The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (145 page)

⁵²
The Netherlands Non-paper, ‘A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study’, The Hague, revised version, Apr. 1995, section I.5. Available as annex II in Dick A. Leurdijk (ed.),
A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: Strengthening the Capacity for Quick Response
(The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 1995), 73–85. In connection with the Dutch project I participated in a symposium at The Hague on 22–3 Mar. 1995, and a version of my paper there is in the above-mentioned book.

⁵³
The Netherlands Non-paper, rev. version, Apr. 1995, section I.5.

⁵⁴
André Ouellet at UN General Assembly, 49th session, 29 Sep. 1994.

⁵⁵
‘Improving the UN’s Rapid Reaction Capability: A Canadian Study’, a 6-page preliminary document issued by the Government of Canada in early 1995.

⁵⁶
Peter Langille, Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes, and James Hammond, ‘A Preliminary Blueprint of Long-Term Options for Enhancing a UN Rapid Reaction Capability’, in David Cox and Albert Legault (eds.),
UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects
(Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Clementsport, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), 181 and 197. In connection with the Canadian project I participated in a conference at Montebello on 7–8 Apr. 1995, and a version of my paper there is in the above-mentioned book.

⁵⁷
Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations: Report of the Government of Canada
(Ottawa: Government of Canada, September 1995), 67–71. This bilingual report of the project, the English text of which is 78 pp., was tabled at the UN, New York, on 26 Sep. 1995.

⁵⁸
Denmark, Chief of Defence, ‘Report by the Working Group on a Multinational UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade’, 15 Aug. 1995; and Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Background Paper about Establishing a Multinational UN Standby Forces Brigade at High Readiness’ (SHIRBRIG), Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers in the ‘Friends of Rapid Deployment’ Group, New York, 26 Sep. 1996. These papers and other sources on SHIRBRIG are mentioned in H. Peter Langille,
Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment
(Centre for UN Reform Education, Nov. 2002), 11–12, 44–51, 119, and 124. The Langille paper is available at the Center for UN Reform website:
www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/standby.htm

⁵⁹
On the development of SHIRBRIG, see its website:
www.shirbrig.dk/
accessed 17 Apr. 2007.

⁶⁰
‘Military Component of United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations’ (JIU/REP/95/11), UN doc. A/50/576 of 14 Nov. 1995, Recommendation 4 (p. vii) and para. 32 (p. 9).

⁶¹
See e.g. the advocacy of an all-volunteer UN force with a total strength of 15,000, to be assisted by backup forces organized and deployed regionally: Carl Kaysen and George W. Rathjens, ‘Send in the Troops: A UN Foreign Legion’,
The Washington Quarterly
20, no. 1 (Winter 1997), 207–28.

⁶²
For a factual survey of developments regarding the rapid-deployment concept by a member of the 1995 Canadian study, see Peter Langille, ‘Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces’,
International Peacekeeping
7, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 219–53. This group of studies also appeared as Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse (eds.),
Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution
(London: Frank Cass, 2000).

⁶³
Secretary-General elect Kofi Annan, press conference, UN Headquarters, New York, 18 Dec. 1996.

⁶⁴
‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’, UN doc. A/55/305 and S/2000/809 of 21 Aug. 2000, paras. 85, 90, and 91. As Kofi Annan stated in his covering letter, the Panel, chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, was convened ‘to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future’.

⁶⁵
The Millennium Declaration, issued by Heads of State and Government in Sept. 2000, contained only a brief and anodyne reference to the Brahimi Report which had been issued less than three weeks earlier. GA Res. 55/2 of 8 Sep. 2000, para. 9. There was an equally brief treatment of ‘reforming peace operations’ in a follow-up from the Millennium Assembly, ‘Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN doc. A/57/387 of 9 Sep. 2002, para. 9.

⁶⁶
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the ICISS
, 2 vols. – report and supplementary volume (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, Dec. 2001). Available at the commission’s website
www.iciss.gc.ca

⁶⁷
High-level Panel,
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
, UN doc. A/59/565 of 2 Dec. 2004, Recommendation 60. See also para. 219. Kofi Annan had first announced his intention to create the Panel in Sept. 2003, and it was actually established on 4 Nov. 2003.

⁶⁸
In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All – Report of the Secretary-General
, UN doc. A/59/2005 of 2 Mar. 2005, para. 112. See also paras. 213–14 and, in the Annex ‘For decision by Heads of State and Government’, paras. 6(j) and 8(j).

⁶⁹
‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 Sep. 2005), UN doc. A/Res./60/1 of 24 Oct. 2005, paras. 138–9 and 177.

⁷⁰
EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, ‘EU Battlegroups’, Nov. 2006, cited in Gustav Lindstrom,
Enter the EU Battlegroups
(Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper no. 97, 2007), 13–15.

⁷¹
‘Headline Goal 2010’, endorsed by the European Council, 17–18 June 2004, paras. 2 and 4. Text in Lindstrom,
Enter the EU Battlegroups
, 80 and 81.

⁷²
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, concluded at Durban, 9 July 2002.

