A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (102 page)

86
A disturbing example is the account by Uno Shintar
, innocuously entitled ‘Spies and Bandits’, in Cook and Cook 92, pp151–8. Uno, a self-confessed master of the art of beheading, prides himself on his ability to kill and torture. He – and some of his superiors – saw this as an important aspect of educating troops (p156).

87
Behr 89, pp263–4.

88
Williams and Wallace 89, p178. These experiments mostly took place at Ping Fan in Manchuria under the now notorious Unit 731 headed by Major (later General) Ishii Shir
(1892–1959). Prisoners of war and enemy civilians, including women and children, from as early as 1932 were used as live experimental subjects, known as
maruta
, or ‘logs of wood’. In some cases entire villages were infected with plague germs or similar. Those conducting the experiments included Japanese civilians, who appear to have become inured to the work. An account from one such civilian, Tamura Yoshio, is given in Cook and Cook 92, pp159–67. Detailed discussion of Unit 731 and its experiments is given in the works by Williams and Wallace 89, and Harris 02.

Despite various plans and unsuccessful attempts, neither biological nor chemical weapons appear to have actually been used by the Japanese against the Allies during the Pacific War, though there was extensive use of biological weapons against the Chinese. Regular Japanese troops themselves seem to have known little or nothing of these tactics, nor of the experiments, and at least 10,000 of them ended up as accidental victims of their own nation’s germ warfare. (Williams and Wallace 89, pp69–70.)

89
Daniels 93, p101.

90
Daniels 93, p103.

91
Nakamura 88, p491.

92
Daniels 93, p103.

93
For these and other details of wartime production, see Hane 86, pp331–3.

94
See Morris 75 for a detailed discussion of
kamikaze
pilots. Note also that the same suicide principle applied to minisubs as well as planes.

95
A particularly poignant account of the atrocity given by survivors was released internationally by Reuter in February 1995. My particular source here is the
Waikato Times
of 8 February 1995. It is not clear how many of the estimated 100,000 were killed by the Japanese, and how many by American bombardment.

96
See the
Japan Times
, weekly international edition, 23–29 August 1993. The incident was later reported to the US Army’s war crimes branch, who judged it to be ‘a heinous act repugnant to the sense of all civilized nations’. However, it was referred to the Japanese authorities, since laws governing the conduct of war crimes trials at that time prevented acts of brutality against one’s own nationals from being treated as war crimes. The outcome is unclear. Similar acts took place in the defence of Okinawa, and no doubt elsewhere. (See too the 27 November–3 December 1995 edition of the same newspaper.)

97
Coox 88, p369.

98
Following research by the historian Yoshida Morio there is now some dispute as to whether these really were spared for cultural reasons, as the American government has claimed – a claim officially accepted by the Japanese government – or whether they were simply not strategically important as targets. For an English language summary of Yoshida’s views, see the
Japan Times
, weekly international edition, 19–25 July 1993.

99
Heinrichs 83, p276.

100
There are a number of poignant accounts of these suicides given in Cook and Cook 92. They also reveal the degree of indoctrination of hatred and fear towards Americans, which proved to be unfounded once the American troops had arrived. Many American ‘demons’ treated the Okinawans better than the (mainland) Japanese had, as the survivors themselves remark. This left many Okinawans feeling betrayed by mainland Japan, feelings that have still not fully subsided.

101
Heinrichs 83, p276.

102
The text of the Potsdam Declaration – also known as the Potsdam Proclamation – is given in Borton 55, pp485–6.

103
The Suzuki cabinet ended up using the word ‘
mokusatsu’
(literally ‘kill with silence’). This term basically means ‘to ignore with contempt’, but it has been claimed it was used to mean simply ‘no comment at this stage’- that is, Japan simply wanted more time to consider the Declaration, and was not really rejecting it. However, such a view fails to take into account other comments made by Suzuki (see Butow 54, p148) that more clearly indicated Japan’s rejection of the Declaration.

