Complete Works (128 page)

S
OCRATES
: Do you mean, what should you have done if you didn’t actually know then whether or not you were being cheated?

A
LCIBIADES
: But I
did
know, by Zeus! I saw clearly that they were cheating [c] me.

S
OCRATES
: So it seems that even as a child you thought you understood justice and injustice.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, and I
did
understand.

S
OCRATES
: At what point did you find it out? Surely it wasn’t when you thought you knew.

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Then when did you think you didn’t know? Think about it—you won’t find any such time.

A
LCIBIADES
: By Zeus, Socrates, I really can’t say.

[d] S
OCRATES
: So it isn’t by finding it out that you know it.

A
LCIBIADES
: That’s not very likely.

S
OCRATES
: But surely you just finished saying that it wasn’t by being taught, either, that you knew it. So if you neither found it out nor were taught it, how and where did you come to know it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Maybe I gave you the wrong answer when I said I knew it by finding it out myself.

S
OCRATES
: Then how did it happen?

A
LCIBIADES
: I suppose I learned it in the same way as other people.

S
OCRATES
: That brings us back to the same argument: from whom? Do tell me.

[e] A
LCIBIADES
: From people in general.

S
OCRATES
: When you give the credit to ‘people in general’, you’re falling back on teachers who are no good.

A
LCIBIADES
: What? Aren’t they capable of teaching?

S
OCRATES
: No, they can’t even teach you what moves to make or not make in knucklebones. And yet that’s a trivial matter, I suppose, compared with justice … What? Don’t you agree?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So although they can’t teach trivial things, you say they can teach more serious things.

A
LCIBIADES
:
I
think so; at any rate, they can teach a lot of things that are more important than knucklebones.

S
OCRATES
: Like what?

[111]
A
LCIBIADES
: Well, for example, I learned how to speak Greek from them; I couldn’t tell you who my teacher was, but I give the credit to the very people you say are no good at teaching.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, my noble friend, people in general are good teachers of that, and it would be only fair to praise them for their teaching.

A
LCIBIADES
: Why?

S
OCRATES
: Because they have what it takes to be good teachers of the subject.

A
LCIBIADES
: What do you mean by that?

S
OCRATES
: Don’t you see that somebody who is going to teach anything must first know it himself? Isn’t that right?

[b] A
LCIBIADES
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: And don’t people who know something agree with each other, not disagree?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: If people disagree about something, would you say that they know it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Then how could they be teachers of it?

A
LCIBIADES
: They couldn’t possibly.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, do you think that people in general disagree about what wood or stone is? If you ask them, don’t they give the same answers? Don’t they reach for the same things when they want to get some wood [c] or some stone? And similarly for all other such cases; I suppose this is pretty much what you mean by understanding Greek, isn’t it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So they agree with each other in these cases, as we said, and with themselves when acting privately. But don’t they also agree in public? Cities don’t disagree with each other and use different words for the same thing, do they?

A
LCIBIADES
: No.

S
OCRATES
: So it’s likely that they would make good teachers of these things.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes. [d]

S
OCRATES
: So if we wanted somebody to know these things, we’d be right to send him to lessons given by these people in general.

A
LCIBIADES
: Certainly.

S
OCRATES
: Now if we wanted to know not just what men or horses are like, but which of them could and couldn’t run, would people in general be able to teach this as well?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: Isn’t the fact that they disagree with each other about these things enough to show you that they don’t understand them, and are not [e] ‘four-square teachers’ of them?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, it is.

S
OCRATES
: Now if we wanted to know not just what men are like, but what sick and healthy men are like, would people in general be able to teach us?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: And if you saw them disagreeing about it, that would show you that they were bad teachers of it.

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes, it would.

S
OCRATES
: Very well, then—does it seem to you that people in general actually agree among themselves or with each other about just and unjust people and actions?

A
LCIBIADES
: Not in the slightest, Socrates.
[112]

S
OCRATES
: Really? Do they disagree a huge amount about these things?

A
LCIBIADES
: Very much so.

S
OCRATES
: I don’t suppose you’ve ever seen or heard people disagreeing so strongly about what is healthy and unhealthy that they fight and kill each other over it, have you?

A
LCIBIADES
: Of course not.

S
OCRATES
: But I know you’ve seen this sort of dispute over questions of justice and injustice; or even if you haven’t seen it, at least you’ve heard [b] about it from many other people—especially Homer, since you’ve heard the
Iliad
and the
Odyssey
, haven’t you?

A
LCIBIADES
: I certainly have, of course, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Aren’t these poems all about disagreements over justice and injustice?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: It was over this sort of disagreement that the Achaeans and the Trojans fought battles and lost their lives, as did Odysseus and the suitors of Penelope.

[c] A
LCIBIADES
: You’re right.