⁷³
SC Res. 1556 of 30 July 2004.

⁷⁴
SC Res. 1706 of 31 Aug. 2006. China, Russia, and Qatar abstained.

⁷⁵
The earlier resolution was SC Res. 1674 of 28 Apr. 2006, on protection of civilians in armed conflict. Its para. 4 had mentioned ‘the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.

⁷⁶
International Crisis Group Policy Briefing, ‘Getting the UN into Darfur’ (Nairobi/Brussels: ICG, 12 Oct. 2006).

⁷⁷
Brian Urquhart, ‘Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability’, paper presented at Vienna Seminar of International Peace Academy, 2–4 Mar. 1995, 4.

⁷⁸
See especially Giandomenico Picco, ‘The U.N. and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary-General Out of It’,
Foreign Affairs
73, no. 5 (Sep./Oct. 1994), 14–18.

⁷⁹
See e.g. the record of the UN General Assembly’s debate on the Report of the Security Council (A/49/2), starting on 31 Oct. 1994, UN doc. A/49/PV.48, pp. 1–29.

⁸⁰
Statement of France, 28 July 1993, in response to
An Agenda for Peace
, in ‘Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General – Addendum’, UN doc. A/48/403/Add.1/Corr.1 of 2 Nov. 1993, p.6, para. 11.

⁸¹
See e.g. the booklet edited by Robert C. Johansen,
A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To Prevent Genocide and Crimes against Humanity
(New York: World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy, 2006); and the draft resolution for a UN Emergency Peace Service that was submitted in the US House of Representatives in March 2007, available at
www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hr110–213

⁸²
A challenging attack on the capacity of international institutions to provide a collective security system in the post-Cold War world, and a warning of the pernicious effects of excessive reliance on institutional approaches, is John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’,
International Security
19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), 5–49.

⁸³
SC Res. 1645 and GA Res. 60/180, both of 20 Dec. 2005.

^*
I am grateful to Andrew Hurrell, Jennifer Welsh, Dominik Zaum, and participants in a coloquium at Oxford University’s Department of Politics and International Relations for comments on an earlier draft.

¹
See, for example, US Department of Defense,
National Defense Strategy 2005
, available at
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf
p. 5 (‘Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international for a, judicial processes, and terrorism’).

²
See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’,
International Security
19, no. 3 (1994–95), 13; B.S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’,
European Journal of International Law
15, no. 1 (2004), 1–37.

³
See, for example, Inis L. Claude,
Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Process of International Organization
, 3rd edn. (New York: Random House, 1964), 12–14; Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’, in Reus-Smit (ed.),
The Politics of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30–1.

⁴
See G. John Ikenberry,
After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Ngaire Woods, ‘The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank and the IMF’, in Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (eds.),
US Hegemony and International Organizations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 92–114. Liberal institutionalists, though generally taking a more subtle approach, often neglect problems of power: see Andrew Hurrell, ‘Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality’, in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.),
Power in Global Governance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34–42.

⁵
Hans Morgenthau,
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Knopf, 1949), 381.

⁶
Michael J. Glennon, ‘The UN Security Council in a Unipolar World’,
Virginia Journal of International Law
44 (2003), 107.

⁷
Ian Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument’,
European Journal of International Law
14 no. 3 (2003), 437–80.

⁸
Informal regimes and networks can accommodate power more flexibly: see Nico Krisch, ‘More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and U.S. Predominance in International Law’, in Michael Byers and Georg Nolte (eds.),
United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 158–9.

⁹
See on the following Gerry Simpson,
Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chs. 4–6.

¹⁰
See Ruth B. Russell,
A History of the United Nations Charter
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1958); Simpson,
Great Powers and Outlaw States
, ch. 6.

¹¹
See Russell,
A History of the UN Charter
, 713–49; Simpson,
Great Powers and Outlaw States
, 174, 180–91.

¹²
See the statement by the representative of New Zealand: ‘[I]t was a question of… a new world organization or no world organization… And that organization… is more important than any condition,’ quoted in Russell,
A History of the UN Charter
, 742.

¹³
See Patrick A. McCarthy,
Hierarchy and Flexibility in World Politics: Adaptation to Shifting Power Distributions in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), ch. 6.

¹⁴
See Bardo Fassbender, ‘All Illusions Shattered? Looking Back on a Decade of Failed Attempts to Reform the UN Security Council’,
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law
7 (2003), 210–15.

¹⁵
Barry O’Neill, ‘Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council’,
Journal of Conflict Resolution
40 (1996), 219–37.

¹⁶
On the symbolic force of Security Council membership, see Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’,
Global Governance
8 (2002), 41–4.

¹⁷
See Sidney D. Bailey and Sam Daws,
The Procedure of the UN Security Council
, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 69.

¹⁸
Ibid., 60–6. Figures on the frequency of informal consultations can be found in Theodor Schweisfurth, ‘Article 28’, in Bruno Simma (ed.),
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary
, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 523–38, 529–30. On the rise of informal meetings since the mid-1970s, see Jochen Prantl, ‘Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council’,
International Organization
, 59 (2005), 571–2.