Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (15 page)

Although technical and military subjects are stressed, in the BSPP period, all officers were trained in the doctrines of the BSPP (see previous chapter). Under the SLORC/SPDC, such training focuses on the military itself as the ideological nucleus. This is in line with the general approach to the
tatmadaw
as the core of society. U Nu stressed Buddhism, the BSPP focused on
the secular approach through socialism, and the present regime centers on the military itself.

The military has been struck by charges that the officers were poorly educated, and they have required that regional military commanders (there are a total of thirteen military regions including a new one, for Naypyidaw) have master’s degrees. Aside from the SPDC members, the regional commanders are the most powerful of the officer corps. Generally, it is probably accurate to characterize the military leadership as highly nationalistic and insular, with limited foreign experience.

The military teaches that there have been eight stages in the development of their ideology since 1941. The first three (1941–1955) involve pre-ideological and an ideological gestation period; stages four through six (1956–1959) are the formation of an ideology of the defense services; stage seven (1962–1988) is the Burmese Way to Socialism, the change from a “praetorian army” to a “revolutionary army”; and finally, stage eight (1988–) contains the principles of the
tatmadaw
—the perpetuation of national sovereignty, national unity, etc., under military leadership.

The expansion of military training facilities may be part of a concerted plan to staff a future government with retired military specialists whose loyalty to the
tatmadaw
is unquestioned. Because civilian institutions of higher education have been closed for extended periods because of the fear of demonstrations, the military institutions have provided greater continuity through these difficult times.

Burma began to change even before the coup of September 18, 1988. In the last days of the BSPP at the end of July, the waning party legally opened border trade with China. It also moved to encourage the private sector. On November 30, 1988, the new government issued a major foreign investment law
that they claimed was “the best in the world,” which protected foreign investors from nationalization, a justified fear based on Burmese history. The private sector was encouraged (at least on paper), and socialist policies were abandoned although there was very little movement to reduce the extensive state economic enterprises (the public sector industries), for if this were to happen, unemployment—already endemic—would rise. That fall, the government encouraged contracts with foreign firms to explore the oil resources of central Burma, and ten contracts were signed with a variety of international firms, each of which provided a signing bonus to the government, which was pitifully short of foreign exchange. After the visit of Thai army commander General Chavalit Yangchaiyut in December 1988, the first high-level external arrival, a variety of concessions were given to the Thai for hardwood extraction and maritime fisheries. The timber extraction contracts were highly significant—Thailand had recently banned all internal logging because the resulting deforestation had led to hundreds of deaths from landslides near the Burma border; these contracts were thus exploiting Burma in lieu of Thailand. Some years later, the Chinese also banned logging and moved into Myanmar to repeat the ecological damage.

Following the coup, the military moved to arrest as many people as they could find that were involved in the demonstrations. The repression was severe, and thousands were arrested and subjected to incarceration for varying periods, and many tried in camera (without a jury). There was no appeal in this process. Some 10,000 people, mainly students, fled across the borders, mostly to Thailand and to rebel areas, where some joined resistance groups. Schools and universities were closed for long periods.

At the same time, and perhaps because of the repression that shocked the public, the military promised that there would be multiparty elections. President Maung Maung said they would take place within three months of September 11, 1988. Many did not believe that the junta would carry this forward, but it
seemed evident, even shortly after the coup, that the
tatmadaw
would honor its commitment. In private conversations, however, military officials implied that it had no intention of giving up effective power over the state, and an elective process (for what positions and when the elected group would assert its authority remain contested) was one that need not diminish their control. On September 27, 1988, the Political Parties Registration Law was promulgated, and 235 parties eventually registered. This was the basis for the elections of May 1990.

There was widespread dissatisfaction with the BSPP regime and its thoroughly inadequate economic performance. Together with pent-up general and local political frustration, which became manifest in the popular uprising against the military, and the announcement that multiparty elections would be held, the National League for Democracy (NLD) was formed (as were 234 other parties over the period prior to May 1990 when the elections were actually held). The NLD was an amalgam of disparate individuals coalescing under the banner of democracy and under the leadership of former military officers under the BSPP but more immediately under the flag of antipathy to continuing military control. General (Ret.) Tin U, Brigadier (Ret.) Aung Gyi, Colonel (Ret.) Kyi Maung, and others joined together with people from all levels. Aung San Suu Kyi, who was junior in age and who had held no Burmese post, became the secretary of the NLD. Friction arose early, as the some on the left wing, accused of being communists, joined. Aung Gyi wanted them expelled and when Suu Kyi, the most articulate and respected member (because of the heritage of her father, Aung San), refused to do so, he and his colleagues walked out and founded a new party, the Union National Democracy Party.

Opposition also developed in other circles. U Nu, last civilian prime minister in 1962, believed he was the last legitimate
leader and had wanted to form an interim government, but he was denied that chance. At the same time, local leaders around the country, many associated with ethnic groups, formed parties in opposition to the junta. It was in effect a period—as the Chinese said in another context—of 100 flowers blooming, and 100 schools of thought contending.

Aung San Suu Kyi (b. June 19, 1945) has become the icon of Burma/Myanmar and the international symbol of tethered democracy. Without her image, the excesses of the regime, which are less than the horrors in parts of Africa or Asia (Cambodia, China, North Korea, for example), would be barely internationally noted.

