1999 (20 page)

Today the United States is the only country that can safeguard Western interests in the Persian Gulf. None of the pro-Western gulf states is strong enough to do the job. None of our European allies have the forces or the will to do so. We, therefore, must step up to this vitally important issue, but so far we have not.

We must act on the military front to improve our capability to project American power into the gulf. We have made significant progress in this area. President Carter created the Rapid Deployment Force. President Reagan has upgraded the RDF into the U.S. Central Command, and Congress has appropriated billions of dollars for its forces. But we have not yet done enough. The Pentagon has made a disproportionate share of overall congressional budget cuts in the forces which would defend the Persian Gulf. As a result, the United States will not soon meet the goal of being able to deploy four divisions in the gulf within thirty days.

We cannot defend our interests in the gulf—or deter a Soviet move against them—if we cannot get our forces there. We need to invest substantially more in our airlift and sea-lift capability. It therefore must be made a top-priority item in our defense budget in the eleven years before 1999.

We must also act on the diplomatic front to forge closer ties with the countries in the region. It is impossible for the United States to intervene in the Persian Gulf without access to air bases in Saudi Arabia and other smaller gulf states. We need to base air forces there so that we can protect our ground forces as they establish a beachhead. Without air superiority, an American landing in the Persian Gulf would become a replay of the British landings at Gallipoli in World War I.

Improving our ties with these states requires the United States to undo the damage done by the Iranian arms deal. For our friends in the region, Khomeini's Iran is a much greater threat than even the Soviet Union. We must therefore assure them that the Iran fiasco was an aberration which will not be repeated. But we also must become actively engaged in efforts to settle the Palestinian question. It is this issue and our close ties with Israel that lead the gulf states to keep relations with the United States at an arm's length.

Even if we take these needed steps, our vital interests will be at risk unless the United States has the will to defend them. The perception that however powerful its armed forces may be, the United States will never use them is a dangerous one. It adds to the risk of war because it tempts aggressors to believe that aggression can succeed at little cost. Yet that is the exact perception that liberal candidates for President in 1984 encouraged when they took turns promising never to send American forces to fight for the Persian Gulf. Whoever makes that kind of pacifist pledge in 1988 will disqualify himself from being considered as a responsible leader of the United States and the free world.

In the current crisis in the Persian Gulf, the United States cannot afford to be disengaged. What happens in the Iran–Iraq war today profoundly affects our ability to safeguard the region from Soviet intervention in the future. If ever there was a war in which both parties deserved to lose, it is the Iran–Iraq war; if ever there was
a war in which the United States could not afford either party to lose, it is also the Iran–Iraq war. An Iraqi defeat would lead to Iranian fundamentalist domination of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the entire gulf region. An Iran bled white by massive losses of manpower would become vulnerable to Soviet subversion and intimidation.

In this war, we should seek a solution that provides peace without victory, while having no illusions about the ability of our diplomats to bring it about quickly. In the meantime, however, we should strengthen our friends in the gulf. We should encourage and assist recent moves toward greater regional defense cooperation, including the reintegration of Egypt not only in the Arab world but also as a potential military ally of the Arab gulf states. We must continue our involvement in escorting reflagged tankers in the gulf, for our presence gives our friends the confidence needed to spurn Iranian threats. We must remain ready and willing to launch stiff reprisals on military and economic targets in Iran for any attacks on our vessels.

At the same time, after months of fruitless debate, it is time for Congress to put up or shut up on the issue of invoking the War Powers Act. If members of Congress intend to try to intrude on the proper role of the President in foreign affairs, they should vote the question up or down. If they cannot muster the votes—and no one believes they can—they should stand aside and let the President operate without interference. As it is, Khomeini has been taking potshots at our tankers and naval forces in the hope of triggering the War Powers Act and starting the sixty-day clock for a U.S. withdrawal. The endless congressional debate, while well intentioned, only serves to bring our servicemen in the gulf under fire.

In addition to its vital interests in the Persian Gulf, the United States has critical interests in other countries in the Third World. We have an enormous stake in the economies and natural resources of these countries. Some also occupy key strategic positions which make them major prizes in the American–Soviet competition. Most important, it is in the Third World that we can
expect to see the greatest gains and losses in the U.S.–Soviet competition.

Since the end of World War II, there have been 120 wars in which 18 million people have been killed—and over forty of them are being waged today. Except for the conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands in 1981, and Greece in 1947, all these wars have taken place in the Third World. The sharpest conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union have occurred in the Third World. The most important battles in the American–Soviet competition are not along our borders but in remote villages and small countries whose names few Americans know. It is there that people and territory will be won and lost in the American–Soviet struggle.

In pinpointing Soviet aggression today, it is no longer enough to look for the smoking gun: we must now look for the hidden hand. While the Soviet Union is not responsible for all the conflicts in the Third World, it has started several and seeks to exploit most of them. We must recognize the role the Soviet Union and its surrogates play in instigating and supporting insurgencies against noncommunist governments—and take the appropriate counteraction.

To protect our interests in the Third World, we must learn how to respond to three situations: (1) a noncommunist government under attack by communist subversion; (2) a noncommunist government at peace but vulnerable to a communist insurgency; and (3) a communist government under attack by anticommunist forces.

