The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (34 page)

Cave pulled Nir aside and asked, “Have you fully vetted Ghorbanifar?”

“Yes, he’s trustworthy,” Nir answered, but Cave remained unconvinced.

Knowledge of both the presidential covert action finding and the subsequent arms shipments remained tightly held by the NSC and the CIA. Worried that the NSA might uncover the details of the arms transfers, Oliver North wanted access to any intercepted communications limited, and ordered the agency’s director, William Odom, to exclude both Shultz and Weinberger. To North’s annoyance, Odom refused. “I work for the defense secretary and the president, not Bill Casey or Ollie North,” the stubborn Odom replied. He had the pertinent intercepts hand carried to Powell. “Weinberger knew of each transfer within a few days by the signals intercepts.”
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Odom considered offering the same information to Secretary Shultz, but the secretary of state refused. He vigorously opposed the arms deals, and the less he knew, the happier and better Shultz felt. But his department certainly knew of the gist of the dealings. Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage spoke daily to his counterpart at State, Arnold Raphel, about the
significant developments from the intelligence reports on the secret dealings with Iran.
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Odom thought the entire idea was foolhardy. In Weinberger’s office one afternoon, the two men discussed the arms-for-hostages operation. “You know this is going to leak, and I hate to say it, but it is going to cause a great crisis,” said Odom. “Why don’t you go over and convince the president to call it off. There is no chance it will succeed.”

“Bill, I’ve tried,” a frustrated Weinberger replied. “He just can’t be convinced.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William Crowe remained the one man in the dark on the shenanigans. He accidently discovered the affair in July 1986. His executive assistant, Lieutenant General John Moellering, had attended an NSC meeting in which North let slip a reference to Iranian arms sales. After the meeting, he and Rich Armitage drove back to the Pentagon together.

“What was that reference to Iran and arms?” Moellering asked.

“You don’t know what they’ve concocted? When we get back, come up to my office and I’ll fill you in.”

Moellering promptly told Crowe, who confronted Weinberger.

“I was against it,” shrugged Weinberger, “but the decision had been made and the president wasn’t going to change his mind. I saw no point in bringing you in.”
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I
n April, Ghorbanifar appeared to achieve a breakthrough. He returned from Iran and proposed a meeting in Tehran with senior Iranian officials, including a meeting with the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Rafsanjani, and Prime Minister Mousavi as part of a final exchange of weapons for the hostages. Initially, Cave and North were to fly first to Tehran with Ghorbanifar to lay the groundwork for the larger meeting with McFarlane. Ghorbanifar offered use of a Lear jet and a house to stay in in Tehran. But Poindexter overruled this as too risky, perhaps fearing news would leak before McFarlane’s more important meeting.
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North sent a memo to Poindexter: “I believe we have succeeded. Thank God—he answers prayers.”
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At eight thirty in the morning on May 25, 1986, an unmarked Israeli aircraft piloted by the CIA touched down at the airport in Tehran. The U.S.
delegation consisted of Bud McFarlane, Oliver North, George Cave, NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Israeli Amiram Nir (pretending to be an American), and a CIA communicator who provided secure communications for the entourage back to Poindexter in Washington. Their plane carried one pallet of Hawk missile parts, with another aircraft filled with twelve more pallets standing by in Israel to be sent the minute the hostages were released. An Iranian airport guard ushered the group into a VIP lounge. Here they waited for someone to appear, content to make polite small talk with the Iranian base commander, who entertained them with an air show using some of his F-4s, having recently received a shipment of spare parts from the West.

