Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (94 page)

11
. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in
Philosophy
, 99.

12
. Rand (August 1964), “Is Atlas shrugging?” in
Unknown Ideal
, 165. The most dramatic, literary presentation of Rand’s belief in the power of ideas can be found in
Atlas Shrugged
(605–7) in the description of an inexorable railroad catastrophe.

13
. Engels (21–22 September 1890), “Letter to Joseph Bloch,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 396.

14
. Engels (5 August 1890), “Letter to Conrad Schmidt,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 393.

15
. Engels (27 October 1890), “Letter to Conrad Schmidt,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 397; (25 January 1894), “Letter to W. Borgius,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 441. This is not the place to consider the myriad interpretations of Marxist historiography. My own view of Marx’s dialectical historical methodology is presented briefly in Sciabarra 1988a and 1995b.

16
. Rand (April 1977), “Global balkanization,” in
Voice of Reason
, 115.

17.
In this same historical context, Paterson formulated a theory of history that also gave credence to the power of ideas. See especially Cox 2004, passim. Paterson ([1943] 1993, 53) writes; “Ideas precede accomplishment.… Every achievement is foreshadowed in fancy; every major disaster is the result of inadequacy, error, or perversion of intelligence.” Also see Cox (1993), “Introduction to the Transaction edition,” in Paterson [1943] 1993; Rand (October 1964), “Books:
The God of the Machine
by Isabel Paterson,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
3:42–43.

18
. Rand (25 February 1974), “Ideas v. goods,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
3:296.

19
. Rand (August-September 1967), “Requiem for man,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 299–300.

20
. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 8. See also Peikoff 1985T, Lecture 5, which compares Rand and the conservatives in terms of their respective views on the speed of social change. N. Branden tells a story in his memoirs (1989, 294) that Rand was amused when, in 1957, on the publication of
Atlas Shrugged
, Peikoff, the youngest member of the inner circle, suggested that Rand’s book would convince America to embrace laissez-faire capitalism within a few years. “‘That’s not how things happen, or can possibly happen,’ she insisted. ‘I
will
have an influence—
Atlas
will have an influence—but it will be a very slow process. We won’t begin to see its concrete results in action for many years. I may not fully see them at all.’” Of course, Peikoff no longer adheres to such ahistorical reasoning.

21
. This is an instance of reciprocal causation. Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 9) explains, for instance, that low-caliber movies will contribute to the disintegration of a culture, even as they are symptomatic of it. In such circumstances, each factor mutually reinforces the other. It should be noted that Peikoff’s book,
The Ominous Parallels
(1982), despite its more popularized style of exposition, is the most explicitly developed application of the Objectivist theory of history yet published.

22
. Peikoff (October 1985), “Philosophy and psychology in history,” in Binswanger 6.5.8. Peikoff’s essay is, in many ways, a response to Branden who argues that the Objectivist philosophy of history is in great need of revision. N. Branden (1982T) suggests that Rand’s theory of history should incorporate both philosophy
and
psychology.

23
. On the issue of whether or not “good or ill” pertains to an idea or to the practitioners of the idea, there has been a debate within Objectivist circles. The themes discussed in the following sources are wide-ranging and controversial, and symptomatic of a deep division between orthodox and neo-Objectivists, particularly Peikoff and Kelley: Schwartz (27 February 1989), “On sanctioning the sanctioners,” in Schwartz 4.20; Peikoff (18 May 1989), “Fact and value,” in Schwartz 5.1; and 1989T; Bidinotto 1989; Kelley 1990.

24
. In the first two-thirds of
Atlas Shrugged
, Galt does not remove himself entirely from the social order; he works incognito at Dagny Taggart’s railroad, but not in his capacity as an inventor and entrepreneur.

25
. Peikoff argues that many Objectivists make a mistake of abstraction. They adopt a quasi-religious perspective, substituting Galt’s Gulch for Heaven, and alienating themselves from the culture-at-large. Like the Christians in days of yore, they view suffering as their destiny. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 12) rejects such “rationalistic” Objectivism.

26
. Marx (13 October 1868), “Letter to J. B. Schweitzer,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 201;
Capital
, 1:17.

27
. Rand (3 January 1972), “‘What can one do?’” in
Philosophy
, 245–49. On Chernyshevsky and Lenin, see
Chapter 1
, in this edition.

28
. Rand (January 1962), “Check your premises: Choose your issues,” in
Objectivist Newsletter
1:1; (October 1966), “A letter from a reader,” in
Objectivist
5:156.

