p. 43.

2.
Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “Bush: Sharon a Man of Peace,”
Washington Post
, April 19, 2002, p. A1.

3.
Veliotes memorandum to Bremer, “Telcon with Habib 10 July,” July 10, 1982, cited in Boykin,
Cursed Is the Peacemaker
, p. 365; Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari,
Israel’s Lebanon War
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 31–108.

4.
American intelligence first detected the Israeli buildup in December 1981, six months before Israel actually launched the attack. Noel Koch memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Lebanon,” February 1, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:687, Folder 1982 Lebanon; Caspar Weinberger handwritten notes from meeting, September 9, 1981, Weinberger Papers; Bing West memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “Invasion of Lebanon Next Moves,” June 15, 1982.

5.
L. Paul Bremer memorandum for William Clark, “Status Report on Lebanon Contingency Planning,” February 12, 1982.

6.
See “The Green Light,” in
Foreign Policy
50 (Spring 1983).

7.
Veliotes interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

8.
Weinberger memorandum for the President, “POTUS Weekly Report,” June 11, 1982.

9.
Cited in Boykin,
Cursed Is the Peacemaker
, p. 65.

10.
President Reagan letter to Menachem Begin, June 9, 1982.

11.
Boykin,
Cursed Is the Peacemaker
, pp. 69–70.

12.
Veliotes interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training; Nathaniel Howell, interview with author, December 2, 1994. After the president appointed Philip Habib as his envoy to negotiate a cease-fire, Haig called him in during a meeting while in Paris and gave him instructions that contradicted the president’s own desire to try to stop the war.

13.
Department of State memorandum for William Clark, “Lebanon: Elements of a U.S. Strategy,” June 5, 1982.

14.
Ronald Reagan, diary entry for June 25, 1982, in Douglas Brinkley, ed.,
The Reagan Diaries
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 91.

15.
Reagan note, undated, Weinberger Papers. Reagan followed it up with an angry phone call on August 12. The Israeli prime minister finally bent to the American will. He ordered a cessation of artillery fire, and he called Reagan back pleading for their continued friendship.
Reagan Diaries
, entry for August 12, 1982, p. 98.

16.
Cited in Boykin,
Cursed Is the Peacemaker
, p. 74.

17.
The CIA initially suspected his motivation had been revenge for the killing of Tony Frangieh. Interview with retired CIA officer in 2009.

18.
Comments by Colonel Robert Johnston and Colonel Mead, “Lebanon Briefing,” December 1, 1982, Beirut Oral History Transcripts, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Box 2, p. 31.

19.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, February 8, 1983, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
www.mfa.gov.il
, accessed February 12, 2011.

20.
Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee,” November 2, 1983, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 98th Congress, 1st Session; “Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for Improving That Security,” House Armed Services Committee, Report No. 98-58, 1985, p. 96.

21.
On October 19, 1982, President Gemayel traveled to Washington. The United States agreed to pay for thirty-five Israeli M-48 tanks for the Lebanese army, the first of some two hundred armored vehicles to be provided to that army.

22.
Retired CIA officer e-mail to author, October 13, 2009.

23.
Point paper, Headquarters Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy, and Operations, “Attack on Marine Positions,” August 10, 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Lebanon Papers, Disc 23.

24.
David Martin and John Walcott,
Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War Against Terrorism
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), p. 115.

25.
“Agreement between the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel,” May 17, 1983; Major General Andrew Cooley, USA, interviewed by Walter Poole, April 10, 1984.

26.
Caspar Weinberger memorandum to William Clark, “Lebanon Initiative,” July 28, 1983.

27.
Colonel Timothy Geraghty, interviewed by Benis Frank, May 28, 1983, Beirut Oral History Transcripts, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Box 2, pp. 5–6.

28.
Timothy Geraghty e-mail to author, March 3, 2011.

29.
Timothy Geraghty,
Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Press, 2009), p. 40; Colonel Jerry Walsh, USMC (Ret.), interview with author, June 18, 2010.

