The World Was Going Our Way (11 page)
Read The World Was Going Our Way Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
Tags: #Biographies & Memoirs, #True Accounts, #Espionage, #History, #Europe, #Ireland, #Military, #Intelligence & Espionage, #Modern (16th-21st Centuries), #20th Century, #Russia, #World
In the heady early years of the Cuban Revolution, the Centre seems to have believed that its example was capable of inspiring movements similar to the Sandinistas in much of Latin America. Guerrilla groups sprang up in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Guatemala. In 1961 Castro’s intelligence organization was reorganized as the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), under the Ministry of the Interior. With Ramiro Valdés, Castro’s first intelligence chief, in overall charge as Interior Minister, Manuel Piñeiro Losada, nicknamed ‘Barba Roja’ because of his luxuriant red beard, became head of the DGI. Piñeiro’s chief priority was the export of the Cuban Revolution. The DGI contained a Dirección de Liberación Nacional with three ‘Liberation Committees’ responsible, respectively, for exporting revolution to the Caribbean, Central and South America. Piñeiro and Che Guevara spent many evenings, usually into the early hours and sometimes until daybreak, discussing the prospects for revolution with would-be revolutionaries from Latin America and the Caribbean. Always spread out on the table while they talked was a large map of the country concerned which Che examined in detail, alternately puffing on a cigar and drinking strong Argentinian tea -
mate
- through a straw.
37
mate
- through a straw.
37
While Che and Piñeiro dreamed their revolutionary dreams and traced imaginary guerrilla operations on their maps into the early hours, the KGB sought methodically to strengthen its liaison with and influence on the DGI. Among the most striking evidence of the closeness of the DGI’s integration into the intelligence community of the Soviet bloc was its collaboration in the use of ‘illegals’, intelligence officers and agents operating under bogus identities and (usually) false nationalities. In 1961 the Spanish-speaking KGB illegal Vladimir Vasilyevich Grinchenko (successively codenamed RON and KLOD), who ten years earlier had obtained an Argentinian passport under a false identity, arrived in Cuba, where he spent the next three years advising the DGI on illegal operations.
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Further KGB exploitation of the Cuban ‘bridgehead’, however, was dramatically interrupted by the missile crisis of October 1962. In May Khrushchev summoned Alekseyev, the KGB resident in Havana, unexpectedly to Moscow and told him he was to replace the unpopular Kudryavtsev as Soviet ambassador. A fortnight later Khrushchev astonished Alekseyev once again by saying that he had decided to install offensive nuclear missile sites in Cuba targeted against the United States. A small delegation, including Alekseyev, was sent to Havana to secure Castro’s approval. ‘If the issue had been only our defence’, said Castro later, ‘we would not have accepted the missiles.’ He agreed to the building of the missile sites, he insisted, in the broader interests of solidarity with the Soviet bloc - or, as Moscow preferred to call it, ‘the socialist commonwealth’. Though Khrushchev sought the KGB’s assistance in cementing the alliance with Castro, he did not trouble to seek its assessment of the likely American reaction to the building of the Cuban missile bases. Acting, like Stalin, as his own intelligence analyst, he rashly concluded that ‘the Americans will accept the missiles if we install them before their [mid-term Congressional] elections in November’. Few world leaders have been guilty of greater foreign policy misjudgements. The discovery of the construction of the missile sites by US U-2 spy planes in October 1962 led to the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War.
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Khrushchev’s decision to resolve the crisis by announcing - without consulting Castro - the unilateral withdrawal of ‘all Soviet offensive arms’ from Cuba caused outrage in Havana. Castro angrily told students at Havana University that Khrushchev ‘had no balls’. Privately, he denounced the Soviet leader as a ‘sonofabitch’, a ‘bastard’ and an ‘asshole’. In a bizarre and emotional letter to Khrushchev, Castro declared that the removal of the missile bases brought tears to ‘countless eyes of Cuban and Soviet men who were willing to die with supreme dignity’. Alekseyev warned Moscow in the aftermath of the missile crisis that ‘one or two years of especially careful work with Castro will be required until he acquires all of the qualities of Marxist-Leninist party spirit’.
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In an attempt to shore up the Cuban bridgehead, Khrushchev issued a personal invitation to Castro to visit the USSR in order to ‘become acquainted with the Soviet Union and the great victories achieved by its peoples’, and ‘to discuss matters concerning relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and other matters of common interest’. In April 1963, accompanied by Alekseyev, Castro and his entourage arrived in Moscow, intending to stay only a few days. Castro was persuaded, however, to stay on for a forty-day tour of the Soviet Union which, amid almost continuous applause, took him from Leningrad to the Mongolian border. Old Bolsheviks in Leningrad told him that no one since Lenin had received such a hero’s welcome. Wearing his olive-green battle fatigues when the weather was warm enough, Castro addressed enthusiastic crowds at sports stadiums, factories and town centres across the Soviet Union. He inspected a rocket base and the Northern Fleet, reviewed the May Day parade with Khrushchev from the top of the Kremlin wall, was made a Hero of the Soviet Union, and received the Order of Lenin and a gold star.
