A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (104 page)

25
See, for example, Large 92, pp136–9, Bix 95, p323, and also Borton 67, pp15–16. For a fuller discussion of the American government’s views on both the imperial institution and Hirohito personally see Ward 87a, pp3–18.

26
Contemporary figures who felt he should have abdicated either at once or at an early stage of the Occupation include the immediate prewar prime minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro and the immediate postwar (Aug.–Oct. 1945) prime minister Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko. See also Ruoff 01, p135. Later figures who shared such a view include the novelist Mishima Yukio and the novelist-cum-politician Ishihara Shintar
– both strong nationalists. Tsurumi (87, p26) discusses ongoing Japanese reservations, and among other things notes that Hirohito’s failure to step down has paved the way for a belief that governing individuals need not take responsibility for their decisions.

27
As one interesting example of Hirohito’s thinking, in 2003 the so-called ‘Emperor’s apology’ was found, this being a draft, probably written for him around late 1948 (the time of the verdict of the T
ky
Trial) by his then Grand-Steward Tajima Michiji, in which he explicitly uses the word ‘defeat’, appears to take responsibility for the defeat in terms of his own ‘lack of virtue’, and also states that it would be shirking his responsibility to the nation if he abdicated at this difficult time. Though it was almost certainly not written by Hirohito personally, equally almost certainly it accurately reflects what he himself wanted to say. It was never published. See the
East
, vol. XXXIX, no. 2, July/August 2003, pp4–14. It should be noted that Hirohito’s abdication, especially in the immediate aftermath of the war, would have made it easier for him to be tried.

28
MacArthur 64, p301.

29
There is great controversy over Hirohito’s war responsibility. Like Pearl Harbor, it is an issue that should not be over-simplified. Relevant works range from the critical (such as Bergamini 71, Behr 89, and Bix 92 and ‘00) to the supportive (such as Mosley 66 and Shillony 73). Many commentators have tended to hold views similar to those of Stephen Large (92), basically a balanced but mildly sympathetic position to the effect that Hirohito was a weak man caught up in circumstances too powerful for him to handle. That is, he was guilty by omission rather than commission, in failing to stop the wrongdoings of others. On the other hand, the recent detailed writings of Herbert Bix in particular suggest a much less sympathetic view might be more appropriate. Among other things, Bix lists examples of Hirohito’s active involvement in such matters as strategic military planning, as in pressing for the deployment of army air power in the Guadalcanal campaign, even insisting over the views of his field staff. (See Bix 92, pp352–4, and 00, Part Three passim.) Among his critics there is also condemnation of his delay in terminating the war, thereby allowing numerous further casualties. (See, for example, Takahashi 03, pp9–10.)

30
For details see Ward 87a, p16, and Behr 89, p348.

31
Large 92, p141, and Nishi 82, pp55–6.

32
MacArthur 64, p284 and pp310–1. See also Ward 87a, p7, for a Washington policy recommendation, seemingly initiated by Hugh Borton as early as May 1944, that Hirohito’s divinity should not be supported.

33
Bix 92, pp318–21.

34
See Large 92, p147.

35
See Bix 95 and Ruoff 01 (esp. Ch. 2) for discussion of the the ‘symbol emperor’.

36
Ward 87a, p13, Large 92, p152, and esp. Behr 89, pp364–5.

37
Bix 95, p331, and 00, Part Four passim.

38
Ward 87a, p36.

39
MacArthur 64, p300.

40
See the video ‘Reinventing Japan’, which contains revealing interviews with Kades and a number of other SCAP staff involved in the drafting of the new constitution.

41
McNelly 87, p80.

42
Ward 87b, p400.

43
See interview in ‘Reinventing Japan’. It is not just Japanese who express such a view. In a book questioning the nature of democracy in modern Japan, Herzog (93, Ch. 1) makes a similar point.

44
In addition to Herzog 93, for details of undemocratic aspects of modern Japan see McCormack and Sugimoto 86. These include criminal justice practices that clearly violate human rights.

