The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (148 page)
Authors: Adam Roberts,Vaughan Lowe,Jennifer Welsh,Dominik Zaum
54
See Jochen Prantl and Jean Krasno, ‘Informal Groups of Member States’, in Jean Krasno (ed.),
The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of Global Security
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 333.
55
UN doc. S/PV.3482 of 16 Dec. 1994, 2.
56
See Nico Krisch’s discussion of the issue in
Chapter 5
.
57
Csaba Békés, ‘New Findings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution’,
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
, Issue 2 (1992), 3.
58
Brian McCauley, ‘Hungary and Suez, 1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power’,
Journal of Contemporary History
16, no. 4 (1981), 790. In the debates on Hungary on 3 and 4 Nov. 1956, the US abstained from a motion to extend the Security Council debate, and voted against a motion to resume the discussion of the issue the following day. See ibid., 794.
59
This sentiment was not shared by everybody in the State Department. The US ambassador to France, Douglas Dillon, pleaded in a telegram to President Eisenhower, ‘Mr. President, Franco-British action on Suez is a small wound to their prestige but American inaction about Hungary could be a fatal wound to ours.’ He also suggested that the President might address the General Assembly in person on this issue, and that the US might consider to threaten to discontinue diplomatic relations with Moscow. See FRUS 1955–57, Vol. XXV, 390.
60
Acheson,
Present at the Creation
, 450. See also Bourantonis and Magliveras, ‘Anglo-American Differences over the UN During the Cold War’, 69.
61
Paul Heinbecker, ‘Kosovo’, in David Malone (ed.),
The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 543. The possibility of using a Uniting for Peace resolution to authorize the use of force in the Kosovo conflict was also raised by some international lawyers. See for example Ian Brownlie and C.J. Apperley, ‘Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects’,
International Comparative Law Quarterly
49, no.4 (2000), 904. For the argument that the Uniting for Peace resolution could not have been rightfully used in the context of the Kosovo war, see Masahiko Asada, ‘Democratic Control of Humanitarian Intervention? The “Uniting for Peace” Resolution Revisited’, in Chi Carmody, Yuhi Iwasawa, and Sylvia Rhodes (eds.),
Trilateral Perspectives on International Legal Issues: Conflict and Coherence
(Baltimore: American Society of International Law, 2003), 217–41.
62
Statement by Mr. Emyr Jones Parry
, House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 Nov. 1999, 63–4. See also House of Commons,
4th Report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs
, 23 May 2000, para.128. Interestingly, the Committee concluded in its report that a Uniting for Peace resolution could possibly have provided a legal basis for intervention.
63
GA Res. 2252 of 4 July 1967; and GA Res. 2253 of 4 July 1967.
64
M. J. Peterson,
The UN General Assembly
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 107.
65
GA Res. 498; GA Res. 1474.
66
GA Res. 1004 of 4 Nov. 1956.
67
Yearbook of the United Nations
, 1956, 77–83. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld also offered to meet the Hungarian government in Budapest in person, to discuss the humanitarian needs of Hungary following the Soviet intervention, but the government refused such a meeting. The report of the Committee was submitted to the General Assembly on 12 July 1957 (UN doc. A/3592).
68
GA Res. ES 10/14.
69
International Court of Justice,
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
, 14–17.
70
GA Res. ES 8/2 of 14 Sep. 1981.
71
UN doc. S/PV. 2277 of 30 Apr. 1981.
72
The failure of the Council to act in response to the Assembly’s requests raises questions about the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s (ICISS) belief that ‘the mere possibility that this action [the use of the Uniting for Peace procedure] might be taken will be an important additional form of leverage on the Security Council to encourage it to act decisively and appropriately.’ See ICISS,
The Responsibility to Protect
, 53.
73
Marrack Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’,
International Affairs
69, no. 3 (1993), 453–5.
74
Ibid., 453–4.
75
Rosalyn Higgins,
United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967 Documents and Commentary
, Vol. I (Middle East) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 262;Jefrey Laurenti, ‘Financing the United Nations’, in Krasno (ed.),
The United Nations
, 278.
76
Higgins,
United Nations Peacekeeping
, Vol. I, 430.
77
Ibid., 426.
78
GA Res. 1089 (XI) of 21 Dec. 1956.
79
Laurenti, ‘Financing the United Nations’, 278.
80
Certain Expenses of the Unites Nations: Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
, 1962.
81
Charter of the United Nations, Art. 19.
82
Laurenti, ‘Financing the United Nations’, 279.
83
SC Res. 1031 of 15 Dec. 1995; and SC Res. 1088 of 12 Dec. 1996.
84
SC Res. 1244 of 10 June 1999.
85
SC Res. 1386 of 20 Dec. 2001.
86
In June 2007, the UN ran 15 peacekeeping operations, deploying more than 80,000 soldiers, military observers, and policemen. See
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm
87
Goulding, ‘Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’, 454.
88
Higgins,
United Nations Peacekeeping
, Vol. I, 262.
89
UN doc. A/3302 of 6 Nov. 1956. Emphasis in the original.
90
Thus, China abstained and did not oppose the establishment of UNMIK in Kosovo because the Yugoslav government had consented to the establishment of an international presence. See UN Doc. S/PV.4011 of 10 June 1999, 9.