30.
Colonel Timothy Geraghty, interviewed by Benis Frank, November 21, 1983, Beirut Oral History Transcripts, Marine Corps Archives, GRC, Box 2, pp. 6–7.

31.
Authorization Under the War Powers Resolution—Lebanon: Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983, pp. 2–7.

32.
In May 1983 European Command looked to expand the marines’ presence along the Sidon highway from Beirut to the Awali River. It was dependent upon the Israeli withdrawal, which did not happen until September. Lieutenant
Colonel William Solomon, “Beirut Lessons Learned,” undated [1983], U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Box 1, Folder Chronology of Events.

33.
Department of the Army, DAMO-SSM, “Lebanon Update,” August 19, 1983; Walter Poole, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Involvement in Lebanon: July 1982–February 1984,” Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1988.

34.
Poole, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Involvement in Lebanon,” p. 27.

35.
Caspar Weinberger,
Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon
(New York: Warner, 1990), p. 360.

36.
Carl Stiner, interview with author, April 2009; McFarlane interview.

37.
COMSIXTHFLEET message to CINCUSNAVEUR, “Deployment of FASTAB to Beirut” (0816Z), August 1983, GRC, Lebanon Papers, Disc 23.

38.
U.S. Marine Corps, “Mass Casualty Report on Beirut, Lebanon,” September 8, 1983, GRC, Lebanon Papers, Disc 26.

39.
CTF Six One message to Commander, Sixth Fleet, “Joint Daily Intelligence Summary 095 for the Period 031800Z-041759Z” (05000Z), September 1983; CTF Six Two message to CTF Six One, “Update” (04117Z), September 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Lebanon Papers, Disc 26.

40.
Tom Clancy, Carl Stiner, and Tony Koltz,
Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces
(New York: Putnam’s Sons, 2002), p. 238.

41.
Martin and Walcott,
Best Laid Plans
, p. 121.

42.
Weinberger Diaries, entry for September 11, 1983, Weinberger Papers.

43.
Ronald Reagan memorandum addendum to NSDD, “On Lebanon of September 10,” September 11, 1983, Weinberger Papers, Box I:729, Folder Lebanon 7.

44.
CTF Six One message to COMSIXTHFLEET, “Employment of ANGLICO Team in Direct Support of the Lebanese Armed Forces” (131630Z), September 1983, GRC, Lebanon Papers, Disc 28; COMSIXTHFLEET message to CTF Six Zero, “Close Air Support for Defense of Suq al-Gharb” (191139Z), September 1983; CTF Six One message to COMSIXTHFLEET, “Concept of Operations in Support of Suq al-Gharb” (160517Z), September 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Lebanon Papers, Disc 29.

45.
Geraghty,
Peacekeepers at War
, p. 65.

46.
Ibid., pp. 62–63.

47.
Geraghty interview with Frank, November 21, 1983, pp. 11–12. The United States had responded three days earlier. On September 16, several rounds from a Druze artillery battery landed near the U.S. embassy. The American naval gunfire responded by sending sixty 5-inch shells in the general direction of batteries in the Chouf Mountains. The next day, Stiner, who was not in the chain of command, canceled the order by calling in the rickety Lebanese air force instead of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Handwritten notes, “19 September After Action Report,” September 19, 1983, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Disc 29; CINCUSNAVEUR message, “Geopolitical Intelligence Highlights” (191820Z), September 1983; Summary and Conclusions, “Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements,” House Armed Services Committee; Clyde Mark, “Marine Security in Beirut: A Comparison of the House Armed Services Committee and the Long Commission Reports,” Congressional Research Service, January 1984, p. 4.

C
HAPTER 7
A S
PECTACULAR
A
CTION

1.
Robert Baer,
The Devil We Know
(New York: Three Rivers, 2008), pp. 53–63; Ronen Bergman,
The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Clandestine Struggle Against the World’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Power
(New York: Free Press, 2007), p. 59; David Hirst,
Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East
(New York: Nation Books, 2010), p. 185.