The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (113 page)

42.
Lugo interview.

43.
CNO-OP 6B memorandum for the record, “Mobile Sea Base,” CM-3-88 Document Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Folder USMC Ops in Persian Gulf, Folder #2, p. 1; Major, pp. 1–4; CINCCENT message to COMIDEASTFOR, “Barge OIC’s” (151639Z), September 1987, p. 1.

44.
General Royal Moore, “Personal For” message to Rear Admiral Fogarty, “Mobile Sea Basing Brief” (151820Z), September 1987.

45.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3 Decision paper, September 1987, CM-3-88 Document Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center.

46.
Admiral Crowe “Personal For” message to General Crist, “Visit to CMEF” (172330Z), September 1987, pp. 3–8.

47.
Parran interview; COMIDEASTFOR message, “
Iran Ajr
” (252035Z), September 1987.

48.
This had led to speculation that Iran had advance information about the
La Salle
’s schedule.

49.
Complete collections of teletype and paper-tape messages found on board the
Iran Ajr
, in
Case Concerning Oil Platforms
, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibits 70–72, June 23, 1997.

50.
Ziegler interview.

51.
COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intelligence Advisory—175/87—Landing Craft Engagement” (221735Z), September 1987, Earnest Will Collection, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 10, Folder 9.

52.
Grieve interview; Bernsen interview.

53.
Captain Marc Thomas, USN (Ret.), interviews with author, August 15, 1995. Also again in 2007; Parran interview.

54.
USS
Jarrett
message for COMIDEASTFOR, “SITREP” (212313Z), September 1987; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intelligence Advisory—175/87—Landing Craft Engagement” (212245Z), September 1987, Earnest Will Collection, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 18, Folder 10.

55.
Weinberger Diary, entry for September 21, 1987.

56.
Thomas interview; Sergeant Gilbert Kerr, USMC Oral History, Marine Corps History Divison, January 5, 1988.

57.
Bernsen interview with Partin.

58.
Grieve interview; Lugo interview; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Iranian Landing Craft Capture Plan” (212315Z), September 1987.

59.
Thomas interview. Combat photographers captured the entire assault on videotape. See
Persian Gulf Operations
, Defense Visual Information Center, March Air Force Base, Pin No. D5-208DM-002, Series Title DN-DEE-92-0009, Tape 5.

60.
Thomas interview.

61.
Parran interview.

62.
Lieutenant Commander Paul Evancoe, USN (Ret.), interview with author, May 22, 1995; Commander Peter Wikul, interview with author, August 17, 1995.

63.
Wikul interview.

64.
Ibid.

65.
“Excerpts from the Address to the General Assembly by the President of Iran,”
New York Times
, September 23, 1987.

66.
Most of the Iranians captured were very docile. Only a couple of officers showed any real hostility to the Americans. Lieutenant John M. Ickes, USN Oral History, January 28, 1988, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.

67.
John Kifner, “United States Blows Up Captured Iranian Vessel,”
New York Times
, September 26, 1987.

68.
The location of the
Iran Ajr
’s sinking was 27˚00´ north, 051˚23´ east. COMIDEASTFOR message, “After Action Report for Sinking of
Iran Ajr
” (260030Z), September 1987; Evancoe interview.

C
HAPTER 16
A V
ERY
C
LOSE
C
ALL

1.
CIA, “We Watched the Gulf,”
Studies in Intelligence
33:1 (Spring 1989), p. 6; Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Planned Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities” (01150Z), October 1987, pp. 1–2; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intel Advisory 187/87, Persian Gulf Threat Update” (271650Z), September 1987, Files Intelligence Notebook I, 1985–1987, JTFME/MEF Operations, Operations Archives, Naval Historical Center, Series VI, Box 18.

2.
Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor,
The General’s War
(New York: Little, Brown, 1995), p. 38.

3.
Strasser notebook, entry for September 29, 1987, Rear Admiral Strasser, USN (Ret.), interview with author, April 7, 2007.

4.
Riahi interview.

5.
CIA, “We Watched the Gulf”; Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Planned Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities,” pp. 1–2; COMIDEASTFOR message, “Force Intel Advisory 187/87.”

6.
General Crist daily notebook; Crowe, Daily Schedule, October 1, 1987. In May 1988 two additional P-3s were added, based with the others in Dhahran.
Command History, 1988
, pp. ii–121; Ambassador Edward Gnehm, interviews with author, May 16 and June 29, 1995.

7.
USS
Guadalcanal
,
Command History, 1987
, entry for October 3, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center.

8.
Penzler interview; Crist interview. Many believe that the AWACS radar while operating in maritime mode simply picked up wavelets and mistook them for small boats. As the radar has to be preset to pick up objects traveling at a certain speed, in this case twenty to twenty-five knots, it remains a distinct possibility that on October 3 the AWACS picked up the tops of waves in the water traveling at this speed. General Charles Horner and Colonel George Williams, both of whom were heavily involved with AWACS operations in the Gulf during this period, believe this was in fact the case. However, in light of what happened on October 8 and the additional intelligence indicators, the threat posed by massed Iranian boats was real. General Charles Horner, USAF (Ret.), interview with author, July 28, 1995; Colonel George Williams, USAF, interview with author, December 13, 1994.

