Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (29 page)

Does the perceived internal and/or external legitimacy of the electoral process depend on the participation of the NLD? If it is invited to participate but decides not to do so, does that decision further marginalize that group (or even have it declared illegal) or delegitimate the whole elections to the Burmese or foreign states and observers? If officially precluded from running, what would be the effect of such a prohibition? It is possible that the NLD may split into a variety of fragments, with some of the younger members disagreeing with the “uncles”—the executive committee, composed of elder members.

The senior general at the Armed Forces Parade on March 27, 2009, while blaming the problems of Burmese politics on the colonialists and the egotism of civilian politicians, remarked that democracy was in a “fledgling stage,” requiring nurturing, gradual growth, and tranquility. Quoting the Burmese proverb
that “a recently dug well cannot be expected to produce clear water immediately,” he implied that the
tatmadaw
would enforce those conditions and would take a long time to overcome past defects, implying the continuing need for military dominance. The
tatmadaw
will filter the water of the newly dug “democratic” well.

The efforts of the Obama administration to review policy toward Burma/Myanmar are welcome—this is the first signifi-cant indication of official U.S. dialogue on policy toward that country in some eighteen years. Such dialogue, let alone policy changes, will be resisted by those with vested interests in the present confrontation. Having imposed isolation, any significant U.S. retreat from that position without commensurate Burmese changes would be politically unacceptable. How the senior general and the junta will respond is unclear at this writing.

In discussing the role of the military in politics, years ago one distinguished Burman remarked, “The play is over, but the audience is forced to remain in their seats and the actors refuse to leave the stage.” As 2010 approaches, we may see the on-stage chorus increased and diversified, but the usual actors (many in mufti) will still be in evidence both in front of the footlights, and now hidden in the wings as well and, most important, controlling the curtain.

As the political stalemate continues, as foreign pressures for reform seem ineffective, and as the internal conditions of the peoples in the country deteriorate, those outside of that benighted country can only hope that in some Burmese manner the people will, as U Nu once wrote, “win through.”

As this book went to press in August 2009, there has been no definite word from Myanmar authorities on three important events and their dates: the political party registration law that will determine the parameters for the formation and registration of those entities allowed to participate in (or which have been excluded from) the 2010 elections; the electoral law indicating who is entitled to vote and how the election will be carried out; and the actual date of the election itself, variously anticipated before the monsoon in 2010 (i.e., before the middle of May) or in the fall.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon’s visit to Myanmar in early July 2009 in an effort to free Aung San Suu Kyi and the rest of the political prisoners came to naught. In spite of two meetings with Than Shwe, he was unable to see Aung San Suu Kyi. It had been evident before her trial and his visit that the junta was prepared to hold her under house arrest until after the 2010 elections. Although Than Shwe promised fair elections in 2010, the concept of “fairness” is ambiguous and culturally defined.

It is still unclear whether the NLD will participate in the elections (they agreed under conditions unlikely to be accepted by the junta), be banned, split, or dissolve. Aung San Suu Kyi, tried in the summer of 2009 under clearly trumped-up charges of violating her house arrest because of an American who
twice swam to her compound on Inya Lake, will remain under detention until the elections, which the junta fears she might “disrupt.” The trial was unnecessary to hold her in detention because policy prevails over law and in any case a means would have been found to enforce the state’s will.

There will be parties formed in opposition to the government and its military-supported groups and parties, but it is too early to determine whether these newly formed parties would have the ability to campaign with relative freedom. At this stage, and based on precedent, the prospects remain murky.

Reports in June 2009 have indicated that the junta wanted the cease-fire minority groups to be formed into border guards with an admixture of government troops. Preliminary indications are that at least two such groups have refused that demand, but it is still too early at this point to predict a consistent pattern. Minority issues are likely to be the most difficult of relationships over a longer period.

Aung San Suu Kyi was found guilty and sentenced to three years’ detention, but this was immediately commuted by Than Shwe to eighteen months of house arrest (she has appealed). This both fulfills the junta’s plan to isolate her and makes the senior general appear magnanimous. If he believed this would placate the international community, he was wrong as protestations mushroomed from world leaders.

Rumors persist that the military may form an interim government until the elections, thus providing an aura of impartiality that would likely be mere veneer. Many senior military will be prompted to resign to run for election in any case to ensure
tatmadaw
control.

During the summer, a variety of opposition political and ethnic groups have come together to develop a united front in the hope of reconciling with the junta. This effort indicates both the urgency of their plight and concern over their marginalization in the elections and subsequent government. They are, however, unlikely to obtain sustained unity given their long,
varied backgrounds, and the junta is unlikely to be interested in negotiating.

