Confronting the Colonies (38 page)

On balance the importance of closer producer-consumer relations outweighed the risks of politicisation. After high profile controversies regarding Iraq in 2003 however, the system was further strengthened by the establishment of the post of professional head of intelligence analysis. Encompassing responsibility for supporting government decision-making, it is designed to enhance the quality of intelligence analysis through oversight of, and advice on, analytical capabilities, methodology and training across the intelligence community. In short, this power, which was invested in the JIC chair, seeks to ensure that intelligence products are impartial and uninfluenced by preconceptions or assumptions. Similarly, the government response to the Butler review into the intelligence failure over weapons of mass destruction also included proposals to expand the Assessments Staff by developing a new team to provide a standing internal review and challenge of JIC assessments.
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Consensus is a further theoretical foundation underpinning the JIC system and aiding policy impact. This was (and remains) a useful function in that, according Lord Butler, appreciations that are ‘single statements of position' benefit the policymaking process.
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Consensus presents policy practitioners with a unified intelligence position from which to begin their policy debates, thereby providing clarity and efficiency. An interdepartmentally-agreed position also provided an authoritative weapon to be used in battles with the Treasury when trying to secure funding for extra intelligence or Special Branch personnel in a particular theatre.

Consensus also reduces the chances of policymakers falling foul of their own biases. As former JIC chairman Percy Cradock has argued, it would represent an abdication of responsibility for the JIC to offer more than one intelligence judgement.
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Consensus allowed policy practitioners to work from the same intelligence starting point. According to former chair of the JIS, Alan Crick, ‘a mere parade of the possibilities is not enough'.
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The quest for consensus also proved, and continues to prove, a useful end in itself. It forced the relevant personnel to work rigorously through the issues and thus gain a thorough understanding. As a member of the modern Assessments Staff has stated, ‘In some way the process of interdepartmental assessment is more important than the
product. Committee discussion helped ensure that diplomats, military officers and intelligence practitioners saw the world through roughly the same eyes'.
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Consensus is, however, difficult to achieve due to the number of intelligence, security and political actors involved in countering insurgency. Different Whitehall departments often held diverging and competing understandings of the threat. A prominent criticism is that the system led to lowest common denominator judgements. By analysing counterinsurgency, this book has shed new light on broader issues relating to intelligence assessment. JIC conclusions were the result of much interdepartmental bargaining. The final reports themselves belie the turf wars and tension whirring away beneath the surface. Central intelligence assessment must therefore be seen as a process rather than merely as an end product. The quest for consensus, however, usefully brought the tangled mess of competing judgements into a unified policy-relevant whole. A full and frank discussion about intelligence was vital to ensure that assessments were as authoritative as possible. Yet to be useful, intelligence ultimately has to be unified. This surely overrides charges of banality.

A second potential weakness is the potential for consumers to exploit the JIC's use of consensus. Consumers could wear the committee's ‘interdepartmentalism' and objectivity as a badge of credibility. JIC assessments could thus be used as an authoritative source through which to bolster support of pre-conceived policy ideas. The Butler review also raised this idea. It warned that publishing a document under the name and authority of the JIC ‘had the result that more weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear'.
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Obviously regarding Iraq, the public publication took this a stage further.

Analysis of the JIC files reveals a fundamental transformation in the management of empire: centralisation. This involved not only an increased role for MI5, but extended to the JIC itself. Whilst currently charged with some review and oversight responsibilities, the JIC has long since shed its overseas baggage. However, as part of its expansion from 1948 the committee attempted to acquire a role in local colonial intelligence reform. This, according to the JIC, fell under the banner of
keeping intelligence organisations at home and overseas under review. Effective local intelligence was paramount not only tactically but also strategically. For example, a survey into the Adeni intelligence set-up in late 1963 concluded that the objective of intelligence was not only to ‘warn local authorities of threats to internal security' but also to ‘warn of matters which threaten HMG's strategic and political interests in the wider sense'.
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JIC encroachment onto Colonial Office territory regarding threat assessments had created bitter Whitehall tension and turf wars. Direct JIC involvement in the local intelligence and security apparatus had the potential to be even more controversial. The committee had to operate delicately within a framework dominated by a lead department (the Colonial Office) and a lead agency (MI5). The JIC sensibly took a back seat, focusing mainly on coordinating interdepartmental reforms. When the committee did intervene it concentrated on reforms of intelligence assessment and dissemination structures, leaving MI5 to take the lead in intelligence collection. In doing so, the fireworks between the Colonial Office and the JIC did not extend to this realm. It could be said, however, that this was because the JIC lacked the executive authority to actually do anything drastic, thereby leaving the Colonial Office with little to fear.

Historians now know that the JIC attempted to intervene in overseas security from 1948. Declassified intelligence files also reveal that the committee was generally weak regarding its managerial role. As colonial territories dwindled, however, so too did the JIC's role. Although passive and ineffective, such attempts began during the Malayan insurgency when the committee offered advice on forming a Local Intelligence Committee. At this point however, the JIC lacked authority and its suggestions were met with resistance by local figures. By the mid-1950s, the committee became more involved in managing, or at least overseeing, colonial intelligence reform. Regarding Cyprus for example, JIC chairman Patrick Dean visited the island in October 1955 and reported that local intelligence requirements had grown beyond the local capability. Although not becoming directly involved itself, the JIC swiftly adopted a role of coordinating and overseeing interdepartmental discussion and intelligence reform. Committee meetings became a talking shop for interested departments including MI5, the Colonial Office and the military. Through this role, the JIC was able to oversee intelligence reform,
overcome departmental disagreements and could try to inject some urgency into floundering negotiations. In practice however, it was limited to making invitations, suggestions and recommendations. Constitutionally, the JIC had no power to give orders to the departments and agencies. Despite this, the mere process of interdepartmental discussion and the need for consensus were beneficial in allowing all departments concerned to view the issues from the same intelligence foundations.