She is the only daughter of the founder of Burmese independence in 1948, who was assassinated by a rival Burmese politician on July 19, 1947. (There is also one son, who has eschewed politics and has lived in the United States.) That anniversary, Martyrs Day, is still remembered in Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi (her name incorporates that of her father in a most unorthodox Burmese manner) was in Burma in 1988 by accident. She grew up partly in India, where her mother was ambassador, and was schooled in England, where she married an English scholar on central Asia and had two sons. She returned to Burma to care for her sick mother in 1988 and was caught up in the opposition to military rule. She joined the NLD as secretary but soon became its primary spokesperson and intellectual force. The NLD attracted opponents of the military from all segments of the Burman population, from the left to the moderate right.

In July 1989, she was arrested for the most heinous crime—attempting to destroy military unity, essential for continued military dominance—and was sentenced to house arrest, where, off and on, she remained until 2009. She has been in various stages of isolation for about thirteen years during that time. When
she has been occasionally released, she has tested the limits of military endurance through statements and attempted travel. On two occasions she has been in some physical danger from progovernment mobs, but at least some of the higher echelons of the military understood that it was in their interests to keep her safe and out of commission, because if anything untoward were to happen to her, even if from natural causes, the military would be held responsible, and it could give rise to revolution. “The lady,” as she is known in Myanmar in official circles and the media (when she is mentioned) is the appellation used for her, because even to speak her name evokes the memory of the national founder, Aung San, and indirectly provides her some legitimacy. There are persistent rumors than Senior General Than Shwe will not hear her name mentioned in his presence.

Through outside pressure, the United Nations has been able to have two quiet interlocutors (Special Envoys Tan Sri Razali Ismail and Ibrahim Gambari) try to mediate between the junta and Aung San Suu Kyi, and the junta in 2007 assigned the minister of labor as an intermediary, although sustained progress has not been apparent at this writing (June 2009). At various periods, there seems to have been some peripheral movements in improving relations, but these have rapidly dispersed. There is fear among some of the junta that her full release or any public activities by her could disrupt the 2010 elections.

The views of Aung San Suu Kyi, as reflected in her writings and in the platform of the NLD, are in line with democratic concepts in most such states: representative government, civilian control of the military, better education (including scholarships), improved access to health, and some form of federal structure for the minorities. In her writings, however, she noted that democracy would come slowly to Myanmar. Yet the NLD is a Burman party, even though the Shan variant won the second largest number of seats in the 1990 election.

The West has basically supported her even more than it did the NLD. It may be argued that the views of Aung San Suu Kyi (or at least her past or purported views when she has been
held incognito) shape or strongly influence U.S. policy and are vigorously supported by an effective democracy and human rights lobby and a large contingent of Burmese expatriates. An obscure amendment to some U.S. economic assistance legislation even stipulates that the NLD leadership must approve the UN development assistance program in Myanmar. To criticize her or the tactics of the NLD that she supports and that support her is regarded as heresy in the opposition community.

At this publication, she is sixty-four years old and could, under normal circumstances play an important role in Myanmar political life. She has occasionally called for dialogue, compromise, and discussion, which the junta has denied, and she has been specific in indicating that the military would play an important role in any government she might influence. The senior general has indicated the regime would be willing to have such dialogue if she rescinded her call for sanctions and was more flexible. But whether the aging leadership of the SPDC might agree to some form of coalition, and whether she would accept such a role given her long-held views of the inheritance of the mantle of her father, are not answerable at this stage. Some in the
tatmadaw
accuse her of arrogance, as she is said to believe herself the equal of Than Shwe.

Even before the coup, the junta promised that there would be multiparty democratic elections. Certainly, one must assume they did this to placate a restive population. The opposition did not believe it would conduct them fairly and called for a neutral interim government, which the military rejected.

The first question that must be asked is: What were these elections to be for? Was it for a new parliament that would immediately take over government, as the NLD and public external observers seem to have expected, or for some sort of constitutional convention that would draft a new constitution,
after which a government would be formed? This lack of clarity has resulted in high tensions.

The junta had publicly stated almost a year before the elections that those elected could not form a new government until there was a new constitution. On several occasions at press conferences, this was reiterated by Saw Maung and Khin Nyunt. Aung San Suu Kyi personally indicated on July 5, 1989, just prior to her house arrest, that “Whoever is elected will have to draw up a constitution that will have to be adopted before the transfer of power.” Yet this condition had not been sufficiently stressed, and there seems to have been no direct contact between the military and politicians on what the rules of the game were to be. In that sense, the government bears the responsibility for the opaqueness of the process.

As preparations for the election progressed, the military did not discourage the formation of parties. Eventually, 235 of them were registered with the government. Some were said to have ulterior motives: they were anxious to get a telephone (in short supply and very expensive), as well as a ration of gasoline, which could be sold on the black market. Clearly, however, this was considered some sort of countrywide landmark, and people wanted to participate.

By the time the election of May 27, 1990, took place, 2,209 candidates from 93 parties and 87 independents competed for 479 seats. Aung San Suu Kyi was under house arrest at that time and could not stand for election. She had campaigned earlier and was almost shot, although cooler military heads prevailed. Although there were severe restrictions on campaigning, the parties emphasized local interests, including those of the ethnic nationalities. The BSPP was reincarnated into the National Unity Party, with many of the same ideological tenets as their former organization. Some Burmese observers expected them to do well because they inherited the resources of the BSPP. The military, however, was not said to be anxious for their victory.