9.
Fariborz Haghshenass, “Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2008, p. 5.

10.
Evancoe interview; Grieve interview; Lieutenant Colonel James R. Pruden, Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Division, January 5, 1988. CENTCOM asked the chief of naval operations to dispatch a team from Naval Sea and Air Systems Commands to the Gulf to see the barges firsthand and come up with any additional recommendations. While NavSea established a twenty-four-hour crisis support cell to facilitate support for the barges, a survey team arrived in the Gulf on September 23. Many of its recommendations reiterated earlier concerns, especially ammo handling and HERO problems. One of the team’s best ideas was for a redesign of the proposed helicopter hangar on the
Hercules
, which allowed for helicopters to be brought in for maintenance without tying down the main flight deck for operations. Additionally, it strongly recommended that a second helicopter deck be constructed on the
Wimbrown
. The current deck, thirty by thirty feet, while strong enough to support the small army helicopters, would not be strong enough to support the larger navy and marine helicopters.

Also from John W. Parton,
Special Operations Forces in Operation Earnest Will/Prime Chance I
, pp. 44–45. In case the Iranians directly challenged them, the barges would be reinforced with metal plating and sandbags while the marines manned a variety of weapons: .50-caliber machine guns, Mk-19 grenade launchers, a TOW missile, 81-mm mortars, and Stinger missiles. There was even discussion of placing a tank on board, but this was rejected as it would make the barge top-heavy. For protection, the barges would be moved randomly every few days among the Saudi islands and oil platforms. To prevent an attack on the barge, a layered defense was envisioned. The helicopters interdicted any target out to fifty nautical miles, while the Mk-IIIs covered the middle distances of ten to twenty miles, with the smaller Seafoxes and PBRs safeguarding the five miles around the barges. If all else failed, the marine security force would provide the final layer, manning the barges’ machine guns, armed with pistols and M-16s to repel boarders if necessary. APP Comment on ComNavSpecWar Group One, Det. 12 (26170Z), September 1987; “Surveys in Support to Arabian Gulf Mobile Sea Bases,” September 30, 1987.

11.
Middle East Force/Joint Task Force Middle East,
Command History, 1988
, Enclosure 5, p. 7.

12.
Interview with senior military officer.

13.
Evancoe interview; Wikul interview.

14.
Wikul interview.

15.
Lieutenant Colonel Edward B. Cummings, USMC, interview with Mr. Benis Frank, January 4, 1988, and Captain Ernie L. Gillespie, OIC Det. 2d Radio Battalion, interview with Mr. Benis Frank, January 6, 1988, Marine Corps Oral History Collection, Marine Corps History Divsion.

16.
Gillespie interview with Frank.

17.
Persian Gulf Operations
, Series Title DN-DEE-92-0009, Tape 4.

18.
American Consulate message, “Partition of Iranian Detainees Observe/Interpreters Report” (181215Z), October 1987, Series IIII: JTFME Public Affairs, JTFME Iranian Gunboat Attack, October 1987–April 1988, Box 10, Operational Archives, Navy Historical Center.

19.
It is not known if the Iranians realized the United States had deployed the mobile sea base.
Persian Gulf Operations
, Series Title DN-DEE-92-0009, Tape 4; American Consul message, “Partition of Iranian Detainees Observe/Interpreters Report.”

20.
Wikul interview.

21.
Evancoe interview.

22.
Captain Jerry O’Donnell, USN (Ret.), e-mails to author, April 27, May 1 and 2, 2001.

23.
Sreedhar and Kaul, p. 61.

24.
See “Archive of Incoming Messages, Rostam Oil Platform,”
Case Concerning Oil Platforms
, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibits 118–19, Annex, Volume 4.

25.
CINCCENT message, “Execute Order—Operation Nimble Archer” (180350Z), October 1987.

26.
CJTFME message, “Operation Nimble Archer After Action Report” (260958Z), October 1987; USS
Hoel
(DDG-13),
Command History, 1987
, p. 3.

27.
The total number of rounds fired at the platform was 1,065. Chief of Naval Operations, “Arabian Gulf Lessons Learned Report: April–November 1987,” p. 16.

28.
Frédéric Lert,
Wings of the CIA
(Paris: Histoire and Collections, 1998), pp. 279–84; Wayne Mutza,
Loach: The Story of the H-6/Model 500 Helicopter
(Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2005), pp. 71–75.

29.
Twetten interview.

30.
On October 5, 6, and 13, Admiral Crowe went to the Hill to brief relevant congressional subcommittees on both the Saudi decision to accept the CIA aircraft and the Eager Glacier program, describing how this capability added to the U.S. military. At least on this aspect of Earnest Will, Congress appeared satisfied and raised no objections. Admiral William Crowe, “Opening Statement,” U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, July 21, 1992,
www.fas.org/news/iran/1992/920722-236124.htm
, accessed September 1, 2005.

31.
Hart interview.

32.
Horner interview.

33.
Penzler interview; Crist interview.

34.
Lert,
Wings of the CIA
, pp. 279–80. Lert writes that the surveillance aircraft were Beechcraft King Air 100, very similar to the Merlin.

35.
Grieve interview; CENTCOM, “Lessons Learned,” Draft Script Slides 16L and 16R.

36.
Grieve interview.

37.
Rear Admiral Donald Dyer, USN, interview with author, December 19, 1994, Norfolk, Virginia.

38.
General George Crist letter to Admiral William Crowe, “Eager Glacier,” November 30, 1987.

39.
CIA was adamant about maintaining its own search and rescue capability, in the event one of its aircraft crashed or was shot down. Howard Hart observed: “We have no protections, if we are shot down. It’s not like an air force or navy pilot, which affords you some legal protections. What you are as a CIA pilot is a mercenary black spy who could be shot immediately. If a military pilot gets killed, it’s an act of war; we get killed, nobody gives a shit—you’re a filthy spy, so who cares.”