A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (103 page)

4
These traits are unmistakably clear from his less-than-modest memoirs (MacArthur 64) and from the comments of those who knew him well, such as his personal aide Faubion Bowers (see interview in the video ‘Reinventing Japan’ in the
Pacific Century
series). See also Reischauer 88, p104, and Dower 93b, p165.

5
Cohen 87, pp53–4.

6
Storry 63, p240. Theodore Cohen – himself an important figure in the Occupation – repeatedly points out that those around MacArthur usually had mixed feelings towards him, respecting him but angered by his self-importance and his failure to acknowledge the achievements of others. See Cohen 87, pp.xix-xx, 54, and 63.

7
China was busy with domestic troubles. The Soviets demanded their own zone of occupation, in Hokkaid
, and when this was refused, declined to send their troops to serve under a US commander. The British troops were mostly Australian. See Cohen 87, pp58–61, for details of the position of the Soviets and other Allies.

8
MacArthur 64, pp291–3.

9
Regarding commencement of planning, see Ward 87b, p395, and Borton 67, pp4–8. See also Ward 87a, pp3–4. New Dealers were liberals supportive of the ‘New Deal’ – the social and economic reforms introduced in America by President Roosevelt during the 1930s to alleviate the effects of the Depression. They were particularly concerned to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth, and labour reforms supportive of unions rather than big business interests. See Cohen 87 for a general discussion of the New Deal aspect of planning for Japan.

10
Borton published a number of works on Japan in the postwar period, but greatly played down his own major role. However, examination of important directives and other documents of the day reveals his involvement in the great majority. For an informed comment by a contemporary on the extent of his role, see Cohen 87, p18.

11
For details of JCS1380/15, see Gibney 92, p182. (Gibney himself was a member of the Occupation.) It should not be confused with the much vaguer and simpler directive issued in August, the
U.S. Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan
, also known as SWNCC 150/4 (SWNCC standing for State [Dept]-War-Navy Coordinating Committee).

12
MacArthur 64, pp280–3.

13
MacArthur 64, p283.

14
See Cohen 87, p11–2.

15
MacArthur 64, pp286–7.

16
MacArthur 64, p298.

17
Many western commentators attribute it to MacArthur without qualification, while many Japanese nowadays prefer to believe it was of Japanese origin. In fact it is a classic case of ‘buck passing’, when one might have expected rather a case of ‘credit grabbing’. It is beyond dispute that MacArthur pencilled the clause and handed it to the SCAP team working on the new constitution. One of that team, Richard Poole, confirms this, attributing the clause to MacArthur himself (see interview in ‘Reinventing Japan’). However, in his memoirs (MacArthur 64, pp302–4) MacArthur denies it was his own idea and asserts that the initiative came from then Prime Minister Shidehara Kij
r
. Yoshida Shigeru, who succeeded Shidehara as Prime Minister, recalled in his own memoirs (Yoshida 61, p137) his impression that MacArthur had suggested it to Shidehara, not the other way round as MacArthur claimed. As an alternative, Theodore McNelly (McNelly 87, pp79–80), raises the possibility that it might have come from Shidehara, but in response to a suggestion by Charles Kades, who was in charge of the team drafting the constitution and who was greatly impressed by the anti-war Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928. To add to the range of possible sources, Robert Ward (Ward 87a, pp23–4) draws attention to a State Department plan for postwar Japan, drawn up on 9 May 1944 by Hugh Borton, which refers to ‘the wide consensus which now exists that Japan should not be permitted in the postwar period to retain an army, navy, or air force’. Though this particular Washington plan refers to the ‘postwar’ period and not a permanent arrangement, and may not have been specifically sent to MacArthur anyway, an early document of August 1945, SWNCC 150/2, does clearly refer to the ‘complete and permanent’ disarmament of Japan. (See Dower 93b, p168, though Dower feels the clause’s origin was in T
ky
not Washington.) Borton himself (Borton 55, note 5 on pp423–4) attributes the ‘renunciation of war principle’ to MacArthur, and later (Borton 67, p16) attributes the idea of disbanding the armed forces to his State Department colleague George Blakeslee. Nor, in a broader sense, should it be forgotten that half a century earlier Japan itself had disbanded the Korean army.

18
The full text of the constitution is given in the
K
dansha Encyclopedia of Japan
, v.2, pp9–13, and in the
Asahi Shimbun Japan Almanac
(1997), pp284–91.

19
For further details of the T
ky
Trial see Minear 71 (in full) and 83 (in brief). See also Tsurumi 87 Ch. 2, Bix 2000 pp581–618, and Maga 2001 for more discussion. See Picigallo 79 for discussion of overseas trials, and Barber and Henshall 99.

20
See, for example, Tsurumi 87, p16.

21
Williams and Wallace 89, p286.

22
See Seagrave 99, esp. p216 re non-trial of those involved.

23
Tsurumi 87, p16.

24
In an opinion poll conducted in June 1945 77 per cent of American people wanted Hirohito severely punished, and on 18 September that year a joint
resolution was introduced into the Senate (and referred to a committee) declaring that Hirohito should be tried as a war criminal. Many leading figures from among the other Allied nations, such as the prime minister of New Zealand, and leaders from Australia, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and China, were also of the view that Hirohito should be tried. See, for example, Bix 95, pp320–1, Bix 00, pp610–2, MacArthur 64, p288, Behr 89, p294 and p332, and Ward 87a, p11.