Confronting the Colonies (26 page)

These concerns were echoed by the JIC's regional outpost, the JIC(ME). In May 1963 the JIC(ME) carried some intelligence from
British ‘observers' and ‘journalists' who had visited the Yemen. However, the JIC(ME) was dismissive of their upbeat assessments about Royalist chances of success, confuting that ‘such claims have been made too often before to warrant serious attention'. Similarly, six weeks later the JIC(ME) reported that a ‘British observer' who had visited Royalist areas in Yemen warned that the Royalists lacked ammunition and morale. Again the JIC(ME) dismissed these reports as politicised and exaggerated. It was believed that Royalists often ‘have more ammunition than they admit'.
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The JIC therefore appeared to harbour reservations about the use of mercenaries. Lack of archival evidence however, precludes a detailed discussion of the relationship between the JIC and any mercenary activity. Regardless, there is little evidence that much aid was channelled to the mercenaries. Instead, as Spencer Mawby asserts, the frontier tribes were used: ‘The British government did give aid to the Royalists intermittently but […] generally preferred to operate against the Egyptians through its own independent tribal connections rather than utilising Badr or the mercenaries'.
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Overall, it appears that whatever official sanctioning the mercenaries may have enjoyed, they had little connection with the JIC. The central intelligence machinery may well have received unofficial reports from mercenary sources, but committee output suggests that the JIC lacked detailed awareness of their activity. Mercenary intelligence structures operated in parallel to the official intelligence machine. Indeed the most active mercenary, Johnny Cooper, led his own intelligence gathering reconnaissance missions, which he hoped would shed alternative light on the assessments made by the JIC.
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Covert action, however, is not essentially an intelligence activity but a foreign policy option. It is designed to influence events overseas in support of British interests. It is therefore important to examine the impact intelligence assessments had on the actual covert policy sanctioned. The JIC's influence was intermittent in the early years of the conflict and assessments were used or overlooked depending on the consumers' interests. Although some officials and ministers vociferously disagreed with the committee's conclusions, JIC reports were used in planning covert intervention from 1964. They helped temper some of the more aggressive
proposals. Intelligence helped ensure that any action did not extend to actively taking sides in the civil war but was instead limited to counter-subversion along the frontier. It must, however, be noted that JIC assessments were only one source in moderating covert action. Other factors simply included bureaucratic delays in responding to and processing requests, as well as policy malaise owing to ongoing tension about the best means with which to proceed.

From the outbreak of the Yemeni conflict, the JIC chairman fed intelligence directly to senior policy practitioners and ministers via his attendance of ad hoc cabinet committees. This happened for example in October 1962 when the committee's assessments of stalemate and its criticism of exaggerated local reports were used in debates regarding initial responses and potential recognition of the new Yemeni regime. Perhaps such input casting doubt on the governor's assessment played a role in Macmillan's decision to sanction only some of Johnston's requests the following month.
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Elsewhere, the chiefs of staff waited for JIC conclusions before planning action to ‘counter border incursions and subversion in the Protectorate or hostile action affecting the security of the Aden base'. Based on the JIC's threat assessment, military planners then began to liaise with the Colonial Office and a local security committee to consider how best to react to border skirmishes using counter subversion, infrastructure development and propaganda.
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Between late 1962 and early 1964, the government authorised cautious covert action in the frontier area, including mine-laying, supplying arms to tribes and sabotage. This was ultimately defensive and more limited than requests from people like Johnston and Trevaskis. Local officials were hoping for retaliatory action inside Yemen itself as well as covert military assistance directly to the Royalists. They sought active involvement in the civil war. As Spencer Mawby has argued, ‘Macmillan's administration was willing to consider retaliatory action, though not on the scale which Johnston proposed'.
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Elsewhere, however, JIC reports were not used as an objective foundation to policy discussion. Some ministers and officials disagreed with the committee's assessments and so simply ignored JIC intelligence. It has already been noted that Julian Amery criticised the JIC for underestimating the coherence and vehemence of Royalist resistance and fed parallel reports to the prime minister. Elsewhere, the committee's assessments were used to justify covert action—despite JIC reservations. By
January 1964 the JIC had dismissed any overt military threat, acknowledged the political subversive threat, but stopped short of accusing the Egyptians of an active coordinated campaign of violent subversion and terrorism. Yet these JIC conclusions were swiftly pounced upon by the chiefs of staff as the foundations on which to base and justify their own policy recommendations to cabinet. The chiefs, who emphasised the military importance of the Aden base, were keen to use the JIC acknowledgement of subversion as a green light. It would have provided the necessary intelligence justification for covert action. They were briefed that the JIC ‘agree (almost reluctantly!) that there is evidence to support the case that a concerted subversive effort is under way'. The chiefs used the JIC threat assessment to corroborate Trevaskis's claims of coordinated external violent subversion.
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Surprisingly, this was despite the fact that the JIC had explicitly cast doubts on the high commissioner's arguments. Burrows had personally informed the chiefs of staff just a few days earlier that some JIC members believed the grenade attack was part of uncoordinated hostility, and the committee continued to warn only of political subversion.
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Using the JIC intelligence as a foundation (or excuse), the chiefs of staff immediately discussed means to counter this subversion. They recommended using ‘all practicable measures' to counter hostile propaganda.
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Moreover, the exclamation mark denoting the perceived JIC reluctance combined with the swiftness and firmness of the chiefs' lobbying for counter-subversion measures suggests a sense of relief that the JIC had reached the desired outcome. JIC intelligence could now be used as evidence to justify counter-subversion efforts. It was, of course, right and proper for the chiefs of staff to issue planning and policy recommendations and they were under no obligation to agree with JIC intelligence conclusions. This episode, however, raises important questions about the subtle use of intelligence assessments, which are perceived as objective, to justify consumers' own preconceptions.

