Confronting the Colonies (27 page)

However, a potential recognition of the increasing appeal of covert action does not necessarily mean that JIC members performed an about face. More likely, the JAC was used to dilute the more bellicose Colonial Office proposals to which the JIC had previously expressed reservations. The JAC subjected them to rigorous interdepartmental scrutiny and a bureaucratic process. This ensured that they were carried out as responsibly as possible.

The JAC also potentially helped to ensure that covert action was being conducted for the right reasons and not for political purposes. Planning for the forthcoming election campaign, for example, Julian Amery wrote to the prime minister in spring 1964 urging the government to ‘act on a much bigger scale than has been envisaged hitherto'. This was designed not only to defeat Nasser but to push the Egyptian leader so hard that the Labour opposition would be forced to come out in his support. According to Amery, ‘Nasser is probably the best hated man in Britain. But at bottom his policy and the Labour Party's also towards the Middle
East are very closely aligned. If we could identify [Harold] Wilson with Nasser over the next few months we might greatly strengthen our hand'.
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An interdepartmental body carefully scrutinising covert action proposals was therefore useful. The existence of such a coordinated mechanism also went some way to appeasing local authorities that were angry that their recommendations ‘seem scarcely to have been examined'.
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Indeed, this set-up, which drew heavily on key JIC personnel, therefore achieved a further important criterion for planning covert interventions: evaluation in consultation with intelligence analysts.
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Throughout the summer of 1964, calls continued to press for more active or offensive operations. Suggestions included assassinating Egyptian intelligence officers, organising tribal revolts inside Yemen and directly supplying the Royalists with arms and ammunition. Hawkish ministers hoped to link government-sanctioned covert action with direct aid to the Royalist forces by calling for clandestine parachute drops to be made directly to Royalist forces operating inside Yemen.
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By contrast, however, the JAC recommended that covert operations ‘should not be resumed so long as the U.A.R. and their friends remain inactive against the Federation. [Redacted sentence…] Should Egyptians or Yemenis however resume their attacks and armed invasions, the J.A.C. considers that it is important that retaliatory RANCOUR action should be permitted on a similar scale'.
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These operations were, however, more defensive than those called for from South Arabia and involved indirect aid channelled to pro-British tribes as opposed to direct intervention in the civil war.
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Additionally, JAC recommendations included the proviso that any supply of arms was a ‘once-for-all exercise' and that the high commissioner had to seek interdepartmental clearance before resuming operations beyond the accustomed level.
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By the autumn of 1964 British-backed tribesmen were covertly engaged in operations against Egyptian forces along the Yemeni frontier.
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Yet this was quite different from the more active and direct operations inside Yemen urged by local authorities and certain ministers in Whitehall. Indeed, in November 1964 the JAC stated that ‘none of the foregoing [covert operations] has any direct connection with the Royalists versus Republican struggle in the Yemen but has merely been part of an economical system for protecting the frontier of the Federation for whose defence we are responsible'.
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Linking this back to the JIC, strategic intelligence impacted upon the covert action debate. Channelled
through the JAC, intelligence helped to ensure that any operations sanctioned were conducted as responsibly as possible. Oversight from London may have irritated local officials who felt that it made tribal rulers look like British ‘stooges',
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but was necessary to prevent escalation and damaging repercussions.

Violence in the FSA spiralled in the year and a half preceding British withdrawal. Growing increasingly vocal about the Egyptian threat, the JIC continued to regularly inform senior policymakers of the deteriorating security situation. Indeed, Prime Minister Harold Wilson commented that one JIC report made ‘pretty gloomy reading'.
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As independence approached, a new body was urgently established to deal with the deteriorating security situation in South Arabia by coordinating further interdepartmental action. Known as the South Arabian Action Group (SAAG), it was established in the Foreign Office in September 1966.

Like the JAC, the SAAG also possessed links to the JIC. Indeed, the JIC lay at the very heart of the Whitehall web. As well as being established by the JIC chairman, the group drew heavily on JIC assessments in order to compose a comprehensive report on counter action for ministers. SAAG ultimately called for ‘positive action' to be taken on every front including both overt and covert.
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Overall, although Britain was forced to withdraw, covert action, according to Lord Shackleton, minister without portfolio under Harold Wilson, was ‘extremely successful. [It was] effective both in driving the Egyptians back from parts of the South Arabian frontier and in causing the Egyptians considerable inconvenience by tying down a disproportionate number of Egyptian forces'.
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Although South Yemen became a leftist state, significantly it was not an Egyptian satellite. Intelligence assessment was one source that helped achieve this and ensure that overzealous proposals with potentially damaging consequences were tempered.

By the mid-1960s, the JIC had acquired an increased confidence and status within the Whitehall hierarchy. With this however, came responsibility and vulnerability. Greater access to policy practitioners and ministers brought greater influence in the policymaking process. However, such newfound relevance pushed strategic intelligence towards the
choppy waters of politicisation. As the central intelligence machinery's status grew, so too did the potential for its assessments to become mired in departmental rivalries and for the subtle manipulation of objective assessment.

JIC threat assessments possessed a higher Whitehall profile. The committee had moved away from the narrow militaristic topics that characterised the intelligence agenda during earlier insurgencies. However, the JIC did not operate in a political vacuum. Intelligence assessments were subjected to the winds of Whitehall—the vigorous buffetings from across the interested departments. The committee initially acted as a moderating influence by disseminating information that displeased certain consumers in the Colonial Office. As such, it found itself most often aligned with Foreign Office ideas and, initially at least, downplayed some of the more pugnacious rhetoric emanating from the Colonial Office. Whilst a useful function, certain colonial sources were perhaps too easily dismissed in favour of their Foreign Office and GCHQ counterparts. Fear of bias and politicisation can skew intelligence assessments just as much as actual bias.

