Complete Works (131 page)

There is more gold and silver in Sparta in private hands than in the rest of Greece put together. It’s been coming in to them for many generations, pouring in from all of Greece’s cities, and often from foreign cities, too, and it never goes out again. It’s just like what the fox says to the lion in
[123]
Aesop’s fable
¹⁸
—you can clearly see the tracks of the money going in toward Sparta, but the tracks coming out are nowhere to be seen. So you can be sure that the Spartans are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that the king is the richest of all the Spartans, because the greatest share of these revenues goes to him. Furthermore, he receives a considerable sum from the Spartans by way of royal tribute.

[b] But great as they are when compared with other Greek cities, the Spartan fortunes are nothing compared with the fortunes of the Persians and their king. I once spoke with a reliable man who travelled over to the Persian court, and he told me that he crossed a very large and rich tract of land, nearly a day’s journey across, which the locals called “the Queen’s girdle.” [c] There’s another one called “the Queen’s veil,” as well as many others, all fine and rich properties, each one named for a part of the Queen’s wardrobe, because each one is set aside to pay for the Queen’s finery.

Now suppose someone were to say to Amestris, the king’s mother and the widow of Xerxes, “The son of Dinomache intends to challenge your son; her wardrobe is worth only fifty minas at best, and her son has less than three hundred acres
¹⁹
of land at Erchia.” I think she’d be wondering [d] what this Alcibiades had up his sleeve to think of competing against Artaxerxes. I think she’d say, “I don’t see what this fellow could be relying on, except diligence and wisdom—the Greeks don’t have anything else worth mentioning.”

But if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making this attempt is, in the first place, hardly twenty years old yet, and, secondly, entirely uneducated, and furthermore, when his lover tells him to study and cultivate [e] himself and discipline himself so that he can compete with the king, he says he doesn’t want to and that he’s happy with the way he is—if she heard all that, I think she’d ask in amazement, “What in the world could this youngster be relying on?” Suppose we were to reply, “Good looks, height, birth, wealth, and native intelligence.” Then, Alcibiades, considering all that they have of these things as well, she’d conclude that we were stark raving mad. Again, I think that Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides,
[124]
wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who were all Spartan kings, would be similarly amazed if you, with your bad upbringing, proposed to compete with her son, considering all his advantages.

And yet, don’t you think it’s disgraceful that even our enemies’
wives
have a better appreciation than we do of what it would take to challenge them? No, my excellent friend, trust in me and in the Delphic inscription [b] and ‘know thyself’. These are the people we must defeat, not the ones you think, and we have no hope of defeating them unless we act with both diligence and skill. If you fall short in these, then you will fall short of achieving fame in Greece as well as abroad; and that is what I think you’re longing for, more than anyone else ever longed for anything.

A
LCIBIADES
: Well, Socrates, what kind of self-cultivation do I need to practice? Can you show me the way? What you said really sounded true.

S
OCRATES
: Yes—but let’s discuss together how we can become as good as possible. You know, what I’ve said about the need for education applies [c] to me as well as to you—we’re in the same condition, except in one respect.

A
LCIBIADES
: What?

S
OCRATES
: My guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, your guardian.

A
LCIBIADES
: Who’s that, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: God, Alcibiades; it was a god who prevented me from talking with you before today. I put my faith in him, and I say that your glory will be entirely my doing.

A
LCIBIADES
: You’re teasing me, Socrates. [d]

S
OCRATES
: Maybe; but I’m right in saying that we stand in need of self-cultivation. Actually, every human being needs self-cultivation, but
especially
the two of us.

A
LCIBIADES
: You’re right about me.

S
OCRATES
: And about me.

A
LCIBIADES
: So what should we do?

S
OCRATES
: There must be no giving up, my friend, and no slacking off.

A
LCIBIADES
: No, Socrates, that really wouldn’t do.

S
OCRATES
: No it wouldn’t. So let’s work it out together. Tell me—we say [e] that we want to be as good as possible, don’t we?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: In what respect?

A
LCIBIADES
: In what good men do, obviously.

S
OCRATES
: Good at what?

A
LCIBIADES
: Taking care of things, obviously.

S
OCRATES
: What sorts of things? Horses?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: In that case, we’d consult a horse expert.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Well, do you mean sailing?

A
LCIBIADES
: No.

S
OCRATES
: In that case, we’d consult a sailing expert.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Well, what sorts of things? Whose business is it?

A
LCIBIADES
: The leading citizens of Athens.

S
OCRATES
: By ‘leading citizens’ do you mean clever men or stupid men?
[125]

A
LCIBIADES
: Clever.

S
OCRATES
: But isn’t everybody good at what they’re clever at?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And bad at what they’re not?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: And is the shoemaker clever at making shoes?