In the 1960s, the JIC directly intervened in local and regional intelligence reform for the first time. Having visited Aden, the JIC chairman established a working party focusing on reforming regional intelligence assessment structures. However, owing to a combination of the rapidly deteriorating security situation and a lack of JIC managerial authority, implementation of the reforms was slow and incoherent. The committee was forced to intervene for a second time as the Federation of South Arabia began its approach to independence. This too proved unsuccessful. However, the insurgency can be seen as the peak of the committee's involvement in overseas intelligence management. By the early 1970s, the JIC's managerial role had come full circle and—as in the late 1940s—the JIC played a negligible part. This time, however, JIC inconspicuousness reflected Britain's transition to the post-imperial world.

Reflecting the changed international context, a central difference between the JIC's role in Iraq and in earlier insurgencies was that of intelligence reform. As an extension of the process illustrated during the Dhofari campaign, the transition to the post-imperial world axiomatically negated this aspect of the committee's colonial counterinsurgency role. The JIC lacked any mandate to reform the intelligence structures in Oman and unsurprisingly had no input into reforming local intelligence structures during the Iraq campaign. Reform of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service was conducted by the Americans—indeed the CIA established the service in 2004.
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The end of the colonial era and the decline of British overseas intelligence apparatus clearly altered the JIC's functions in this regard. But, as we have seen, other functions have transcended the transition to the post-imperial world.

Integration and an interdepartmental approach permeate the British ‘way'. This was also beneficial due to a further challenge posed by insurgency
warfare. Insurgencies cross traditional departmental boundaries and jurisdictions, including those of the Colonial Office, MI5, the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Ministry of Defence. Intelligence therefore had to consider colonial, political and security intelligence, intelligence gathered by MI5, SIS and GCHQ, Foreign Office intelligence from diplomatic channels and the Information Research Department, and Defence Intelligence. The diverging and competing priorities of the myriad actors involved (that is, tactical versus strategic, internal versus external) therefore rendered coordinated all-source intelligence assessment and dissemination crucial in strategic level counterinsurgency thinking.

Countering insurgencies required not only effective coordination within Whitehall, but also coordination across vast distances because of the geographical divide between the local theatre and London. The JIC system, with its responsibility for British intelligence at home and overseas, was important in bridging a tactical-strategic divide and coordinating intelligence flows from the periphery to the centre. It was crucial that intelligence from local sources reached the relevant intelligence consumers in London swiftly, so as to be used in strategic intelligence assessments appropriately. Political and military actors in the theatre and in London therefore needed to be aware of the JIC agenda and time-frame. This would ensure that all relevant information to be considered centrally arrived in time for the issuing of a particular intelligence report. Although in practice there are always difficulties, a benefit of the British intelligence organisation was its ability to ensure that the right information reached the right intelligence consumers—that is, that policy practitioners considering strategic policy were kept updated with the implications of an insurgency on the broader region without being overwhelmed by detailed tactical information regarding the actual operations.

Additionally, however, ministers also need to work in a more operational forum. Whilst key ministers respect the operational responsibilities of the military chiefs in relation to the armed forces, ‘they want to set the political direction on each of the operational issues that come up'.
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Such action requires knowledge of both tactical and strategic realities and implications. In 2011 this approach was demonstrated within the National Security Council's sub-committee on Libya (NSC[L]), which met sixty-two times during the conflict to consider both strategic
and tactical matters.
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The joint intelligence organisation again becomes useful in this context. Regarding Libya, the intelligence machinery produced daily intelligence summaries in addition to formal assessments to aid NSC(L) and NSC(L)(Officials) discussions.
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A similar (albeit more embryonic) process ensuring ministerial and official needs were met was happening regarding counterinsurgency in the era of decolonisation.

Theoretically, the British system also helped reduce bureaucratic confusion. Detailed study of the JIC reveals, however, that this was often messier and more ad hoc than was desirable. Eventually, the system ensured that channels of communication were properly in place from the periphery to the centre and that clarity existed over the various actors' roles and responsibilities. This reduced the gaps and overlaps that can occur in a more fragmented system. Such need for coordination has not been lost on the British government in recent years. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review emphasised the importance of strategic intelligence in drawing together information from across Whitehall, of coordinated assessments, and praised moves towards coordinated cross-Whitehall horizon scanning and early warning provision.
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JIC veteran Michael Herman famously wrote that the JIC ‘is like democracy; the least bad arrangement yet invented'.
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On counter-insurgency the committee's record is indeed mixed. It did, however, improve substantially. This came as the committee evolved to better handle non-defence matters and as the intelligence assessment system became more integrated and sensitive to the policy context. The JIC certainly deserves credit for staying relevant by adapting to meet the changing threats in the post-Second World War era. Intelligence officials in a small corner of Whitehall helped to reconceptualise traditional understandings of security and redefine what constitutes a threat. There may have been fights along the way and in practice the joint intelligence machinery is a more chaotic process than the theory suggests, but it worked reasonably well on the whole. The JIC broadened its jurisdiction accordingly and gradually found a role in countering insurgencies—a role that remains vital today.