Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (16 page)

The vote resulted in a 72.59 percent turnout, the highest in Burmese history. The NLD received 59.87 percent of the
vote—392 seats or about 80 percent of the positions. The Shan NLD came in second with twenty-three seats (with 1.68 percent of the vote), and the National Unity Party won only ten seats, although they received 25.12 percent of the votes. This was both a remarkable and unexpected victory and no doubt shocked those in the military, who obviously had not been in touch with popular sentiment.

The NLD, flush with their remarkable victory, finally demanded on July 29 at what became known as the Gandhi (Hall) Declaration that the military turn over power to them by September 30, after which they would write an interim constitution and then a more permanent one after the transfer of power. The junta was not prepared to do this. Of great concern to the military was an off-hand remark by an NLD leader that there would be no Nuremberg trials. Although this was phrased in the negative, it heightened anxiety among the military leadership. Certainly, many in the population wanted to see justice done for past illegal actions. (Significantly, a provision of the 2008 approved constitution stipulates that no person can be held legally accountable for any official acts committed before that constitution has come into force.) In any case, the NLD and the outside world assumed that the NLD had a mandate to govern, and the United States still holds that position.

As the stalemate went on, all positions hardened. The military adamantly refused to certify the results of the elections, claiming they were looking into anomalies and irregularities (and the commission to do so was a geriatric rubber stamp of the government). The NLD claimed they had the right to govern. The Western international community backed the NLD. For many years, the U.S. State Department, in its semiannual reports to Congress on Burma, called for the Burmese authorities to honor the results of the 1990 elections before discussions could take place. This was interpreted to mean that the
tatmadaw
had to give up power before normalization of relations could occur. This was patently something it would not do.

Some elected members of the NLD, believing that they represented the elected body as a whole because they had a wide majority of the seats, secretly formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), as a parallel government or government in exile, and moved to a rebel area, and then Thailand, after which they went to the United States to lobby for their cause.

It seems likely the junta thought that if they encouraged broad participation in the elections the votes would be so widely split that the military could remain in control. What became apparent was that the votes were generally fairly counted even if campaigning was heavily restricted. The military-sponsored elections of 1960 and 1990 produced results abhorred by the military authorities. In the first instance, they allowed those elected to take their seats, and in the second they did not. In the third military-sponsored election of 2010, the distribution of power has been predetermined. Even if the military allows open campaigning and a fair count of the ballots, the outcome of the locus of power in Burmese society will not change.

The generals who came to power in the SLORC were largely insulated from the outside world. All had been trained in Burma, and most had fought against Burma’s various insurrections. The leader was General Saw Maung (he was ousted in 1992 for becoming mentally erratic, but only after the regime consulted with General Ne Win). His education had basically ceased in the eighth grade. He had been a sergeant in the Fourth Burma Rifles (originally commanded by Ne Win), and thus was part of the Ne Win entourage. The second in command was General Than Shwe (at that time army commander). General Maung Aye was charged with handing economic affairs. International relations were given to General Khin Nyunt, who was secretary-1 and also the head of military intelligence. He controlled
an extensive network of officers but never commanded troops in the field, and thus he was at a disadvantage in not having a large and loyal military following. He was said to be a protégé of General Ne Win and consulted with him after Ne Win’s official retirement in 1988. He was also said to be close to China.

General Khin Nyunt was promoted to prime minister in August 2003 and finally ousted in October 2004 because of corruption among the intelligence corps along the China border. This may have been an excuse, as through his intelligence functions Khin Nyunt had material that might be damaging to other junta and senior officials and was said to be vying for power with General Maung Aye.

It was Khin Nyunt who negotiated the cease-fires with a multitude of ethnic insurgent groups, and he received credit for that process. He also initiated the informal contacts between the junta and Aung San Suu Kyi through Ambassador Razali, the special envoy of the UN secretary general. General Khin Nyunt focused on foreign affairs and through that official role both had more access to international opinion and activities and was more accessible to foreign visitors. It was likely he who was interested in getting Myanmar to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN; in July 1997). Some observers described him as a “soft-liner” compared to the “hard-liners” among the junta, but it is more likely he recognized that Myanmar was hurt by poor international relations and wanted to do something about it. He had to work within regime confines that were highly restraining.

While carefully cultivating the “national sovereignty” that the leadership believes is one of its highest priorities, Myanmar has moved to cement relations with China, its major supplier of military equipment, development assistance, and infrastructure construction. Innumerable high-level national and provincial delegations continuously visit Myanmar. Because it does not want to be dependent solely on China, it has improved relations with India, and has bought military and nuclear equipment from Russia. It seems likely that it would wish to improve
relations with the West, but national pride seems to prevent the government from being perceived as retreating from its international, nationalistic position and submitting to Western demands. Although Thailand in 1992 called for “constructive engagement” with Myanmar that would lead to eventual political change, this was interpreted elsewhere as simply a euphemism for economic exploitation.

Myanmar joined a number of other regional groupings: the Greater Mekong Sub-Region Economic Cooperation Organization in 1992, BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation) in 1997, and the Irrawaddy, Chao Phraya, Mekong Economic Strategy Group (ACMEC) in 2003. In August 1999, Myanmar attended the Conference on Regional Cooperation and Development in Kunming that also included China, India, and Bangladesh. Known as the Kunming Initiative, it was designed to discuss ways to improve communications among all the countries; in essence, the revival of the southern Silk Road between Assam and Yunnan.

