Find, Fix, Finish (31 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Zazi’s arrest was only the beginning of a long legal process for the US government. Following Zazi’s indictment, more than 120 detectives from the NYPD Intelligence Division continued to work on the case,
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though the investigation remained under the control of the New York and Denver FBI JTTFs.
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though the investigation remained under the control of the New York and Denver FBI JTTFs.
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Zazi’s case had important implications for the image of the US government. As one of the FBI’s highest-profile apprehensions, the case would factor in the Obama administration’s public relations as well as numerous political debates. When Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up a plane en route to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, thwarted only by the quick actions of fellow passengers, members of the Obama administration would point to Zazi’s case as an example of a successful operation, attempting to counter allegations that the administration was generally unprepared for a terrorist strike.
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The Zazi case would surface repeatedly throughout the end of 2009 and 2010 in reference to the reauthorization of many Patriot Act provisions. Since both the “sneak and peek” and roving wiretap provisions had been used in his case, lawmakers would repeatedly reference Zazi’s case to support reauthorization of the policies of the former administration. “All the layers of defense President Bush set up after September 11 are working,” said Republican congressman Peter King in September. “The FBI is working more closely with local police, the Patriot Act, which allows roving wiretaps . . . is essential.”
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A few Democratic senators echoed this sentiment. Less than two weeks after Zazi’s arrest, Senators Patrick Leahy and Dianne Feinstein proposed an amendment to the Senate’s version of the reauthorization bill that significantly curtailed the increased privacy protections both had originally proposed. “The biggest investigation since 9/11 is ongoing,” Feinstein said. ”My concern was that nothing we do here interfere with an investigation that is going on.”
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For almost four months following Zazi’s arrest, the media would report relatively little news about the case, focusing instead on its implications for the administration and increasing “homegrown Muslim extremism.” In January 2010, however, FBI agents suddenly approached two of Zazi’s high school chums who had been under surveillance since his arrest. These two men, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay, had traveled to Pakistan with Zazi on his final trip and had intended to join him in the unfulfilled suicide attack on the New York subway.
Medunjanin, a US citizen born in Bosnia, decided to go out in a blaze of glory. Shortly after FBI agents came to his house to take his passport, he fled, allegedly yelling, “We love death more than you love life!” to an emergency operator before crashing his car into the side of the White-stone Bridge between Queens and the Bronx. He then attempted to flee on foot before federal agents apprehended him. Ahmedzay, also a naturalized US citizen, was apprehended later that night, though in less dramatic fashion.
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Soon after, the FBI charged Medunjanin with conspiring to commit murder in a foreign country and receiving training from al-Qaeda, and Ahmedzay with lying to federal agents. New charges would additionally be handed to Zazi’s father and uncle—who were charged with attempting to destroy evidence. All would plead not guilty.
On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to all three counts: “conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property in the United States, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and providing material support to al-Qaeda.”
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A few additional details surfaced in Zazi’s guilty plea, including the intended targets of the explosive bombs: New York City subway trains. When the judge asked him if he meant that he wanted to be a suicide bomber when he referred to “martyrdom activities,” Zazi responded, “Yes, Your Honor. I have a different explanation to that. To me, it meant that I would sacrifice myself to bring attention to what the United States military was doing to civilians in Afghanistan by sacrificing my soul for the sake of saving other souls.”
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A few additional details surfaced in Zazi’s guilty plea, including the intended targets of the explosive bombs: New York City subway trains. When the judge asked him if he meant that he wanted to be a suicide bomber when he referred to “martyrdom activities,” Zazi responded, “Yes, Your Honor. I have a different explanation to that. To me, it meant that I would sacrifice myself to bring attention to what the United States military was doing to civilians in Afghanistan by sacrificing my soul for the sake of saving other souls.”
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Three days later, a jury indicted Medunjanin and Ahmedzay for conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization, and making false statements to investigators.
