The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (162 page)

¹⁰⁰
UN doc S/2005/635 of 7 Oct. 2005.

¹⁰¹
By 10 Mar. 2007, UN Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his team had held seventeen rounds of direct talks with the two parties (Belgrade and Priština) and twenty-six expert missions to each capital. The two sides remained completely at odds with no compromise in sight, leading to the necessity of an imposed solution, he argued. (Transcript of Ahtisaari press conference that day,
www.unosek.org
). On 3 Apr. 2007, the Security Council began discussion of the action it should take on the most contentious issue since September 1991. Not all analysts agree (see, for example, Thomas Fleiner, in an interview with Valérie de Graffenried, ‘Mieux vaut dix ans de négociations qu’un jour de guerre civile au Kosovo’,
Le Temps
, 3 Feb. 2007), and the early stages of the Security Council debate included demands from a number of countries, with Russia leading, that a new UN envoy be selected to replace Ahtisaari.

¹⁰²
Among others, see Nidzara Ahmetasevic, ‘Justice Report: Bosnia’s Book of the Dead’,
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)
, 21 June 2007 (
www.birn.eu.com/en/88/10/3377/
).

¹
David Fraser,
Alanbrooke
(London: Harper Collins, 1997), 187.

²
SC Res. 781 of 9 Oct. 1992.

³
SC Res. 816 of 31 Mar. 1993.

⁴
Jan-Willem Honig and Norbert Both,
Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime
(London: Penguin, 1996), 80.

⁵
SC Res. 819 of 16 Apr. 1993.

⁶
Shashi Tharoor, ‘Should UN Peacekeeping Go “Back to Basics”?’
Survival
37, no. 4 (1995/96), 60.

⁷
SC Res. 824 of 6 May 1993 declared Sarajevo, Biha
, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde as safe areas.

¹
UN doc. A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992. The report aimed at reinforcing the decision-making processes for preventive diplomacy, peace-making, and peacekeeping.

²
This follows Stephen Krasner’s definition of a regime, in Stephen D. Krasner,
International Regimes
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2.

³
A targeted sanctions regime against the Taliban and al-Qaeda has continued after 2001. See
Appendix 4
.

⁴
SC Res. 1368 of 12 Sep. 2001; SC Res. 1373 of 28 Sep. 2001.

⁵
According to Charles Cogan, the United States gave Afghan guerrillas two billion US dollars in aid. The Gulf States gave their side an equivalent amount. See Charles Cogan, ‘Partners in Time: the CIA and Afghanistan since 1979’,
World Policy Journal
10, no. 2 (1993), 73–82. France and Britain also trained and financed certain groups, notably that of Ahmed Shah Masud.

⁶
GA Res. ES-6/2 of 14 Jan. 1980.

⁷
SC Res. 622 of 31 Oct. 1988; GA Res. 43/20 of 3 Nov. 1988.

⁸
See John Cooley,
Unholy Wars
(London: Pluto Press, 2002).

⁹
The organizers of a number of anti-American attacks had spent time in Afghan camps, including the perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings, Ramzi Yusuf (a Kuwaiti of Pakistani descent) and Mir Aimal Kansi (a Pakistani citizen) accused of firing outside CIA headquarters in January 1993. Consequently, Pakistan was nearly added to the US State Department’s list of terrorist countries in 1994. This would have resulted in the cancellation of international foreign aid, which was essential to Pakistan’s economic survival. In response to these criticisms, Pakistan drove out the Jihadist militants, pushing them towards Afghanistan.

¹⁰
Until 1998, oil companies, in particular UNOCAL, worked towards developing relations with the Taliban with the hope that they would be able to transport oil and gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. The future US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, initially advocated dialogue with the Taliban. However, he later changed his opinion and advocated the destabilization of the Taliban. See Zalmay Khalizad and Daniel Byman, ‘Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State’,
Washington Quarterly
23, no. 1 (Winter 2000).

¹¹
See for example SC Res. 1076 of 22 Oct. 1996.

¹²
As it was, only Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban regime.

¹³
Anthony Davies, ‘Foreign Fighters Step Up Activity in Afghan Civil War’,
Jane’s Intelligence Review
13, no. 8,(Aug. 2001).

¹⁴
For a translation and commentary on the text see Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin-Laden’s Fatwa’,
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
21, no. 4,(1998), 321–30.

¹⁵
SC Res. 1193 of 28 Aug. 1998.

¹⁶
Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison,
Out of Afghanistan. The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Barnett Rubin,
The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 39.

¹⁷
Established in 1997, the ‘Six-plus-Two’ group is comprised of Afghanistan’s neighbours (Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China), as well as the United States and Russia. Its official objective is to build consensus on policy pertaining to the crisis in Afghanistan. For example, in July 1999, the group published a declaration denouncing their support of the armed combatant groups in Afghanistan. In practice, however, this declaration was not followed and had little effect – Pakistan continued to arm the Taliban, and Russia continued to arm the Northern Alliance. Following a meeting in New York on 15 Sep. 2000, the group restated its principal objective: ‘no military solution to the Afghan conflict’, and encouraged the parties to the conflict to ‘enter in negotiations aimed at bringing about a political solution’.

¹⁸
Rubin,
The Search for Peace in Afghanistan
, 135.

¹⁹
GA Res. 48/208 of 21 Dec. 1993.

²⁰
These conflicting aspects are evident in SC Res. 1333 of 19 Dec. 2000, which renewed the sanctions and, at the same time, affirmed its support for the ‘Six-plus-Two’ group and UNSMA.

