Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (74 page)

132
Wilson,
Entente
, pp.35, 38f., 94, 111, 114f.; Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 270; Howard,
Continental Commitment
, p. 57; Andrew, ‘Entente’, p. 25; Steiner,
Britain and the Origins,
p. 57; Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, p. 252. See also Butterfield,‘ Grey,’ p. 2.

133
Trevelyan,
Grey
, pp. 114f.

134
French, ‘Spy Fever’, pp. 355-8, 360-5; Andrew, ‘Secret Intelligence’, pp. 12ff.; Gooch,
Plans of War
, p. 33.

135
Bodi. Lib., Oxford, Harcourt MSS, 577. I am grateful to Mr Edward Lipman of Peterhouse for this reference.

136
Glen O’Hara, ‘Britain’s War of Illusions. Sir Edward Grey and the Crisis of Liberal Diplomacy’ (Oxford University, BA thesis, 1996).

137
Gooch and Temperley (eds),
British Documents
, vol. VI, Nos 430,437.

138
PRO, FO 371/10281, Goschen to Grey, 3 March 1913.

139
O’Hara, ‘War of Illusions’.

140
G. Schmidt, ‘Contradictory Postures and Conflicting Objectives: The July Crisis’ in G. Schöllgen (ed.),
Escape into War? The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany
(Oxford/New York/Munich, 1990), p. 144; Trevelyan,
Grey
, p. 244. As the
Nation
put it in March 1914, ‘The Prussian military would be less than human if it did not dream of anticipating the crushing accumulation of force’: Weinroth, ‘Radicals’, p. 680.

141
Fischer,
Germany’s Aims, passim; idem, War of Illusions
, p. 470.

142
Butterfield, ‘Grey’, pp. 1f.

143
Fischer,
Germany’s Aims
, pp. 103-6.

144
Point one raised the possibility of the cession from France of ‘Belfort and western slopes of the Vosges, razing of fortresses and cession of coastal strip from Dunkirk to Boulogne’. The ore field of Briey was to be ‘ceded in any case’. Point two stipulated that Liege and Verviers were to be ceded by Belgium to Prussia, and a ‘frontier strip’ by Belgium to Luxemburg. It left open the ‘question whether Antwerp, with a corridor to Liege, should also be annexed’. ‘Militarily important ports’ were to be occupied by Germany; indeed, the whole Belgian coast was to be ‘at our disposal in military respects’. French Flanders with Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne would then be taken from France and given to Belgium. Point three stated that Luxemburg would become a German federal state and might acquire Longwy from Belgium. Point seven raised the possibility that Antwerp might be ceded to Holland ‘in return for the right to keep a German garrison in the fortress of Antwerp and at the mouth of the Scheldt’: Fischer,
Germany’s Aims
, p. 105.

145
Fischer,
Germany’s Aims
, pp. 10, 28, 32ff., 101f.; Geiss,
July 1914
, pp. 21f.; Berghahn,
Germany and the Approach of War
, pp. 138ff. It is of course true that the Kaiser occasionally likened himself to Napoleon, but such flights of royal fancy should not be equated with German government policy. He was just as prone to remind British diplomats: ‘We fought side by side a hundred years ago. I want our two nations to stand together again in front of the Belgian monument at Waterloo.... Do I want Australia? With its labour politicians? No thank you’: Gooch and Temperley (eds),
British Documents
, vol. VI, No. 442.

146
The original German objectives are clearly set out in Jagow’s letter to Lichnowsky of 18 July (Geiss,
July
1914, doc. 30).

147
For a summary of the vast literature on German policy in 1914, see N. Ferguson, ‘Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives’,
Historical Journal
, 35, 3 (1992), pp. 725-52. Zimmermann was one of the few German diplomats to admit openly to expecting that ‘we should find our English cousins on the side of our enemies, inasmuch as England fears that France, in the event of a new defeat, would sink to the level of a power of the second class’; see Geiss,
July 1914
, doc. 33.

148
See Grey,
Twenty
-
Five Years
, vol. I, p. 325; Albertini,
Origins,
vol. II, p. 506. It should, however, be noted that Belgian integrity was only guaranteed ‘assuming that Belgium does not take sides against us’; and that no assurance was to be given with respect to French colonies. It is possible to deduce from this that Bethmann already contemplated some changes to the extent and status of Belgium, as by this stage the chances of Belgian acquiescence were small. On the other hand, Moltke’s draft decree 87 justifying the invasion of Belgium offered not only to guarantee Belgium’s sovereign rights and independence in return for its neutrality, but also to evacuate the country immediately after the war was over and to pay compensation for any war damage: Geiss,
July 1914,
doc. 91. The future of Belgium was to be a bone of contention in Berlin throughout the war, and it proved impossible to make the kind of unequivocal commitment to the restoration of Belgian integrity which might have satisfied British opinion; though it should be noted that the issue might have disappeared if, as nearly happened, the Germans had been able to persuade King Albert to drop his country’s commitment to neutrality: Fischer,
Germany’s Aims
, pp. 215-25; 420-8.