The personification of democratic ideals in Aung San Suu Kyi, resulting in her being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, also increased her visibility and role (and through her, that of Myanmar), thus making her an icon throughout much of the world. The excesses of military rule, although deplorable, would probably have not received such broad and continuous condemnation without Aung San Suu Kyi as the representation of liberty. The junta claims discrimination, believing that the issues of democracy and human rights in other Asian countries, such as China and Vietnam, with worse records in some areas such as religious freedom, have received far less attention than those in Myanmar.

Perusal of the state’s statistics on its role in expanding health and educational institutions would lead a naive observer to conclude that progress was evident in Myanmar. Yet these are
essentially inflated figures that mask the brutal reality of decay and neglect for most of the population.

Enrollment in education at all levels has expanded, yet the quality has declined. The government claims those enrolled in primary education are at the ninetieth percentile level, but UNICEF notes that perhaps 50 percent of students do not finish primary school. Classes are overcrowded and teachers underpaid, with the result that “tuition” schools have privately been established, often by the very teachers who teach in public school, to educate the children after normal school hours (and provide the teachers some modest livable income) and for which the parents of students pay. Essentially, teachers teach extracurricularly the material that the state has paid them to teach publicly.

Only a small percentage of students go on to middle school and high school (ten years is the total primary and secondary years of instruction, excluding kindergarten). College- and university-level institutions and enrollments have proliferated (undergraduates are relegated to a campus on the outskirts of Yangon). Yet the bulk of students are in “distance learning,” which keeps them from congregating on campuses and thus potentially causing trouble for the government. The state has formed colleges in each state and division (sometimes with more than one branch). According to those who teach at university or college level, corruption is rife in grades and attendance, and students are not motivated because jobs are scarce. In addition, at the slightest hint of a possible demonstration, schools are closed, often for long periods, which results in chaotic admissions and examination scheduling. The government spends 1.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on education, a very low percentage in international comparisons.

Health services are in disarray. Health expenditures are even lower than in education—only 0.5 percent of GDP, one of the lowest in the world. Primary care is usually not available, and those doctors serving the state in rural areas have to
moonlight to get by. Medicines are unavailable except to the rich or connected, and most doctors serve for a period in the military, which has its own medical school. Civilian doctors must serve three years in the military to receive a license. Medicine is a desired career for both men and women, and in the civilian period, medical standards, reinforced through external examiners, were so high that graduates were automatically allowed to practice in the United Kingdom. This has all changed. Malaria (700,000 cases annually) and tuberculosis (130,000 per year) are rampant. HIV/AIDS is common and far more significant that the government admits. There were estimated to be some 350,000 cases in Myanmar in 2005. The United States quietly and informally scuttled a plan called the Global Fund to provide US$90 million over five years to assist in alleviating the problems of tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS on the grounds that monitoring could not be assured. In response, six donors (Australia, the European Commission, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) established a five-year fund of US$100 million over the same period to provide assistance to deal with the problem of these three diseases, or 3DF, as the program became known.

Infant mortality is said to be 75 per 1,000 live births, and on a national average an additional 105 children die before the age of five years. In eastern Myanmar, where conditions are worse, the infant mortality is 221 per 1,000, compared to 106 in central Myanmar and only 21 in Thailand. The life expectancy of the Burmese is just over sixty years, the lowest in ASEAN.

For a country that was never supposed to have a famine (in contrast to India and China), malnutrition is now common, and some 35 percent of infants suffer from this to some degree. Some 73 percent of income is allocated to purchase basic foods, especially rice, and so the incessant inflation undercuts living standards for the poor. The UN Human Development Report of 2000 ranked Myanmar as 124 (out of 174 countries) in terms of this development. Cyclone Nargis obviously and drastically lowered living standards. The pervasive corruption, so
necessary for survival, has negatively affected the equitable distribution of relief in Nargis-affected areas.

There is thus a socioeconomic crisis that the government has denied, and when the UNDP resident representative brought this to the attention of the cabinet in November 2007 and went public with his views, his visa was not renewed. Although the junta may believe there is a strategic and military security crisis, actual conditions indicate that the security crisis is instead a human security crisis. Food supplies for half the population are not secured, and more broadly the dire state of internal affairs indicates a profound human security crisis—including food, health, education, livelihood, and personal tranquility.

One unanswered question in contemporary Myanmar is the relevance of concepts of the traditional Buddhist virtues of the state (ruler) to treat its people with compassion and that of individual karma, or one’s present status as retribution for activities in previous existences. Thus, if one suffers, is it due to one’s bad practices in a previous incarnation or the lack of interest or inability of the state to supply social services to the population? The degree to which Buddhist karmic concepts of individual responsibility, in conflict with modern beliefs in state responsibility, affects present attitudes in Myanmar is unknown. Karmic concepts were evident in the past, as is apparent from earlier field research a half-century ago, but how much it has changed in rural areas is unclear. It has evidently changed among the educated urban population and seems to have disappeared as a political explanation in another Buddhist country, Thailand.

When the government announced in July 1988 that the rigid socialist doctrine of the BSPP would be rescinded, this passed effectively unnoticed outside the country because of the political turmoil of that time. Yet this was the most significant and positive change in Burma since 1962. It had been brought about by quiet pressure from the Japanese in March 1988, when
the Burmese deputy prime minister was told in Tokyo that economic reforms were essential or the Japanese aid program, comprising over half of all foreign assistance, would have to be reconsidered.