Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (13 page)

The constitution seemed derived from an Eastern European model. The state would be a socialist state, the name changed to the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. It would be a single-party state run by the BSPP, and no other parties were legal. It had a unicameral legislature with a tiered series of elections from the local level to a State Council of twenty-eight, the
chair of which became the president. The government would nominate candidates for a legislature, and there would be no opposition. Although there were various rights stipulated, they were always subject to law and state control. The courts were under the legislature, and judges had no tenure. In effect, Burma became a socialist authoritarian (but not communist) state.

The unitary state under the 1974 constitution codified the military control that had existed since 1962, but did it under the auspices of the military-directed BSPP. General Ne Win had ignored the recommendations by the advisory group in 1969 for some sort of federal structure, thus causing the ethnic insurrections to spread over broader areas after 1962. Under the BSPP, all state control mechanisms over minority peoples remained in force.

The isolation of the Burman majority in this period was contrasted with the informal contacts that some of the minorities had with their ethnic and/or religious colleagues beyond the state’s perimeters. Karen, Mon, Shan, Chin, Kachin, and Rohingya peoples had a modicum (and sometimes much more) of contact with their transborder brethren, and thus with the outside world. Religious contacts, support, and activities of both foreign Christian and Muslim groups intensified these relationships. The result, as one might expect, was the increased isolation of the Burmans and the growing suspicion, present since independence, that some of the minorities, with the support of Christian states in the West, were conspiring to see the break-up of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.

State troops, assigned to the periphery where most of the minorities lived, often felt they were in hostile and culturally unfamiliar territory. The minorities often felt the military was almost a foreign occupying force, which in some instances it
culturally was. The government was not in a position to provide schools or medical facilities or even the means to improve agriculture. Minority dissatisfaction grew. The government had yet to build a nation out of a state.

Every government in Burma since independence has been concerned about the dangers of the distribution of too much autonomous power. This has been evident not only in the political sphere but in religion and economics, the latter closely allied to citizenship issues. The socialist orientation of all governments (and the
dirigiste
orientation of the later SLORC/SPDC) has been motivated by the concept of getting the economy out of the hands of various foreigners and back under Burmese (meaning Burman) control. The
sangha
, as a critical social and nationalist force, and also sometimes a refuge for the unscrupulous, has been a target of control both for religious purposes (to purify the
sangha
has been a proclivity of the kings, U Nu, and the military) as well as to ensure the regime’s power and legitimacy.

In spite of U Nu’s true religiosity and search for state, regime, and personal legitimacy through Buddhist activities, he recognized that the amorphous autonomy of the
sangha
offered various dangers. A common criminal could shave his head, put on a saffron robe, and be considered sacrosanct. A communist insurgent could do the same. Monasteries could become refuges of rebels. Developing a system of control over the
sangha
was always a goal, one that was especially important to the military given the monks’ history of antigovernment activity during the colonial period, and as the only national organization of both size and influence that might challenge the
tatmadaw
. In a historical sense, the military was acting within the patterns of the monarchs, for they had purified the
sangha
and texts, tried to eliminate heterodox and inappropriate Buddhist sects, and built pagodas to acquire personal
and regime merit and legitimacy. In the civilian period, U Nu in 1956 had convened the Sixth Buddhist Synod in the 2,500 years of Buddhism and built the Peace Pagoda in Rangoon.

In 1980, the state finally placed controls on the
sangha
. In 1979, the military formed the Sangha Maha Nayaka—the centralized Supreme Sangha Council of 33 monks—and a group of 1,219 monk representatives of the
sangha
as a whole, as well as local councils at all levels. The hierarchy of the monkhood was established, and all monks were registered with the state by 1980. The educational activities of the
sangha
were controlled and monitored. The state also placed the monastic educational system, which went though university level, under scrutiny and reviewed the number of sects and their teachings. Committees of various monasteries underwent reform, and retired, trusted military officers placed in these organizations. This control was extensive but not absolute, for at the individual monastic level considerable autonomy existed, depending on the orientation of the abbot of that establishment. After 1988, the SLORC/SPDC tightened control over the
sangha
and its various sects. The Saffron Revolution of 2007, however, demonstrated the volatility of the
sangha
even with a Buddhist hierarchy tightly under government command.

Citizenship in the Union of Burma was less disputed under the constitution of 1947 than under the military. Under the BSPP regime, the military completed the final exclusion of Indian and Chinese foreigners from any possibility of assuming official power.

On October 15, 1982, the military passed the Citizenship Act, establishing a three-tiered system of citizenship. Full citizens were those who were Burman or a member of one of the indigenous ethnic/linguistic groups or those who could prove they were descendants of residents who had lived in what was Burma in 1823 (before the start of the first Anglo-Burmese War,
1824–1826). They could be elected to office and assume government posts. One did not lose this class of citizenship by marrying a foreigner. The associate citizens, such as Indians and Chinese, were those who were born in the country after that time. The third group was composed of naturalized citizens. There was to be no dual citizenship, and associate citizenship could be revoked if someone were disloyal to the state “by act or speech or otherwise,” or because of moral turpitude or disclosure of state secrets. Only full citizens could run for office or qualify for certain economic and governmental positions and, after the fifth BSPP congress, become members of the party. Those in the two lesser categories could not be given bureaucratic or military positions, could not vote, and were denied higher education. The indigenous Muslim Rohingyas near the Bangladesh border, however, were never considered as any type of citizen and were excluded from any list of ethnic groups. They have become the most deprived group in that state.

