Complete Works (129 page)

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: He would be a mathematician, someone who knows about numbers.

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: So won’t you also be able to persuade an individual person about the things you can persuade a group of people about?

A
LCIBIADES
: Probably.

S
OCRATES
: Obviously these are things you know about.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Is there any difference between an orator speaking to the [d] people and an orator speaking in this sort of conversation, except insofar as the former persuades them all together while the latter persuades them one by one?

A
LCIBIADES
: I guess not.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, since it’s plain that the same person can persuade individuals as well as groups, practice on me, and try to prove that what is just is sometimes not advantageous.

A
LCIBIADES
: Stop pushing me around, Socrates!

S
OCRATES
: No, in fact I’m going to push you around and persuade you of the
opposite
of what you’re not willing to show me.

A
LCIBIADES
: Just try it!

S
OCRATES
: Just answer my questions.

[e] A
LCIBIADES
: No, you do the talking yourself.

S
OCRATES
: What?! Don’t you want to be completely convinced?

A
LCIBIADES
: Absolutely, I’m sure.

S
OCRATES
: Wouldn’t you be completely convinced if you yourself said, ‘Yes, that’s how it is’?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, I think so.

S
OCRATES
: Then answer my questions. And if you don’t hear yourself say that just things are also advantageous, then don’t believe anything else I say.

A
LCIBIADES
: No, I’m sure I won’t. But I’d better answer—I don’t think I’ll come to any harm.

S
OCRATES
: You’re quite a prophet. Now tell me—are you saying that
[115]
some just things are advantageous while others are not?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Really? Are some of them admirable and others not admirable?

A
LCIBIADES
: What do you mean by that question?

S
OCRATES
: Have you ever thought that someone was doing something that was both just and contemptible?

A
LCIBIADES
: No, I haven’t.

S
OCRATES
: So all just things are admirable.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Now what about admirable things? Are they all good, or are some good and others not good?

A
LCIBIADES
: What I think, Socrates, is that some admirable things are bad.

S
OCRATES
: And some contemptible things are good?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Are you thinking of this sort of case? Many people get [b] wounded and killed trying to rescue their friends and relatives in battle, while those who don’t go to rescue them, as they should, escape safe and sound. Is this what you’re referring to?

A
LCIBIADES
: Exactly.

S
OCRATES
: Now you call a rescue of this sort admirable, in that it’s an attempt to help the people whom you should help, and this is what courage is; isn’t that what you’re saying?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: But you call it bad, in that it involves wounds and death, don’t you?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Now courage is one thing, and death is something else, right? [c]

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: So it’s not on the same basis that rescuing your friends is admirable and bad, is it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Apparently not.

S
OCRATES
: Now let’s see whether, insofar as it’s admirable, it’s also good, as indeed it is. You agreed that the rescue is admirable, in that it’s courageous. Now consider this very thing—courage. Is it good or bad? Look at it like this: which would you rather have, good things or bad things?

A
LCIBIADES
: Good things.

S
OCRATES
: Namely the greatest goods? [d]

A
LCIBIADES
: Very much so.
¹⁰

S
OCRATES
: And wouldn’t you be least willing to be deprived of such things?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: What would you say about courage? How much would you have to be offered to be deprived of that?

A
LCIBIADES
: I wouldn’t even want to go on living if I were a coward.

S
OCRATES
: So you think that cowardice is the worst thing in the world.

A
LCIBIADES
: I do.

S
OCRATES
: On a par with death, it would seem.

A
LCIBIADES
: That’s what I say.

S
OCRATES
: Aren’t life and courage the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

[e] S
OCRATES
: And wouldn’t you want the former most and the latter least?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Is that because you think that the former are best and the latter are worst?

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: Would you say that courage ranks among the best things and death among the worst?

A
LCIBIADES
: I would say so.

S
OCRATES
: So you called rescuing your friends in battle admirable, insofar as it is admirable, in that it does something good, being courageous.

A
LCIBIADES
: I think so, anyway.

S
OCRATES
: But you called it bad, in that it does something bad, being fatal.
¹¹

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Now since you call this act bad insofar as it produces something
[116]
bad, wouldn’t you also, in all fairness, have to call it good insofar as it produces something good?

A
LCIBIADES
: I think so.

S
OCRATES
: Isn’t it also admirable insofar as it’s good, and contemptible insofar as it’s bad?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Then when you say that rescuing one’s friends in battle is admirable but bad, you mean exactly the same as if you’d called it good but bad.