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Castro responded with effusive praise for the achievements of Soviet Communism and its support for the Cuban Revolution. He told a mass rally in Red Square:
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Castro responded with effusive praise for the achievements of Soviet Communism and its support for the Cuban Revolution. He told a mass rally in Red Square:
The Cuban Revolution became possible only because the Russian Revolution of 1917 had been accomplished long before. (
Applause
) Without the existence of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s socialist revolution would have been impossible . . . The might of the Soviet Union and of the whole socialist camp stopped imperialist aggression against our country. It is quite natural that we nourish feelings of profound and eternal gratitude to the Soviet Union. (
Applause
) . . . From the bottom of their hearts the peoples of the entire world, all the peoples of the world, must regard your success as their own. (
Applause
)
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Applause
) Without the existence of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s socialist revolution would have been impossible . . . The might of the Soviet Union and of the whole socialist camp stopped imperialist aggression against our country. It is quite natural that we nourish feelings of profound and eternal gratitude to the Soviet Union. (
Applause
) . . . From the bottom of their hearts the peoples of the entire world, all the peoples of the world, must regard your success as their own. (
Applause
)
42
Khrushchev told the Presidium that his personal talks with Castro had lasted several days: ‘. . . As soon as I finished breakfast, he would come and wait for me. We would sit down together until 2:00. Then we would have lunch and more time together . . . He was left very satisfied.’
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Throughout his forty-day triumphal progress across the Soviet Union, Castro was escorted both by Alekseyev and by Nikolai Leonov, the young KGB officer who had first identified Castro’s revolutionary potential in the mid-1950s. Leonov acted as Castro’s interpreter and, when the visit was over, boasted in the Centre that he and the Maximum Leader were now firm friends for life. In the wake of the visit, the Centre received the first group of Cuban foreign intelligence officers for training by the KGB.
44
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Throughout his forty-day triumphal progress across the Soviet Union, Castro was escorted both by Alekseyev and by Nikolai Leonov, the young KGB officer who had first identified Castro’s revolutionary potential in the mid-1950s. Leonov acted as Castro’s interpreter and, when the visit was over, boasted in the Centre that he and the Maximum Leader were now firm friends for life. In the wake of the visit, the Centre received the first group of Cuban foreign intelligence officers for training by the KGB.
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Scarcely had Castro returned to Cuba, however, than doubts returned in the minds of his Russian hosts about his reliability and political maturity. Moscow was particularly disturbed by the increasing public emphasis in Havana on ‘exporting the revolution’. In September 1963, Che Guevara published a new, much-quoted article on guerrilla warfare. Previously, he had insisted on the importance of a series of preconditions for the establishment of guerrilla bases, such as the absence of an elected, constitutional government. Now he appeared to be arguing that no preconditions were necessary. ‘Revolution’, he declared, ‘can be made at any given moment anywhere in the world.’ Worse still, in Moscow’s eyes, was the fact that Che’s revolutionary heresies seemed to have the blessing of the Castro regime. Despite his personal closeness to Castro, even Alekseyev was shocked. A cable from the Soviet embassy in Havana to Moscow accused Che of ignoring ‘basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism’ and denounced his essay as ‘ultrarevolutionary bordering on adventurism’. Che paid no heed either to the criticism from Moscow or to the opposition to his ideas from Latin American Communist parties. Henceforth he was to be personally involved in the export of the Cuban Revolution.
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As well as being increasingly alarmed by Cuban ‘adventurism’, Moscow was also dismayed by the failure of the Sandinistas to live up to its early expectations. The first FSLN guerrilla force, inadequately dressed in olive-green uniforms (which, though unsuitable for the climate, were chosen to preserve its self-image as freedom fighters), endured a miserable existence at its mountainous base on the Honduras-Nicaragua border. As Borge later recalled, ‘There was nothing to eat, not even animals to hunt . . . It wasn’t just hunger that was terrible, but constant cold twenty-four hours a day . . . We were always wet through with the clinging rain of that part of the country . . .’ In order to survive, the guerrillas were reduced to appealing to local peasants for food. In 1963 the demoralized guerrilla force was routed with heavy loss of life by the Nicaraguan National Guard. For the next few years, in the words of one of its supporters, the FSLN had ‘neither the arms, the numbers nor the organization to confront the National Guard again’.