By April, Afzali pled guilty to lying to federal officials about talking to Zazi. His residency revoked, he had to leave the country within ninety days or face deportation. “To be honest with you, the reality hasn’t set in yet,” Afzali later told reporters. “Anywhere I go I’m going to be known as the imam that worked with the American government . . . what country will take me in?”
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Several weeks later, Ahmedzay pleaded guilty as well, providing additional details of the plot. In late July 2011, a Brooklyn federal jury would convict Zazi’s father of destroying bomb-making materials and conspiring to obstruct a federal investigation.
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THE RECKONING100
Several weeks later, Ahmedzay pleaded guilty as well, providing additional details of the plot. In late July 2011, a Brooklyn federal jury would convict Zazi’s father of destroying bomb-making materials and conspiring to obstruct a federal investigation.
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Zazi’s case figured in one final debate in November 2009 after Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 9/11 mastermind KSM and four of his co-conspirators would be tried in federal court in Manhattan. Attorney General Holder pointed to Zazi’s case as evidence of a successful trial in civilian courts. “In this case, as it has in so many other cases, the criminal justice system has proved to be an invaluable weapon for disrupting plots and incapacitating terrorists, one that works in concert with the IC and our military,” Holder told the press almost immediately after Zazi’s plea.
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The Zazi affair highlights the practical and legal difficulties the government has faced since 9/11. Attempting to provide law enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools they need to fight new threats, Congress and the executive branch have lurched toward the creation of legislation and policies that balance civil liberties and security—an ideal that arguably remains out of reach. Working to protect the public, those agencies in turn wrestle with a balance of priorities and power among themselves. But officials have to make hard choices over and over again to continue protecting the public from terrorism.
CHAPTER 10
AMERICA’S FUTURE
Shadow Wars in Yemen and Somalia
I
n November 2002, the deputy secretary general of Yemen’s ruling party, Brigadier General Yahya al-Mutawakel, shifted uneasily in his seat in his luxurious sitting room. He was giving an interview about joint US-Yemeni counterterrorism efforts and was in a mood to vent his frustrations. “
This
is why it is so difficult to make deals with the United States,” he fumed. “This is why we are reluctant to work closely with them. They don’t consider the internal circumstances in Yemen.”
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Just days before, US deputy secretary of state Paul Wolfowitz confirmed that CIA killed Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi in Yemen via a missile fired from an American UAV. This was the first such operation outside of Afghanistan since 9/11 and the first such strike outside of a combat zone. In making this pronouncement, however, Wolfowitz apparently violated a tacit agreement with Yemeni officials that the strike would stay secret until both countries could release a joint statement. Although they would later confirm that they approved the strike, Wolfowitz’s actions infuriated al-Mutawakel and the Yemeni government because they believed the US did not comprehend the implications of suggesting that the Yemeni government was complicit in the killing of a person inside a country at peace with the US.
n November 2002, the deputy secretary general of Yemen’s ruling party, Brigadier General Yahya al-Mutawakel, shifted uneasily in his seat in his luxurious sitting room. He was giving an interview about joint US-Yemeni counterterrorism efforts and was in a mood to vent his frustrations. “
This
is why it is so difficult to make deals with the United States,” he fumed. “This is why we are reluctant to work closely with them. They don’t consider the internal circumstances in Yemen.”
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Just days before, US deputy secretary of state Paul Wolfowitz confirmed that CIA killed Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi in Yemen via a missile fired from an American UAV. This was the first such operation outside of Afghanistan since 9/11 and the first such strike outside of a combat zone. In making this pronouncement, however, Wolfowitz apparently violated a tacit agreement with Yemeni officials that the strike would stay secret until both countries could release a joint statement. Although they would later confirm that they approved the strike, Wolfowitz’s actions infuriated al-Mutawakel and the Yemeni government because they believed the US did not comprehend the implications of suggesting that the Yemeni government was complicit in the killing of a person inside a country at peace with the US.