S
OCRATES
: I suppose the same is true of those Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians who died at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, including your own father. The disagreement that caused those battles and those deaths was none other than a disagreement over justice and injustice, wasn’t it?

A
LCIBIADES
: You’re right.

S
OCRATES
: Are we to say that people understand something if they disagree [d] so much about it that in their disputes with each other they resort to such extreme measures?

A
LCIBIADES
: Obviously not.

S
OCRATES
: But aren’t you giving credit to teachers of this sort who, as you yourself admit, have no knowledge?

A
LCIBIADES
: I guess I am.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, given that your opinion wavers so much, and given that you obviously neither found it out yourself nor learned it from anyone else, how likely is it that you know about justice and injustice?

A
LCIBIADES
: From what you say anyway, it’s not very likely.

[e] S
OCRATES
: See, there you go again, Alcibiades, that’s not well said!

A
LCIBIADES
: What do you mean?

S
OCRATES
: You say that
I
say these things.

A
LCIBIADES
: What? Aren’t you saying that I don’t understand justice and injustice?

S
OCRATES
: No, not at all.

A
LCIBIADES
: Well, am
I
?

S
OCRATES
: Yes.

A
LCIBIADES
: How?

S
OCRATES
: Here’s how. If I asked you which is more, one or two, would you say two?

A
LCIBIADES
: I would.

S
OCRATES
: By how much?

A
LCIBIADES
: By one.

S
OCRATES
: Then which of us is saying that two is one more than one?

A
LCIBIADES
: I am.

S
OCRATES
: Wasn’t I asking and weren’t you answering?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

[113]
S
OCRATES
: Who do you think is saying these things—me, the questioner, or you, the answerer?

A
LCIBIADES
: I am.

S
OCRATES
: And what if I asked you how to spell ‘Socrates’, and you told me? Which of us would be saying it?

A
LCIBIADES
: I would.

S
OCRATES
: Come then, give me the general principle. When there’s a question and an answer, who is the one saying things—the questioner or the answerer?

A
LCIBIADES
: The answerer, I think, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Wasn’t I the questioner in everything just now? [b]

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And weren’t you the answerer?

A
LCIBIADES
: I certainly was.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, which of us said what was said?

A
LCIBIADES
: From what we’ve agreed, Socrates, it seems that I did.

S
OCRATES
: And what was said was that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, doesn’t understand justice and injustice—though he thinks he does—and that he is about to go to the Assembly to advise the Athenians on what he doesn’t know anything about. Wasn’t that it?

A
LCIBIADES
: Apparently. [c]

S
OCRATES
: Then it’s just like in Euripides, Alcibiades; ‘you heard it from yourself, not from me.’
⁹
I’m not the one who says these things—
you
are—don’t try to blame me. And furthermore, you’re quite right to say so. This scheme you have in mind—teaching what you don’t know and haven’t bothered to learn—your scheme, my good fellow, is crazy.

A
LCIBIADES
: Actually, Socrates, I think the Athenians and the other Greeks [d] rarely discuss which course is more just or unjust. They think that sort of thing is obvious, so they skip over it and ask which one would be advantageous to do. In fact, though, what’s just is not the same, I think, as what’s advantageous; many people have profited by committing great injustices, and others, I think, got no advantage from doing the right thing.

S
OCRATES
: So? Even if just and advantageous things happen to be completely different, surely you don’t think you know what’s advantageous [e] for people, and why, do you?

A
LCIBIADES
: What’s to stop me, Socrates?—unless you’re going to ask me all over again who I learned it from or how I found it out myself.

S
OCRATES
: What a way of carrying on! If you say something wrong, and if there’s a previous argument that can prove that it was wrong, you think you ought to be given some new and different proof, as if the previous one were a worn-out scrap of clothing that you refuse to wear again. No, you want an immaculate, brand-new proof.

I’ll pass over your anticipation of my argument and ask you, all the
[114]
same, ‘How did you come to understand what is advantageous? Who was your teacher?’, and in my one question ask everything I asked you before. Clearly this will put you in the same position again—you won’t be able to prove that you know what is advantageous, either by finding it out or by learning it.

But since you’ve got a delicate stomach and wouldn’t enjoy another taste of the same argument, I’ll pass over this question of whether or not [b] you know what is advantageous for the Athenians. But why don’t you prove whether the just and the advantageous are the same or different? You can question me, if you like, as I questioned you—or else work it out yourself, in your own argument.

A
LCIBIADES
: No, Socrates, I don’t think I’d be able to work it out in front of you.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, my good sir, imagine that I’m the Assembly and the people gathered there; even there, you know, you’ll have to persuade them one by one. Isn’t that right?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: If somebody knows something, don’t you think he can persuade [c] people about it one by one, as well as all together? Take the schoolteacher—don’t you think he persuades people about letters individually, as well as collectively?

A
LCIBIADES
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And won’t the same person be able to persuade people about numbers individually, as well as in groups?