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In 1964, with the assistance of Torres,
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the Mexico City residency reconstituted a sabotage and intelligence group (DRG) from the remnants of Andara y Ubeda’s (PRIM’s) guerrillas. The group was given one of the great historic codenames of Soviet history, chosen by Lenin as the title of the newspaper he had founded in 1900: ISKRA - ‘Spark’.
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By 1964, however, the extravagant optimism in the Centre at the prospects for Latin American revolution which had inspired Shelepin’s 1961 master-plan had faded. The KGB plainly expected that it would be some years before the Sandinista ‘spark’ succeeded in igniting a Nicaraguan revolution.
46
In 1964, with the assistance of Torres,
47
the Mexico City residency reconstituted a sabotage and intelligence group (DRG) from the remnants of Andara y Ubeda’s (PRIM’s) guerrillas. The group was given one of the great historic codenames of Soviet history, chosen by Lenin as the title of the newspaper he had founded in 1900: ISKRA - ‘Spark’.
48
By 1964, however, the extravagant optimism in the Centre at the prospects for Latin American revolution which had inspired Shelepin’s 1961 master-plan had faded. The KGB plainly expected that it would be some years before the Sandinista ‘spark’ succeeded in igniting a Nicaraguan revolution.
During his summer leave in 1964, Alekseyev was told by Shelepin to discuss Cuban affairs with Leonid Brezhnev. This was the first hint he received of preparations for the KGB-assisted coup which led to Khrushchev’s overthrow in October and Brezhnev’s emergence as Soviet leader.
49
Soon after the coup, Mikhail Suslov, the chief Party ideologist, told the Central Committee that Khrushchev had been profligate in the promises he had made to other nations. Though he did not identify the states concerned, Suslov probably had Cuba chiefly in mind.
50
The Kremlin watched aghast as its Cuban allies squandered its economic aid on such frivolities as the giant Coppelia ice-cream emporium. Resentment at the cost of supporting Cuba’s mismanaged economy combined with growing annoyance at Castro’s revolutionary indiscipline. In the mid-1960s, despite opposition from Latin American Communist parties as well as from Moscow, Cuba made unsuccessful attempts to set up guerrilla bases in Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala and Colombia.
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Soon after the coup, Mikhail Suslov, the chief Party ideologist, told the Central Committee that Khrushchev had been profligate in the promises he had made to other nations. Though he did not identify the states concerned, Suslov probably had Cuba chiefly in mind.
50
The Kremlin watched aghast as its Cuban allies squandered its economic aid on such frivolities as the giant Coppelia ice-cream emporium. Resentment at the cost of supporting Cuba’s mismanaged economy combined with growing annoyance at Castro’s revolutionary indiscipline. In the mid-1960s, despite opposition from Latin American Communist parties as well as from Moscow, Cuba made unsuccessful attempts to set up guerrilla bases in Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala and Colombia.
51
The main emissaries of the Cuban Revolution were illegals belonging to, or controlled by, the DGI. Cuban illegals were trained far more rapidly than their KGB counterparts: partly because the DGI was less thorough and paid less attention to devising secure ‘legends’, partly because it was far easier for a Cuban to assume another Latin American nationality than for a Russian to pose as a west European. Instead of going directly to their Latin American destinations, most Cuban illegals were deployed via Czechoslovakia. According to statistics kept by the Czechoslovak StB (and handed over by it to the KGB), from 1962 to 1966 a total of 650 Cuban illegals passed through Czechoslovakia. The great majority carried Venezuelan, Dominican, Argentinian or Colombian passports and identity documents. In most cases the documents were genuine save for the substitution of a photograph of the illegal for that of the original owner.
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One probable sign that the KGB had begun to distance itself from the Cuban attempt to export revolution, however, was the return to Moscow in 1964 of Grinchenko, who for the past three years had been advising the DGI on illegal operations.
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He does not appear to have been replaced. In 1965, however, in an attempt to reinforce collaboration with the DGI, Semichastny (travelling under the pseudonym ‘Yelenin’) led a KGB delegation to Cuba. When they met in the country house of the Soviet ambassador, the easy rapport between Alekseyev and Castro quickly created an atmosphere conducive to convivial discussion over a shashlik dinner. Semichastny was struck by Castro’s personal fascination with intelligence tradecraft. Later, as they watched a KGB film on the tracking down and interrogation of Oleg Penkovsky, the senior GRU officer who had given SIS and the CIA crucial intelligence on Soviet missile site construction before the Cuban missile crisis, Castro turned to Valdés, his Interior Minister, and the DGI officers who accompanied him, and exhorted them to learn as much as possible from the KGB delegation during their stay.