When a friendly noncommunist government finds itself threatened by a communist insurgency, the United States should be predisposed to help it meet that threat. Without a sustained effort along the front lines in the battle between freedom and communism, the United States cannot compete effectively with Moscow.

We must become involved in these conflicts not only on behalf of our own interests, but also in support of the interests of the people of threatened Third World countries. British historian Paul Johnson wrote that “the essence of geopolitics is to be able to distinguish between different degrees of evil.” Those who oppose U.S. involvement to stop the spread of communism in the Third
World because they do not like the noncommunist regimes we at times have to support fail to understand that point. We do not like dictatorships. But we must recognize the difference between communist dictatorships and noncommunist dictatorships. A noncommunist dictatorship allows some freedoms; a communist dictatorship allows none. A noncommunist regime allows some opposition and consequently creates the chance for peaceful change; a communist regime allows no opposition. A noncommunist government might support our foreign policy; a communist government will oppose it.

Soviet-supported communist regimes seek to export their repression, while noncommunist governments do not. North Vietnam's communist leadership did not rest content until it ruled all of Indochina. Cuba has fomented communist revolution in Latin America for thirty years. It succeeded in Nicaragua in 1979, and the Nicaraguan communists, in turn, took up the task of subverting El Salvador and other Central American states.

While U.S. friends and allies might not have perfect records on human rights, theirs are without exception better than those of Moscow's clients. Cubans were better off under Batista than under Castro; the Vietnamese were better off under Thieu than under Hanoi's communists; Cambodians were better off under Lon Nol than under Pol Pot. Since 1945, twenty times as many people have been killed by communist governments as have died in wars to stop communism. We must remember that a communist peace kills more than an anticommunist war.

Our support for noncommunist governments under communist attack should be guided by a policy which came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine after I announced it in Guam in 1969. It states that in the future, unless a major power intervened in a Third World conflict, the United States should not commit its combat forces. We should provide military and economic aid to friendly states in whatever amounts necessary to defeat Soviet-supported insurgents, but the country under attack must undertake the responsibility for providing the troops to mount its own defenses. If a country cannot mobilize the capability and the will to fight and win after receiving our aid and training, sending our own troops to
do the fighting would at best provide only temporary success. Once we withdrew, the enemy would take over.

Many misinterpreted the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine as a decision by the United States to withdraw into isolation, leaving the countries of Asia and the rest of the world to fend for themselves. That was not the case. The Nixon Doctrine was not a formula for getting America
out
of the Third World, but for providing the only sound basis for America to stay
in
the Third World. I knew that after the Vietnam War it was going to be impossible to involve American forces in a war against guerrilla forces. The Nixon Doctrine made it possible for the United States to continue to play a responsible role in helping our friends and allies defend their independence against communist aggression. American aid to the government of El Salvador is an example of the Nixon Doctrine. We provide arms, economic aid, and training, but El Salvador provides the combat forces.

When a Third World government is under attack by communist guerrillas, the task of pacifying the country is extremely difficult. But the United States has had enough experience with this problem that we can avoid mistakes of the past by following seven basic guidelines:

First, we must not destabilize the leadership of our ally. Unless this leadership is hopelessly corrupt, hopelessly incompetent, or both, the United States should exercise great caution before tampering with it—and should act only if a better alternative exists. Strong leadership is essential in counterinsurgency. If our ally has strong leaders with a degree of popular support, we should give them great latitude for action in dealing with the insurgency. They usually understand better than we do what needs to be done in their country. The worst mistake we made in Vietnam was to instigate the coup against President Diem in 1963. While his government had serious flaws, his removal produced political instability, which in turn undermined South Vietnam's military capability. As a direct result, we had to assume the primary burden for fighting the war. If someone depends on us to put him in power, he will continue to depend on us after he is in power.

Second, we must seek to cut off supplies to the insurgents coming
from outside sources. Unless an insurgency enjoys the total support of the people or the government is inept and weak, it is impossible for its troops to keep up the fight without outside aid. Captured weapons and ammunition can give the guerrillas the capability for hit-and-run raids or to defend a few rural strongholds. But a sustained offensive campaign requires the logistical support of an external power. We must therefore make it a military priority to cut off those outside supplies before they reach the insurgents.

Third, we must supply whatever amount of military aid is needed to defeat the insurgents. We must not skimp on a country's survival. We should adopt the principle of doing at least as much for our friends and allies as the Soviets do for theirs.

Fourth, we must require our ally to reform its armed forces, if necessary, to command the support of the people. Counterinsurgency is a political war as much as a military one. A political victory is a precondition for a military one. We must not allow the communists to gain popular support because of brutalities committed against the civilian population by the military. That will lead to a political defeat and, in turn, to a military defeat. Not only will the communists gain recruits and support, but also the United States will find it politically impossible at home to continue to back its ally. But we must pursue military reform with flexibility and patience. A difficult task in the best of circumstances, overhauling the armed forces in wartime without undercutting their effectiveness is a tightrope act which risks a fall to defeat.