Find, Fix, Finish (30 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
To strike the target or to develop him: Cohen’s statement highlighted the struggle to balance possible short-term but nonetheless dramatic losses with plausible but not necessarily quantifiable long-term wins—chances to gather as much evidence as possible of a suspect’s activities and associated networks, contacts, and other potential plots, thereby increasing the chance of hindering other, future plots.
The concern that Zazi might have explosives in his car led the FBI to ask the Port Authority Police to put up a fake checkpoint on the George Washington Bridge, which connects New Jersey to Manhattan.
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The police obliged, pulling over Zazi as well as several other cars under the pretense of a random drug checkpoint, to search his vehicle for bombs or chemicals. Discovering nothing, they let Zazi drive into the city.
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It’s possible that Zazi knew at this point that the police were onto him, although his lawyer maintained that Zazi was unaware: “He thought this was just one of those law enforcement things that happens every now and then. He didn’t think anything of it at that point.”
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The police obliged, pulling over Zazi as well as several other cars under the pretense of a random drug checkpoint, to search his vehicle for bombs or chemicals. Discovering nothing, they let Zazi drive into the city.
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It’s possible that Zazi knew at this point that the police were onto him, although his lawyer maintained that Zazi was unaware: “He thought this was just one of those law enforcement things that happens every now and then. He didn’t think anything of it at that point.”
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Later that evening, two detectives working with the NYPD’s Intelligence Division visited their informants in Queens, showing them pictures of Zazi and soliciting information.
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One informant, Imam Ahmad Wais Afzali, told them that he knew Zazi and could identify him.
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One informant, Imam Ahmad Wais Afzali, told them that he knew Zazi and could identify him.
Law enforcement sources later claimed that Afzali, an imam of a local mosque popular with Afghan immigrants, was not a paid informant but had sometimes been asked to corroborate information provided by other sources.
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Afzali would later tell the press that he did not need to be paid for his work with the FBI after 9/11, as he “was upset because the people involved claimed to follow my faith.” So when two members of the NYPD Intelligence Division knocked on his door and asked him whether he could identify the men in the photographs, he responded by saying he recognized three men from his classes at his mosque when they were boys. But he remembered little else, he claims, and the officers would not explain to him why they were seeking Zazi and his friends, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay. The detectives instructed Afzali to find out as much as he could about them.
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Afzali would later tell the press that he did not need to be paid for his work with the FBI after 9/11, as he “was upset because the people involved claimed to follow my faith.” So when two members of the NYPD Intelligence Division knocked on his door and asked him whether he could identify the men in the photographs, he responded by saying he recognized three men from his classes at his mosque when they were boys. But he remembered little else, he claims, and the officers would not explain to him why they were seeking Zazi and his friends, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay. The detectives instructed Afzali to find out as much as he could about them.
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Such solicitations are not out of the ordinary. The FBI has sought help from the Muslim community in identifying potential terrorists for years and has developed relationships through advisory councils and other contacts. Not only do the members of such communities naturally have a better understanding of the goings-on within a certain neighborhood but they also can help investigators overcome linguistic and cultural barriers.
But attempts to monitor some communities are not always welcome, and authorities struggle to gather information without alienating the locals. In early 2009, suspicion that federal officials were infiltrating mosques around the country led some Muslim charities and groups to threaten to cut ties with the FBI, and caused civil liberties and religious advocacy groups to express concern.
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One man from Flushing told a reporter, “People are scared. They’re scared that if they work with the police they’ll get hurt, and if they don’t work with the police they’ll get hurt.”
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In the Zazi investigation, asking Afzali to serve as an informant would prove controversial and problematic.
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One man from Flushing told a reporter, “People are scared. They’re scared that if they work with the police they’ll get hurt, and if they don’t work with the police they’ll get hurt.”
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In the Zazi investigation, asking Afzali to serve as an informant would prove controversial and problematic.
As long as the FBI and NYPD had Zazi under constant surveillance they felt in control of the situation. But this blanket surveillance came into question when they intercepted a phone call to the Zazi household. An unidentified man apparently told Zazi’s father, Mohammad Wali Zazi, that the police had questioned him about his son. One NYPD detective then left the room, listened to the call, and identified the man as Afzali.
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Afzali had been true to his word to the NYPD. To learn more about Zazi, he had first spoken to a distant relative of Zazi’s and then to Zazi’s father. The police apparently had not known the nature of the relationship between Afzali and Zazi’s father—Afzali had prayed with Zazi and his family during Zazi’s years in Queens.
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According to FBI surveillance, Zazi’s father talked with Afzali for twenty minutes,
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at some point urging him to call his son.
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According to FBI surveillance, Zazi’s father talked with Afzali for twenty minutes,
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at some point urging him to call his son.
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Zazi’s father then called Zazi, telling him, “[Afzali] is going to call you. . . . So, before anything else, speak with [Afzali]. See if you need to go to [Afzali] or to make, make yourself aware, hire an attorney. What has happened? What have you guys done?”