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Despite his enthusiasm for KGB tradecraft, however, Castro continued to alarm the Centre by what it regarded as his excess of revolutionary zeal. In January 1966, undeterred by Moscow’s reservations, Havana hosted a Trilateral Conference to support the onward march of revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America. ‘For Cuban revolutionaries’, Castro declared, ‘the battleground against imperialism encompasses the whole world . . . And so we say and proclaim that the revolutionary movement in every corner of the world can count on Cuban combat fighters. ’
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52
One probable sign that the KGB had begun to distance itself from the Cuban attempt to export revolution, however, was the return to Moscow in 1964 of Grinchenko, who for the past three years had been advising the DGI on illegal operations.
53
He does not appear to have been replaced. In 1965, however, in an attempt to reinforce collaboration with the DGI, Semichastny (travelling under the pseudonym ‘Yelenin’) led a KGB delegation to Cuba. When they met in the country house of the Soviet ambassador, the easy rapport between Alekseyev and Castro quickly created an atmosphere conducive to convivial discussion over a shashlik dinner. Semichastny was struck by Castro’s personal fascination with intelligence tradecraft. Later, as they watched a KGB film on the tracking down and interrogation of Oleg Penkovsky, the senior GRU officer who had given SIS and the CIA crucial intelligence on Soviet missile site construction before the Cuban missile crisis, Castro turned to Valdés, his Interior Minister, and the DGI officers who accompanied him, and exhorted them to learn as much as possible from the KGB delegation during their stay.
54
Despite his enthusiasm for KGB tradecraft, however, Castro continued to alarm the Centre by what it regarded as his excess of revolutionary zeal. In January 1966, undeterred by Moscow’s reservations, Havana hosted a Trilateral Conference to support the onward march of revolution in Africa, Asia and Latin America. ‘For Cuban revolutionaries’, Castro declared, ‘the battleground against imperialism encompasses the whole world . . . And so we say and proclaim that the revolutionary movement in every corner of the world can count on Cuban combat fighters. ’
55
Castro’s confident rhetoric, however, was belied by the lack of success of the revolutionary movement in Latin America. In the summer of 1967 the Sandinistas launched a new offensive which the Centre condemned as premature.
56
Their guerrilla base in the mountainous jungle on the Honduran border was far better organized than at the time of the débâcle in 1963, thanks largely to much greater support from local peasants. According to one of the guerrillas, ‘They took on the job of wiping out tracks where the [FSLN] column had passed; the
compañeros
hung out coloured cloths to warn us of any danger; they invented signals for us with different sounds . . . We had a whole team of
campesino
brothers and sisters who knew the area like the back of their hand. ’
57
At the mountain of Pancasan in August 1967, however, the Sandinistas suffered another disastrous defeat at the hands of the Nicaraguan National Guard. Among those killed was the ISKRA leader, Rigoberto Cruz Arguello (codenamed GABRIEL). The Centre blamed this disaster on ‘disloyalty’ in the FSLN leadership (all of which had gathered at the guerrilla base), inadequate resources with which to take on the National Guard and the ‘unprepared state’ of the local population.
58
The jubilant Nicaraguan dictator, Tachito Somoza, boasted that the Sandinistas were finished. The late 1960s and early 1970s were ‘a period of silence’ for the FSLN during which it continued to rob banks to finance its underground existence but avoided open clashes with the National Guard.
59
56
Their guerrilla base in the mountainous jungle on the Honduran border was far better organized than at the time of the débâcle in 1963, thanks largely to much greater support from local peasants. According to one of the guerrillas, ‘They took on the job of wiping out tracks where the [FSLN] column had passed; the
compañeros
hung out coloured cloths to warn us of any danger; they invented signals for us with different sounds . . . We had a whole team of
campesino
brothers and sisters who knew the area like the back of their hand. ’
57
At the mountain of Pancasan in August 1967, however, the Sandinistas suffered another disastrous defeat at the hands of the Nicaraguan National Guard. Among those killed was the ISKRA leader, Rigoberto Cruz Arguello (codenamed GABRIEL). The Centre blamed this disaster on ‘disloyalty’ in the FSLN leadership (all of which had gathered at the guerrilla base), inadequate resources with which to take on the National Guard and the ‘unprepared state’ of the local population.
58
The jubilant Nicaraguan dictator, Tachito Somoza, boasted that the Sandinistas were finished. The late 1960s and early 1970s were ‘a period of silence’ for the FSLN during which it continued to rob banks to finance its underground existence but avoided open clashes with the National Guard.
59
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