A
LCIBIADES
: I suppose you’re right, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: So nothing admirable, to the extent that it’s admirable, is bad, and nothing contemptible, to the extent that it’s contemptible, is good.

A
LCIBIADES
: Apparently not.

S
OCRATES
: Now then, let’s take a new approach. People who do what’s [b] admirable do things well, don’t they?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And don’t people who do things well live successful lives?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: Aren’t they successful because they’ve got good things?

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: And they get good things by acting properly and admirably.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So it is good to act properly.

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: And good conduct is admirable.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So we’ve seen once again that the very thing that is admirable [c] is also good.

A
LCIBIADES
: Apparently.

S
OCRATES
: So if we find that something is admirable, we’ll also find that it’s good—according to this argument, at least.

A
LCIBIADES
: We’ll have to.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, are good things advantageous, or not?

A
LCIBIADES
: Advantageous.

S
OCRATES
: Do you remember what we agreed about doing just things?

A
LCIBIADES
: I think we agreed that someone who does what’s just must also be doing what’s admirable.

S
OCRATES
: And didn’t we also agree that someone who does what’s admirable must also be doing what’s good?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And that what’s good is advantageous? [d]

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So, Alcibiades, just things are advantageous.

A
LCIBIADES
: So it seems.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, am I not the questioner and are you not the answerer?

A
LCIBIADES
: It appears I am.

S
OCRATES
: So if someone who believed that he knew what is just and unjust were to stand up to advise the Athenians, or even the Peparethians,
¹²
and said that sometimes just things are bad,
¹³
what could you do but laugh at him? After all, as you yourself say, the same things are just and also [e] advantageous.

A
LCIBIADES
: I swear by the gods, Socrates, I have no idea what I mean—I must be in some absolutely bizarre condition! When you ask me questions, first I think one thing, and then I think something else.

S
OCRATES
: And are you unaware, my dear fellow, of what this feeling is?

A
LCIBIADES
: Completely.

S
OCRATES
: Well, if someone asked you whether you had two eyes or three eyes, or two hands or four hands, or something else like that, do you think you’d give different answers at different times, or would you always give the same answer?

[117]
A
LCIBIADES
: I’m quite unsure of myself at this point, but I think I’d give the same answer.

S
OCRATES
: Because you know it—isn’t that the reason?

A
LCIBIADES
: I think so.

S
OCRATES
: So if you gave conflicting answers about something, without meaning to, then it would be obvious that you didn’t know it.

A
LCIBIADES
: Probably.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, you tell me that you’re wavering about what is just and unjust, admirable and contemptible, good and bad, and advantageous and disadvantageous. Isn’t it obvious that the reason you waver about them is that you don’t know about them?

[b] A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, it is.

S
OCRATES
: Would you also say that whenever someone doesn’t know something, his soul will necessarily waver about it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: Really? Do you know any way of ascending to the stars?

A
LCIBIADES
:
I
certainly don’t.

S
OCRATES
: Does your opinion waver on this question, too?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Do you know the reason, or shall I tell you?

A
LCIBIADES
: Tell me.

S
OCRATES
: It’s because, my friend, you don’t understand it and you don’t think you understand it.

[c] A
LCIBIADES
: And what do you mean by that?

S
OCRATES
: Let’s look at it together. Do you waver about what you realize you don’t understand? For example, you know, I think, that you don’t know how to prepare a fine meal, right?

A
LCIBIADES
: Quite right.

S
OCRATES
: So do you have your own opinions about how to prepare it, and waver about it; or do you leave it to someone who knows how?

A
LCIBIADES
: The latter.

S
OCRATES
: Well, if you were sailing in a ship, would you be out there [d] wondering whether to put the helm to port or starboard, and wavering because you didn’t know? Or would you leave it to the skipper and take it easy?

A
LCIBIADES
: I’d leave it to the skipper.

S
OCRATES
: So you don’t waver about what you don’t know, if in fact you know that you don’t know.

A
LCIBIADES
: Apparently not.

S
OCRATES
: Don’t you realize that the errors in our conduct are caused by this kind of ignorance, of thinking that we know when we don’t know?

A
LCIBIADES
: What do you mean by that?

S
OCRATES
: Well, we don’t set out to do something unless we think we know what we’re doing, right?

A
LCIBIADES
: Right.

S
OCRATES
: But when people don’t think they know how to do something, [e] they hand it over to somebody else, right?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: So the sort of people who don’t think they know how to do things make no mistakes in life, because they leave those things to other people.