The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (117 page)

15.
Kelly interview with Stern.

16.
Picco,
Man without a Gun,
p. 157.

17.
Iran claimed that Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins was killed in retaliation for the Israeli kidnapping of a Lebanese scholar. “I deeply regret the reported killing of the U.S. hostage but Israel should be blamed for the tragedy,” said Majlis Foreign Affairs Commission official Sa’id Reja’i Khorsani, “Majlis Official Regrets Higgins Execution,”
Tehran Times
in English, August 5, 1989, FBIS, August 10, 1989.

18.
The killings of Iranian dissidents led many in the White House to conclude that the Iranians had merely exchanged hostage taking for assassinations. Bruce Riedel, interview with author, December 22, 2011.

19.
George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft,
A World Transformed
(New York: Vintage, 1999), pp. 383–84, 399, 432–33.

20.
Picco,
Man Without a Gun
, p. 6.

21.
Interview with former Iranian official; Mousavian interview.

22.
Richard Haass,
War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), p. 38.

23.
“The New Presidency: Excerpts from an Interview with Clinton after the Air Strikes,”
New York Times
, January 14, 1993. Under pressure from the media and his own advisers, President Clinton backtracked the next day on what many believed had been an offer to Saddam Hussein for better relations.

24.
Pollack,
Persian Puzzle
, pp. 259–60.

25.
Martin Indyk,
Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), p. 39.

26.
Ibid.

27.
Dennis Ross,
The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p. 105.

28.
Indyk,
Innocent Abroad
, p. 43.

29.
His words had been coordinated through the U.S. government and originally planned to be given by Anthony Lake, who canceled at the last minute because of a conflict. Remarks by Martin Indyk, “Challenges to U.S. Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities,” Soref Symposium, May 18–19, 1993, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, pp. 1–8.

30.
Ibid., p. 3.

31.
Ibid., p. 6.

32.
Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,”
Foreign Affairs
73:2 (March–April 1994).

33.
Remarks by Paul Wolfowitz, “Challenges to U.S. Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities,” Soref Symposium, May 18–19, 1993, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 18.

34.
General Shalikashvili, confirmation testimony, preparation book, volume 2, enclosure, “Potential Q&A,” 1993; Elaine Sciolino, “CIA Says Iran Making Progress on Atom Arms,”
New York Times
, November 30, 1992. Shalikashvili added that Iraq could also produce a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade if UN sanctions were lifted.

35.
Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2010,
www.cfr.org/publication/16811/irans_nuclear_program.html
, accessed October 8, 2010.

36.
Hooshang Amirahmadi, interview with author, June 25, 2010.

37.
Pollack,
Persian Puzzle
, p. 266.

38.
Osama Hamdan, interview with author, February 16, 2010, Beirut, Lebanon.

39.
Hamdan told the author this over dinner in a restaurant in Hezbollah-controlled south Beirut.

40.
Hamdan interview.

41.
Michael Eisenstadt, “Déjà Vu All Over Again? An Assessment of Iran’s Military Buildup,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, McNair Paper 29: Iran’s Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, April 1994, p. 12.

C
HAPTER 21
W
AR OR
P
EACE

1.
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit,
Command Chronology
, entry for July 1, December 31, 1995, Enclosure 1, pp. 2-6-2-7; Patrick Clawson, comments to author, January 14, 2010.

2.
Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Is Wary as Iran Adds Troops in Gulf,”
New York Times
, March 1, 1995.

3.
Shalikashvili memorandum to Binford Peay, “Expanded Deliberate Planning Against Iran,” October 5, 1995.

4.
“Rafsanjani Answers Question on Regional Issues,” Iranian News Agency in English, May 30, 1995.

5.
Tim Weiner, “U.S. Plan to Change Iran Leaders Is an Open Secret Before It Begins,”
New York Times
, January 25, 1996; Elaine Sciolino, “The Schooling of Gingrich, the Foreign Policy Novice,”
New York Times
, July 18, 1995.

6.
Pollack,
Persian Puzzle
, p. 274.

7.
Kenneth Pollack, interview with author, March 2010. Pollack believes that hard-liners opposed to Rafsanjani seized on this issue as a way of scrapping any possible rapprochement between the United States and Iran.

8.
Interview with Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, IRIB Television, Second Program Network in Persian, “Official Comments on U.S. Propaganda Campaign,” FBIS, January 4, 1996; Algiers Accords, January 19, 1981.

9.
“Khamene’i Assails U.S., Zionist Terrorist Moves,” IRIB Television, First Program Network in Persian, FBIS, March 6, 1996.

10.
All eight likely cooperated with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War; however, it’s highly unlikely they ever worked for American intelligence. “Five Sentenced to Death for Spying for U.S., Iraq,” Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, FBIS, January 6, 1996; “Three People Arrested on Charges of Spying for the U.S.,” AFP, FBIS, June 11, 1996.

11.
Richard Clarke,
Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror
(New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 112.

12.
Indictment,
United States vs. Ahmed Al-Mughassil et al.
, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, June 2001.