29
. B. Branden (June 1963), “Intellectual ammunition department: What is the Objectivist stand on ‘right-to-work’ laws?” in
Objectivist Newsletter
2:23.

30
. Rand (June 1966), “The question of scholarships,” in
Voice of Reason
, 40.

31.
See also Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 10. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 4) argues further that under statist conditions, one may be justified to lie about age, national origin, etc., in order to gain employment, shelter, and other amenities of life.

32
. Rand (5 June 1972), “‘Fairness doctrine’ for education,” in
Philosophy
, 231–43.

33
. Rand (February 1970), “The left: Old and new,” in
New Left
, 96.

34
. Rand (18 July 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Schwartz 6.1.6; (July–September 1965), “The cashing-in: The student rebellion,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 256–57.

35
. Rand (3 January 1972), “‘What can one do?’” in
Philosophy
, 245.

36
. See Peikoff 1984T, which discusses systematization and comprehensiveness as two important components of previously successful intellectual movements.

37
. Rand 1962T; [1964] 1993bT.

38
. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in
Philosophy
, 45.

39
. Packer (February 1984), “The psychological requirements of a free society,” in Binswanger 5.1.2–5.

40
. Rand (22 July 1962), “‘The cold civil war,’” in
Column
, 23–25.

41
. Rand (April 1964), “The property status of airwaves,” in
Unknown Ideal.
A more detailed Objectivist blueprint for deregulation is presented in Reisman 1986T.

42
. Rand (February 1964), “Government financing in a free society,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 116; [1964] 1993aT. Prominent Objectivists have debated the morality of taxation in the pages of
Full Context
. See especially, articles and letters by Peter Saint-Andre, Tibor Machan, Murray Franck, and others, in Reedstrom 1994.

43
. Rand (7 December 1960), “Conservatism: An obituary,” in
Unknown Ideal
, 201.

44
. Rand (18 July 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for
Atlas Shrugged
,” in Schwartz 6.1.3.

45
. On this convergence, see N. Branden 1983b, 239.

46
. Rand (9 April 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.2.

47
. It is no coincidence that Nathaniel Branden (1992, 43–45) projects this same harmonious integration in his description of the fully efficacious individual of self-esteem.

48
. Barry 1983, 108–9; 1987, 130.

49
. Friedman 1991, 17–18. On the other hand, Rand argued that Friedman was not an advocate of capitalism. She characterized him as a “miserable eclectic,” and repudiated his “amoral” defense of the fact-value dichotomy in economics. Rand (January–February 1976), “A last survey, part two,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
4:386; 1976T; Peikoff 1980T, Lecture 1.

50
. B. Branden 1986; Rothbard 1987, 1; Kelley 1990, 71–72.

51
. Though Foucault is most famous for his opposition to the treatment of those individuals labeled as “mentally ill” by the psychiatric profession, it is Szasz among libertarian psychiatrists who has actually fought the practice. Both Branden and Rand have praised Szasz. Though N. Branden (1971b, 6) opposes Szasz’s belief that mental illness is a “myth,” he applauds the famed psychiatrist’s fight against the victimization of mental patients in state psychiatric hospitals. Rand (1976T) considered Szasz a promising advocate of individual rights in this regard.

52
. Machan (1984), “Reason, individualism, and capitalism: The moral vision of Ayn Rand,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 214.

53
. Den Uyl 1973, 7. Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1993, 126–30) provide a quasi-Aristotelian critique of the “moral dualism” that underlies this dichotomy of individuality and sociality.

54
. Flew (1984), “Selfishness and the unintended consequences of intended action,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 191–92.

55
. Rand (August 1962), “The ‘conflicts’ of men’s interests,” in
Virtue of Selfishness
, 55–56.

56
. Rand (23 October 1972), “A nation’s unity, part two,” in
Ayn Rand Letter
2:127–28.

57.
Rand (1971), “Why I like stamp collecting,” in
Column
, 122.

58
. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in
New Left
, 157–58. Despite his criticism of such doctrines as “natural rights,” MacIntyre’s conception is informed by Aristotelian and Thomistic moral theory. He criticizes “the modern liberal attempt to render our public shared morality independent of conceptions of the human good.” MacIntyre 1990, 1981. An interesting commentary on MacIntyre is provided in Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991, 97–101.

EPILOGUE

1
. Lukács (March 1919), “What is orthodox Marxism?” in Lukács 1971, 1–2. More specifically, Lukács identified Marxism with dialectical materialism. Himmelfarb (1994, 52–54) provides an interesting account of the impact of Lukács’s book on Marxist scholarship.

