The Wizards of Langley (56 page)

25
. Ray S. Cline,
Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA
(Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), pp. 199–200. The battle over OSI was the most important but not the only dispute between Cline and Wheelon. They also clashed over the role of Cline’s Collection Guidance Staff and the related issues of the location of the Special Intelligence Staff and the intelligence directorate’s access to information about DS&T reconnaissance activities. Wheelon described the conflict over the Collection Guidance Staff as one of Cline’s “petty bureaucratic gambits.” Of more concern to Wheelon was Cline’s drafting of an OSI analyst to help produce an assessment in October 1963 of the significance of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s remarks on abandoning the race to the moon. In a memo to OSI chief Donald Chamberlain, Wheelon noted that Cline had not consulted him (Wheelon) or his deputy (Carl Duckett), nor had he shown Wheelon a copy of the assessment before it was distributed. In his memo, Wheelon noted that “I raised this with Cline yesterday and told him this would have to stop.” He instructed Chamberlain to inform everyone in OSI not to take any assignments from Cline unless “you . . . or your designated officer, are in the loop.”One battle that was not joined was an attempt to transfer NPIC from Cline’s directorate to the DS&T. A December 1963 memo to Wheelon asked him if he had “given thought to . . . Indian wrestling Ray Cline for control of NPIC.” The justification offered was NPIC’s inactivity in the research and development area. However, Wheelon felt that he already “had enough trouble with Cline,” and fighting for NPIC would not be worth a “bruising fight.” The best thing the DS&T could do for NPIC, Wheelon believed, was to “give them really good pictures.” (Ray S. Cline, Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Rationale for a Central Collection Guidance Function, February 28, 1964; Ray S. Cline [DDI], Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Differences of Opinion Regarding Collection Guidance Staff [CGS], March 13, 1964; interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998; Albert D. Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Memorandum for: Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence, Subject: Coordination with DD/I, October 31, 1963, 2000 CIA Release; [Deleted], Acting Assistant Director, Special Activities, Memorandum for: Deputy Director (Science and Technology), Subject: National Photographic Interpretation Center, December 31, 1963, 2000 CIA Release; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, March 5, 2001.)

26
. Systems Analysis Staff, Directorate of Science and Technology, CIA,
A Report on DS&T Intelligence
Collection Requirements
, July 12, 1966, p. 7; China Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency, “The Production Effort,” July 1965–June 1967, p. 20, NARA, RG 263, CIA HRP 89-2, NN3-263-94-010, Box 9, File HS/HC 735, Folder 2.

27
. Wheelon telephone conversations, September 16, 1999, and June 16, 2000.

28
. Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA,
Japanese Nuclear Energy Program
, OSI-SR/65-55, November 1964; Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA,
Indian Nuclear Energy Program,
November 6, 1964; Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
Soviet Nuclear Research Reactors
, OSI-SR/64-41, September 22, 1964.

29
. Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2-64,
The Soviet Atomic Energy Program
, July 16, 1964, p. 3; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2A-65,
The Soviet Atomic Energy Program
, May 19, 1965.

30
. Donald F. Chamberlain, Director of Scientific Intelligence, Memorandum for: Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Staff Member, National Security Council, Subject: The Nuclear Weapons Capability, October 18, 1965.

31
. Weber interview.

32
. George McGhee to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability,” September 13, 1961, NARA, RG 59, Records of Policy Planning Staff, 1957–1961; “Telegram from State Department to Embassy in Soviet Union,” July 15, 1963, in David M. Mabon and David S. Patterson (eds.),
Foreign Relations of the United States
[FRUS], 1961–1963, Volume VII: Arms Control and Disarmament
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 801; “Telegram from Embassy in Soviet Union to State Department,” July 27, 1963, in Mabon and Patterson (eds.),
FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume VII
, p. 860. Rusk’s rejection of the McGhee proposal is noted in handwritten comments that appear on the document.

33
. Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63,
Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program
, July 24, 1963, p. 1.

34
. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,
China Builds the Bomb
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 114; Joel Ullom, “Enriched Uranium Versus Plutonium: Proliferant Preferences in the Choice of Fissile Material,”
Nonproliferation Review
2, 1 (Fall 1994): 1–15 at 1, 5.

35
. Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63,
Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,
p. 1.

36
. Ibid., pp. 2, 4; Lewis and Xue,
China Builds the Bomb
, pp. 134–135.

37
. SNIE 13-2-63,
Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program
, p. 2.

38
. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Memorandum for General LeMay et al., “Chinese Nuclear Development,” November 18, 1963, NARA, RG 218, Taylor Papers, Box 1.

39
. Johnson’s study remains classified but is concisely summarized in George W. Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” December 14, 1964. The paper was produced by Rathjens while he was a staff member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

40
. Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse,
Nuclear Weapons Databook
Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 333.

41
. Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-4-64,
The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese
Nuclear Explosion
, August 26, 1964, p. 1.

42
. Ibid., p. 2.

43
. Interview with Albert Wheelon, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1997.

44
. Interview by William Burr with Allen S. Whiting, Crystal City, Virginia, December 13, 1996; interview with former CIA official, April 7, 1997.

45
. “Transcript of Daily Press Briefing, Tuesday, September 29, 1964,” RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to Undersecretary for Political Affairs, 1963–1965, Box 2, Psychological Preparations of Chinese Test, October 16, 1964.