149
Ibid
., pp. 104f.

150
Ibid
., pp. 115ff.

151
D. E. Kaiser, ‘Germany and the Origins of the First World War’,
Journal of Modern History
, 55 (1983), pp. 442-74. Cf. P. Winzen, ‘Der Krieg in Bülow’s Kalkül. Katastrophe der Diplomatie oder Chance zur Machtexpansion’, in J. Dülffer and K. Holl (eds),
Bereit zum Krieg. Kriegsmentalität im wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890-1914. Beiträge zur historischen Friedensforschung
(Göttingen, 1986).

152
For further details of the German conception of
Mitteleuropa
as it developed during the war, see Fischer,
Germany’s Aims
, pp. 201-8, 247-56,523-33.

153
Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 248-55, 273.

154
Wilson,
Entente
, pp.39, 42f., 51, 123. See also Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 73-81, 95, 281.

155
PRO, CAB 16/5 XC/A/035374, Proceedings ..., [23 March 1909]. My emphasis. Cf. d‘Ombrain, War
Machinery,
pp. 95-8.

156
K. A. Hamilton, ’Great Britain and France‘, in Hinsley (ed.),
British Foreign Policy
, p. 324; Wilson, Entente, p. 37.

157
Grey to Asquith, 16 April 1911, quoted in Grey,
Twenty-Five
Years, vol. I, p. 94. He repeated this view to the CID the following month: Wilson,
Entente
, p. 85.

158
Wilson,
Entente
, pp.57, 69. For Esher’s similar views, see d’Ombrain, War
Machinery,
pp. 106ff., and Offer,
Agrarian Interpretation
, pp. 307f. Radicals and navalists alike suspected, rightly, that the expeditionary force was the thin end of a wedge which would widen into conscription.

159
Wilson, ‘Decision for War’, pp. 149, 156n.

160
Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 28f., 124; Offer,
Agrarian Interpretation
, p. 295; d‘Ombrain,
War Machinery
, pp. 106f.

161
Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 29, 39, 48, 52f.

162
Hamilton, ‘Great Britain and France’, p. 332; Churchill,
World Crisis
, pp. 112f. My emphasis.

163
Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 97f. Cf. Wilson, Entente, p. 26; Offer,
Agrarian Interpretation
, p. 304; d’Ombrain,
War Machine
, pp. 109f.

164
Renzl, ‘Great Britain, Russia’, p. 3. For Nicolson’s concern at this time about public lack of ‘knowledge’ as to the very great importance that Russia’s friendship is [
sic
] to us’, see Wilson,
Entente
, p. 404.

165
Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 289ff.

166
Monger,
End of Isolation
, pp. 281f. For Crowe’s version of the same deterrent theory, see
ibid
., p. 271. For Nicolson’s, see Wilson, Entente, p. 40.

167
Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and France’, pp.298, 306; Wilson, Entente, pp.92, 98; Schmidt, ‘Contradictory Postures’, p. 139; Fischer,
Germany’s Aims
, p. 32.

168
Brock, ‘Britain Enters the War’, p. 146. British non-intervention could also have been inferred from Lloyd George’s emollient Mansion House speech of 1914: Hazlehurst,
Politicians at War
, p. 28. For the early German assumptions about British non-intervention, see Geiss,
July 1914
, p. 95, docs. 18, 28. It is possible that Bethmann was gambling on the timing of British intervention, rather than on British intervention itself, believing that it would come too late to determine the outcome of the crisis.

169
This possibility was discussed but dismissed by Bertie: Wilson,
Entente
, pp. 46ff.; Monger,
End of Isolation
, p. 279.

170
Albertini,
Origins
, vol. II, pp. 203-8; Cf. Butterfield, ‘Grey’, pp. 9f; Geiss,
July
1914, pp. 95, 138. The Russian ambassador in Vienna made it clear as early as 8 July that ‘Russia would be compelled to take up arms in defence of Serbia’ if Austria ‘rushed into war’. Grey’s belief that a distinction could be drawn between cessions of territory from Serbia and some less serious form of reprisal was never really shared in St Petersburg. Revealingly, Grey warned the German ambassador Lichnowsky that ‘in view of the present unpopularity of England in Russia’ he would ‘have to be careful of Russian feelings’.

