France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (40 page)

The economic crisis, followed by the international crisis, gave rise to another reaction that Tardieu discussed in 1931, namely “the Empire as salvation.” In an unpublished and important study, J. Marseille
⁷²
shows that “a deeper change took place in the
function
assigned to the Empire… Up to 1935–1936 the Empire was basically a
market
for the French consumer manufacturing industry but during the closing years of the 1930s it became a
resource center
while basic industries began penetrating the colonial market.”

We mentioned earlier that we were still unsure of the total amount of investments in the Empire.
⁷³

Public investments took place for the most part through loans taken by the colonies on the French market. Between 1931 and 1934 four laws authorized colonial borrowing up to 5.7 billion, about half of these as credits for purchases destined to the colonies. The state was merely extending a guarantee. From 1929 to 1940 these loans were to total 15 billion and were part of the budgets of the colonies or the protectorates (the debt service was 40 percent of the AEF budget and 35 percent for Morocco). The colonies also complained about the fact that they were expected to participate in France’s military budget and requested higher subsidies.

In December 1934, following an idea that Daladier had launched in 1933 a Franco-colonial economic conference was called together. In a world full of high protectionist tariffs, the idea was to take stock of the opportunities the Empire could offer. The conference recommended creating a Colonial Equipment Fund, but the result was disappointing and
the actions taken were rather timid. The government failed to create the fund, and there was sharp rivalry between French and overseas producers (wine, sugar cane, Brazilian coffees or from AOF, etc.).

The result was that colonial trade, amounting to 13.1 percent of total French trade in 1927, reached 25 percent in 1932; 27.6 percent in 1934 and 30.3 percent in 1936, but it must be said that trade overall was strongly decreasing and this, therefore, did not represent progress. The numbers seem to indicate that the Empire was benefiting more from this “autarchy” than France itself. French exports to the colonies in 1938 were 35 percent lower than in 1929, or in constant franc values, 9.7 billion Poincaré francs in 1929, 4.7 billion in 1936, 3.6 billion in 1938. Only manufactured products remained constant. Conversely, colonial exports to France increased by 30 percent during the same period from 1929 to 1938. The trade deficit with the colonies did not stop growing.
⁷⁴

Clearly: “salvation through the Empire” was a myth. The French people couldn’t fail noticing that buying from the colonies was to buy goods that were twice as expensive”
⁷⁵

Yet even if the Empire was a commercial burden, it appeared to be a source of strength with some justification in providing soldiers, bases, space and opportunities for youth. Hitler’s long-standing colonial demands—but pressing too hard for them—and those Mussolini unleashed at the end of 1938
⁷⁶
drew the attention of many circles. The issue in the end came down to whether we should agree to fight for the Empire’s integrity. Shouldn’t we concede some territory to appease Germany? This was the position of radical deputy Jean Piot, who wrote in the radical daily
L’Œuvre
. However, a poll of its readers showed that 102,671, or 57 percent, rejected that concession while 79,884 accepted it. Among those who were ready to “renounce” were well-known politicians such as Anatole de Monzie, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, and Adrien Marquet. In
Barrages
a small pacifist magazine, Ageron wrote this priceless line: “I refuse to believe that there could be a Parliament criminal enough to start a world war engulfing Europe to keep a few hundred budget eaters alive on a sandy earth full of crocodiles.” New polling techniques and the creation of IFOP indicated a stiffening of French public opinion.

Answers to the question: “Do you believe Germany should be given colonies?”

If the question was narrowed to
giving back
the old German colonies under French mandate, the answer at the end of December 1938 (following the November 30 Italian demands and the wave of indignation they brought with them) was completely different:

And in February 1939:

The response to Italian demands as well was:

It must be pointed out that attachment to the Empire was stronger among youth under age 30 and older people over 60; 53 percent of the French people at the same date felt that the colonial Empire was France—which indicated considerable progress since 1930, according to Ageron. But regarding the fateful question, “Are you ready to fight rather than give up any one of our colonial possessions?”, the answer was:

The issue took the shape of a vast “Eurafrica,” a dream from the 1920s. Ageron
⁷⁷
indicates the book
Réforme de la France
published by the group called “of July 9” (1934) that included Jules Romains, Alfred Fabre-Luce, Paul Marion, Louis Vallon, and Pierre-Olivier Lapie. The idea was to distract the Europeans away from their border disputes to offer them “economic fusion” with North and West Africa.

But these generous ideas couldn’t stop the rise of fascism. The “renouncers” used them in their schemes to appease Germany, thinking that Hitler would renounce the conquests of
Lebensraum
if he were offered free access to colonial raw materials. This plan was not coming exclusively from President Roosevelt, who turned it into one of the main ingredients of his policy between 1937 and 1939. Some men on the moderate
left in France, such as Albert Sarraut, Charles Spinasse, André Philip (a socialist member of Parliament), Paul Rivet (president of the
Comité des intellectuels anti-fascistes
), René Belin (deputy secretary general of the CGT), Gaston Bergery (founder of the frontist movement), Anatole de Monzie, some right-wing pacifists attracted to Dr. Schacht, and men such as Robert Delavignette, the director of the
École Coloniale
,
⁷⁸
continued to hatch plans for Eurafrica as Nazi officials would periodically bring up, without seeing any kind of urgency, the idea that Germany had a “right” to have colonies. On March 3, 1939, the French government offered to create “Franco-German consortiums” in Morocco, Guinea, and Cameroon.

All such projects were meaningless. Hitler did want Europe and even Africa but not that way.

*
Youth, What Kind of France Do You Want?
[NDT]

Chapter VIII

E
LUSIVE
S
ECURITY

E
veryone in France wanted security. The tragedy was that a victorious France of the early 1920s created
two contradictory security systems
. The first was the brainchild of diplomats, with the help of Foch, who spent most of his time at inter-allied organizations and was thus separated from the French army. The vigorous impetus of Philippe Berthelot and a few others instituted, beyond collective security, a system of Eastern alliances and an alliance with Belgium, which was the only area where armies could maneuver since the border between France and Germany wasn’t suited for lightning attacks because of the Rhine and the hills of Lorraine.

The second system belonged to the military headed by Pétain. “To that skeptical and pedestrian mind, the entire pre-1914 thinking was wrong; no more panache, swagger, or enthusiasm for vast abstract concepts. We must remain focused on recent experience and practical problems. Everything must be based on technique and be tied to tactics… Experience taught him that continuous and fortified fronts are essential… Therefore the defensive posture will be the queen of war.”
¹

On one hand there was a vast all-encompassing vision, the necessary
maneuvering
to help the allies in seeking to engage a large number of enemy
forces. On the other hand, there was a
defensive
posture preparing a vast mobilization behind a fortified barrier.