France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (43 page)

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The French military machine, while steeped in tradition and extremely stiff,
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remained very large and ready to play an important part if properly used. From top to bottom those who were in charge—the officers—had a responsibility in the exercise of foreign policy. The army’s prestige and the actual or implicit threat it represented in the use of force were permanent factors that took on particular significance at times of danger.

The most important man was the vice-president of the Superior War Council: Pétain up to 1931, then Weygand starting on January 21, 1935, followed by Gamelin. Weygand was chief of the general staff under Pétain and Gamelin had the same position under Weygand. In taking over the top job, Gamelin also remained chief of the general staff. On January 21, 1938, Gamelin was appointed chief of staff of national defense, meaning that he now accumulated authority over the three branches of the military while retaining direct command of the ground forces. Until then he was equal to the other chiefs of staff, the navy (Admiral Durand-Viel was replaced by Admiral Darlan in 1937 who was part of Superior Council of the Marine and had been head of the cabinet of the Minister of Marine at the beginning of the Popular Front), and that of the air force.

The air force, as we have noted, was trying hard to secure its independence from the army. The first move came in 1928 with the creation of the air ministry—over the objections of the army general staff. The first minister, Laurent Eynac, prepared the proposed laws to create an independent “military air force.” In August 1931 a Superior Air Council was created—over the objections of General Weygand. Thanks to Pierre Cot (air minister in 1933), the ministry was given more authority. Pierre Cot was the first to use the term “air force,” making it official. With the law of July 2, 1934, General Denain, a flyer and Air Minister at the time, organized the “air forces” into four peacetime air regions. There remained, however, a serious constraint. In time of war only the “reserved” forces came under the command of an air force general. The others, the “forces of cooperation” were part of the army and, while they were under the command of a general officer of the air force, he reported to an army general in charge of a specific theater of
operations. In other words, at the time of mobilization part of the air force was shifted to the “ground” troops, causing “a complete disorganization of the air force lasting several days.”
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It must also be pointed out that the DAT (défense aérienne du territoire) reported to the army until 1938. The air force chiefs of staff at this time were General Denain (air minister from February 1934 to January 1936) and General Vuillemin. The newly found autonomy and creation of the Air Ministry as a third cabinet ministry alongside War and Marine, dating back to the Ancien Régime, was followed at the same time by the grouping of all three branches of the armed forces under the single authority of National Defense.

At the government level the first short-lived attempt to create a Ministry of National Defense took place on February 20, 1932, in the Tardieu cabinet which lasted until June. The idea originated with André Maginot in 1931, and became necessary during periods of weak budgets,

“A whole book would be required—said General de Gugnac—to tell the story of the counterproductive efforts of our ministries that were side by side and didn’t know each other. It should be pointed out that the statistical charts of the War ministry had no knowledge of the ones at the Marine ministry; that the calibers used by one branch were never used by the other… As night flights increased, the Air Force studied navigation using the compass and the sextant. Years went by before they thought of asking the Navy about its methods and procedures.”
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The elections of 1932 brought in Herriot to replace Tardieu and the ministry was eliminated. It did reappear for ten days at the beginning of 1934 in the Daladier cabinet. The Popular Front brought it back to stay in June 1936 with Daladier at the head (his duties were “Minister of National Defense and War,” proving that the army was actually superior to the other two branches of the military). Daladier was to hold that position until May 1940.

The Ministry of National Defense in 1932 created two important agencies: the General Secretariat of National Defense and the key High Military Committee. There were also permanent offices to ensure coordination.

The High Military Committee
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was created in March 1932 and changed its name after the June elections to High Committee in Charge
of National Defense Requirements; its chairman was Air Minister Painlevé. In February 1934 the government placed it under the nominal leadership of Prime Minister Doumergue but it actually was under Pétain as Minister of War. The name High Military Committee reappeared on December 11, 1934. Some very powerful leaders were part of the committee: the primem, the ministers of the three branches of the military, the vice presidents of the superior councils of War, Marine and Air, along with the three chiefs of the general staff and the inspector general of the DAT—Pétain at that time. “The High Military Committee examines and coordinates issues that are pertinent to the general organization of the ground troops, the navy and air forces and how these are used, the general armaments programs and the apportionment of funds that are attributed to that particular organization and the relevant programs.”

What did it do? At first there was little activity: four meetings from May to July 1932 (with only one that included the uniformed services); two in March 1933; one in October 1933 (only of the uniformed services); one on March 8, 1934. Except for the March 8, 1934, meeting that examined the conditions for disarmament, the issues discussed were generally related to command in wartime, but rivalries between the three branches of the service prevented reaching any decisions.

The decree of December 11, 1934 widened its role and there was at least one meeting per month. Flandin as prime minister consulted with the committee regarding the military implications of diplomatic issues, which meant inviting Foreign Minister Laval, Secretary General Alexis Léger and other top Quai d’Orsay officials. We had noted earlier
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how the committee examined German rearmament, the issue of an alliance with Italy, the Anschluss and Ethiopia.

The High Military Committee did not meet in an official capacity from September 1935 to April 1936. However, François Piétri, its founder in 1932 and now Minister of Marine made sure it met unofficially every fortnight from September to November 1935 (without Prime Minister Laval.) The consequences of the war in Ethiopia, the stocking of fuel oil, etc., were all examined. The 1936 meetings were also unofficial and focused on the reoccupation of the Rhineland. There were seven meetings from March 8 to April 30. “The various possibilities were examined without ever reaching definite decisions thus remaining undecided and ambivalent reflecting the troubled views of the country’s political and military leaders.”
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As soon as the Popular Front came to power, a decree of June 6, 1936, replaced the High Military Committee with the Permanent Committee of National Defense with a slightly wider membership that included the minister of foreign affairs and the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexis Léger, as well as the secretary general of national defense, Robert Jacomet.