However deplorable and discriminatory such laws were (and Dr. Maung Maung, its author, had a doctorate in law from the Netherlands), in a sense they were the logical extension of the effort since independence of moving the economy under Burmese control. In the civilian period, only citizens could get certain types of import and export licenses. After the coup of 1962, the military expelled some 200,000 Indians (those from the subcontinent) back to that region with only their movable baggage. The new legislation, then, was the culmination of long-standing xenophobia.

General (
bogyoke
, supreme commander) Ne Win (1910–2002; his original name was Shu Maung and he was from a Sino-Burman family) has been the most important influence on contemporary Burma. As second in command of the Burma army on independence in 1948, he became commander in 1949 and has since played an unprecedented role in the plight of the state,
virtually until his death in 2002. A dropout from the University of Rangoon in the 1930s, he was one of the thirty comrades trained by the Japanese to revolt against the British. He claimed a close association with Aung San that may have been more hyperbole than reality. During the civilian government, he was minister of defense and on occasion deputy prime minister. The coup of 1958 that brought in the Caretaker Government, if not initiated personally by him, was carried out in his name. After the coup of 1962 he was variously not only head of the military but also chairman of the Revolutionary Council and the BSPP and, after 1974, president; in both roles he was head of state. (In 1976, an attempted coup against him failed.) He resigned as president in 1981, but retained his function as chair of the BSSP until his resignation in July 1988. Even after leaving all offices, he is said to have a decisive influence on major decisions, including, for example, approving the removal of General Saw Maung as chairman of the SLORC (and thus also head of state) in 1992 and perhaps renaming of the junta the SPDC in 1997. As he grew older, his influence faded, and his son-in-law and grandsons were accused of fomenting a coup in 2000, a charge that has kept them in jail and his daughter under house arrest until 2008, but which still is questionable. Ne Win died in December 2002 at the age of ninety-two. He was unceremoniously buried.

Ne Win’s influence is important not only for the roles he played but because of his disastrous policies or those carried out in his name. He was highly mercurial, and his whims became commands, policy, and law. He could not be contradicted. He changed the currency into multiples of nine, his lucky number, which was astrologically assured to enable him to live to be ninety. He changed traffic from the left to the right side of the road (on the advice of an astrologer) to ensure his success. In his later years, he built a pagoda even though he was against making Buddhism the state religion. He recruited leaders whom he could control, forming his own entourage, often those who had served under him in the Fourth Burma Rifles,
which he commanded. As head of the army, all the officers who were promoted owed their success to him. He changed those considered to be his political heirs at will, ensuring there was no one who could threaten his position. He was never an intellectual or even well educated, but he had a sense of political acumen that enabled him to rule officially for twenty-six years and unofficially for much longer.

One future question is: how generic is the Ne Win style of administration? Some believe that Senior General Than Shwe is exhibiting all the same traits of Ne Win, and one issue is whether this type of leadership (and the actions of those that follow the present leader) is virtually inherent in the political culture of Burma/Myanmar and reminiscent of the power of the Burmese kings; whether this is some singular aberration; whether this is inherent in the Burmese military command structure; or whether the actions of the leadership are fostered by their followers. This is a critical, unaddressed issue for the political future of Myanmar over the near term. Any answer proffered should not be interpreted as casting the political future of the state in stone, for attitudes among leaders and the population change, and an analysis today may not apply in the next generation.

The Burmese economy continued to be dependent on its export of primary products, such as rice and teak. It extracted from the peasant surplus rice beyond consumption, seed, and modest religious donations. The remainder could only be sold to the government at below-market rates. All legal exports were under government control. Burmese industry was light and of mediocre quality. As the 1980s progressed, prices for Burmese exports essentially stagnated; agricultural production could not expand without foreign fertilizer and pesticides that were lacking. The prices of necessary imports—intermediate goods on which Burmese industry depended, spare parts,
and consumer goods, however, increased. Smuggling certain types of goods out—such as jade, gems, and even rice in border areas—proliferated, and smuggling consumer goods in, such as textiles and medicines, was widespread and deprived the government of income. Inflation, increased from 1986, causing growing hardships.

On September 1, 1987, the state announced the greatest economic liberalization since 1962: farmers could sell their grains, most importantly rice, on the open market as they wished. This was greeted as a major reform. However, less than a week later (September 5) the government announced the most stringent demonetization (not a devaluation of the currency but the declaration that certain bank notes were no longer legal tender and could not be redeemed) in modern history. (The British did this to Japanese currency issued during World War II, and this had dire effects on the population.) To destroy black marketers, the state claimed, all currency bills over about US$2.50 in value (said to be about two-thirds of the value of bills in circulation) were declared illegal, and there was no possible conversion to the new currency. This was the third demonetization since 1962 (others were in 1964 and in November 1985), but in the others documented assets could be converted; in this case, this option was impossible.

The impact was immediate. No one wanted to hold Burmese currency, because they feared further demonetizations (the constitution of 2008, significantly, has an article against demonetization). Peasants refused to sell their only asset (rice), because no one wanted to hold currency. This raised the urban price of rice, in effect a surrogate indicator of stability. Urban dwellers bought anything that would retain value, such as building supplies and appliances, just to avoid disaster. Many of these items were smuggled in from China, which had begun its economic liberalization program. Because demonetizations had always occurred on Saturday, merchants brought in bags of cash to the banks on Fridays, bribing officials to register these funds as deposited even if uncounted (and thus not affected by
any possible future demonetization), and then withdrew the bag of money on Monday to begin business.