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While speaking with his father, Zazi received a second call on the other line, Afzali was again true to his word. Zazi ended his call with his father and spoke with Afzali. According to a transcript, Afzali told Zazi:
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While speaking with his father, Zazi received a second call on the other line, Afzali was again true to his word. Zazi ended his call with his father and spoke with Afzali. According to a transcript, Afzali told Zazi:
I want to speak with you about something.... I want a meeting with you [and others]. You probably know why I’m calling you for this meeting.... I was exposed to something yesterday from the authorities. And they came to ask me about your characters. They asked me about you guys.I’m not sure if somebody complained about you. I’m not sure what happened. And I don’t want to know.... They [the authorities] said, “Please, we need to know who they are . . . what they’re all about.” . . . And I told them that they are innocent, law abiding.
Afzali then asked Zazi when he had last traveled to Pakistan. Afzali also said, “They [the police] came to the
masjid
to ask for help. That is a good sign. Trust me that this a good sign. The bad sign is for them coming to you guys and picking you up automatically.” Afzali told Zazi, “Don’t get involved in Afghanistan garbage, Iraq garbage” and then ominously, “Listen, our phone call is being monitored.”
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masjid
to ask for help. That is a good sign. Trust me that this a good sign. The bad sign is for them coming to you guys and picking you up automatically.” Afzali told Zazi, “Don’t get involved in Afghanistan garbage, Iraq garbage” and then ominously, “Listen, our phone call is being monitored.”
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That day, Afzali tried to speak with one of Zazi’s accomplices, though he was unable to reach him. Afzali then called the police three times to tell them what he had learned, and each time they asked him for more. Later that day, Zazi and Afzali spoke again, and Zazi told Afzali that he was worried that he was being watched. The individuals watching him, he claimed, had taken his car. Afzali asked Zazi if there was “evidence in his car,” to which Zazi said no.
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Seeking more information, the FBI had indeed towed away Zazi’s rental car and searched it, swabbing the vehicle for various chemicals. Investigators also mirrored Zazi’s laptop’s hard drive, as Zazi had left it in the car at the time. They then carefully put everything back where they had found it.
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This particular search was authorized under the “sneak and peek” provision of the Patriot Act.
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During a sneak and peek, or in the more official-sounding “delayed notice” search, law enforcement officials can legally enter a place where an individual might have an expectation of privacy, such as a car or a home, without immediately notifying him. Although such searches have several times been challenged under the Fourth Amendment, district courts have upheld their constitutionality. Law enforcement officials argue that they are valuable tools when detectives do not want the targeted individual to know that he is under investigation.
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During a sneak and peek, or in the more official-sounding “delayed notice” search, law enforcement officials can legally enter a place where an individual might have an expectation of privacy, such as a car or a home, without immediately notifying him. Although such searches have several times been challenged under the Fourth Amendment, district courts have upheld their constitutionality. Law enforcement officials argue that they are valuable tools when detectives do not want the targeted individual to know that he is under investigation.
The search produced one of the most important pieces of evidence in the case against Zazi. Authorities discovered on the hard drive a JPEG file of nine pages of handwritten notes containing, according to Zazi’s arrest affidavit, “formulations and instructions regarding the manufacture and handling of initiating explosives, main explosives charges, explosives detonators and components of a fuzing system.”
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The instructions detailed how to make triacetone triperoxide (TATP), an explosive used by so-called shoe bomber Richard Reid and the London transit bombers in 2005.
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The instructions detailed how to make triacetone triperoxide (TATP), an explosive used by so-called shoe bomber Richard Reid and the London transit bombers in 2005.
Zazi visited New York City’s financial district on September 11, according to several of his former customers, who saw him there.
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On September 12, two days before Zazi’s rental car agreement expired, Zazi prepared to fly back to his apartment in Colorado, and officials debated whether to allow him on the plane. They decided to permit Zazi to fly but ensured that he was carefully screened and that he was monitored by dozens of FBI agents, including several who posed as fellow passengers.
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It must have been a tense flight for the FBI agents, tailing an al-Qaeda terror suspect in midair over New York airspace.
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On September 12, two days before Zazi’s rental car agreement expired, Zazi prepared to fly back to his apartment in Colorado, and officials debated whether to allow him on the plane. They decided to permit Zazi to fly but ensured that he was carefully screened and that he was monitored by dozens of FBI agents, including several who posed as fellow passengers.
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It must have been a tense flight for the FBI agents, tailing an al-Qaeda terror suspect in midair over New York airspace.
Officials—or at least the FBI—still did not want to tip off Zazi to the investigation. They had probably not yet built up a full case against him
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—they had no specific information as to when, where, or how an alleged attack might take place, or if they would need to take additional action to disrupt Zazi’s plot.
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Furthermore, they likely hoped to learn more about his contacts in the US and Pakistan.
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—they had no specific information as to when, where, or how an alleged attack might take place, or if they would need to take additional action to disrupt Zazi’s plot.
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Furthermore, they likely hoped to learn more about his contacts in the US and Pakistan.
Several FBI officials would later lambaste—anonymously of course—the NYPD for acting without FBI’s knowledge in questioning Afzali and thereby compromising the investigation.