Of international interest was the growing connection between North Korea and Myanmar, two states linked emotionally through their U.S. “outposts of tyranny” designation. Revelations appear to confirm North Korean assistance in building tunnels and bunkers in Naypyidaw, but suspicions have arisen over a possible nuclear connection. Myanmar has been training hundreds of Burmese in nuclear subjects in Russia, and even South Korea has trained more than fifty. General Thuru Shwe Mann made a secret trip to North Korea, exacerbating suspicions, and a North Korean freighter with unknown cargo supposedly bound for Rangoon returned to port under international pressure. Both North and South Korea have been supplying arms to the junta, and South Korea officially notified the Burmese that it would have no objection to Myanmar reestablishing diplomatic relations with the North, which has since happened.

How much internal or external political legitimacy will accrue to the new government as a result of the 2010 elections is in doubt, although it may significantly differ not only among various indigenous ethnic and social groups but also among a variety of foreign states and institutions. In spite of what the junta will claim as the achievement of a discipline-flourishing democracy, internal and external doubts will remain.

Note: There are fascinating accounts of Burma in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by British and other travelers and officials, but they are too numerous to list here. For a taste, see Gerry Abbott’s
Inroads into Burma: A Travellers’ Anthology
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997). The interested reader should check the bibliographies in some of the listed volumes for their titles. For a more thorough list of contemporary Burmese materials, visit
www.Burmalibrary.org
.

Aung San Suu Kyi.
The Voice of Hope
. New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997.

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe.
The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile
. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987.

Ba Maw.
Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946
.

New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968.

Ba U.
My Burma: The Autobiography of a President
. New York: Taplinger, 1958.

Nu (U Nu).
Saturday’s Son: Memoirs of the Former Prime Minister of Burma
.

New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975.

Wintle, Justin.
Perfect Hostage: The Life of Aung San Suu Kyi Burma’s Prisoner of Conscience
. London: Skyhorse, 2007.

Fraser-Lu, Sylvia.
Splendour in Wood: The Buddhist Monasteries of Burma
. Trumbull, Conn.: Weatherhill, 2001.

Gutman, Pamela.
Burma’s Lost Kingdoms: Splendours of Arakan
. Trumbull, Conn.: Weatherhill, 2001.

Becka, Jan.
Historical Dictionary of Myanmar
. London: Scarecrow Press, 1995 (Asia Historical Dictionaries no. 15).

Seekins, Donald M.
Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar)
. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2006.

Selth, Andrew.
Modern Burma Studies: A View from the Edge
. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, Southeast Asia Research Centre, Working Paper no. 96, 2007.

Thanegi (Ma).
An Introduction to Myanmar Cuisine
. Yangon: Asia Publishing House, 2004.

Khin Maung Kyi, Ronald Findley, et al.
Economic Development of Burma: A Vision and Strategy
. Stockholm: Olaf Palme International Center, 2000.

Tin Maung Maung Than.
State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Economy of Industrialization
. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007.

Turnell, Sean.
Fiery Dragons: Banks, Moneylenders and Microfinance in Burma
. 2008.

Walinsky, Louis J.
Economic Development in Burma, 1951–1960
. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.

Charney, Michael W.
A History of Modern Burma
. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Fink, Christina.
Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule
. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2001.

Ganesan, N., and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, eds.
Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity
. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2006.

Houtmann, Gustaaf.
Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics
. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1999.

Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than, eds.
Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives
. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.

Lintner, Bertil.
Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948
(2nd ed.). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Press, 1999.

Lintner, Bertil.
Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy
. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1990.

Mathieson, David S., and R. J. May, eds.
The Illusion of Progress: The Political Economy of Reform in Burma/Myanmar
. Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2004.

Nash, Manning.
The Golden Road to Modernity: Village Life in Contemporary Burma
. New York: Wiley.

Pedersen, Morten.
Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy
. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.

Rotberg, Robert, ed.
Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future
. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.

Seekins, Donald M.
The Disorder in Order: The Army-State in Burma since 1962
. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2002.

Skidmore, Montique, and Trevor Wilson, eds.
Myanmar: The State, Community and the Environment
. Canberra: Australia National University Press, 2007.

Steinberg, David I.
Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar
. Norwich, Conn.: EastBridge, 2006.

Steinberg, David I.
Burma: The State of Myanmar
. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001.

Taylor, Robert H.
The State in Myanmar
(2nd ed.). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009. [Earlier edition:
The State in Burma
(1988)]

Twawnghmung, Ardeth Maung.
Behind the Teak Curtain: Authoritarianism, Agricultural Policies and Political Legitimacy in Rural Burma/Myanmar
. New York: Kegan Paul, 2004.

Wilson, Trevor, ed.
Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation
. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.

Aung-Thwin, Michael.
Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma
. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.

Bruce, George.
The Burma Wars, 1824–1886
. London: Hart-Davis, 1973.