Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (25 page)

Although there is and was social mobility (there was no planned succession to the throne or the military leadership and no tenure in the precolonial administration), hierarchy is extremely important and has been reinforced by the military system, and mobility avenues have been channeled and controlled by the military. This has resulted in great frustration and despair among youth. The military controls all avenues of social mobility, of which the most important is the military itself and its educational institutions.

Because of the paucity of available private capital through the banking system, private sector mobility is effectively limited to the military’s entourages and the Chinese community, which has its own access to private sources of capital (clan, linguistic groups) as well as knowledge of foreign markets.

The leader (under both civilian—U Nu—and military governments) maintains secret information on all associates and their families to command loyalty and conformity. This is effective because (a) breaking existing laws is required for economic survival; (b) the entourage system requires extralegal funding; (c) policy replaces law and is controlled at the apex of the system, and this what may have been “legal” yesterday may be illegal today; (d) loyalty requires the follower to obey leadership commands even when they contradict legal norms or common sense; and (e) wives often have business interests based on “insider trading” and have been accused of corruption in the past.

When a person falls from an entourage’s grace, all those associated with him in the hierarchy of lesser entourages are also purged because loyalty is presumed to be to the leader, not the institution. This happened to General Khin Nyunt in 2004 and General Tin Oo in 1983, both of whom commanded military intelligence.

The personalized system effectively discourages shared responsibility at the top. When such sharing has occurred, splits have followed (the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League in 1958), and ultimately a single leader has emerged (e.g., Than Shwe).

Fear of conspiracies (even invasions) by foreign powers or elements against the leadership have made Burmese leaders both wary and skeptical about the motivations of foreign governments toward the state and its leaders. This is reinforced by previous foreign attempts to destabilize governments and rulers and support of dissident ethnic/political groups. These nationalistic tendencies are only magnified by derogatory foreign comments about the regime, its goals, and its leaders.
Fear of foreign domination may contribute to the suspicions about Aung San Suu Kyi, who is supported by the Western foreign community.

Given the touted natural resources of the state, there is a belief that if necessary, the state could continue to be effective with limited foreign exposure or economic investment, and such isolation may be desirable because of foreign cultural imperialism. Although widespread, this view is inaccurate because of the increasing infiltration of foreign ideas and concepts, as well as increasing dependence on foreign markets.

Nationalism reinforced by past colonial oppression has become a central factor in political legitimacy and affects all foreign relations and foreign assistance. Foreign public criticism of the regime or its leaders invokes negative and defensive responses. There is a persistent (however erroneous) believe that Burmese (i.e., Burman) culture is under attack from foreigners, and only the military can save both the state and its (Burman) culture. These beliefs are deeply held and are not propaganda, although they are often portrayed as such by foreign media. Ultimately, Burmese governments have always stressed the need to protect national sovereignty.

The state generally considers indigenous minorities, even some that are Buddhist, as less cultured at best (the exception being the Mon) and attempting to escape Burman control, aided and abetted by foreign states and those with non-Buddhist affiliations. The leadership often points to past historic episodes without understanding that changes over half a century have rendered these conditions invalid. Strong internal anti-Muslim prejudice continues to affect state policies and are generally prevalent, although they are most obvious in relation to the Rohingyas of Rakhine (Arakan). There are Christian and Muslim administrative ceilings for state and military positions, which was not the case under the civilian government. This stems in part from beliefs in the superiority of Buddhist culture, in part from group (Burman) solidarity, and in part from foreign support to religious minorities.

The hierarchical system fosters intensive pressures on underlings to please superiors, whether through achieving arbitrary quotas or through unauthorized actions based on vague leadership policies. The system sometimes backfires, resulting in inappropriate or detrimental activities that undercut regime objectives or even the regime itself.

The state often tolerates foreign humanitarian or other support by international nongovernmental organizations for the funding or programs they bring and closely monitors their activities out of suspicion. The degree of such monitoring is partly dependent on the personal whims of local military commanders. Still, some mid-level officials may mitigate inappropriate orders from on high by selective enforcement or interpretation to achieve other, localized state-sponsored, necessary, or personal goals.

At present, the Burmese middle class seems to be composed predominantly of some retired military, Chinese, and Sino-Burmans because of the limitations on local access to capital except though military-approved channels. This presents potentially destabilizing social and ethnic tensions should this trend continue or be exacerbated. More broadly, Burman control over the economy has been a hallmark of economic policies in all governments since independence and is likely to continue.

These characteristics of politics are most evident in the regime’s behavior, but they pervade opposition groups, local governments, indigenous governmental and nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and businesses.

Winston Churchill once characterized Russian policy as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” We might apply the same analogy to Burma/Myanmar’s future for all the diverse reasons previously discussed. As Dante Alighieri wrote in the
Divine Comedy
, soothsayers go to a very low circle of hell. Yet it is imperative to try to delineate the issues that this state will face and must address if it is to deliver to its own peoples, whether civilian or military, the fruits of its own slogans and promises, and if it is to find a respected place in the international community. Some might argue that the junta has had no intention of meeting any of the above targets and that they have been either designed for foreign consumption or internal propaganda. Although some attribute the tenacity of the
tatmadaw
in continuing its rule through various means as an obsession with power and venality, this writer believes that there is an ideological core and a sense of national purpose, misdirected sometimes and often overzealously pursued, that in part motivates many of the
tatmadaw
—whatever excesses they have committed (and they have been many and egregious). Although the military is grammatically singular collectively, there is a degree of plurality that should be internationally recognized, even though outsiders may have difficulty in assessing the various players or groups.