46
. Donald Chamberlain, AD/SI to DDCI, Subject: Estimated Imminence of a Chinese Nuclear Test, October 15, 1964, in Harriet Dashiell Schwar (ed.),
Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968,
Volume XXX, China
, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), pp. 107–108.

47
. Ibid.

48
. Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb,
Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson
Years
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 116; V. Gupta and D. Rich, “Locating the Detonation of China’s First Nuclear Explosive Test on 16 October 1964,”
International Journal of Remote
Sensing
17, 10 (October 1996): 1969–1974.

49
. Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse,
Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V
, p. 345; Willis Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, “The Hazards of Single- Outcome Forecasting,”
Studies in Intelligence
28, 3 (Fall 1984): 57–70, reprinted in H. Bradford Westerfield (ed.),
Inside the CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal
Journal 1955–1992
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 238–254 at p. 246; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997.

50
. Letter, B. A. Schriever, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, to General Curtis E. LeMay, December 26, 1963.

51
. Office of Computer Services, Directorate of Science and Technology, CIA,
OCS Computer
System Planning Report
, June 1, 1965. FMSAC’s work was aided by help from outside specialists—from contractors as well as the national labs that analyzed the radar signatures and telemetry of satellites and missiles. Telemetry of Soviet reconnaissance satellites was analyzed in an attempt to determine their targets. Another group, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, analyzed Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons programs. (Albert D. Wheelon, Memorandum for: Director, BPAM, Subject: Replies for Questions by Bureau of the Budget Examiners, November 19, 1964; interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998.)

52
. Albert D. Wheelon and Sidney N. Graybeal, “Intelligence for the Space Race,”
Studies in Intelligence
7, 4 (Fall 1963): 1–13 at 1.

53
. Ibid., p. 3.

54
. Telephone interview with Edward Proctor, March 16, 1999; Wheelon interview, June 14, 1999; Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

55
. Interview with R. Evans Hineman, Chantilly, Virginia, February 17, 1999; Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997.

56
. David S. Brandwein, “The SS-8 Controversy,”
Studies in Intelligence
13, 3 (Summer 1969): 27–35.

57
. Ibid.; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-8-63,
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
, October 18, 1963, p. 12.

58
. Wheelon interview, November 11–12, 1998.

59
. Interview with former CIA official.

60
. Ibid.; Wheelon telephone conversation, September 16, 1999.

61
. Wheelon interview, April 9, 1997; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, November 29, 1998.

62
. Hineman interview.

63
. Ibid.

64
. Letter, Schriever to LeMay.

65
. Ibid.

66
. Ibid.

67
. Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Subject: CIA Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center, January 2, 1964.

68
. Draft of Letter, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay to Gen. B. A. Schriever, AFSC, January 7, 1964.

69
. Department of Defense Directive S-5100.43, “Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (Defense/SMAC),” April 27, 1964; Richard L. Bernard, “The Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center,”
Cryptologic Spectrum
, Fall 1981, pp. 30–33; Mark Clesh, “Dedication of New Operations Center for DEFSMAC,”
Communiqué
, March/April 1998, pp. 42–43.

70
. Clesh, “Dedication of New Operations Center for DEFSMAC”; National Security Agency,
A
Historical Perspective of DefSMAC with Charles Tevis and Max Mitchell
, 1980 (video); Hineman interview.

71
. Nicholas L. Johnson,
Soviet Military Strategy in Space
(London: Jane’s, 1987), p. 51; James Harford,
Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon
(New York: John Wiley, 1997), pp. 190–200; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-65,
The Soviet
Space Program
, n.d., pp. 23–24, 28; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67,
The Soviet Space
Program
, March 2, 1967, pp. 6–7.

72
. Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-65,
The Soviet Space Program
, p. 27; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67,
The Soviet Space Program
, p. 5.

73
. Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67,
The Soviet Space Program
, pp. 5–6, 34–35; Harford,
Korolev
, pp. 155–156; William E. Burrows,
Exploring Space: Voyages in the Solar System
and Beyond
(New York: Random House, 1990), p. 162.

74
. Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67,
The Soviet Space Program
, pp. 6, 34–35; Har-ford,
Korolev
, p. 154; Burrows,
Exploring Space
, p. 134.

75
. Hineman interview.

76
. Wheelon and Graybeal, “Intelligence for the Space Race,” p. 5.

77
. Ibid., pp. 4–5.

78
. Harford,
Korolev
, p. 152.

79
. Frank A. Whitmire and Edward G. Correll, “The Failure of Cosmos 57,”
Studies in Intelligence
10, 3 (Summer 1966): 25–29.

80
. Ibid.

81
. Ibid.; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-1-67,
The Soviet Space Program
, p. 33.

82
. James Burke, “Seven Years to Luna 9,”
Studies in Intelligence
10, 2 (Summer 1966): 1–24 at 20.

83
. Ibid.; Burrows,
Exploring Space
, pp. 162–163.

84
. Robert C. Berman and John P. Baker,
Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 104; “Soviets Step Up Testing of First-Line ICBM Systems,”
EUCOM Intelligence Report
, April 13, 1966, p. 1.

85
. Jerold H. Klaimon, “Reentry Vehicle Analysis,”
Studies in Intelligence
12, 3 (Summer 1968): 23–33.