13.
While many intelligence officers suspected that the supreme leader authorized the attack on Khobar Towers, to date, there has been no conclusive evidence that he did. While it is hard to imagine such an important action not having his blessing, the Quds Force is given wide latitude to undertake its operations. Riedel interview.

14.
Both the DIA and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations had warned of possible terrorism in the region and had conducted a study that pointed out the vulnerabilities of Khobar Towers, especially the small perimeter that permitted civilian vehicles to get close to the barracks on the north side. Had they known about the plot uncovered by the Saudis, it might have galvanized officials to take action and averted the disaster that followed. Allen interview; Downing Report, August 30, 1996, Finding 18, p. 38; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Creamer and Lieutenant Colonel James Seat, “Khobar Towers: The Aftermath and Implications for Commanders,” Air War College, Air University, April 1998, pp. 5–21.

15.
United States vs. Ahmed Al-Mughassil
, Criminal No. 01-228-A.

16.
Perry Jamieson,
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force History and Museums Program, 2008), p. 13.

17.
Unfortunately, no one activated the basewide Giant voice with its audible alarm designed to alert everyone to danger. Downing Report, Finding 20, p. 46.

18.
Staff Sergeant Eric Ziegler, cited in Jamieson,
Khobar Towers
, pp. 46–47.

19.
Louis Freeh letter to Prince Bandar bin Sultan, July 11, 1996.

20.
According to Richard Clarke, Bandar and others in the Saudi leadership welcomed a conflict with Iran, but were worried that Washington would start a war and not overthrow the Iranian regime based upon their experience in Desert Storm. Clarke,
Against All Enemies
, p. 117. On January 15, 2004, Paul Wolfowitz asked whether al-Qaeda had been behind Khobar Towers. The Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism responded to the deputy secretary “that no credible intelligence strand indicates Al-Qaeda involvement in Khobar Towers bombing. Intelligence has conclusively established Saudi Hezbollah and Lebanon Hezbollah’s responsibility, with direction and oversight provided by the Iranian government.”

21.
Mousavian interview.

22.
Jay Hines, interview with author, June 17, 2002.

23.
There had always been some tension between the United States and Iran due to the latter’s calculating its twelve-mile territorial waters differently than accepted conventions, giving Iran control over a few miles farther out into the Gulf. The U.S. Navy delighted in challenging these claims by steaming a frigate into the disputed water just to assert the right of “freedom of navigation.” Frequently, Iran responded by dispatching some small boats to pester the American warship. CINCCENT message to Joint Staff, “Freedom of Navigation Program” (260959Z), April 1994.

24.
Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni message for Vice Admiral Dennis Blair, “Maritime Incident between USS
Paul F. Foster
and Iranian Patrol Craft” (021912Z), May 1997.

25.
Kenneth Pollack, “What If Iran Was Behind al-Khobar? Planning for a U.S. Response,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 243, April 16, 1997.

26.
General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), interview with author, August 26, 2010.

27.
Clarke,
Against All Enemies
, pp. 119–20.

28.
Riedel interview.

29.
George Tenet,
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA
(New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 124.

30.
Con Coughlin,
Khomeini’s Ghost: The Iranian Revolution and the Rise of Militant Islam
(New York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 279.

31.
Cited in Said Amir Arjomand,
After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 82.

32.
“Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami,” January 7, 1998,
www.cnn.com/world/9801/07/iran/interview.html
, accessed October 31, 2010.

33.
Coughlin,
Khomeini’s Ghost
, p. 282; Zinni interview.

34.
Richard Murphy and Zalmay Khalilzad, “Iran after Khatami’s Elections: Whither U.S. Containment Policy?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 256, June 20, 1997.

35.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph McMillan memorandum, “Iran: Domestic and Foreign Policy,” February 3, 2001.

36.
Indyk,
Innocent Abroad
, pp. 215–17.

37.
Ibid., p. 219.

38.
Pollack interview; Zinni interview.

39.
Ambassador Hadi Nejad Hosseinian letter to the Secretary General, United Nations, S/1999/1274, enclosure, December 22, 1999; Secretary of State message to U.S. Mission, United Nations, “Response to Alleged Violations of Iranian Territorial Waters,” undated.

40.
Speech by President William Clinton, June 21, 1998,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrsEhjm1DS0
, accessed October 30, 2010.

41.
President William Clinton, “Remarks at the Seventh Millennium Evening at the White House,” April 12, 1999,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William Jefferson Clinton
, part I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), p. 545.

42.
Pollack,
Persian Puzzle
, p. 323.

43.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, “Remarks before the American-Iranian Council,” March 17, 2000, Washington, D.C. The speech went exceedingly well except for one line by the secretary: “Despite the trend towards democracy, control over the military, judiciary, courts and police remains in unelected hands.” Ken Pollack, a respected CIA analyst now working on the NSC staff, listened to the “unelected hands” line and cringed. He had lobbied hard to no avail to have it removed, believing that it would be seen in Tehran as questioning the legitimacy of the supreme leader.