Complete Works (127 page)

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, I suppose I would say it was something that I know [d] better than they do.

S
OCRATES
: So it’s on matters you know about that you’re a good adviser.

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: Now the only things you know are what you’ve learned from others or found out for yourself; isn’t that right?

A
LCIBIADES
: What else could I know?

S
OCRATES
: Could you ever have learned or found out anything without wanting to learn it or work it out for yourself?

A
LCIBIADES
: No, I couldn’t have.

S
OCRATES
: Is that right? Would you have wanted to learn or work out something that you thought you understood?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: So there was a time when you didn’t think you knew what [e] you now understand.

A
LCIBIADES
: There must have been.

S
OCRATES
: But I’ve got a pretty good idea what you’ve learned. Tell me if I’ve missed anything: as far as I remember, you learned writing and lyre-playing and wrestling, but you didn’t want to learn aulos-playing.
⁵
These are the subjects that you understand—unless perhaps you’ve been learning something while I wasn’t looking; but I don’t think you have been, either by night or by day, on your excursions from home.

A
LCIBIADES
: No, those are the only lessons I took.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, is it when the Athenians are discussing how to
[107]
spell a word correctly that you’ll stand up to advise them?

A
LCIBIADES
: Good God, I’d never do that!

S
OCRATES
: Then is it when they’re discussing the notes on the lyre?

A
LCIBIADES
: No, never.

S
OCRATES
: But surely they’re not in the habit of discussing wrestling in the Assembly.

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly not.

S
OCRATES
: Then what will they be discussing? I presume it won’t be building.

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Because a builder would give better advice on these matters than you.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes. [b]

S
OCRATES
: Nor will they be discussing divination, will they?

A
LCIBIADES
: No.

S
OCRATES
: Because then a diviner would be better at giving advice than you.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Regardless of whether he’s tall or short, or handsome or ugly, or even noble or common.

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.
⁶

S
OCRATES
: And when the Athenians are discussing measures for public [c] health, it will make no difference to them if their counsellor is rich or poor, but they will make sure that their adviser is a doctor.

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: I suppose that’s because advice on any subject is the business not of those who are rich but of those who know it.

A
LCIBIADES
: Quite reasonably so.

S
OCRATES
: Then what
will
they be considering when you stand up to advise them, assuming you’re right to do so?

A
LCIBIADES
: They’ll be discussing their own business, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: You mean their shipbuilding business—what sorts of ships they should be building?

A
LCIBIADES
: No, Socrates, I don’t.

S
OCRATES
: I suppose that’s because you don’t understand shipbuilding. Am I right, or is there some other reason?

A
LCIBIADES
: No, that’s it.

[d] S
OCRATES
: So what kind of ‘their own business’ do you think they’ll be discussing?

A
LCIBIADES
: War, Socrates, or peace, or anything else which is the business of the city.

S
OCRATES
: Do you mean they’ll be discussing who they should make peace with and who they should go to war with and how?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: But shouldn’t they do that with the ones with whom it’s better to?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

[e] S
OCRATES
: And when it’s better?

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: And for as long a time as it’s better?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Now supposing the Athenians were discussing who they should wrestle with and who they should spar with and how, who would be a better adviser, you or the trainer?

A
LCIBIADES
: The trainer, I guess.

S
OCRATES
: And can you tell me what the trainer has in view when he advises you who you should or shouldn’t wrestle with, and when, and how? I mean, for example, that one should wrestle with those with whom it’s better to wrestle, isn’t that right?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And as much as is better?
[108]

A
LCIBIADES
: That’s right.

S
OCRATES
: And when it’s better, right?

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: Let’s take another example: when you’re singing, you should sometimes accompany the song with lyre-playing and dancing.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, you should.

S
OCRATES
: You should do so when it’s better to, right?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And as much as is better.

A
LCIBIADES
: I agree.

S
OCRATES
: Really? Since you used the term ‘better’ in both cases—in [b] wrestling and in playing the lyre while singing—what do you call what’s better in lyre-playing, as I call what’s better in wrestling ‘athletic’? What do you call that?

A
LCIBIADES
: I don’t get it.

S
OCRATES
: Then try to follow my example. My answer was, I think, ‘what is correct in every case’—and what is correct, I presume, is what takes place in accordance with the skill, isn’t it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Wasn’t the skill athletics?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: I said that what’s better in wrestling, was ‘athletic’. [c]

A
LCIBIADES
: That’s what you said.

S
OCRATES
: Wasn’t that well said?

A
LCIBIADES
: I think so, anyway.

S
OCRATES
: Come on then, it’s your turn; it’s partly up to you, surely, to keep our conversation going well. First of all, tell me what the skill is for singing and dancing and playing the lyre correctly. What is it called as a whole? … Aren’t you able to tell me yet?

A
LCIBIADES
: No, I can’t.

S
OCRATES
: Well, try it this way. Who are the goddesses to whom the skill belongs?