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DHS—arriving like a dinner guest after the dishes are washed—criticized the FBI for not sharing more information with local authorities, and, according to one official, for including DHS only minimally with the investigation.
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It’s more likely that no one bothered to let DHS know, since no one took the department seriously.
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DHS—arriving like a dinner guest after the dishes are washed—criticized the FBI for not sharing more information with local authorities, and, according to one official, for including DHS only minimally with the investigation.
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It’s more likely that no one bothered to let DHS know, since no one took the department seriously.
These arguments highlighted yet another tension in counterterrorism operations: balancing a need for investigative secrecy with a need to empower officials to stop an attack. “Dissemination [to other agencies] guarantees release to the public,” one FBI official said, while former DHS head Tom Ridge argued that information sharing is key to national security. “I don’t care whether you’re on the battlefield in Iraq or Afghanistan, or in the battlefield of some city in the United States,” said Ridge two months after Zazi’s indictment, “having knowledge and information about a potential problem is absolutely critical . . . to making Americans more secure.”
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Both the NYPD and the FBI publicly sidestepped questions of a ruptured relationship. “I can say without reservation that our relationships with the NYPD in this and other investigations could not be better,” FBI director Robert Mueller would later tell Congress.
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THE FIRST SEARCHES81
Two days after Zazi returned to Colorado, the New York JTTF searched four apartments in Queens. They twice searched the home of Naiz Khan, an Afghan immigrant and coffee cart owner with whom Zazi had stayed on the night of September 10, and found a calculator, several backpacks, cell phones, and a scale, all of which law enforcement claimed could potentially have been used in bomb construction—although they could equally well have been used in provisioning a coffee cart.
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“Our homes have been destroyed,” he later said. “If we go back to Afghanistan, Taliban will kill you for being American. In Pakistan, we don’t have a good life. Now they say we are terrorists here? Where should we go?”
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Questioned several times, Khan reiterated that he was just helping an out-of-town acquaintance.
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“Our homes have been destroyed,” he later said. “If we go back to Afghanistan, Taliban will kill you for being American. In Pakistan, we don’t have a good life. Now they say we are terrorists here? Where should we go?”
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Questioned several times, Khan reiterated that he was just helping an out-of-town acquaintance.
The backpacks initially concerned authorities, as backpacks held the bombs used in the Madrid and London subway bombings in 2004 and 2005. Khan claimed, somewhat suspiciously, that these backpacks had been given to his uncle to take to Pakistan by a relative. That fellow had, in turn, received them from the business partner of another man who had hundreds of extra bags when he went out of business.
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Some sources argue that the cell phones were also a cause of concern, as they could have been used as triggering devices.
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Some sources argue that the cell phones were also a cause of concern, as they could have been used as triggering devices.
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All sources seem equally concerned with the scale, which was found in Khan’s closet although Khan claimed never to have seen it before.
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Zazi’s fingerprints were found on both the scale and its batteries, and authorities would later argue that the scale could have been used for several of the steps outlined in Zazi’s bomb-making notes. According to FBI explosives experts, “With specific respect to TATP, a scale such as the one recovered would be required to weigh the hydrogen peroxide and other precursor chemicals in determining the proper concentrations and ratios.”
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Zazi’s fingerprints were found on both the scale and its batteries, and authorities would later argue that the scale could have been used for several of the steps outlined in Zazi’s bomb-making notes. According to FBI explosives experts, “With specific respect to TATP, a scale such as the one recovered would be required to weigh the hydrogen peroxide and other precursor chemicals in determining the proper concentrations and ratios.”
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Despite the suggestive evidence, FBI officials didn’t think they had enough to arrest Zazi. Zazi and his lawyer, however, voluntarily met with FBI agents at the field office in Denver over the next two days. While he was being questioned, agents in Aurora evacuated his apartment building and searched his home, as well his aunt’s home. Curious bystanders noticed the FBI leaving with six boxes and luggage, and directing two women and one man—Zazi’s brother—into separate cars, which were then driven off.
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Around this time agents again seized and searched Zazi’s laptop, though they had already copied the hard drive.
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Around this time agents again seized and searched Zazi’s laptop, though they had already copied the hard drive.
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During questioning, Zazi admitted that he had spent some time in an al-Qaeda training camp in Peshawar. When presented with a copy of the handwritten notes found on his hard drive, he claimed neither to have seen them nor to have written them. If they had indeed been found on his computer, he said, he must have accidentally downloaded them as an attachment to a religious book in August 2009, which he had then deleted when he saw that it spoke of jihad.
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By the evening of September 19, Zazi decided it was in his best interest to stop talking to authorities. It proved a poor choice, as the FBI arrested him just hours later.
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The 2009 New York City subway bombing was another terrorist attack that thankfully never was. Federal officers also formally arrested his father and Afzali. Four days later, a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York released an indictment charging Zazi with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against persons or property within the US.
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The 2009 New York City subway bombing was another terrorist attack that thankfully never was. Federal officers also formally arrested his father and Afzali. Four days later, a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York released an indictment charging Zazi with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against persons or property within the US.
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