45
By a directive from SCAP these were carried out in line with the provisions of the draft constitution, even though this was yet to be formally accepted by the parliament that was now being elected. This meant that women voted for the first time.

46
The proposal regarding women’s rights was drawn up by Beate Sirota, a 22-year-old woman who despite her Japanese-sounding name was a Russian-American. She was the only one of the drafting team who had any real experience of Japan, one of the few civilians and one of the few not picked virtually at random. She was chosen for a number of reasons: she had spent her childhood years between 5 and 15 in Japan, she was fluent in Japanese, and she was a woman.

Of all the remarkable stories of the drafting of the constitution, hers is one of the most remarkable. As she elaborated in ‘Reinventing Japan’ and in a later interview (see the
Japan Times
, weekly international edition, 31 July–6 August 1995, pp10–11), she put her contribution together after madly dashing around libraries to find any relevant material. It was too detailed, and was heavily cut back by Kades. When put to Japanese representatives for their comments, they were initially unwilling to accept such a dramatic change for women as guaranteeing equality. However, this part of the constitutional draft was only reached after 16 solid hours of discussion, largely on the role of emperor. Everyone was desperately tired and wanted to finish as soon as possible. She herself had been acting as interpreter for the Japanese during discussions and as a result was seen by them as a kindly disposed helper. They were unaware that it was she herself who had drafted the item that now came before them. She quotes Kades as saying to them that ‘Miss Sirota has her heart set on the women’s rights, so why don’t we pass them?’ She adds simply, ‘And they did.’

47
It was not until the 1990s that a majority of Japanese women came to disagree with traditional gender roles. See for example surveys reported in the
Japan Times
, weekly international edition, 2–15 January 1995 and 15–21 April 1996. See too Kumagai 96, pp100–11. Many women, even quite young ones, continued to agree with traditional roles. (See esp. Iwao 93.) As Iwao and other contemporary women commentators show, Japanese women’s perception of the female role has been a complex issue. Though Confucianism is a major factor, it is not the sole determinant of Japanese women’s position in society. Neither is male chauvinism, nor actual lack of opportunity for women regardless of constitutional ‘guarantees’ of equality. Many women themselves have remained unconvinced of women’s suitability for certain occupations, usually relating to the exercise of power. In politics, for example, women voters have preferred male candidates. In the October 1996 Lower House elections, women represented 10 per cent of all candidates, but fewer than 5 per cent of those elected were women, despite female turnout exceeding male. After the June 2000 elections the percentage of Lower House seats held by women rose to 7.5, but after the November 2003 elections fell back to 7.1 (34 out of 480 seats). Clearly, this is an issue that merits further discussion in a more specialised context.

48
See the video ‘Out of a Firestorm’.

49
This is covered in some detail in Nishi 82, pp90–105. See also Braw 91. In fairness to the Occupation, this is also an illustration of the universal philosophical question of the extent to which tolerance can tolerate intolerance.

50
See the videos ‘Reinventing Japan’ and ‘Out of a Firestorm’.

51
Nishi 82, pp103–4.

52
Reischauer and Craig 79, p282. This lies behind many of the comments made by Occupation officials attributing everything to the Japanese. Obviously, it was not just the Japanese who differentiated between what was said on the outside and what was actually done on the inside.

53
Nishi 82, p166.

54
For full details of land reform see Dore 59.

55
Hadley 83, p364. The six lesser
zaibatsu
were Asano, Furukawa, Ayukawa (Aikawa), Okura, Nomura, and Nakajima.

56
Hadley 83, p365.

57
The following draws particularly on Cohen 87. Cohen himself oversaw most of the labour reforms.

58
A US Government report of April 1946 reported the number as just 6,800 (Nishi 82, p95), whereas in March 1947 it was reported by Nosaka Sanz
to be 60,000 (Cohen 87, p281). Even allowing for distortion of the figures, the trend of rapid growth is unmistakable, and the concern among the authorities obvious. As Cohen points out by way of comparison, in Russia just prior to the March 1917 revolution there were fewer than 50,000 Bolshevik card holders, in a population double that of Japan’s.