171
Albertini,
Origins
, vol. II, pp. 209-14, 329-38; Geiss,
July
1914, docs 44, 46, 57, 80, 93.

172
Hence his characteristically convoluted statement to Lichnowsky on 24 July that ‘there was no alliance ... committing us to ... France and Russia.... On the other hand ... the British government belonged to one group of powers, but did not do so in order to make difficulties greater between the two European groups; on the contrary, we wished to prevent any questions that arose from throwing the groups ... into opposition.... We should never pursue an aggressive policy, and if there was a European war, and we took part in it, it would not be on the aggressive side, for public opinion was against that.’ Lichnowsky interpreted this, as Grey doubtless intended, as a warning that ‘in case France should be drawn in, England would [not] dare to remain disinterested’, a point he repeated with growing anxiety as the crisis intensified. But Bethmann and Jagow evidently concluded that a show of German support for four-power mediation would suffice to satisfy Grey: Geiss,
July 1914
, docs 68, 73, 81, 82, 83, 85, 94, 97, 98, 99; Grey,
Twenty-Five
Years, vol. II, pp.304f., 317. See also Albertini,
Origins
, vol. II, pp. 336-9, 514; Asquith,
Genesis
, pp.201f. The King took a similar ambiguous line with the German Crown Prince when they met on 26 July: ‘I don’t know what we shall do, we have no quarrel with anyone and I hope we shall remain neutral. But if Germany declared war on Russia and France joins Russia, then I am afraid we shall be dragged into it. But you can be sure that I and my government will do all we can to prevent a European war’:
ibid
., pp. 429, 497, 687. Prince Heinrich concluded that England would remain neutral ‘at the beginning’, though he doubted ‘whether she will be able to do so in the long run ... on account of her relations with France’. However, neutrality in the short run was all the German government needed, provided victory over France could be achieved quickly enough.

173
Albertini,
Origins
, vol. II, p. 429.

174
Geiss,
July 1914
, p. 221, docs. 95, 96; Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, pp. 319f.

175
Albertini,
Origins,
vol. II, pp. 329-34, 340; Geiss,
July 1914
, docs 50, 79; Churchill,
World Crisis
, pp. 193f.

176
Geiss,
July 1914
, docs 103, 110, 112, 114. The Germans had begun to spread rumours of Russian mobilisation as early as 26 July: Albertini,
Origins,
vol. II, p. 343.

177
As Nicolson commented, ‘One does not really know where one is with Mr Sazonov’: Geiss,
July 1914
, docs 108, 119, 120; Albertini,
Origins
, vol. II, p. 509; Grey,
Twenty-Five Years
, vol. I, p. 319; Asquith, Genesis, pp. 190ff. Nor did one know where one was with Bethmann: he now argued that a four-power conference would amount to a court of arbitration, putting Austria and Serbia on an equal footing, while at the same time deliberately not mentioning Sazonov’s proposal for bilateral talks to Lichnowsky, who, he complained, was ‘informing Sir Edward [Grey] of everything’: Geiss,
July 1914
, docs 90, 100.

178
Geiss,
July 1914
, docs 121, 122, 123, 128; Albertini,
Origins
, vol. II, pp. 510ff.

179
Geiss,
July 1914
, doc. 101. Sazonov declared himself willing to halt mobilisation only ‘if Austria ... declares itself ready to eliminate from its ultimatum those points which infringe on Serbia’s sovereign rights’. An increasingly desperate Bethmann seized on this as a basis for negotiation and the Austrian government actually accepted Sazonov’s offer of talks on 30 July, but by this stage military considerations had taken over:
ibid
., docs 140, 141a, 153.

180
The Russians in fact mobilised in the southern districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan on 29 July - a decision which the Tsar later said had been taken four days before - assuring the German ambassador that this was ‘far from meaning war’. But on being told by Pourtalès that Germany would nonetheless ‘find herself compelled to mobilise, in which case she would immediately proceed to the offensive’, the Russians concluded that a partial mobilisation would be inadequate, and might even jeopardise full mobilisation. There followed a series of hysterical meetings and telephone conversations as Sazonov and his colleagues tried to persuade the vacillating Tsar to agree to full mobilisation. He finally did so at 2 p.m. on 30 July and mobilisation began the next day. As in Berlin, the much vaunted power of the monarch proved to be illusory at the moment of decision: Geiss,
July
1914, pp. 271, 291, docs 118, 123, 124a, 137, 138, 147.