104
The historian most associated with this view is the American Gar Alperovitz. See for example his 1985 (orig. 1965) work.

105
Sayle 95, p54. Sayle sees the testing motive as particularly applicable to General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project for the development of the A-bomb.

106
The whole question of how far Japan was advanced in its own nuclear technology is a matter of considerable controversy. Most westerners still do not realise the extent of Japanese expertise in this area at the time. Two Japanese scientists – Yukawa Hideki and Tomonaga Shinichir
– later received
Nobel prizes for prewar work in nuclear physics, and a number of others had worked with top western scientists. Japan had no fewer than five nuclear particle accelerators – the only nation other than America to possess them. Destruction of these cyclotrons was one of the very first tasks of the postwar Occupation forces. The matter of a possible nuclear strike by Japan against the Allies has been discussed for some time, but was particularly brought to prominence by Robert Wilcox (85). Most specialists (such as Low 90) feel his claims are greatly exaggerated, and argue that despite its expertise Japan still lacked sufficient relevant knowledge actually to build a bomb, lacked coordination, and also lacked uranium. On the other hand, it is known that Germany was supplying uranium ore to Japan. Moreover, recently declassified documents show Japan did in fact have enough uranium compounds to make at least one bomb. It had, for example, more than 500 kg of uranyl nitrate at a navy depot in Tokuyama, Yamaguchi Prefecture. (See the
Japan Times
, weekly international edition, 20–26 January 1997.) In any event, while is very unlikely Japan was near nuclear capability in 1945, it is impossible simply to dismiss out of hand a scenario in which American fears about a Japanese strike played at least some part in the American decision to drop their own bomb. An official American report of July 1945 stated that ‘
Most
of us are certain that the Japanese cannot develop and use this weapon effectively’ (my italics). Presumably,
some
were not so certain. (See Dower 93c, note 26 on p95. Dower himself, while referring to the report, is strongly of the view that Japan lacked nuclear capability.)

107
Clear figures regarding casualties are difficult to ascertain. The usual figure is 140,000, but in 1995 the Hiroshima City authorities gave the number of confirmed dead by the end of 1945 as 87,833. (See the
Japan Times
, weekly international edition, 7–13 August 1995.) There is a substantial amount of literature dealing with the atomic bombings (especially Hiroshima) and their effects on the victims. One of the best-known works available in English is
Kuroi Ame
(Black Rain) of 1966, by the novelist Ibuse Masuji (1898–1993). For some very recent and very poignant poetry and comment by a survivor of the Hiroshima bombing, the female poet Hashizume Bun (b.1931), see Hashizume 96.

108
See Large 92, p126.

109
The text of the emperor’s speech is given as an appendix in Behr 89, pp407–8 or Barber and Henshall 99, pp264–5.

110
The text of the Instrument of Surrender is given in Borton 55, pp487–8, and the imperial edict on p489.

111
For discussion of operational factors in Japan’s defeat, such as poor inter-service coordination, loss of merchant shipping, poor code security, and so forth, see Coox 88, pp377–9.

112
Behr 89, p366.

113
In a survey conducted in November 1944, 13 per cent of Americans – more than one in eight – wanted the Japanese to be utterly exterminated. (See Cohen 87, p27, and Dower 86, pp53–5.) Such a view was not confined to the general public, but was also found among the nation’s leaders.

114
Dower 86, p150.

Part Six: A Phoenix from the Ashes

1
A detailed account of the surrender ceremony, including the text of the speech, is given in MacArthur 64, pp272–7.

2
For details see Nishi 82, pp47–9.

3
For details see Hane 86, pp341–3. About one house in five throughout the nation had been destroyed (more than half the houses in the case of T
ky
and Osaka), and food was in desperately short supply. The Occupation forces provided some food relief, but not in substantial form till early 1946. Many Japanese in late 1945 spent almost their entire energies simply trying to obtain enough food to stay alive. See also ‘Out of a Firestorm’ in the BBC
Nippon
video series.