²¹
SC Res. 1267 of 15 Oct. 1999.

²²
SC Res. 1333 of 19 Dec. 2000. There seems to be an escalation in the terminology used by the Council in the resolutions leading up to SC Res. 1333: ‘expressing its grave concern at the continued Afghan conflict which has recently sharply escalated due to the Taliban forces’ offensive in the northern part of the country’ (SC Res. 1193 of 28 Aug. 1998); ‘deeply disturbed by the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts’ (SC Res. 1214 of 8 Dec. 1998); and ‘[s]trongly condemning the continuing use of the areas of Afghanistan under the control of the Afghan faction known as Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (hereinafter known as the Taliban), for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts, and reaffirming its conviction that the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (SC Res. 1333 of 19 Dec. 2000).

²³
See also the wider discussion of the impact of sanctions by David Cortright, George Lopez, and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, in
Chapter 8
.

²⁴
See the interview with President Musharraf in the
Washington Times
, 21 Mar. 2001.

²⁵
The US bombings may have contributed to general opposition by the Taliban to the mission of Prince Turki (the head of the Saudi secret service) to Kandahar in the late summer of 1998, after he had received a relatively encouraging reception at an earlier mission to Kandahar in June 1998 to obtain the expulsion of bin Laden.

²⁶
See Pierre Centlivres,
Les Bouddhas d’Afghanistan
(Lausanne: Favre, 2001).

²⁷
See also Richard Caplan’s discussion of UN international administrations in
Chapter 25
.

²⁸
SC Res. 1386 of 20 Dec. 2001.

²⁹
SC Res. 1401 of 28 Mar. 2002. There is no evidence of any discussion on the establishment of the ISAF in the resolutions or the related statements (See UN Doc. S/PV.4443 of 20 Dec. 2001).

³⁰
The agreement, which was signed at the time of his trip to Washington in May 2005, in practice, gives the United States total autonomy in organizing military operations on Afghan territory. See
Joint Declaration of the United States–Afghanistan Partnership
, Washington, DC, 23 May 2005. By the end of 2006, the US and Afghanistan had not signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), regulating the rights and responsibilities of US troops in Afghanistan.

³¹
See Lakhdar Brahimi’s report on Afghanistan, advocating the extension of the ISAF with 5,000 additional soldiers, and American ambassador Negroponte’s rebuttal (UN doc. S/PV.4579 of 19 July 2002). This refusal to extend ISAF was a reaffirmation of the position of his predecessor in Mar. 2002 (S/PV.4497 of 26 Mar. 2002, 9).

³²
SC Res. 1510 of 13 Oct. 2003.

³³
See for example SC Res. 1189 of 13 Aug. 1998; SC Res. 1214 of 8 Dec. 1998; SC Res. 1267 of 15 Oct. 1999; and SC Res. 1333 of 19 Dec. 2000.

³⁴
Anna Mūller, ‘Legal Issues Arising from the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan’,
Non-State Actors and International Law
4, no. 3 (2004), 239–76.

³⁵
SC Res. 1368 of 12 Sep. 2001.

³⁶
The US doctrine, as presented in the National Security Strategy issued in Sep. 2002, practically erases all distinction between prevention and pre-emption (text is available at
www.white-house.gov/nsc5/html/
). See also Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Self Defense and the Use of Force: Breaking the Rules, Making the Rules, or Both?’
International Studies Perspectives
4, vol. 4 (2003), 409–31.

³⁷
See statement made by Colin Powell in
The Statesman
(Pakistan), 20 Sep. 2001.

³⁸
See also Georg Nolte’s discussion of the Council’s role with respect to humanitarian law in
Chapter 23
.

³⁹
Aunohita Mojumdar, ‘Doubts Grow over Afghan War Crimes Amnesty’,
Financial Times
, 12 Feb. 2007.

*
The author would like to thank Ngozi Amu, James Jonah, Lansana Kouyatté, Musifiky Mwanasali, and Dominik Zaum for invaluable comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

¹
See Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.),
West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region
(Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

²
See ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Lomé, 10 Dec. 1999.

³
For a background to the Sierra Leone conflict, see Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, ‘The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat’, in Christopher Clapham (ed.),
African Guerrillas
(Oxford, Kampala, and Bloomington: James Currey, Fountain Publishers, and Indiana University Press, 1998); Adekeye Adebajo,
Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau
(Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo and David Keen, ‘Sierra Leone’, in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (eds.),
United Nations Interventionism 1991–2004
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 246–73;
African Development
22, nos. 2 and 3 (1997), special issue on ‘Youth Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War’; John Hirsch,
Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); David Keen,
Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone
(Oxford and New York: James Currey and Palgrave, 2005); and Mark Malan, Phenyo Rakate, and Angela McIntyre,
Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight
(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002).

⁴
See, for example, Musifiky Mwanasali, ‘Africa’s Responsibility to Protect’, in Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds.),
A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations
(Jacana: Johannesburg, 2006), 89–110.

⁵
See, for example, Clement Adibe, ‘The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership’,
Third World Quarterly
18, no. 3 (1997), 471–88; Norrie MacQueen,
United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960
, (London and New York: Pearson Education, 2002); Binaifir Nowrojee, ‘Joining Forces: UN and Regional Peacekeeping, lessons from Liberia’,
Harvard Human Rights Journal
8 (Spring 1995), 129–51; Funmi Olonisakin, ‘UN Cooperation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia’,
International Peacekeeping
3, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), 33–61; and United Nations,
The United Nations and the Situation in Liberia
, Revision one, (New York: Department of Public Information, Feb. 1997).