2
. Of course, Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 8) does not characterize the relational view as “dialectical.” But clearly, Peikoff views Hegel as “the best actual predecessor of Ayn Rand” on the issue of integration, the view “that every item implies every other, that there is nothing by chance and no inexplicable element, and that integration is
the
key to knowledge.” Peikoff wonders “whether Ayn Rand in her reading of the history of philosophy got any leads from Hegel …” (Peikoff 1997T, Lecture 7). Thanks to David M. Brown for bringing this to my attention.

A
PPENDIX
I: T
HE
R
AND
T
RANSCRIPT
(1999)

1
. I detail the discovery of the Rosenbaum transcript in Sciabarra 1999b.

2
. The transcript was translated by George L. Kline on 15 November 1998, with additional translations made by Bernice Rosenthal.

3
. Almedingen (1941) reports that “[b]y 1924 … humanities had no longer any room in the Soviet scheme” (333). This would not have affected Rand’s studies at all, since she was a 1924 graduate.

4
. I have enlisted the help of several scholars in reconstructing the contents and teachers of the courses herein mentioned. Special thanks to Michael David-Fox, George Kline, Peter Konecny, Bernice Rosenthal, and Philip Swoboda. In his investigation of courses from 1923, TsGa SPb (Central State Archives in St. Petersburg) f.2556, op.1. d.318, Konecny cites additional professors in the Petrograd College of the Social Sciences: M. I. Aranov (
NOT
course [
nauchnaia organizatsiia truda
, or scientific organization of labor, an organization set up to improve labor efficiency]); B. S. Martynov (Land Law in the USSR); A. Venediktov (Organization of Industry); V. A. Zelenko (Education and Politics); and Zhizhilenko’s course on criminal law. Vladimir Vasilyevich Weidle also taught a course on the history of art.

5
. The expression “obshchee uchenie o gosudarstve” can be translated as “general doctrine” or “general theory of the state.” Thanks to both Bernice Rosenthal and George Kline for these varying translations.

6
. George Kline (in a personal correspondence, 8 February 1999) finds it curious that, as a philosophy minor, Rand never took a course in “Introduction to Philosophy,” taught by Lossky five times between 1907–8 and 1917–18, by Vvedensky in 1906–7, and by both Sergei Alekseevich Alekseev (who was known as Sergei Alekseev Askoldov) and Semyon Frank in 1916–17 (
RP
). Thanks to Philip Swoboda for bringing the
RP
volume to my attention, and to George Kline for translating its relevant pages.

7
. This course may have incorporated some formal classes on the philosophy of Fried-rich Nietzsche, a major influence on the Russian Silver Age. In
Russian Radical
, I speculated that Rand “was probably among the last students at the university to study Nietzsche’s philosophy formally” before Nietzsche’s works were banned by the Soviets. The
transcript discloses no
formal
courses on Nietzsche’s philosophy, however. I speculated that Rand may have studied with Askoldov or Faddei Frantsevitch Zelinsky, both of whom used concepts from Nietzsche’s work on the nature of the will. Askoldov was also “captivated” by Lossky’s philosophy (Nikolai Starchenko in Kuvakin 1994, 658). In fact, these two thinkers shared a common intellectual heritage: Lossky had identified Askoldov’s father, A. A. Kozlov, the Leibnizian epistemologist, as one of his most important intellectual forebears. Both Askoldov and Lossky were part of the neo-Idealist tradition in Russian philosophy, as was I. I. Lapshin. However, according to
RP
, Askoldov did not teach psychology in 1916–17 or 1917–18 (though he did teach “Introduction to Philosophy” and “History of Ethics”). He moved to Kazan in 1918, and returned to Petrograd in 1920, where he resumed teaching at the Polytechnical Institute until the mid-1920s (Alekseev 1995). He was exiled in 1928. Of course, even if she did not study with Askoldov or Zelinsky, Rand read much Nietzsche on her own, and was also enraptured by the writings of the Nietzschean Russian Symbolist Aleksandr Blok, whom she characterized as her favorite poet. Blok gave regular readings of his work in Petrograd. In addition, one cannot discount the intellectual ties between Rand, Dostoyevsky (one of her favorite literary stylists), and Nietzsche. Nietzsche, in fact, wrote abstracts of many of Dostoyevsky’s works. Their common “existentialist” themes influenced the writings of E. I. Zamyatin, which were circulated in Petrograd literary circles in the early 1920s. On the similarities between Rand’s
Anthem
and the “dialectic path” in Zamyatin’s
We
, see Gimpelevich 1997. Thanks to Richard Shedenhelm for bringing this article to my attention.