Meanwhile, other consumers used JIC conclusions to formulate limited counter measures. For example, using the JIC's more limited assessments of the subversion, the Counter Subversion Committee examined means of countering Egyptian propaganda, such as through the use of a more powerful transmitter to broadcast counter-propaganda from Aden.
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Covert action was not as potent as it otherwise might have been.

A review of policy towards Aden and South Arabia took place in spring 1964, in which JIC intelligence assessments proved influential. Alec Douglas-Home, then prime minister, requested a fresh look at the situation. He commissioned an up-to-date intelligence appreciation, which was to be circulated amongst the most senior policymakers.
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Although Douglas-Home was not ‘yet convinced' by the JIC's review, Foreign Secretary Rab Butler drew heavily on the committee's intelligence to argue for a distinction to be made between aiding the frontier tribes and the Yemeni Royalists. Butler wrote that ‘we must look critically at the argument that the best way of countering U.A.R.-Yemeni subversion is to provide encouragement and help to the Yemeni Royalists'. Explicitly referring to the JIC's conclusions, he posited that direct aid to the Royalists was futile and risked escalating the violence.
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As part of the spring review, various proposals were made both in London and locally. Reflecting the input of Butler and the JIC, the actions sanctioned demonstrated the distinction between defensive border operations and offensive aid to the Royalists as well as an unwillingness to engage in particularly aggressive operations. For example, ‘actions to induce Yemeni tribes to neutralise centres of anti-Federation subversion' were sanctioned, whilst a suggestion to assassinate Egyptian intelligence officers was not. Shallow non-retaliatory sabotage was sanctioned, whilst proposals for action deep inside the Yemen were vetoed. Similarly, the government was prepared to offer the Royalists money and to turn a blind eye to their use of federation territory, but was not prepared to supply arms and heavier equipment.
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JIC intelligence assessments had a more formalised impact on policy from 1964. This was when calls for increased covert intervention intensified and new interdepartmental machinery was established. Intelligence then helped guide committees such as the South Arabian Action Group (which was charged with formulating proposals for overt and covert action), the Joint Action Committee (JAC), the Counter Subversion Committee and the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee in scrutinising and coordinating covert action. Available archival evidence suggests that, channelled through the JAC, all source intelligence assessment helped moderate the more aggressive proposals for covert intervention. Covert action was stepped up but intelligence played an important role in ensuring that it was a proportionate response to the threat, tied to specific goals and embedded in a broader
foreign and colonial policy. These factors were, and remain, important guidelines for effective covert action planning.
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Intriguing connections existed between the JIC and the Joint Action Committee. Although perhaps created earlier, the JAC was reconstituted in July 1964 along with (or as part of) a broader reorganisation of the joint intelligence machinery, including the Joint Intelligence Staff.
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Indeed, there were extensive overlaps between the two committees in terms of structure and personnel. Firstly, the JAC was served by the JIC secretariat—an arrangement that meant that the JIC secretary doubled up as the JAC secretary.
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Secondly, the two committees shared a chairman. Bernard Burrows and his influential successor Denis Greenhill were therefore heavily involved in planning covert operations including mine-laying, increased arms sales to ‘friendly' tribal groups and ‘unavowable [sic] action within the Yemen itself'.
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Thirdly, the most senior JIC members also sat on the JAC and were joined by representatives from the operational dimension in the Ministry of Defence, including the director of Special Forces. Composed of only those with a need to know, the JAC was smaller than the JIC and worked with a more highly classified distribution list. As such the JAC could discuss issues of a more sensitive and secretive nature than the Joint Intelligence Committee. This is one of the reasons why the two committees were kept separate.
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The levels of overlap between the JIC and JAC are significant. They raise issues concerning the relationship between covert action and intelligence, with the former often being ignored in traditional conceptions of the intelligence cycle. The overlap also questions the relationship between intelligence and policy (with some American practitioners arguing that policy neutrality among intelligence officials does not apply regarding covert action).
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Importantly however, policy formulation did not fall under the JAC's remit. This was instead conducted by the relevant departments and was sanctioned by senior ministers. The JAC was simply involved in scrutinising and coordinating these policy proposals interdepartmentally. It then offered recommendations to ministers, and in doing so often invoked JIC assessments. It was, according to Davies, intended to provide direction and coordination for covert action programmes.
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JIC involvement was therefore sensible in that the committee's structure was used to ensure secrecy and committee members brought valuable experience with which to scrutinise, manage and
coordinate. Moreover, the type of policy with which the JAC did deal can perhaps be termed ‘intelligence policy' involving intelligence operations and inter-agency coordination. Such policy can be differentiated from broader strategic political or military policies, on which intelligence bodies should obviously avoid prescription.

The shadowy Joint Action Committee discussed, scrutinised and worked through the various issues within, and consequences of, the proposed action. Regarding Yemen and South Arabia, this was known as RANCOUR II. The committee's scrutiny included
inter alia
considering the potential impact that halting operations would have had on local leaders and the impact of various political developments involving Nasser on the effectiveness of covert operations.
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Once again it appears that late spring 1964 was a pivotal date regarding the JIC's views on the threat and the best means with which to counter it. As has been argued, committee assessments in 1962 and 1963 were sceptical of covert action, yet from 1964 it appears that, through the JAC, JIC members were instrumental in issuing proposals. Stephen Dorril claims that Dick White performed an ‘unexplained' ‘about-turn' in the summer of 1964 and began to support covert action.
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It appears that others could have followed suit and bought into a growing consensus around some sort of covert action driven by mounting evidence of Egyptian violence on the one hand and constraints on overt action on the other.