A
LCIBIADES
: Do you mean the Muses, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: I do indeed. Don’t you see? What’s the name of the skill that’s [d] named after them?

A
LCIBIADES
: I think you mean music.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, I do. Now what is “correctly” for what takes place in accordance with this skill? In the other case I told you what “correctly” is for what takes place in accordance with the skill, so now it’s your turn to say something similar in this case.
How
does it take place?

A
LCIBIADES
: Musically, I think.

S
OCRATES
: A good answer. Come on now, what do you call what’s better in both going to war and keeping the peace? In these last two examples you [e] said that what was better was more musical and more athletic, respectively. Now try to tell me what’s better in this case, too.

A
LCIBIADES
: I really can’t do it.

S
OCRATES
: But surely it’s disgraceful if when you’re speaking and giving advice about food—saying that a certain kind is better than another, and better at a certain time and in a certain quantity—and someone should ask you, “What do you mean by ‘better’, Alcibiades?” you could tell him in that case that ‘better’ was ‘healthier’, though you don’t even pretend
[109]
to be a doctor; and yet in a case where you do pretend to understand and are going to stand up and give advice as though you knew, if you aren’t able, as seems likely, to answer the question in this case, won’t you be embarrassed? Won’t that seem disgraceful?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, certainly.

S
OCRATES
: Then think about it, and try to tell me what the better tends towards, in keeping the peace or in waging war with the right people.

A
LCIBIADES
: I’m thinking, but I can’t get it.

S
OCRATES
: But suppose we’re at war with somebody—surely you know what treatment we accuse each other of when we enter into a war, and what we call it.

[b] A
LCIBIADES
: I do—we say that they’re playing some trick on us, or attacking us or taking things away from us.

S
OCRATES
: Hold on—
how
do we suffer from each of these treatments? Try to tell me how one way differs from another way.

A
LCIBIADES
: When you say ‘way’, Socrates, do you mean ‘justly’ or ‘unjustly’?

S
OCRATES
: Precisely.

A
LCIBIADES
: But surely that makes all the difference in the world.

S
OCRATES
: Really? Who will you advise the Athenians to wage war on? Those who are treating us unjustly, or those who are treating us justly?

[c] A
LCIBIADES
: That’s a hard question you’re asking. Even if someone thought it was necessary to wage war on people who were treating us justly, he wouldn’t admit it.

S
OCRATES
: Because I think that wouldn’t be lawful.

A
LCIBIADES
: It certainly wouldn’t.

S
OCRATES
: Nor would it be considered a proper thing to do.

A
LCIBIADES
: No.
⁷

S
OCRATES
: So you would also frame your speech in these terms.

A
LCIBIADES
: I’d have to.

S
OCRATES
: Then this ‘better’ I was just asking you about—when it comes to waging war or not, on whom to wage war and on whom not to, and when and when not to—this ‘better’ turns out to be the same as ‘more just’, doesn’t it?

A
LCIBIADES
: It certainly seems so.

[d] S
OCRATES
: But how could it, my dear Alcibiades? Don’t you realize that this is something you don’t understand? Or perhaps, when I wasn’t looking, you’ve been seeing some teacher who taught you how to tell the difference between the more just and the less just. Have you? … Well, who is he? Tell me who he is so that you can sign me up with him as well.

A
LCIBIADES
: Stop teasing me, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: I’m not—I’ll swear by Friendship,
⁸
yours and mine. I’d never perjure myself by him. So tell me who he is, if you can.

A
LCIBIADES
: And what if I can’t? Don’t you think I might know about [e] justice and injustice some other way?

S
OCRATES
: Yes, you might—if you found it out.

A
LCIBIADES
: Well, don’t you think I might find it out?

S
OCRATES
: Yes, of course—if you investigate the matter.

A
LCIBIADES
: And don’t you think I might investigate it?

S
OCRATES
: Yes, I do—if you thought you didn’t know.

A
LCIBIADES
: And didn’t I once think that?

S
OCRATES
: A fine answer. Can you tell me when this was, when you didn’t think you knew about justice and injustice … Well, was it last year
[110]
that you were looking into it and didn’t think you knew? Or did you think you knew? … Answer me truthfully, or else our conversation will be a waste of time.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, I thought I knew.

S
OCRATES
: Didn’t you think the same thing two years ago, and three years ago, and four?

A
LCIBIADES
: I did.

S
OCRATES
: But surely before that you were a boy, weren’t you?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Well now, at that point I’m sure you thought you knew.

A
LCIBIADES
: How can you be sure of that?

S
OCRATES
: When you were a boy I often observed you, at school and [b] other places, and sometimes when you were playing knucklebones or some other game, you’d say to one or another of your playmates, very loudly and confidently—not at all like someone who was at a loss about justice and injustice—that he was a lousy cheater and wasn’t playing fairly. Isn’t that true?

A
LCIBIADES
: But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me like that?