The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (140 page)

¹³
This is a slight adaptation of the definition offered in Martin Wight,
Systems of States
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), 149.

¹⁴
Andreas Osiander,
The States System of Europe 1640–1990
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 40–3.

¹⁵
Wight,
Systems of States
, 62 & 149–50.

¹⁶
On the proposal in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document to delete the references to ‘enemy states’ in the UN Charter, see above, n. 9.

¹⁷
UN doc. S/23500 of 31 Jan. 1992, p. 3. The meeting was attended by thirteen heads of state and government and two foreign ministers.

¹⁸
Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992
(New York: June 1992), paras. 42 & 63. Originally issued as UN doc. A/47/277 – S/24111 of 17 June 1992. This report, like the other reports mentioned here, is available on the UN website,
www.un.org/english

¹⁹
For a contemporary critique, see Adam Roberts, ‘The United Nations and International Security’,
Survival
35 (1993), 3–30.

²⁰
‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’, UN doc. A/50/60 of 3 Jan. 1995.

²¹
SC Res. 1318 of 7 Sep. 2000.

²²
High-level Panel,
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
(New York: United Nations, 2004), UN doc. A/59/565 of 2 Dec. 2004, synopsis.

²³
‘World Summit Outcome’ of 16 Sep. 2005 (above, n. 9), paras. 7, 9, 16, 69, & 72.

²⁴
SC Res. 1624 & 1625, both of 14 Sep. 2005.

²⁵
High-level Panel,
A More Secure World
, synopsis, p. 11.

²⁶
James Goodby, ‘Can Collective Security Work? Reflections on the European Case’, in Chester Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (eds.),
Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict
(Washington, DC, US Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 237. Goodby had been special representative of the President for nuclear security and disarmament during the Clinton administration.

²⁷
See e.g. Paul Kennedy,
The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and Quest for World Government
(London: Allen Lane, 2006).

²⁸
See Hidemi Suganami,
The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

²⁹
GA Res. of 24 Jan. 1946, on ‘Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy’. Although it was the General Assembly that established the Commission, the resolution specified that the new body was to report to the Security Council.

³⁰
See also John Dunbabin’s exploration of this in
Chapter 22
.

³¹
On the activities of the Military Staff Committee, see Bailey and Daws,
Procedure of the UN Security Council
, 274–81.

³²
The ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure, whereby the General Assembly could act when the Security Council was blocked by the veto, was laid down in GA Res. 377(V) of 3 Nov. 1950. For its operation in practice, see Dominik Zaum, ‘The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution’,
Chapter 6
.

³³
As the International Court of Justice stated in its Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962 on
Certain Expenses of the United Nations
– a case in which the issue at stake was the lawfulness under the Charter of UN requirements that member states pay for peacekeeping operations in Congo and the Middle East – ‘it must lie within the power of the Security Council to police a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement action against a State.’ The Court thus viewed it as a question of
implied
powers.
ICJ Reports 1962
, 167.

³⁴
The UN’s and UNAMSIL’s objectives in Sierra Leone had been set out in SC Res. 1289 of 7 Feb. 2000, which made reference to
Chapter VII
. UNAMSIL had proved ineffective in carrying out key parts of its mission.

³⁵
See
Chapter 4
, Adam Roberts, ‘Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical History’.

³⁶
Following the repatriation of the MINUGUA military observers in 1997, MINUGUA continued its other verification and institution-building activities in support of the peace process in Guatemala, and its mandate was regularly renewed by the General Assembly.

³⁷
Inis L. Claude, Jr., ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’,
International Organization
20, no. 3 (Summer 1966), 367–79.

³⁸
What has been referred to as the ‘Just War tradition’ dates back at least to St Augustine. A modern treatment can be found in Michael Walzer,
Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
, 3rd edn. (New York: Basic Books, 2000). The other principles usually associated with the tradition are just cause, right intention, last resort, reasonable prospects of success, and proportionality.

³⁹
Legitimate authority, including that of the UN Security Council, to authorize the use of force is discussed in some of the contributions to Charles Reed and David Ryall (eds.),
The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. Frank Berman (162–9), Michael Quinlan (292–3), and Richard Harries (305–6).

⁴⁰
Claude, ‘Collective Legitimization’, 374.

⁴¹
See Sean D. Murphy, ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security after the Cold War’,
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
32 (1994), 201–88.

⁴²
See Jane Boulden’s discussion of terrorism,
Chapter 27
. In addition, see C. H. Powell, ‘The Legal Authority of the United Nations Security Council’, in Benjamin Goold and Liora Lazarus,
Security and Human Rights
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); P. Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’,
American Journal of International Law
96, no. 4 (2002), 901–2; J. Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’,
American Journal of International Law
, 97, no. 4 (2003), 874 and 875 n. 9; R. Lavalle, ‘A Novel, if Awkward, Exercise in International Law-making: Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)’,
Netherlands International Law Review
(2004), 411. For an analysis of the arguments against a legislative role for the Council, see Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’,
American Journal of International Law
99, no.1 (2005), 179.