Yemen and Somalia are considered terrorist safe havens by many—weakly governed territories that offer nominal protection of sovereignty—and the counterterrorism battlegrounds of the future. For the US, the challenge remains how to cooperate with foreign governments to finish terrorist threats within their borders—often territories they barely control—without either creating a larger problem or becoming hostage to local political concerns. This problem is not new, of course; the US has been involved in joint counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counterinsurgency efforts for years, with many of the same problems. What is new is the way the tools have been applied since 9/11.
Sovereignty is generally understood to mean that each nation is responsible for policing and protecting its own territory. If a person, say, a known terrorist, takes refuge in a particular nation, the government of that nation has the responsibility to arrest and either extradite or prosecute the accused. If the state lacks sufficient evidence, another state or an international body such as the UN could theoretically provide the evidence to pursue or prosecute. If the host government is incapable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility, a carrot-and-stick diplomatic approach could be employed to encourage results, for instance, withholding or offering aid, trade, training, or weaponry. The process might go on for years, surviving changes in government and regimes. Even in cases of extreme injustice, however, the laborious machinations of diplomacy are generally respected.
The principle of sovereignty lies at the heart of the safe haven challenge, defining how and when the US can legitimately target and destroy terrorists in foreign territory. Unfortunately, it is difficult to define with precision—scholars list multiple possible interpretations of sovereignty.
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One definition suggests sovereignty is a “fundamental concept underlying the system of public international law which implies the state’s lawful and essentially exclusive control of its territory, with the authority to govern it and enact and enforce its laws with respect to all persons, property, and events within this territory.”
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One definition suggests sovereignty is a “fundamental concept underlying the system of public international law which implies the state’s lawful and essentially exclusive control of its territory, with the authority to govern it and enact and enforce its laws with respect to all persons, property, and events within this territory.”
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Under this definition, the concept includes two distinct categories: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the authority of the government to exercise legal and political control within its own territory in relation to its own
people
; no other entity within the state has this right. External sovereignty is the authority of the state to exercise full and exclusive control over its own territory—and to be free from any encroachment to its authority by other states.
people
; no other entity within the state has this right. External sovereignty is the authority of the state to exercise full and exclusive control over its own territory—and to be free from any encroachment to its authority by other states.
By this standard, an American incursion into a country without permission or notification would violate the territorial sovereignty of that particular state and United Nations Charter Article II, Section 4, which states that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”
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But, as many are quick to point out, states have never enjoyed full territorial sovereignty and freedom from encroachment. Former UN secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali, for example, noted, “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.”
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But, as many are quick to point out, states have never enjoyed full territorial sovereignty and freedom from encroachment. Former UN secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali, for example, noted, “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.”
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Indeed, the very existence of international law is to some degree a violation of state sovereignty; most states accept that there is a trade-off between the principle of sovereignty and other principles such as self-defense. The UN Charter seems to make this exception explicit, saying that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”
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After 9/11, the US used this provision to justify its actions overseas. “There is no question but that the United States of America has every right, as every country does, of self defense, and the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend against the terrorists at every place and every time against every conceivable technique,” remarked Donald Rumsfeld in 2001. “The only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them.”
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After 9/11, the US used this provision to justify its actions overseas. “There is no question but that the United States of America has every right, as every country does, of self defense, and the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend against the terrorists at every place and every time against every conceivable technique,” remarked Donald Rumsfeld in 2001. “The only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them.”
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So that’s what America did. The Bush Administration—staffed by highly organized, dedicated political players who believed in active US intervention overseas—decided that the attacks had occurred because the US had been too willing to accept constraints on its actions from the international system. This system, they believed, served to protect al-Qaeda and other groups with their sights set on the US. Terrorism was no longer considered a diplomatic or law enforcement problem; rather, it was a military and intelligence problem that demanded forceful action and rapid results. If another state was hosting a wanted terrorist and was unwilling or incapable of acting, the US would.
In his address to the nation on the evening of September 11, Bush explained the new approach: “I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”
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Nine days later, in his address to a joint session of Congress, he made the new Bush Doctrine even more explicit:
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Nine days later, in his address to a joint session of Congress, he made the new Bush Doctrine even more explicit:
Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.... And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism . . . any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
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