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: Then he’s good at it.

A
LCIBIADES
: That’s right.

S
OCRATES
: Well now, isn’t the shoemaker stupid at making clothes?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

[b] S
OCRATES
: So he’s bad at that.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So the same person is both good and bad, at least by this argument.

A
LCIBIADES
: Apparently.

S
OCRATES
: Do you mean to say that
good men
are also bad?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: So which ones
do
you say are good men?

A
LCIBIADES
: I mean those with the ability to rule in the city.

S
OCRATES
: But not, I presume, over horses.

A
LCIBIADES
: No, of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Over people?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: When they’re sick?

A
LCIBIADES
: No.

S
OCRATES
: When they’re at sea?

A
LCIBIADES
: No.

S
OCRATES
: When they’re harvesting?

A
LCIBIADES
: No.

[c] S
OCRATES
: When they’re doing nothing? Or when they’re doing something?

A
LCIBIADES
: Doing something.

S
OCRATES
: Doing what? Try to make it clear for me.

A
LCIBIADES
: It’s when they’re helping each other and dealing with each other, as we do in our urban way of life.

S
OCRATES
: So you mean ruling over men who deal with men.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Over the boatswains who deal with rowers?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: That’s what the pilot is good at.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

[d] S
OCRATES
: Do you mean ruling over flute-players, who direct the singers and deal with the dancers?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Again, that’s what the chorus-master is good at.

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: So what
do
you mean by being able to ‘rule over men who deal with men’?

A
LCIBIADES
: I mean ruling over the men in the city who take part in citizenship and who make a mutual contribution.

S
OCRATES
: Well, what skill is this? Suppose I asked you the same thing again—what skill makes men understand how to rule over men who take part in sailing?

A
LCIBIADES
: The pilot’s.

S
OCRATES
: And what knowledge did we say enables them to rule over [e] those who take part in singing?

A
LCIBIADES
: The chorus-master’s, as you just said.

S
OCRATES
: Well now, what do you call the knowledge that enables you to rule over those who take part in citizenship?

A
LCIBIADES
: I call it the knowledge of good advice, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: But then do you think the pilot’s advice is bad advice?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Then is it good advice?

A
LCIBIADES
: I should think so; he has to ensure the safety of his passengers.
[126]

S
OCRATES
: You’re right. Well then, what’s the purpose of this good advice you’re talking about?

A
LCIBIADES
: The safety and better management of the city.

S
OCRATES
: But what is present or absent when the city is safe and better managed? If, for example, you asked me, “What is present or absent in the body when it is safe and better managed?” I’d reply, “Health is present and disease is absent.” Wouldn’t you agree?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes. [b]

S
OCRATES
: And if you asked me again, “What is present in our eyes when they are better cared for?” I’d say the same sort of thing—“Sight is present and blindness is absent.” Again, with our ears, deafness is absent and hearing is present when they’re in better condition and getting better treatment.

A
LCIBIADES
: You’re right.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, what about a city? What is it that’s present or absent when it’s in a better condition and getting better management and treatment?

A
LCIBIADES
: The way I look at it, Socrates, mutual friendship will be [c] present, and hatred and insurrection will be absent.

S
OCRATES
: When you say ‘friendship’, do you mean agreement or disagreement?

A
LCIBIADES
: Agreement.

S
OCRATES
: What skill is it that makes cities agree about numbers?

A
LCIBIADES
: Arithmetic.

S
OCRATES
: What about private citizens? Isn’t it the same skill?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And doesn’t it also make each person agree with himself?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And what skill is it that makes each of us agree with himself about whether a hand’s-width is larger than an arm’s-length? It’s measuring [d], isn’t it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: Doesn’t it make both cities and private citizens agree?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And isn’t it the same with weighing?

A
LCIBIADES
: It is.

S
OCRATES
: Well, this agreement you’re talking about, what is it? What’s it about? What skill provides it? Doesn’t the same skill make both a city and a private citizen agree, both with themselves and with others?

A
LCIBIADES
: That does seem quite likely.

[e] S
OCRATES
: What is it then? Don’t give up… . Try your best to tell me.

A
LCIBIADES
: I suppose I mean the sort of friendship and agreement you find when a mother and father agree with a son they love, and when a brother agrees with his brother, and a woman agrees with her husband.

S
OCRATES
: Well, Alcibiades, do you think that a husband is able to agree with his wife about wool-working, when he doesn’t understand it and she does?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Nor does he have any need to, because that’s for a woman to know about.

A
LCIBIADES
: That’s right.

[127]
S
OCRATES
: And is a woman able to agree with her husband about military tactics, without having learned about it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: I suppose you’d say that that’s for a man to know about.