In fact, the U.S. visit caught the Iranians completely by surprise. Despite the agreement and having relayed the day of McFarlane’s arrival, the Iranians did not really think the Americans would come. When the Revolutionary Guard heard of this strange delegation’s appearance in Tehran, they sent men over to the old U.S. embassy to examine the personnel files. They scanned them and could find no one named McFarlane or North, but did see a George Cave. So they agreed to meet with the Americans.
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More than an hour later, Ghorbanifar appeared with Kangarlou in tow, both men looking harried. Ghorbanifar made an excuse about the Americans arriving early and escorted them to several old cars that would serve as their humble motorcade. They drove to the old Hilton Hotel—now called Independence Hotel—where the Revolutionary Guard had hastily cleared the entire top floor for the unexpected American delegation. A secure message transmitted to the White House regarding their arrival stated, “We have been treated politely, though heavily escorted by Revolutionary Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms.”
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The first meeting began at five p.m. Three Iranians arrived, none of whom appeared to be either polished or senior officials. The Iranians opened with a litany of grievances and American transgressions. Regardless, McFarlane put that aside and began with rehearsed remarks designed to get the negotiations moving.

President Reagan had asked him to do what was necessary to find common ground for discussions in the future, to try to find common ground for cooperation, McFarlane told the Iranians. The United States had no desire to reverse the Iranian Revolution and was willing to work with the government.

Very quickly, however, it became apparent that the two sides were operating from completely different views on what had been agreed to. The
United States expected the hostages to be released immediately, and before any more Hawk missile parts arrived. The Iranians thought that the United States intended to provide them a vast array of weapons and spare parts, with the hostages to be released at a later date. It became apparent to Cave that Ghorbanifar had promised the Iranians much more in the way of weapons than the United States would ever agree to. Ghorbanifar had lied to both sides.

In a message sent to Poindexter, McFarlane relayed his view of the Iranian government: “It might be best for us to try to picture what it would be like if after a nuclear attack, a surviving tailor became vice president; a recent grad student became secretary of state; and a bookie became the interlocutor for all discourse with foreign countries. While the principals are a cut above this level of qualification, the incompetence of the Iranian government to do business requires a rethinking on our part of why there have been so many frustrating failures to deliver on their part.”
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When McFarlane threatened to leave, the Iranians promised him a meeting with an official of greater stature. A short time later, a member of the parliament and a senior political adviser to Rafsanjani, Hadi Najafabadi, arrived on the fifteenth floor of the old Hilton Hotel to meet with the Americans. A short, bearded man, Najafabadi immediately impressed the delegation. A mullah who had taken off his turban, he was several cuts above the other Iranians: confident, Western educated, cultured, and able to converse in excellent English.

McFarlane repeated why they were in Iran and his hopes that this would create the beginning of a renewed friendship and a strategic opening between the two nations. He stressed the threat of the Soviet Union to Iran. He told them that the United States knew about a planned Soviet invasion and that the Soviets had already conducted two rehearsals. The United States had a high-level source, a Soviet major general named Vladimir, who confirmed the Soviet intentions. This was pure fabrication, concocted on the plane ride over, but it drove home the theme the United States wanted to leave with the Iranians: that Moscow, not Washington, posed the greater risk to Iranian security.

McFarlane handed over to Najafabadi a slickly produced packet of intelligence developed by the CIA on Soviet forces arrayed along the Iranian border. He then informed the Iranian that the Soviets had recently told their rival, Saddam Hussein, that they would do everything in their power to keep Iraq from losing the war. McFarlane conveniently left out that American public diplomacy was doing the same thing for Iraq.