91
‘Secretary-General Condemns Eritrea’s Decision to Expel Peacekeepers’, UN doc. SG/SM/10250/AFR/1298 of 7 Dec. 2005.
92
See Jennifer Welsh’s discussion of the role of consent in
Chapter 24
.
93
Goulding, ‘Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’, 454.
94
Sir Anthony Parsons, ‘The UN and the National Interest of States’, in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.),
United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations
, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 106.
95
Georges Abi-Saab,
The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 55–69.
96
The Soviet Union also accused the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld of partiality, and wanted a resolution effectively censuring him for having ‘failed to display the minimum of impartiality required from him in this situation’, UN doc. S/4497 of 9 Sep. 1960.
97
GA Res. 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 Sep. 1960, para.6.
98
Rosalyn Higgins,
United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967 Documents and Commentary
, Vol. II (Africa) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 24.
99
UN doc. S/4389 of 18 July 1960, 5.
100
Jane Boulden,
Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia
(Westport: Praeger, 2001), 31–3.
101
SC Res. 169 of 24 Nov. 1961.
102
The Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Center (RDC) has confirmed a death-toll of 6,882 (July 2007). See also Susan Woodward’s discussion of the events in Srebrenica in
Chapter 18
.
103
ICISS,
Responsibility to Protect
, 53.
104
Ibid.
105
See
Statement by Mr. Emyr Perry Jones
, above n. 62.
1
Herbert Nicholas, ‘UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe: The Lesson of Suez and Congo’,
International Organization
17, no.2 (1963), 335.
2
The report was the outcome of the work of a panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, former foreign minister of Algeria. ‘Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’, UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 of 21 Aug. 2000 (henceforth ‘Brahimi Report’).
3
Press Conference, Jean-Marie Guehenno, DPKO, 4 Oct. 2006. Available at
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/articles/pr_JMG.pdf
4
Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General, 1960, quoted in Brian Urquhart,
Hammarskjold
(London: Bodley Head, 1973), 256. For an excellent discussion of the process of conceptualization of peacekeeping in the late 1950s, see Neil Briscoe,
Britain and UN Peacekeeping 1948–67
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 4.
5
The first two field operations by the UN – both of them still running – followed in the wake of Britain’s retreat from Empire in the Middle East and in India: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established to supervise the truce in Palestine in 1948, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNGOMIP) was created in 1949 to oversee the ceasefire that had been reached between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
6
Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws,
The Procedure of the Security Council
, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 356.
7
‘Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN doc. A/3943 of 9 Oct. 1958 (henceforth,
Summary Study).
8
In the years 1948–87 the only other UN force which, like UNEF I, was authorised by the General Assembly was the UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) in 1962, created to assist in the temporary administration of the territory of West New Guinea in preparation for its transfer from Netherlands to Indonesia. Bailey and Daws,
The Procedure of the Security Council
, 356.
9
For background and discussion of this ‘fictive’ category, see Thomas Franck,
Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 39–40.
10
UN doc. 42/22.10.73 of 26 Oct. 1973, para. 3.
11
There are, as always, exceptions to a rule. Britain, France, and the USSR all provided personnel to UNTSO in 1948. France also contributed troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon in 1978 (UNIFIL) and Britain has been a long-time contributor of troops to the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). In some cases, notably in the Congo in 1960, Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union offered transport support for the initial deployment to theatre.
12
Summary Study
, para. 167.
13
Alan James,
Peacekeeping in International Politics
(London: Macmillan/IISS, 1990), 1.
14
For some of these roles in Cold War operations, see Katarina Månsson, ‘The Forgotten Agenda: Human Rights Protection and Promotion in Cold War Peacekeeping’,
Journal Conflict and Security Law
, 10, no. 3 (2005).
15
U Thant deals with the events surrounding the withdrawal of UNEF in some detail in his memoirs,
View from the UN
(London: David & Charles, 1978), 212–52. For a concise overview of the issues involved in the withdrawal of UNEF, see also James,
Peacekeeping in International Politics
, 220–23.
16
As for other exceptions, mention has already been made of the UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) in 1962 – a precursor of sorts to similar but much larger ‘trusteeship’ operations in the 1990s. UNIFIL in Lebanon, especially the first phase of its deployment from 1978 to 1982, is another instance where the requirements of peacekeeping as elaborated by Hammarskjöld and, later, Waldheim, were often striking by their absence.
17
Norrie Macqueen,
United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960
(London: Pearson Education/Longman, 2002), 59.
18
There are numerous accounts of the UN’s travails in Congo, many of them coming to the subject from a distinctive angle or perspective. A useful and detailed overview is provided by Macqueen, ibid., 34–60. See also Georges Abi-Saab,
The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
19
SC Res. 143 of 14 July 1960.
20
SC Res. 161 of 21 Feb. 1961.
21
SC Res. 169 of 24 Nov. 1961.
22
See, for example, the writings of D. K. Bowett, Rosalyn Higgins, Inis Claude, Jr., and Alan James. D. K. Bowett,
UN Forces – A Legal Study
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1964); Rosalyn Higgins,
UN peacekeeping, 1946–67: Documents and Commentary
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Inis Claude, Jr., ‘The United Nations and the Use of Force,
International Conciliation
,’ no.532 (Mar. 1961); and special issue of
International Organization
17, no. 2 (1963);
The Oslo Papers
(Oslo: The Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1964).