The Permanent Committee met four times in 1936 (the first meeting was on June 26), six times in 1937, twice in 1938 (on March 15 and December 5) and once in 1939 (on February 24). Daladier became prime minister in April 1938 and held only two meetings until the outbreak of the war. Since Daladier was both prime minister and minister of national defense and war, working closely with Gamelin, recently appointed chief of staff of national defense as well as of the army, it may explain why he felt that there was enough coordination around him. Military meetings, especially at the chiefs of staff level, became more frequent.

In 1936 Léon Blum created at a much lower level a “weekly liaison committee” that met at the ministry of foreign affairs, bringing together the director of political affairs and his deputy, with the representatives of the three military staffs and a representative of General Bührer, the colonial chief of staff. The purpose of that meeting was purely informational.

The military machine was coordinating and organizing itself. The results, however, cannot be termed very satisfactory. On one end the system was heavy. If France’s military defense coordination required the presence of the prime minister and four other ministers, then this will explain the small number of meetings that took place. Furthermore, the title of Chief of the General Staff of National Defense was only symbolic for Gamelin. The ministers of Marine and Air considered themselves responsible only toward Parliament and tended to “by-pass” Gamelin, much to the satisfaction of their superior officers. More importantly, there was the personality of Daladier—conscientious, hardworking, honest but often hesitant to make a decision,
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and the character of Gamelin whose other traits need to be examined.

In taking over from Weygand on January 21, 1935, he listened to the many ongoing technical problems and said, “You know I am a strategist.”
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“He wanted to be at the conceptual rather than the practical level… He didn’t want to get involved and stoop down to the technicalities of getting things done; he wanted to be seen as an intellectual, who did not condescend to handling details,” as Pierre Le Goyet commented.
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He had worked with Joffre in the past and wanted to imitate him, not realizing that Joffre’s dominant trait was a very strong domineering personal authority, coupled with a clever way of never tolerating potential rivals. But what did Gamelin actually do? He in fact would have liked to be the only commander; but with the kind of “ostentatious humility” of someone “falsely modest,”
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he never requested the position. He also surrounded himself with men who were almost his equals like General Colson, Major General of the Armies, and General Georges, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (since July 2, 1939). Within the organization of the wartime high command, Gamelin set up four theaters of operations: the Northeast (Georges); the Southeast (Billotte); North Africa (Noguès); and the Middle East (Huntziger and later Weygand). The Northeast included three-fourths of the forces. Gamelin and Georges shared the same GHQ. Which one of the two was in charge? With Joffre it would have taken less than one hour to find out. “Joffre would concentrate, Gamelin scatters and dilutes.” Gamelin “felt comfortable when matters were unsettled, vague, in a double command; he relied on his intelligence and flexibility to slip out of the most intractable situations…He sets up the chessboard but lets others take the initiative.”
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This worked well in peacetime, but war reveals weaknesses, demonstrating that decisions cannot be made by committees but by individuals and that, contrary to the thinking of most third raters, men are not interchangeable. The most efficient structures are powerless without true character.

What was the quality of the French officer corps under those top commanders? If we may be allowed to generalize, the commanders were of high quality but uneven; the commanding officers, with a few notable exceptions, were overwhelmed by their task, while the middle ranks were absolutely first class.

To give examples of the first and second points is rather difficult. The men who were leading the armies in 1939–1940—Giraud, Blanchard, Corap,
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Huntziger, Frère,
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Billotte, etc.,…were competent and dedicated officers but much too steeped in military doctrine to bypass it. Giraud, the hero of prison escapes, and a leader of men, would play a key role in North Africa; Frère was to become the head of the ORA, the Organization of Resistance of the Army. As a former commandant of the Special Military School at Saint-Cyr, he was also a great leader and later died in a concentration camp. Billotte died in an accident in June 1940 before he could show his talent. Huntziger, who signed the Armistice, became a cabinet minister during the early Vichy period.

Among the colonels of 1937–1939 we must not forget that there were Charles de Gaulle, Alphonse Juin, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny and many other less well-known officers who were also heroic and effective leaders. Yet the accounts of the defeat (of 1940) are replete with embarrassing anecdotes about officers retreating much too fast or even ahead of their men. It was at that level that such incidents occurred. The top officer ranks in 1939 should have included thousands of regular army officers who had been killed as lieutenants between 1914 and 1918.

We do have for both those categories some actual facts provided mostly by General Weygand.

First, since 1911 there existed a “school for Marshals,” the nickname of the Center for Higher Military Studies. Every year some forty colonels or generals who were brigade commanders, most of them certified for staff work, were appointed to take a number of theoretical courses and practical exercises. Weygand was commanding the center at the end of the 1920s. He attempted, he said “to fight against conformity, to stimulate the imagination and the willingness to take initiatives, encouraging the development of the personality and character.”
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But he also could see how some participants felt that their stay at the Center was a necessary chore to secure promotion to a higher rank. Since the lowest rank was colonel and that the officer had to have completed his time as a commander, the average age was ten years higher than what it was prior to 1914.