Najafabadi agreed with McFarlane’s assessment of the Soviet threat. He also impressed upon his American counterpart the risk his own government took in meeting with the Americans. It all looked hopeful. McFarlane cabled Poindexter with a slightly optimistic message: “Have finally reached a competent Iranian official…. We are on the way to something that can become a truly strategic gain for us at the expense of the Soviets. But it is going to be painfully slow.”
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Najafabadi added new conditions set by Hezbollah for the hostages’ release. This included Israeli evacuation of the Golan Heights, monetary compensation, and release of seventeen Shiite prisoners who had been arrested for participation in a massive series of bombings in Kuwait in July 1983. The American delegation convened out on a balcony to avoid the presumed microphones in the hotel rooms. No one could be sure whether the Iranians were simply trying to extract more concessions or had difficulties controlling their surrogates. McFarlane stuck to his instructions from Poindexter. He insisted on the hostages’ release first and no new preconditions.
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On Tuesday, May 27, talks continued. The two sides wrangled over sending the Hawk spare parts immediately or an immediate release of the hostages. Late in the afternoon, a conciliatory Najafabadi arrived bearing “good news.” The Lebanese captives had dropped all their demands except release of their colleagues in Kuwait. He then pleaded for the United States to immediately send the spare parts to Iran. The Americans could not deliver on this, but drafted a proposed statement they hoped would satisfy the Iranians, saying the United States would “work to achieve a release and fair treatment for Shiites held in confinement.” It did not, but talks continued well into the next morning. They were like two parties haggling in the bazaar. McFarlane threatened to leave if all the hostages were not returned, and Najafabadi and the other Iranians offered two hostages immediately in return for more missile spare parts. After a phone call with Poindexter around one thirty in the morning, McFarlane gave the Iranians until four a.m. to free all the hostages. If they did, an aircraft carrying the remainder of the Hawk spare parts would arrive in Tehran at ten a.m. If not, the U.S. delegation would leave. The Iranians balked, pleading for more time; McFarlane gave them until six thirty. When no hostages emerged, the U.S. delegation ate breakfast and packed up to go to the airport.

A visibly exhausted Najafabadi again asked for more time. “The hostages are not in our control.”

“You have our position,” McFarlane replied. “When you can meet it, let me know.”

Privately, the Americans worried the Iranians might try to hold them hostage, but the real threat came from opponents of the talks within the regime. News spread of the arrival of McFarlane and the Americans. Not everyone liked it. Mehdi Hashemi organized a mob to go and get the Americans. At about eight a.m., his mob of vigilantes formed and began moving toward the hotel. Kangarlou came into the hotel and yelled at Cave, “Get everyone up. You need to leave immediately!” The Iranians brought three nondescript jalopies and they drove McFarlane’s group by backstreets to the military side of the airport. Had Hashemi succeeded, Reagan would have had his own hostage crisis.

Just as Cave boarded the aircraft, a senior Revolutionary Guard intelligence officer, Feridoun Mehdi-Nejat, approached Cave and begged him to stay a few more days. The two intelligence officers had warmed to each other during the three days of talks. “Let’s stay in touch,” he told Cave. Cave nodded in agreement.

As he prepared to board the plane, McFarlane told one of the Iranians that this was the fourth time they had failed to honor an agreement. “Our lack of trust will endure for a long time. An important opportunity has been lost.” With that the cabin door closed and the four-engine 707 taxied down the runway, taking off at 8:55 a.m.

President Reagan followed the McFarlane mission closely. After being informed of the failure of the mission, President Reagan wrote in his diary, “It seems the rug merchants and the Hisballah [sic] would only agree to 2 hostages. Bud told them to shove it, went to the airport and left for Tel Aviv. This was a heartbreaking disappointment for all of us.”
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The failure of the meeting in Tehran should have ended the affair. McFarlane recommended as much to Reagan when he back-briefed the president upon his return to Washington. Reagan refused to concede defeat. Ghorbanifar and Nir continued to encourage the policy, and they found a willing accomplice in North, who zealously continued to work the scheme.

On July 26, Hezbollah released Father Lawrence Jenco, the director of Catholic Relief in Lebanon, after 564 days in harsh captivity. Ghorbanifar had promised the Iranians the remaining twelve pallets of Hawk missile parts when they ordered Jenco’s release. For William Casey, this validated Ghorbanifar. “It is indisputable,” he wrote, “that the Iranian connection
actually worked this time.” Casey attributed this success to Nir sitting on Ghorbanifar. Casey, while not pleased with the deal Ghorbanifar had arranged, recommended continuing with the arms deliveries as a means of securing the release of more hostages. Absent from the director’s arguments was any mention of the strategic opening to counter the Soviet Union that he had so firmly advocated since the spring of 1985.
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