Myanmar’s geographic position between the two major regional powers in East and South Asia make it a pivotal nexus on the Bay of Bengal. This will likely continue and even intensify. Adjacent to both China and India, Myanmar has become an important element in the strategic planning of both states. This concern extends to Thailand. They are not only regional and expanding economic powers, but ones with growing military capacities. Although China may not fear an expansive India, the reverse is not true; India is concerned about growing Chinese influence in general and specifically in Myanmar.

China has engaged in an effective Southeast Asian foreign policy both with each of the countries of the region, but also institutionally with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Chinese consider Southeast Asia, especially the mainland, to be within their traditional sphere of influence. Although the People’s Republic has rejected Chinese citizenship for its indigenous and extensive Chinese populations in that area (
jus sanguinis
), a natural confluence of influence and even capital is apparent.

Myanmar is especially important to China for various strategic reasons, the least of which is its potential as a market for Chinese products in that poor land of some 53–58 million people (even though this market will increase). More important, Chinese strategy for defense in any future conflict in all of Asia depends in part on elimination of a great vulnerability—reliance on the Straits of Malacca for its supply of energy. Now, some 80 percent of China’s gas and oil imports pass through those straits. Elimination of this bottleneck is important to China, for it could be blocked by any riparian nation or major power, such as the United States, and alternative routes are both more expensive and also subject to blockade. Chinese pipelines (one for natural gas found offshore in Myanmar, and one for Middle Eastern crude oil) from the Bay of Bengal
to Yunnan Province would mitigate one of its strategic problems. Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca directly through Myanmar could also inhibit the control of the straits by other powers. Although an earlier concern over possible Chinese military bases in Myanmar has been assuaged, potential Chinese naval use of Burmese ports and facilities has not. The new Burmese constitution, however, prohibits foreign bases on Burmese soil.

Chinese interests in Myanmar also stem from access to the internal energy and natural resources of that state. In addition to the off-shore natural gas that China has bought and will ship into Yunnan through a pipeline, China has constructed and continues to build a large number of dams (thirty at last count) to capture the hydroelectric power from Myanmar’s untapped rivers. Chinese mining, including gold and other minerals, as well as exploitation of timber reserves, make Myanmar an important economic asset beyond China’s geopolitical interests.

A compliant Myanmar (or one reliant on China) also enhances China’s strategic position in relation to India. India is evidently concerned over China’s increased role in Myanmar. Delhi feels threatened and surrounded with Pakistan to its west allied with China, China to its north, and a penetrated Myanmar to its east. Chinese access to the Bay of Bengal, considered by India as
mare nostrum
(“our sea”), is of concern, as a major Indian naval base is located at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, and India tests its missiles in that region.

From a virulent antimilitary policy toward Myanmar beginning in 1988, India shifted to support the junta and provide assistance in the early 1990s in an effort to mitigate Chinese influence. A friendly Myanmar is also of importance to India to help suppress the Naga rebellion and a variety of other rebellions in its remote northeast, as the rebels as well as refugees often sought sanctuary in Myanmar. India has also developed a major plan for the economic development of that poor and restless region where some eleven insurrections of varying intensity
have taken place. It will employ a transportation network from the Myanmar port of Sittwe (which the Indians will modernize) north up the Kaladan River to Manipur (known as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project). India is also hoping to buy Burmese off-shore gas, of which China has contracted for the lion’s share.

Japan has informally expressed concern over Chinese capacity to strengthen its defense and economy through these actions. The United States needs free access to the Straits of Malacca to ensure deployment of its forces in the Indian Ocean. Thailand is perpetually concerned about a strong Myanmar, and because Thailand is a non-NATO treaty ally of the United States, Thailand’s security is of importance to the United States.

Myanmar does not want to become too dependent on China but needs China for both military support and economic development. Thus, Myanmar has tried to diversity its suppliers by buying MiG-29 fighter aircraft and a nuclear reactor from Russia (US$300–500 million in May 2007). It also has received military supplies from a variety of other states, such as the Ukraine, Israel, Singapore, Pakistan, and North and South Korea. The junta has officially written that the reason the United States wants to see regime change in Myanmar is because Myanmar is the weakest link in the U.S. policy of containing China.

The interest of foreign powers is just one facet of the issue; another is the attitude of the Burmese regime toward foreign governments and individuals. As Senior General Saw Maung said, “The nation should be one in which only Myanmars reside and which Myanmars own. We have to be vigilant against Myanmar, the home of Myanmar nationals, being influenced by anyone. It is important that Myanmar does not become the home of mixed bloods influenced by alien cultures though it is called Myanmar.” For any foreign government to consider Myanmar simply as a pawn in regional politics or easily subverted to foreign positions (such as to China) is to
mistake the nature of nationalism and the political imperatives within that country.

The Burmese
tatmadaw
has played a far greater role in modern Burmese history than the militaries in the contemporary period in the West. The general Western concept that the military should be under civilian control is thus far more difficult to achieve in Myanmar, even though it was a part of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party platform in 1989. Under the constitution approved in 2008, the military in effect will have veto power over any substantive decision on state policy. Military members will hold the ring of power. Under present provisions of that constitution, any amendments would in effect require military approval, which would mean the military would have to vote to diminish its own role. This is most unlikely in foreseeable future. Thus, the
tatmadaw
will have the coercive, executive, and legislative power within the state. It is not likely that judicial control will remain beyond their grasp; the State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC) may have replaced the “people’s” untrained judges with lawyers, but this does not equate with improving the rule of law. Their influence on the economy will be substantial, and the state will attempt to monitor (if not influence) civil society activities.