Policymakers drew upon JIC threat assessments on a number of occasions. These included firstly when considering the nature of the threat; secondly when discussing covert action; and thirdly when excogitating strategic regional policies. The latter case demonstrated an effective intelligence system whereby objective analysis was presented without political weight to policy staffs from which policy could be formulated. On other occasions however the committee's assessments were subtly manipulated in order to support a pre-conceived idea relating to Egyptian violent subversion or covert action. Similarly, the JIC was specifically asked to find (sometimes uncorroborated) intelligence implicating Egypt that could be published for political purposes—leaving a dangerous impression of the JIC being used as a tool in the policymaking process.

A fundamental principle of British intelligence assessment is that it remains objective and provides assessments of a given situation based on the available intelligence. It should not stray into the realm of policy prescription. Although avoiding outright policy instructions (which were well beyond the JIC's jurisdiction and authority), the committee,
perhaps indicative of its increased status and confidence, did stray into the realm of policy advice. It warned against the devolution of authority to local commanders regarding photo reconnaissance and retaliation. However, such policy requires a particular amount of input from intelligence authorities. This was also the case regarding the Joint Action Committee, in which JIC personnel were heavily involved. Again, however, the JAC did not formulate policy itself and dealt with intelligence-specific policy in which input from the JIC was integral and which must be differentiated from broader policies.

JIC threat assessments changed emphasis in spring 1964: they began increasingly to highlight violent and coordinated Egyptian subversion. The task of assessing the levels and nature of external influence and its interplay with internal factors was a tricky one. The JIC initially considered internal agency by looking at union strikes and the political threat, but also examined links with Egypt regarding political subversion. However, from 1964, local agency was increasingly eroded in the official mind and replaced with an emphasis on an externally-directed campaign of violence. This brought the committee more in line with Colonial Office and military thinking. There may have been an element of politicisation in this shift given, for example, pressure for evidence implicating the Egyptians. Egyptian policy, however, was becoming more aggressive. The JIC received much new evidence indicating this. Ultimately, the committee's assessment reflected Nasser's attempts to increase pressure on the British, but underestimated local agency and ideology thereby preventing policymakers from adequately understanding the likelihood of a future leftist government. Focus on the Cold War had shaped intelligence assessments of Malaya and Cyprus, yet this time it was warped by focus on Nasser. Once more, non-state actors were seen in a predominantly statist context.

All source intelligence assessment proved important in managing and coordinating covert intervention interdepartmentally. It ensured that any action sanctioned was properly scrutinised so as to reduce potentially damaging ramifications. Covert intervention is a risky strategy and it is therefore imperative that the likelihood of success is adequately considered. Assessments must examine firstly whether covert action is
necessary, commensurate with broader policy goals and whether the means chosen are proportionate to the objective. Secondly, the balance of power in the conflict must be assessed to determine the scale of covert action required. Thirdly, the trustworthiness, skill and motivation of the sponsored party should be considered, as the inherent secrecy involved generates a lack of ultimate control. Such risk assessment can then form a foundation for appreciating the feasibility of covert intervention and for setting clear objectives accordingly.

It is likely that similar considerations were taken into account when British leaders were planning covert operations in Libya in 2011. Balancing strategic and tactical priorities, Whitehall had to operate within tight constraints following the difficulties in Iraq and the strict terms of the UN resolution, thereby causing frustration on the ground akin to the tension between local officials and London in the 1960s.
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Similarly, assessments of the strength and unity of opposition forces in Syria in 2012 played into Whitehall deliberations about whether or not to support the movement. This is in much the same way as assessments of the Royalists half a century earlier.
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Planning covert action can degenerate into a politicised activity. Given the secret nature of the proposals, excitable officials can develop a personal stake in the operations, lose perspective and become swept away in the drama. As a result objective and strong intelligence assessment machinery is necessary. An interdepartmental approach combing all available sources is important in ensuring that intelligence can be adequately evaluated and assessed against other sources from different departments. This is integral in spotting flawed sources that may have been written with a clear agenda, thereby ensuring that covert intervention is planned objectively and rationally. It is therefore important that the intelligence assessment machinery is confident enough to deliver potentially unpopular conclusions. This is easier said than done and it is beneficial if assessment is conducted interdepartmentally and disseminated by very senior figures.

In contrast to its enhanced status within Whitehall, the JIC lacked authority in overseas intelligence management despite radiating some newfound confidence. Charged with an intelligence management function,
the committee theoretically held an important role in keeping the local and regional intelligence organisations under review. As with Cyprus before, this involved monitoring the situation and intervening once the intelligence requirements had escalated beyond the capabilities of the local authorities. Demonstrating increased assertiveness, the JIC directly instigated a number of reforms, particularly focusing on the intelligence assessment and dissemination structures. This extended to the JIC overseeing the appointment of certain intelligence or Special Branch personnel, especially when appointing a new post that impacted upon the Adeni intelligence structure.

Yet the JIC lacked the authority to attain the required results. Violence spiralled and the committee had to re-examine the situation a year later. The JIC's reforms were introduced slowly and incoherently. They were fatally impeded by lack of authority, an inability to force through the reforms, a deficiency of political will on the ground and of course a highly challenging security situation. Ultimately, as both political will and time dwindled, the committee's attempts at reforms resulted in an imperfect and temporary stopgap until independence. Despite growing ambition, the committee failed to acquire the necessary authority to implement reforms in overseas intelligence organisations. This, however, became less of a problem as the last remaining colonial territories disappeared, taking the formal British intelligence structures with them.