⁴³
Two commonly cited alternatives are addressed by later chapters in this volume: the UN General Assembly, acting under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure, and regional security organizations, such as NATO or the African Union.

⁴⁴
Simon Chesterman, ‘Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule of Law’,
Security Dialogue
33, no. 3 (Sep. 2002), 293–307.

⁴⁵
Joachim Krause, ‘Enlightenment and Nuclear Order’,
International Affairs
83, no. 3 (May 2007), 498. This is a special issue on the NPT and the concept of nuclear enlightenment.

⁴⁶
David Harland, ‘Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration’,
Global Governance
, 10, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2004), 15. This is a special issue on the politics of international administration. See also Richard Caplan, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia’,
International Peacekeeping
12, no. 3 (Autumn 2005), 463–76.

⁴⁷
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility to Protect
(Ottawa: International Development Research Council, 2001), xii.

⁴⁸
Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’,
Global Governance
8, (2002), 35.

⁴⁹
This is the term used by Wallander and Keohane to refer to the Council. See ‘Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions’, in Robert O. Keohane,
Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 93.

⁵⁰
Ian Hurd,
After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁵¹
Dominik Zaum, ‘The Authority of International Administrations in International Society’,
Review of International Studies
32, no.3 (July 2006), 457.

⁵²
Allen Buchanan, ‘Political Legitimacy and Democracy’,
Ethics
112 (July 2002), 691. This definition suggests that the phrase ‘legitimate authority’, which is so often used in discussions about the Security Council, is a pleonasm.

⁵³
Ibid., 692.

⁵⁴
Hannah Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, in Hannah Arendt (ed.),
Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought
(New York: Viking Press, 1954), 93.

⁵⁵
John G. Ruggie, ‘International Authority’,
Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization
(London: Routledge, 1998).

⁵⁶
Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational’, in Keohane,
Power and Governance
, 155.

⁵⁷
Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

⁵⁸
Thomas Franck,
The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 19.

⁵⁹
See
Chapter 24
for an illustration of this clash in the cases of Kosovo and Darfur.

⁶⁰
These consultations, which can include either all fifteen Council members or ad hoc smaller groupings, usually precede official decisions and are not formally documented. For their impact on the governance of the Council, see Bailey and Daws,
Procedure of the UN Security Council
, 3rd edn., 18, 21–2 & 60–8; and David D. Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’,
American Journal of International Law
87 (1993), 552–88. Some commentators suggested that even if a ‘second resolution’ on Iraq had been approved by a majority of Council members in 2003, the bargaining and political coercion necessary to achieve such a result would have damaged its legitimacy. See John Ruggie, ‘Measuring the Legitimacy of UN Vote’,
Financial Times
, 14 Mar. 2003.

⁶¹
Examples of this politicized behaviour are the use of the veto by China on extensions of peacekeeping missions in Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia in 1999 (due to China’s objections to the decisions of the latter two countries to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan), and the US veto of a resolution extending the mandates of UN and multinational peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in 2002 (due to US concerns about subjecting American peacekeepers to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court).

⁶²
In 1993, the General Assembly established the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation of and an Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. Its work culminated in a report by the GA president, Razali Ismail of Malaysia, which has continued to serve as a basis for reform discussions. For a further discussion of the pre-2005 reform negotiations, see Mark Zacher, ‘The Conundrums of International Power Sharing: The Politics of Security Council Reform’, in Richard Price and Mark Zacher (eds.),
The United Nations and Global Security
(New York: Palgrave, 2004), 211–25.

⁶³
These so-called Cluster II issues relate to the transparency of Council deliberations and the nature of its communications with non-Council members. Since the end of the Cold War, non-members (both states and NGOs) have been invited to participate in Council meetings, and the current P5 frequently consult with other large powers (such as Germany and Japan) over UN-authorized missions. In addition, the Council now regularly circulates its agenda, and its President briefs both non-members and the international media.

⁶⁴
See Kofi Annan,
In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All – Report of the Secretary-General
, UN doc. A/59/2005 of 21 Mar. 2005, paras. 165–83.

⁶⁵
‘World Summit Outcome’ of 16 Sep. 2005 (above, n. 9), paras. 152–4.

⁶⁶
Edward C. Luck, ‘The UN Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?’, in Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff (eds.),
Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century
(Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2005), 143–52.

⁶⁷
Edward C. Luck, ‘The UN Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?’, in Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff (eds.),
Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century
(Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2005), 151–2.

⁶⁸
For discussions of international legal aspects of the role of the Security Council see José E. Alvarez,
International Organizations as Law-makers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), and Dan Sarooshi,
International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).